J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0061: IMPORTANT POINTS IN A MURDER CASE: DYING DECLARATION, ALIBI, USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE, MOTIVE OF WITNESSES, PENALTIES, CRIME WHEN DECEASED WAS PREGNANT, CIVIL INDEMNITY, MORAL DAMAGES, TEMPERATE DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO SALCEDO ALIAS “DIGOL,” (G.R. NO. 178272, 14 MARCH 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: MURDER (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. SALCEDO).

WHY DO THE COURT GIVES GREAT WEIGHT TO THE TRIAL COURT’S EVALUATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS?

 BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT  HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE FACIAL EXPRESSION, GESTURE, AND TONE OF VOICE OF A WITNESS WHILE TESTIFYING, THUS, MAKING IT IN A BETTER POSITION TO DETERMINE WHETHER A WITNESS IS LYING OR TELLING THE TRUTH.^[7]

 In the main, appellant put in issue the credibility of Efren and Geraldino. He contends that the testimonies of said witnesses did not establish his guilt for murder.

The Court affirms the appellant’s conviction. There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt made by the RTC and affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial of the case. The Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness, because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.^[7]

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF A DYING DECLARATION?

 IN ORDER FOR A DYING DECLARATION TO BE HELD ADMISSIBLE, FOUR REQUISITES MUST CONCUR: FIRST, THE DECLARATION MUST CONCERN THE CAUSE AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DECLARANT’S DEATH; SECOND, AT THE TIME THE DECLARATION WAS MADE, THE DECLARANT MUST BE UNDER THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN IMPENDING DEATH; THIRD, THE DECLARANT IS COMPETENT AS A WITNESS; AND FOURTH, THE DECLARATION MUST BE OFFERED IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR HOMICIDE, MURDER, OR PARRICIDE, IN WHICH THE DECLARANT IS THE VICTIM.^[27] 

 All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met.  First, the statement of the deceased concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding her death. When asked who stabbed her, Analyn uttered the name of the appellant. Further, as proven during trial, appellant was the only person referred to as “Digol” in their place. Second, the victim must have been fully aware that she was on the brink of death, considering her bloodied condition and the gaping wounds on her chest when Efren saw her. True, she made no express statement showing that she was conscious of her impending death, however, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that she was in a dying condition.^[28]  Third, the declarant, at the time she uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.  Fourth, the victim’s statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for her murder. Thus, Analyn’s condemnatory ante mortem statement naming appellant as her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

WHY IS THE DYING DECLARATION GIVEN CREDENCE?

The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation.^[29]

SUPPOSE FRIENDS AND RELATIVES SUPPORT THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI. HOW WOULD THE COURT CONSIDER THEIR TESTIMONIES?

COURT GIVES THEIR TESTIMONIES LESS PROBATIVE WEIGHT.

Further, the Court gives less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. One can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused whose defense is alibi, courts have more reason to view such testimony with skepticism.^[34] In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.^[35]   Given the positive identification of the appellant by Geraldino, who is a credible witness, and the lack of physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing, the defense of alibi must fail.

HOW WOULD MOTIVE ON THE PART OF WITNESSES BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT?

IF THE WITNESSES HAVE NO IMPROPER MOTIVE THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

Additionally, one thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to lie against the appellant. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.^[44]  In the present case, there was no shred of evidence to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were impelled by improper motives to implicate appellant in the crime.

HOW IS ABUSE OF SUPERIORITY BE DETERMINED?

Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it.  The aggressor must have taken advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of the crime.^[46]  

In the present case, the Court finds that there was abuse of superior strength employed by the appellant in committing the killing. The evidence shows that the victim was a sixteen (16)-year-old female,^[47]  who is 6 to 7 months pregnant.^[48] The victim was also stabbed by the appellant with a sharp bladed and pointed instrument while she was lying on her back. The victim was also unarmed when she was attacked. The Court has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.^[49]   The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the CA, as qualifying the offense to murder.

WHAT IS THE PENALTY OF MURDER?  

RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH.

The penalty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already qualified the killing to murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable penalty. We note that while other aggravating circumstances, i.e., evident premeditation, treachery and nighttime, were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to support the presence of these circumstances. Hence, the RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.  It must be stressed that under R.A. No. 9346, appellant is not eligible for parole.^[50]

WHAT IS THE AWARD OF CIVIL INDEMNITY IN A MURDER CASE? 

The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.^[51]   The Court affirms the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court and the CA in the amount of PhP50,000.00.

WHAT IS THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES IN A MURDER CASE?

Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.^[52]  The CA correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief to her family.^[53]   

SHOULD EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BE AWARDED?

Further, the CA correctly awarded exemplary damages. The award of exemplary damages is warranted because of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in the commission of the crime.^[54]  The amount of PhP25,000.00 granted by the trial court and the CA should, however, be increased to PhP30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.^[55] 

WHEN IS TEMPERATE DAMAGES BE AWARDED?

 TEMPERATE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED WHEN THE COURT FINDS THAT SOME PECUNIARY LOSS HAS BEEN SUFFERED BUT ITS AMOUNT CANNOT, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE, BE PROVED WITH CERTAINTY

The CA deleted the award of burial expenses for failure of the prosecution to substantiate the same with receipts. Although temperate damages may be awarded when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,^[56] the Court is inclined to deny the award of temperate damages.  Efren testified that he did not spend any amount for the burial of Analyn, as the expenses were shouldered by his employer and by other people he knew.^[57]  

IN THE CASE THE VICTIM WAS PREGNANT. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE CRIME?

 MURDER, DEFINED IN AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, COMPLEXED WITH UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION, DEFINED IN AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 257 OF THE SAME CODE.

 On a final note, the prosecution should have been more prudent in determining the proper crimes that should have been filed against the appellant. Clearly, at the time of the death of the woman, she was carrying a 6 to 7-month-old fetus which probably died because of the stabbing incident. If indeed the fetus died at the time the woman was stabbed, then the crime of murder, defined in and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, complexed with unintentional abortion, defined in and penalized under Article 257 of the same Code, should have been filed against the appellant.  Had this been done, the penalty of Death, which is the maximum penalty for the gravest offense among the two crimes committed as provided under Article 48^[58]of the Revised Penal Code, should have been the proper penalty. Although, the penalty of death cannot be imposed in light of Republic Act No. 9346,^[59] and that the same penalty of Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed, like in the present case,^[60] the heirs of the victim should have been entitled to a higher civil indemnity and moral damages at PhP75,000.00^[61] each. 

^*               Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

^[1]              Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 4-18.

^[2]               Records, p. 1.

^[3]               Id. at 45.

^[4]               TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 20.

^[5]               Records, pp. 297-317.

^[6]              G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, modifying Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

^[7]               People v. Pillas, 458 Phil. 347, 369 (2003).

^[8]               TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 7.

^[9]               Id. at 8.

^[10]             The correct date should be November 6, 1994.

^[11]             TSN, May 2, 1995, pp. 9-10.

^[12]             Id. at 10-11.

^[13]             Id. at 20.

^[14]            Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 301; People v. Escote, G.R. No. 151834, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 345, 351; People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 744 (2003).

^[15]             TSN, June 23, 1995, p. 24.

^[16]             Rollo, p. 10.

^[17]             Id. at 11.

^[18]            Prosecutor Nielo to Geraldino:

Q. How about your brother Efren? What did he do if he did anything?

A. He became hysterical and I restrained him. TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 11.

^[19]             TSN, June 23, pp. 9-10.

^[20]             Id. at 10-11.

^[21]             Id. at 12.

^[22]             Id. at 14.

^[23]             Id. at 15-16.

^[24]             TSN, May 2, 1995, pp. 10-11.

^[25]             Rollo, p. 11.

^[26]           Marturillas v. People, supra note 14, at 305.

^[27]             People of the Philippines v. Jonel Fabrica Serenas and Joel Lorica Labad, G.R. No. 188124, June 29, 2010.

^[28]             People v. Tañeza, 389 Phil. 398, 411 (2000).

^[29]              Marturillas  v. People, supra note 14, at 306.

^[30]              People v. Delim, G.R. No. 175942, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 366, 379.

^[31]              People v. Felipe Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 412, 439.

^[32]             TSN, January 14, 1997, p. 7.

^[33]             322 Phil. 551, 563 (1996).

^[34]              People v Sumalinog, Jr., 466 Phil. 637, 651 (2004).

^[35]             People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 425 (2003).

^[36]             People v. Lovedorial, 402 Phil. 446, 460 (2001).

^[37]             Records, p. 8.

^[38]             TSN, June 23, 1995, p. 20.

^[39]             Records, p. 7.

^[40]             TSN, September 8, 1999, p. 5.

^[41]             Id. at 4.

^[42]             Id. at 5.

^[43]             Id. at 6-7.

^[44]             Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 216, 226.

^[45]             Records, p. 315.

^[46]           People v. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592, 611 (2003).

^[47]             Records, p.  9.

^[48]             TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 13.

^[49]              People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004, 433 SCRA 389, 411; People v. Loreto, supra note 46, at 612; People v. Barcelona, Jr., 438 Phil. 335, 348-349 (2002).

^[50]             R.A. 9346, Section 3.  Person convicted of an offense punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

^[51]             People v. Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 519, 542.

^[52]             Id.

^[53]             People v. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 555, 571.

^[54]             Id. at 571-572.

^[55]             People of the Philippines v. Pedro Ortiz, Jr. y Lopez, G.R. No. 188704, July 7, 2010.

^[56]             People v. Delima, Jr., G.R. No. 169869, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 526, 540.

^[57]             TSN, June 23, 1995, pp. 20-21.

^[58]             Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.   

^[59]             An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

^[60]             R.A. No. 9346, Section 2.

^[61]             People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 179714, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 517, 530.

LEGAL NOTE 0060: HOW TO PROVE THAT LAND IS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE.

 SOURCE: UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MR. HILARION P. UY VS. REPUBLIC   OF  THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 185683, 16 MARCH 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND; POSSESSION SINCE 12 JUNE 1945. (BRIEF TITLE: UNION LEAF VS. REPUBLIC).

CASE DIGEST:

UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORP FILED APPLICATIONS FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND. HIS PROOF THAT THE LANDS ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ARE  ADVANCE PLANS AND CONSOLIDATED PLANS WHICH ALL NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE “INSIDE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA AS PER PROJECT NO. 5-A, LC MAP NO. 2891.”^[12] 

ARE THE SURVEY PLANS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT SUCH PARCELS OF LAND ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

NO.

THE SUPREME COURT RULED:

The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence that the law requires.  The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands’ classification.^[14] 

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.^[15] directs that    

x x x x [T]he applicant for registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretaryand certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.  These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.  Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.^[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) 

Respondent failed to comply with this directive.  This leaves it unnecessary to delve into the testimonies of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest respecting their alleged possession of the subject properties. 

^*               Designated member per Special Order No. 940 dated February 7, 2011, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.

^[1]               Rollo, p. 459. 

^[2]               Records (LRC Case No. A-294) pp. 1-4; records (LRC Case No. A-295) pp. 1-3; records (LRC Case No. A-296), pp. 1-3; and  records (LRC Case No. A-298), pp. 1-3.

^[3]               Id.  

^[4]               Id. at  27-29; pp. 16-18; pp. 15-17; and pp. 15-17.

^[5]               Id. at 140-141; pp. 94-95;pp. 94-95; and pp. 91-92.

^[6]               Id. at p. 151; p. 104, p. 104; and p. 101. 

^[7]               Rollo, pp. 286-305.  Penned by Presiding Judge Clifton U. Ganay.

^[8]               Ibid. 

^[9]               Id. at 47-56.  Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. and Isaias P. Dicdican concurring.

^[10]             Id. at 58-60. 

^[11]             Id. at  464-466.

^[12]             Id. at 465; Exhibit “C.”

^[13]             Vide Comment on Motion for Reconsideration dated April 30, 2010, pp. 5-7.  

^[14]             Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).

^[15]             G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477. 

^[16]             Id. at 489.

LEGAL NOTE 0059: IF DOUBT EXISTS BETWEEN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE MUST BE TILTED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE.

SOURCE: LORES REALTY ENTERPRISES, INC., LORENZO Y. SUMULONG III VS. VIRGINIA E. PACIA (G.R. NO.  171189, 9 MARCH 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT; AWARD OF DAMAGES (BRIEF TITLE: LORES REALTY VS. PACIA).

 STORY OF THE CASE:

SUMULONG DIRECTED ACCOUNTING MANAGER PACIA TO PREPARE CHECK TO BPI. SHE PREPARED BUT AFTER MUCH DELAY. THIS WAS REPEATED. PACIA EXPLAINED THAT SHE DELAYED THE PREPARATION OF THE CHECKS BECAUSE AT THAT TIME THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR THE CHECK. PACIA WAS DISMISSED. THE LABOR ARBITER RULED THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. NLRC REVERSED. CA CONFIRMED.

WHAS THERE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

YES. WHILE THERE WAS DOUBT AS TO WHO IS RIGHT, THAT DOUBT SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR.

SAID THE COURT:

 Let it be noted at this point that the Court finds nothing unlawful in the directive of Sumulong to prepare checks in payment of LREI’s obligations. The availability or unavailability of sufficient funds to cover the check is immaterial in the physical preparation of the checks.

Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks, however, which was seemingly an act of disrespect and defiance, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting LREI and Sumulong from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law^[18] was foremost in her mind.  It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority.  The Court takes into consideration that Pacia, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she was tasked to do it.

The Court also finds it difficult to subscribe to LREI and Sumulongs’s contention that the reason for Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks was a mere afterthought considering that “check no. 0000737527 under one of the check vouchers she reluctantly prepared, bounced when it was deposited.”^[19] Pacia’s apprehension was justified when the check was dishonored.  This clearly affirms her assertion that she was just being cautious and circumspect for the company’s sake.  Thus, her actuation should not be construed as improper conduct.      

 In finding for Pacia, the Court is guided by the time-honored principle that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The rule in controversies between a laborer and his master distinctly states that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor.^[20]

^* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurred in by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang.

^[2] Id. at 52-59. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier with Commissioner Ireneo B.Bernardo and Commissioner Tito E. Genilo, concurring.

^[3] Id. at 74.

^[4] Batas Pamabansa Blg. 22.

^[5] Rollo p. 75.

^[6] Id. at 49.

^[7] Id. at 50.

^[8] Id. at 60-65.

^[9] Id. at 52-59.

^[10] Citations omitted.

^[11] Rollo, pp. 32-42.

^[12] Id. at 159.

^[13] Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services Inc., G.R. No. 188637, December 15, 2010.

^[14] Diamond Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 452, 458 (2003).

^[15] Rollo, p. 170.

^[16] Id. at 145.

^[17]Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Marbella, G.R. No. 149074, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 389, 395, citing  Bascon v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 719, 730 (2004), citing Dimabayao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 363 Phil. 279, 284 (1999).

^[18] Supra note 4.

^[19] Rollo, p. 41 and 56.

^[20] E.G. & I Corporation v. Sato, G.R. No. 182070, February 16, 2011.