J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0087: RE  NON-FORUM SHOPPING BASED ON CAUSAPIN CASE, JUNE 2011

SOURCE: ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA VS. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA (A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2044, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING. (BRIEF TITLE: BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN)

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WHAT IS THE PROVISION IN THE RULES ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

RULE 7, SECTION 5 OF THE RULES OF COURT

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court – which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91,^[1][19] as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94^[2][20] – requires the plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.   

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court prescribes:

SEC. 5.  Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.  The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.  If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

WHAT ARE THE EARLIER RULINGS ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and constitutes a defect in the petition.  The attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition.^[3][21]

It is true that in Loquias, the Court required strict compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case.  We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.  Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.  Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.  There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification.  It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending.  We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.  The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.  Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.  Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.^[4][22]

WAS THERE SUBSEQUENLTY A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING?

YES, IN CAVILE CASE.

Nevertheless, in Cavile,^[5][23] the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing substantial compliance with the rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping:

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient.  However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.  This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.  It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.  All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon.  They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents.  Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.  There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.  Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as “special circumstance” for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.^[6][24]

LEGAL NOTE 0086: PRIMER ON SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

SOURCE: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), REPRESENTED BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TREÑAS; CITY OF CALBAYOG, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO; AND JERRY P. TREÑAS, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS TAXPAYER VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON  ETC. (G.R. NO. 176951 ETC., 28 JUNE 2011, BERSAMIN, J.) SUBJECT: SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. (BRIEF TITLE: LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC).

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WHAT IS THE RULE GOVERNING SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN ORDINARY COURTS?

RULE 2, RULE 15.

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.

No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. (n)

CAN A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE ENTERTAINED?

GENERALLY, NO BECAUSE SECTION 2, RULE 15 IS UNQUALIFIED.

The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be entertained. As to that, Section 2^[1][4] of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified.

WHEN CAN A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE ENTERTAINED?

THERE ARE TWO CONDITIONS:

–                     THERE MUST BE EXTRA ORDINARY PERSUASIVE REASON.

–                     AN EXPRESS LEAVE HAS BEEN FIRST OBTAINED.

. . . and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained.^[2][6]

WHY IS THAT SO?

BECAUSE A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A RESTRICTIVE PLEADING. OR THERE IS A RESTRICTIVE POLICY AGAINST SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

WHAT IS THE RULE GOVERNING SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE SUPREME COURT?

SECTION 3, RULE 15 OF THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.          There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

WHAT IS THE FULL RULING ON THE ISSUE IN THE LEAGUE  OF CITIES VS COMELEC CASE?

THE RULING READS:

The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be entertained. As to that, Section 2^[3][4] of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading,^[4][5] and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained.^[5][6] The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.          There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

NOTE: WHEN THE SC STATES THAT A DECISION IS ALREADY FINAL NO SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHALL BE ENTERTAINED.

We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration “can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration” even renders the denial of the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of April 12, 2011 bears out,^[6][7] the ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by the Court’s express declaration. Consequently, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration is immediately warranted.

IN THE LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC, PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PREVIOUSLY ENTERTAINED. THEREFORE, THEIR MOTION FOR ANOTHER RECONSIDERATION MUST BE ENTERTAINED. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.  BECAUSE THE SC, WITH REGARDS TO THE PREVIOUS SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNANIMOUSLY DECLARED THAT THE SECOND  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT A PROHIBITED PLEADING. HERE THERE WAS NO SUCH DECLARATION.

Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the respondents’ own second motion for reconsideration.  There is no similarity between then and now, however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2, 2009 that the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration was “no longer a prohibited pleading.”^[7][8] No similar declaration favors the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. (REMEMBER: UNANIMOUS AND EN BANK DECLARATION NEEDED. IT SEEMS THAT IF YOU MEET SUCH CONDITION EVEN A 10^TH MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WILL STILL BE ENTERTAINED? BASIC RULE IS HE WHO HAS THE POWER TO CREATE HAS THE POWER TO DESTROY?)

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LEGAL NOTE 0085: LIABILITY OF THE EGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING SUCH VEHICLE.

SOURCE: FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (NOW BPI LEASING CORPORATION) VS. SPOUSES SERGIO P. BAYLON AND MARITESS VILLENA-BAYLON, BG HAULER, INC., AND MANUEL Y. ESTILLOSO (G.R. NO. 181398, 29 JUNE 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: LIABILITY OF A REGISTERED OWNER OF VEHICLE; ATTORNEY’S FEES. (BRIEF TITLE: FEB FINANCE VS. SPOUSES BAYLON)

AN OIL TANKER REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF BPI LEASING AND LEASED AND OPERATED BY BG HAULER AND DRIVEN BY ESTILLOSO HIT A PEDESTRIAN.

IS BPI LEASING LIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE OIL TANKER WAS OPERATED BY BG HAULER?

YES.

BPI LEASING, BEING THE REGISTERED OWNER, IS LIABLE UNDER THE LAW ON COMPULSORY VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND JURISPRUDENCE. THE POLICY BEHIND THE RULE IS TO ENABLE THE VICTIM TO FIND REDRESS BY THE EXPEDIENT RECOURSE OF IDENTIFYING THE REGISTERED VEHICLE OWNER IN THE RECORDS OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE.

In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration, this Court has consistently ruled that, with respect to the public and third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation regardless of who the actual vehicle owner might be.²¹ Well-settled is the rule that the registered owner of the vehicle is liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use. Thus, even if the vehicle has already been sold, leased, or transferred to another person at the time the vehicle figured in an accident, the registered vehicle owner would still be liable for damages caused by the accident. The sale, transfer or lease of the vehicle, which is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, will not bind third persons aggrieved in an accident involving the vehicle. The compulsory motor vehicle registration underscores the importance of registering the vehicle in the name of the actual owner.

The policy behind the rule is to enable the victim to find redress by the expedient recourse of identifying the registered vehicle owner in the records of the Land Transportation Office. The registered owner can be reimbursed by the actual owner, lessee or transferee who is known to him. Unlike the registered owner, the innocent victim is not privy to the lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance of the vehicle. Hence, the victim should not be prejudiced by the failure to register such transaction or encumbrance. As the Court held in PCI Leasing:

The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to the chaos that may result if registered owners or operators of vehicles are freed from such responsibility. Petitioner pays the price for its failure to obey the law on compulsory registration of motor vehicles for registration is a pre-requisite for any person to even enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on public roads.²²

In the landmark case of Erezo v. Jepte,²³ the Court succinctly laid down the public policy behind the rule, thus:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

x x x

Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or, or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may be thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person.²⁴

In this case, petitioner admits that it is the registered owner of the oil tanker that figured in an accident causing the death of Loretta. As the registered owner, it cannot escape liability for the loss arising out of negligence in the operation of the oil tanker. Its liability remains even if at the time of the accident, the oil tanker was leased to BG Hauler and was being driven by the latter’s driver, and despite a provision in the lease contract exonerating the registered owner from liability.

* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1006 dated 10 June 2011.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2Rollo, pp. 31-48. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.

3Id. at 50-52. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa, concurring.

4Id. at 53-65. Penned by Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta.

5 Records (Vol. I), p. 8.

6Now BPI Leasing Corporation; records (Vol. II), pp. 14-24.

7 Rollo, pp. 86-89.

8 Records (Vol. I), p. 33.

9Id. at 10.

10Id. at 1-7.

11 Rollo, pp. 64-65.

12Id. at 47.

13Rollo, p. 99. BG Hauler and the driver filed in this Court (Third Division) a separate petition for review, which the Court denied in its Resolution dated 9 April 2008. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.

14AN ACT REGULATING THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF FINANCING COMPANIES. Approved on 4 August 1969.

15AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5980, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FINANCING COMPANY ACT. Approved on 26 February 1998. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8556 states:

SEC. 10. There is hereby inserted after Section 8 as renumbered, new Sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 to read as follows:

x x x

“SEC. 12. Liability of Lessors. ‒ Financing companies shall not be liable for loss, damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property leased to a third person or entity except where the motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property is operated by the financing company, its employees or agents at the time of the loss, damage or injury.

x x x

16 G.R. No. 162267, 4 July 2008, 557 SCRA 141.

17 Rollo, p. 86 (back page); records (Vol. I), p. 123 (back page).

18Otherwise known as the “Land Transportation and Traffic Code.”

19Section 5 of RA 4136 reads:

SEC. 5. Compulsory registration of motor vehicles. ‒ (a) All motor vehicles and trailers of any type used or operated on or upon any highway of thePhilippines must be registered with the bureau of Land Transportation for the current year in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

x x x

(e) Encumbrances of motor vehicles.‒Mortgages, attachments, and other encumbrances of motor vehicles, in order to be valid against third parties must be recorded in the bureau. Voluntary transactions or voluntary encumbrances shall likewise be properly recorded on the face of all outstanding copies of the certificates of registration of the vehicle concerned.

Cancellation or foreclosure of such mortgages, attachments, and other encumbrances shall likewise be recorded, and in the absence of such cancellation, no certificate of registration shall be issued without the corresponding notation of mortgage, attachment and/or other encumbrances.

x x x

20Id.

21PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 162267, 4 July 2008, 557 SCRA 141; Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244 (2002); First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91378, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 660.

22PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 162267, 4 July 2008, 557 SCRA 141, 154.

23 102 Phil. 103 (1957).

24Id. at 108-109.

25V.V. Soliven Realty Corp. v. Ong, 490 Phil. 229 (2005).

26Delos Santos v. Papa, G.R. No. 154427, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 385; Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical & Educational Center – Bicol Christian College of Medicine, 489 Phil. 380 (2005); Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 492.

27 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

28Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) v. Angala, G.R. No. 153076, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 229.