J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0115: HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

SOURCE: D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION VS. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (G.R. No. 189496, 01 FEBRUARY 2012, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: WHAT DETERMINES CAUSE OF ACTION; CERTIORARI AS REMEDY IF MAIN CASE IS STILL PENDING. (BRIEF TITLE: D.M. FERRER VS. UST).  

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

PETITIONER AND USTHI (UST HOSPITAL INC.)  EXECUTED A CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. PETITIONER DEMANDED PAYMENT. USTHI DID NOT PAY. USTHI WAS DISSOLVED AND UNDER ITS CHARTER ITS ASSETS GO TO UST. PETITIONER SUED UST AND USTHI. RTC DISMISSED THE CASE AGAINST UST ON THE GROUND THAT UST HAS NO PRIVITY WITH PETITIONER. WAS RTC CORRECT?

NO. IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION ONLY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT MUST BE CONSIDERED. NOT EVIDENTIARY FACTS. NOT LEGAL CONCLUSIONS FROM WHATEVER IS ALLEGED AND WHATEVER EVIDENCE IS ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT. ONLY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT MUST BE CONSIDERED.

THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT (1) UST AND USTHI ARE ONE AND THE SAME CORPORATION; (2) UST STANDS TO BENEFIT FROM THE ASSETS OF USTHI BY VIRTUE OF THE LATTER’S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION; (3) RESPONDENT CONTROLS THE BUSINESS OF USTHI; AND (4) UST’S OFFICIALS HAVE PERFORMED ACTS THAT MAY BE CONSTRUED AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RESPONDENT’S LIABILITY TO PETITIONER.  THESE ALLEGATIONS CLEARY IMPLEAD UST AND THE ISSUES RAISED WOULD BE BEST RESOLVED AT THE TRIAL.

Anent the second issue, we also agree with petitioner that the Complaint states a cause of action against respondent UST. In Abacan v. Northwestern University, Inc.,^[1][13] we said:

It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Indeed, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test. (Emphasis supplied)

While it is admitted that respondent UST was not a party to the contract, petitioner posits that the former is nevertheless liable for the construction costs. In support of its position, petitioner alleged that (1) UST and USTHI are one and the same corporation; (2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of USTHI by virtue of the latter’s Articles of Incorporation; (3) respondent controls the business of USTHI; and (4) UST’s officials have performed acts that may be construed as an acknowledgement of respondent’s liability to petitioner.

Obviously, these issues would have been best resolved during trial. The RTC therefore committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case against respondent for lack of cause of action. The trial court relied on the contract executed between petitioner and USTHI, when the court should have instead considered merely the allegations stated in the Complaint.                          

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court

SECOND DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution^[2][1] promulgated on 26 June 2009 dismissing the former’s Petition for Certiorari, and the Resolution^[3][2] dated 3 September 2009 denying the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed:

On 25 November 2005, petitioner and University of Santo Tomas Hospital, Inc. (USTHI) entered into a Project Management Contract for the renovation of the 4^th and 5^th floors of the Clinical Division Building, Nurse Call Room and Medical Records, Medical Arts Tower, Diagnostic Treatment Building and Pay Division Building. 

On various dates, petitioner demanded from USTHI the payment of the construction costs amounting to P17,558,479.39. However, on 16 April 2008, the University of Santo Tomas (UST), through its rector, Fr. Rolando V. Dela Rosa, wrote a letter informing petitioner that its claim for payment had been denied, because the Project Management Contract was without the required prior approval of the board of trustees. Thus, on 23 May 2008, petitioner filed a Complaint^[4][3] for sum of money, breach of contract and damages against herein respondent UST and USTHI when the latter failed to pay petitioner despite repeated demands.

In impleading respondent UST, petitioner alleged that the former took complete control over the business and operation of USTHI, as well as the completion of the construction project.

It also pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of USTHI provided that, upon dissolution, all of the latter’s assets shall be transferred without any consideration and shall inure to the benefit of UST. It appears that USTHI passed a Resolution on 10 January 2008 dissolving the corporation by shortening its corporate term of existence from 16 March 2057 to 31 May 2008. 

Finally, petitioner alleged that respondent, through its rector, Fr. Dela Rosa, O.P., verbally assured the former of the payment of USTHI’s outstanding obligations.

Thus, petitioner posited in part that UST may be impleaded in the case under the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil,” wherein respondent UST and USTHI would be considered to be acting as one corporate entity, and UST may be held liable for the alleged obligations due to petitioner.

Subsequently, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 12 June 2008.^[5][4] It alleged that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action, and that the claim was unenforceable under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.

On 4 August 2008, Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez of Branch 97 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon Citygranted the motion and dismissed the Complaint insofar as respondent UST was concerned.^[6][5]

First, basing its findings on the documents submitted in support of the Complaint, the RTC held that respondent was not a real party-in-interest, and that it was not privy to the contract executed between USTHI and petitioner. Second, the court pointed out that the alleged verbal assurances of Fr. Dela Rosa should have been in writing to make these assurances binding and demandable.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the RTC Order and asserted that only allegations of the Complaint, and not the attached documents, should have been the basis of the trial court’s ruling, consistent with the rule that the cause of action can be determined only from the facts alleged in the Complaint. It also insisted that the Statute of Frauds was inapplicable, since USTHI’s obligation had already been partially executed.^[7][6]

On 5 October 2008, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition^[8][7] on the ground that Judge Fernandez was an alumnus of respondent UST.

Thereafter, Judge Fernandez issued an Order^[9][8] inhibiting himself from the case, which was consequently re-raffled to Branch 76 presided by Judge Alexander S. Balut.

On 16 April 2009, Judge Balut dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner,^[10][9] upholding the initial findings of Judge Fernandez declaring that respondent UST was not a real party-in-interest, and that Fr. Dela Rosa’s alleged assurances of payment were unenforceable.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.^[11][10] Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of the documents submitted in support of the Complaint, and not solely on the allegations stated therein. Petitioner pointed out that the allegations raised questions of fact and law, which should have been threshed out during trial, when both parties would have been given the chance to present evidence supporting their respective allegations.

However, on 26 June 2009, the CA issued the assailed Resolution and dismissed the Petition on the ground that a petition under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy to question the RTC’s Order that completely disposes of the case. Instead, petitioner should have availed itself of an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Resolution.^[12][11] It pointed out that the present case falls under the enumerated exceptions of Rule 41, in particular, while the main case is still pending, no appeal may be made from a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints.

On 3 September 2009, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration through its second assailed Resolution, holding that the motion raised no new issues or substantial grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the court.

Hence this Petition.

Petitioner raises two grounds in the present Petition: first, whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari by failing to consider the exception in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; second, whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the Complaint stated no cause of action.

We rule for petitioner.

Respondent insists that petitioner should have first filed a notice of appeal before the RTC, and the appeal should have been subsequently denied before recourse to the CA was made. This contention holds no water.

In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals,^[13][12] we held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of an action against one of the parties while the main case is still pending. This is the general rule in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 1(g). In that case, ruled thus:

Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari from the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent. While Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case, it also provides several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In the foregoing instances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.  

In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint against Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA erred in dismissing the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, in the case at bar, the CA also erred when it dismissed the Petition filed before it.

Anent the second issue, we also agree with petitioner that the Complaint states a cause of action against respondent UST. In Abacan v. Northwestern University, Inc.,^[14][13] we said:

It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Indeed, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test. (Emphasis supplied)

While it is admitted that respondent UST was not a party to the contract, petitioner posits that the former is nevertheless liable for the construction costs. In support of its position, petitioner alleged that (1) UST and USTHI are one and the same corporation; (2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of USTHI by virtue of the latter’s Articles of Incorporation; (3) respondent controls the business of USTHI; and (4) UST’s officials have performed acts that may be construed as an acknowledgement of respondent’s liability to petitioner.

Obviously, these issues would have been best resolved during trial. The RTC therefore committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case against respondent for lack of cause of action. The trial court relied on the contract executed between petitioner and USTHI, when the court should have instead considered merely the allegations stated in the Complaint.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. Branch 76 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby ordered to REINSTATE respondentUniversity ofSanto Tomas as a defendant in C.C. No. 0862635.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

   ARTURO D. BRION                                DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                          

Associate Justice                                                 Associate Justice

  JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                    ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                        Associate Justice

                                                             Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                      Chief Justice

LEGAL NOTE 0112: HOW DO YOU COMPUTE PENALTY FOR QUALIFIED THEFT?

SOURCE: ANITA L. MIRANDA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 176298, 25 JANUARY 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.) SUBJECT/S: ACCOUNTANT DEPOSITED CHECKS TO ACCOUNT OF VIVA AND WITHDREW PROCEEDS, LIABLE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT, NOT ESTAFA; COMPUTATION OF PENALTY FOR QUALIFIED THEFT; PENALTY INCREASED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR STOLEN AMOUNT OF P797,187.85. (BRIEF TITLE: MIRANDA VS. PEOPLE).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858 affirming the conviction of petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is increased to reclusion perpetua.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE:

However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioner’s guilt, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado¹⁷ is instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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FIRST DIVISION

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Anita L. Miranda appeals the January 11, 2007 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the judgment² of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, convicting her of qualified theft.

Petitioner was charged with qualified theft in an Information dated November 28, 2002. The Information reads:

That in or about and during the period comprised between April 28, 1998 and May 2, 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the total amount of P797,187.85 belonging to VIDEO CITY COMMERCIAL, INC. and VIVA VIDEOCITY, INC. represented by MIGUEL Q. SAMILLANO, in the following manner, to wit: by making herself the payee in forty-two pre-signed BPI Family Bank checks in the account of Video City Commercial and Jefferson Tan (the latter as franchise[e]) and encashing said checks in the total amount of P797,187.85, for her personal benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P797,187.85, Philippine Currency.

That the said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, she being then employed as bookkeeper in the aforesaid firm and as such was privy to the financial records and checks belonging to complainant and was actually entrusted with the said financial records, documents and checks and their transactions thereof in behalf of complainant.³

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

Summarily, the prosecution proved the following facts: Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc. (Viva) were sister companies which managed a chain of stores known as VideoCity. These stores, some company-owned while others were operated in joint ventures with franchisees, were engaged in the sale and rental of video-related merchandises. During the period of April 28, 1998 to May 2, 2002, petitioner was the accounting clerk and bookkeeper of VCCI and Viva. One of her duties was to disburse checks for the accounts she handled. She was assigned to handle twelve (12) VideoCitystore franchise accounts, including those of Tommy Uy, Wilma Cheng, Jefferson Tan and Sharon Cuneta. As regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan, who was out of the country most of the time, Tan pre-signed checks to cover the store’s disbursements and entrusted them to petitioner. The pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan were from a current account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement with the bank that any disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00 would require only Tan’s signature.⁴

Taking advantage of Tan’s constant absence from the country, petitioner was able to use Tan’s joint-venture bank account with VCCI as a clearing house for her unauthorized transfer of funds. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming from other franchisees’ accounts into the said bank account, and withdrew the funds by writing checks to her name using the checks pre-signed by Tan. It was only after petitioner went on maternity leave and her subsequent resignation from the company in May 2002 that an audit was conducted since she refused to turn over all the financial records in her possession. The audit was made on all the accounts handled by petitioner and it was discovered that she made unauthorized withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to P4,877,759.60.⁵

The prosecution, in proving that petitioner had unlawfully withdrawn P797,187.85 for her own benefit, presented as its witness Jose Laureola, the assistant manager/acting cashier of BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch. Laureola presented a microfilm of the checks, the encashed checks and deposit slips. He also presented the bank statement of VCCI which showed the encashment of forty-two (42) checks from the account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan amounting to P797,187.85.⁶

In the face of the prosecution’s evidence, petitioner chose not to present any evidence during trial.

On October 7, 2005, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. The RTC sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay VCCI P797,187.85 plus costs.⁷

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish that the checks deposited to the joint account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank were unlawfully withdrawn by the petitioner without VCCI’s consent. Petitioner took advantage of her position with VCCI and her access to the checks and its bank accounts.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that contrary to petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to show who was the absolute owner of the thing stolen, there was no doubt that the personal property taken by petitioner does not belong to her but to Jefferson Tan and his joint venture partner VCCI. Thus, petitioner was able to gain from taking other people’s property without their consent. More, she was able to perpetrate the crime due to her position in VCCI which gave her access to the joint venture account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan, both of whom reposed trust and confidence in her. She exploited said trust and confidence to their damage in the amount of P797,187.85.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court, raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.

1-a. WHETHER THE PHRASE “X X X SHALL TAKE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF ANOTHER WITHOUT THE LATTER’S CONSENT X X X” IN ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 310 OF THE SAME CODE WOULD REQUIRE AS AN ELEMENT OF “QUALIFIED THEFT” AN ESTABLISHED PROOF OF “OWNERSHIP” OF THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN?

1-b. WHETHER IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE ALLEGED SIGNATURES OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CHECKS BE FULLY ESTABLISHED AND IDENTIFIED AND IF NOT SO ESTABLISHED AND IDENTIFIED, THE SAME WOULD BE A FATAL FLAW IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH INEVITABLY WOULD LEAD TO ACCUSED’S ACQUITTAL?

1-c. WHETHER THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND AUTHENTICATE OR IDENTIFY THE SIGNATURES OF THE ACCUSED ANNIE MIRANDA AND JEFFERSON TAN CONSTITUTED A FATAL FLAW IN PROVING THAT THE ACCUSED AND JEFFERSON TAN WERE THE AUTHORS OF SAID SIGNATURES?

1-d. [WHETHER THE] CONCLUSION OF FACTS BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

1-e. WHETHER THE CHECKS AND VOUCHERS PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE NOT IN THEIR ORIGINALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED ADMISSION BY THE COURT A QUO, THERE BEING NO SUFFICIENT FACTS ADDUCED TO JUSTIFY THE PRESENTATION OF XEROX COPIES OR SECONDARY EVIDENCE.⁸

Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA correctly affirmed petitioner’s conviction for qualified theft.

Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private complainant’s absolute ownership of the thing stolen. Further, she maintains that Jefferson Tan’s signatures on the checks were not identified by any witness who is familiar with his signature. She likewise stresses that the checks and vouchers presented by the prosecution were not original copies and that no secondary evidence was presented in lieu of the former.

The appeal lacks merit.

A careful review of the records of this case and the parties’ submissions leads the Court to conclude that there exists no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA. We note that the arguments raised by petitioner in her petition are a mere rehash of her arguments raised before, and correctly resolved by, the CA.

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308⁹ of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.¹⁰ Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310¹¹ is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.¹²

Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCI’s consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecution’s evidence proved that petitioner was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI.

We find no cogent reason to disturb the above findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the CA and fully supported by the evidence on record. Time and again, the Court has held that the facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the CA, are as a general rule, conclusive upon this Court¹³ in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion. In this case, none of the exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of said findings of facts are applicable.¹⁴ The Court gives weight and respect to the trial court’s findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.¹⁵ Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses.

Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift to petitioner’s argument that full ownership of the thing stolen needed to be established first before she could be convicted of qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.¹⁶ In any event, as stated above, the factual findings of the courts a quo as to the ownership of the amount petitioner stole is conclusive upon this Court, the finding being adequately supported by the evidence on record.

However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioner’s guilt, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado¹⁷ is instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858 affirming the conviction of petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is increased to reclusion perpetua.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

1Rollo, pp. 24-35. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Lucenito N. Tagle concurring. The assailed decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858.

2CA rollo, pp. 33-42. The decision of the RTC was penned by Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali.

3Records, p. 1.

4CA rollo, pp. 34-39; rollo, pp. 26-27.

5Id.

6Id. at 38.

7Id. at 39-41.

8Rollo, pp. 12-14.

9Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

x x x x

10People v. Sison, G.R. No. 123183, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 345, 363-364.

11Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

12People v. Sison, supra note 10 at 364.

13See Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 571, 584, citing The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 274, 283.

14See Reyes v. CA, 328 Phil. 171, 179-180 (1996) citing Floro v. Llenado, 314 Phil. 715, 727-728 (1995). The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies under specific circumstances, such as:

(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;

(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

15People v. Martinada, G.R. Nos. 66401-03, February 13, 1991, 194 SCRA 36, 41.

16Florenz D. Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First edition, p. 522.

17G.R. No. 143676, February 19, 2003, 397 SCRA 746, 758.

LEGAL NOTE 0109: WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE SUPREME COURT SHALL NOT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS?

SOURCE: JAIME ABALOS AND SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR AND CONSUELO SALAZAR, GLICERIO ABALOS, HEIRS OF AQUILINO ABALOS, NAMELY: SEGUNDA BAUTISTA, ROGELIO ABALOS, DOLORES A. ROSARIO, FELICIDAD ABALOS, ROBERTO ABALOS, JUANITO ABALOS, TITA ABALOS, LITA A. DELA CRUZ AND HEIRS OF AQUILINA ABALOS, NAMELY: ARTURO BRAVO, PURITA B. MENDOZA, LOURDES B. AGANON, CONSUELO B. SALAZAR, PRIMA B. DELOS SANTOS, THELMA APOSTOL AND GLECERIO ABALOS VS. HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, NAMELY: PUBLIO TORIO, LIBORIO TORIO, VICTORINA TORIO, ANGEL TORIO, LADISLAO TORIO, PRIMO TORIO AND NORBERTO TORIO (G.R. NO. 175444, 14 DECEMBER 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT/S: ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; EFFECT OF NOTARIZATION; WHEN SC CAN REVIEW FINDINGS OF FACT. (BRIEF TITLE: ABALOS VS. HEIRS OF TORIO).

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONERS POSSESS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS OWNERS, OR WHETHER THEY OCCUPY THE SAME BY MERE TOLERANCE OF RESPONDENTS, IS A QUESTION OF FACT. IS THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THIS MATTER REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT?

ORDINARILY NO. BUT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.¹⁵

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

x—————————————————————————————–x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision¹ dated June 30, 2006 and Resolution² dated November 13, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision³ dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended that: they are the children and heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate on September 11, 1973; at the time of the death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land measuring 2,950 square meters, more or less, which is located at San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente and through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay and build their respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente, herein respondents allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, in 1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.⁴

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the Complaint and asserting in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that: respondents’ cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the persons of the defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and possessors of the disputed lot are the deceased predecessors of defendants; defendants and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are faithfully and religiously paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced by Real Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously introduced improvements on the said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds of ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of their Answer.⁵

On the same date as the filing of defendants’ Answer with Counterclaim, herein petitioners filed their Answer in Intervention with Counterclaim. Like the defendants, herein petitioners claimed that their predecessors-in-interest were the absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question; that petitioners and their predecessors had been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial up to the present; they have paid real property taxes and introduced improvements thereon.⁶

After the issues were joined, trial ensued.

On December 10, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], the Court adjudged the case in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and defendants-intervenors are ordered to turn over the land in question to the plaintiffs (Lot Nos. 869 and 870, Cad. 467-D. Binmaley Cadastre located in Brgy. San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan with an area of 2,950 sq. m., more or less, bounded and described in paragraph 3 of the Complaint[)]; ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors to remove their respective houses standing on the land in dispute; further ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors, either singly or jointly to pay the plaintiffs land rent in the amount of P12,000.00 per year to be reckoned starting the year 1996 until defendants and defendants-intervenors will finally vacate the premises; furthermore, defendants and defendants-intervenors are also ordered to pay, either singly or jointly, the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.⁷

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the MTC with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.⁸ Herein petitioners, who were intervenors, did not file an appeal.

In its Decision dated June 14, 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have acquired the subject property through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein respondents’ complaint.

Aggrieved, herein respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the Decision of the RTC.

On June 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead, a new one is entered reinstating the Decision dated December 10, 2003 of the Municipal Trial Court of Binmaley, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.⁹

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated November 13, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition based on a sole assignment of error, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE PETITIONERS HEREIN ARE NOW THE ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.¹⁰

The main issue raised by petitioners is whether they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed lot in the concept of an owner, or whether their possession is by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Corollarily, petitioners claim that the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents’ predecessors-in-interest derived their ownership were not proven during trial.

The petition lacks merit.

Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the observation of respondents that some of the petitioners in the instant petition were the intervenors¹¹ when the case was filed with the MTC. Records would show that they did not appeal the Decision of the MTC.¹² The settled rule is that failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.¹³ Hence, insofar as the intervenors in the MTC are concerned, the judgment of the MTC had already become final and executory.

It also bears to point out that the main issue raised in the instant petition, which is the character or nature of petitioners’ possession of the subject parcel of land, is factual in nature.

Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.¹⁴ Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”

Doubtless, the issue of whether petitioners possess the subject property as owners, or whether they occupy the same by mere tolerance of respondents, is a question of fact. Thus, it is not reviewable.

Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the abovementioned restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are the following:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.¹⁵

In the present case, the findings of fact of the MTC and the CA are in conflict with those of the RTC.

After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that the petition must fail as it finds no error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC.

Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.¹⁶ Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years.¹⁷ Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.¹⁸

Possession “in good faith” consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.¹⁹ There is “just title” when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.²⁰

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime’s house was built on the landof Vicente, respondents’ immediate predecessor-in-interest.²¹ Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners’ possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners’ possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.²² Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.²³

Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners’ possession of the subject property had become adverse, as evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in 2004. However, herein respondents’ complaint was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners’ possession upon service of summons on them.²⁴ Thus, petitioners’ possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet the required statutory period of extraordinary prescription.

This Court has held that the evidence relative to the possession upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish the prescription.²⁵ In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in holding that petitioners failed to present competent evidence to prove their alleged good faith in neither possessing the subject lot nor their adverse claim thereon. Instead, the records would show that petitioners’ possession was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest.

Finally, as to the issue of whether the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents anchor their ownership were not proven, the Court notes that petitioners did not raise this matter in their Answer as well as in their Pre-Trial Brief. It was only in their Comment to respondents’ Petition for Review filed with the CA that they raised this issue. Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court.²⁶ They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.²⁷

Even granting that the issue of due execution and authenticity was properly raised, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA, to wit:

x x x x

Based on the foregoing, respondents [Jaime Abalos and the Spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar] have not inherited the disputed land because the same was shown to have already been validly sold to Marcos Torio, who, thereupon, assigned the same to his son Vicente, the father of petitioners [herein respondents]. A valid sale was amply established and the said validity subsists because the deed evidencing the same was duly notarized.

There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.²⁸

Indeed, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.²⁹ In the instant case, petitioners’ bare denials will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring ; Annex “J” to Petition, rollo, pp. 87-98.

2Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Asuncion-Vicente and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; Annex “L” to Petition, id. at 107-109.

3Records, pp. 316-324.

4Id. at 1-3.

5Id. at 34-39.

6Id. at 10-16.

7Id. at 273.

8See Notice of Appeal, id. at 274.

9CA rollo, p. 94

10Rollo, p. 8.

11Except for Jaime Abalos and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar, all petitioners in the instant petition were intervenors in the case filed with the MTC.

12See Notice of Appeal, records, p. 274.

13Province of Camarines Sur v. Heirs of Agustin Pato, G.R. No. 151084, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 644, 652, citing M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 525, 530.

14Heirs of Felicidad Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Pedro T. Fajardo, G.R. No. 184966, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 463, 470.

15Spouses. Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 10.

16Civil Code, Art. 1117.

17Civil Code, Art. 1134.

18Civil Code, Art. 1137; Tan v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 158929, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 327, 336; Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 855, 860.

19Villanueva v. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011, 640 SCRA 308, 320; Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 423, 433.

20Id.

21Exhibit “K,” records, p. 264.

22Lamsis v. Donge-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 154, 172.

23Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 561, 573; Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131803, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 800, 807-808.

24Article 1120 of the Civil Code provides that “[p]ossession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly.” Article 1123 of the same Code further provides that “[c]ivil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor.”

25Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Magdua, G.R. No. 176858, September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 573, 584.

26American Home Insurance Co. of New York v. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 174926, August 10, 2011.

27Id.

28CA rollo, pp. 91-92.

29Spouses Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011; Emilio v. Rapal, G.R. No. 181855, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 199, 202-203; Heirs of the Deceased Spouses Vicente S. Arcilla and Josefa Asuncion Arcilla v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 545, 564.