LEGAL NOTE 0077: PRIMER ON TENANCY.

SOURCE: ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIR ROLANDO B. SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO AND NORBERTO R. SUSANO (G.R. NO. 179024) ; JULIAN C. CHAN VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO AND NORBERTO R. SUSANO (G.R. NO. 179086, 30 MAY 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.) (BRIEF TITLE: ESTATE OF SAMSON VS. SUSANO).

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DEFINE A TENANT.

R.A. No. 1199,  otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS IN A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP?

For a tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the following essential elements must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. The presence of all of these elements must be proved by substantial evidence.

RESPONDENTS ARGUED THAT THAT THERE WAS IMPLIED TENANCY BECAUSE PASTOR ACCEPTED HIS SHARE OF THE PRODUCTION FOR A CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME. TO PROVE THEIR CONTENTION, RESPONDENTS PRESENTED THE AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY THREE FARMERS FROM ADJOINING LANDHOLDINGS, NAMELY SANTIAGO PACHECO,^[1][62] APOLINARIO FRANCISCO,^[2][63] AND DAMASO MATIAS,^[3][64] STATING THAT THEY KNEW MACARIO TO BE A TENANT OF PASTOR SINCE 1959 AND THAT MACARIO RELIGIOUSLY PAID HIS SHARE OF THE PRODUCE TO PASTOR.  ARE THESE THREE AFFIDAVITS SUFFICIENT?

NO. AFFIANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE DETAILS PROVING THE ELEMENTS OF TENANCY RELATIONS.

It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.^[4][70]  Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner.^[5][71] Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.^[6][72] Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed;^[7][73] the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by conjectures.^[8][74] Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.^[9][75]  For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.^[10][76]

The affidavits executed by three of respondents’ neighbors are insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship between Pastor and Macario. As correctly observed by the estate of Pastor Samson, the affiants did not provide details based on their personal knowledge as to how the crop-sharing agreement was implemented, how much was given by Macario to Pastor, when and where the payments were made, or whether they have at any instance witnessed Pastor receive his share of the harvest from Macario. Such failure is fatal to respondents’ claim particularly since the respondents have the burden of proving their affirmative allegation of tenancy.^[11][77] In fine, the conclusions of the RARAD, DARAB and the CA respecting the existence of tenancy relationship between Pastor and Macario are not supported by substantial evidence on record.

BUT RARAB DARAB AND CA WERE UNANIMOUS IN RULING THAT THERE WAS TENANCY RELATION. IS THEIR UNANIMOUS DECISION NOT ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT?

NO, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OR RECORD IN SUPPORT OF SUCH RULING.

The question of whether a tenancy relationship exists is basically a question of fact which, as a general rule, is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.^[12][66]  The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and sharing are basically questions of fact and the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled to respect and nondisturbance, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.^[13][67]  Such findings of fact may be reviewed by the Court when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures,^[14][68] or if the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.^[15][69]

In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are unanimous in their conclusion that an implied tenancy relationship existed between Pastor Samson and Macario Susano, no specific evidence was cited to support such conclusion other than their observation that Pastor failed to protest Macario’s possession and cultivation over the subject land for more than 30 years. Contrary to what is required by law, however, no independent and concrete evidence were adduced by respondents to prove that there was indeed consent and sharing of harvests between Pastor and Macario.

Sounding Board

Command responsibility

By: Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J.
Philippine Daily Inquirer

4:09 am | Monday, June 27th, 2011

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The people who filed a civil case seeking to hold former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo liable, under command responsibility, for the extrajudicial killings and disappearances during her watch must have known what chance of success they had. Military commanders have been brought to court for the same purpose, but no suit has succeeded. But this is not because we have rejected command responsibility as law but rather because of failure to establish the necessary link between the commanders and the crime.

What is the doctrine of command responsibility? In its simplest terms, command responsibility means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflicts. The concept itself is not new. Sun Tzu recognized it in his sixth-century classic “The Art of War,” and the Holy Roman Empire applied it as early as 1474. Its more elaborate development, however, did not come until after World War II.

We can perhaps begin with the case closest to our country. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita was the commanding general of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. He was charged with violating the laws of war. The charge stated that Yamashita, “[W]hile commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the Philippines.”

Legal scholars and commentators who have studied the case are divided on the basis for the conviction of Yamashita. Did Yamashita have actual knowledge of the crimes or even ordered their commission? Or was he convicted on the basis of presumed constructive knowledge? There was no clear definition in the decision of what the commander’s state of mind had to be in order to justify conviction. It was not until later that the doctrine of command responsibility underwent more careful development.

The first important development was the codification of the doctrine in Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1977. Article 87 provides that parties to a conflict should require military commanders to prevent, supervise and report breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol by troops and others under their command and, where appropriate, initiate disciplinary action.

On the basis of the text of Protocol I the ICRC Commentary identified three conditions for command responsibility:

(i) the person to be held responsible must be the superior of the person or persons committing the breach of the convention;

(ii) the superior must have known or had information which should have enabled him to conclude that a breach was being committed or was going to be committed; and

(iii) the superior did not take all feasible measures within his powers to prevent the breach.

These requisites were later reflected in Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) which provides as follows: “The fact that any of the … crimes within the jurisdiction of the [Tribunal] was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”

The Trial Chamber identified three elements for liability pursuant to Article 7(3): (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator.

As things stand now, it is already a well-established norm of customary and conventional law that “military commanders and other persons occupying positions of superior authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates.” Under the incorporation principle of our Constitution whereby we “adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land…,” this is now also domestic law.

As much is said by former Justice Conchita Carpio Morales in a concurring opinion in a 2010 case decided by the Supreme Court. A categorical adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility, as Justice Carpio Morales said, will bring the writ of amparo cases to their logical conclusion.

LEGAL NOTE 0075: WHEN IS CHECK CONSIDERED AS PAYMENT?

SOURCE: DONNINA C. HALLEY VS. PRINTWELL, INC. (G.R. No. 157549, 30 MAY 2011, BERSAMIN, J) SUBJECTS: TRUST FUND DOCTRINE, JUDGE COPYING MEMORANDUM OF PARTY. (BRIEF TITLE: HALLEY VS. PRINTWELL).

DOES DELIVERY OF CHECK CONSTITUTE PAYMENT?

NO. THE DELIVERY OF A CHECK DOES NOT OPERATE AS PAYMENT AND DOES NOT DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION UNDER A JUDGMENT.^[1][46] THE DELIVERY OF A BILL OF EXCHANGE ONLY PRODUCES THE FACT OF PAYMENT WHEN THE BILL HAS BEEN ENCASHED.

The petitioner’s OR No. 227,presentedto prove the payment of the balance of her subscription, indicated that her supposed payment had beenmade by means of a check. Thus, to discharge the burden to prove payment of her subscription, she had to adduce evidence satisfactorily proving that her payment by check wasregardedas payment under the law.

Payment is defined as the delivery of money.^[2][45]Yet, because a check is not money and only substitutes for money, the delivery of a check does not operate as payment and does not discharge the obligation under a judgment.^[3][46] The delivery of a bill of exchange only produces the fact of payment when the bill has been encashed.^[4][47]The following passage from Bank of Philippine Islands v. Royeca^[5][48]is enlightening:

Settled is the rule that payment must be made in legal tender. A check is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute a valid tender of payment. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized.

To establish their defense, the respondents therefore had to present proof, not only that they delivered the checks to the petitioner, but also that the checks were encashed. The respondents failed to do so. Had the checks been actually encashed, the respondents could have easily produced the cancelled checks as evidence to prove the same. Instead, they merely averred that they believed in good faith that the checks were encashed because they were not notified of the dishonor of the checks and three years had already lapsed since they issued the checks.

Because of this failure of the respondents to present sufficient proof of payment, it was no longer necessary for the petitioner to prove non-payment, particularly proof that the checks were dishonored. The burden of evidence is shifted only if the party upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim.

Ostensibly, therefore, the petitioner’s mere submission of the receipt issued in exchange of the check did not satisfactorily establish her allegation of full payment of her subscription. Indeed, she could not even inform the trial court about the identity of her drawee bank,^[6][49]and about whether the check was cleared and its amount paid to BMPI.^[7][50]In fact, she did not present the check itself.