J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0103: CAN THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE THE COURT OF APPEALS?

SOURCE: FERNANDO CO (FORMERLY DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME “NATHANIEL MAMI HOUSE”VS. LINA B. VARGAS (G.R. NO. 195167, 16 NOVEMBER 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; C.A. FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL; EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT SC CANNOT REVIEW FACTS. (BRIEF TITLE: CO VS. VARGAS)

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WHAT IS COVERED BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45?

ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH MUST BE DISTINCTLY SET FORTH.

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law, thus:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

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CAN THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS?

AS A RULE, NO BECAUSE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE  C.A. ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE.

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BUT ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE?

YES. AS FOLLOWS:

(1) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES;

(2) WHEN THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE;

(3) WHEN THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;

(4) WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;

(5) WHEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONFLICTING;

(6) WHEN IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE, OR ITS FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH THE APPELLANT AND THE APPELLEE;

(7) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT;

(8) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED;

(9) WHEN THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE PETITION AS WELL AS IN THE PETITIONER’S MAIN AND REPLY BRIEFS ARE NOT DISPUTED BY THE RESPONDENT;

(10) WHEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PREMISED ON THE SUPPOSED ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; OR

(11) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES, WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.¹⁸

As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal,¹⁶ subject to exceptions such as those enumerated by this Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank:¹⁷

The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court’s function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.¹⁸

Petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. The finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner’s bakery and his residence are located at the same place was not reversed by the NLRC.¹⁹ Furthermore, the Court of Appeals upheld this finding of the Labor Arbiter. We find no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and ruling of the Court of Appeals.

SECOND DIVISION

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review¹ assails the 29 June 2010 Decision² and the 5 January 2011 Resolution³ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110728. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 June 2008 Decision⁴ of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the 30 October 2004 Decision⁵ of the Labor Arbiter.

The Facts

On 22 April 2003, respondent Lina B. Vargas (respondent) filed against Nathaniel Bakeshop and its owner Fernando Co a complaint for underpayment or non-payment of wages and holiday pay.⁶ The complaint was later amended to include illegal dismissal as a cause of action and the non-payment of service incentive leave.⁷

Respondent alleged that she started working at the bakeshop in October 1994 as a baker and worked from 8:00 a.m. until 8:30 p.m., Monday to Saturday. Aside from baking, respondent also served the customers and supervised the other workers in the absence of the owner. Furthermore, respondent claimed that she sometimes cooked and did the chores of a housemaid whenever the latter was not available. Respondent had a salary of P220 per day, which she received every Saturday afternoon. During the period of her employment, respondent was not given a payslip and she was never asked to sign a payroll.

On 6 April 2003, petitioner Co’s wife, Nely Co, told respondent to cook their lunch because the housemaid was ironing clothes. Since respondent was busy preparing customers’ orders, she lost track of time and was unable to cook lunch as instructed. Irate at respondent’s failure to cook, Nely Co cussed respondent and told her to leave and never to return because she was not needed anymore. Respondent was so humiliated and could no longer bear the treatment she received from her employers that she decided to take her salary and leave that same day. Respondent later filed the complaint against Nathaniel Bakeshop and its owner Fernando Co.

Petitioner denies respondent’s claim that she was employed as a baker in their business. Petitioner alleges that they hired respondent to work as a housemaid. Petitioner refutes respondent’s version of the events which allegedly happened on 6 April 2003. Petitioner alleges that in April 2003, his wife, Nely Co, reprimanded respondent for her failure to cook lunch on time. Angered at being reprimanded, respondent then demanded her salary and walked out of petitioner’s residence and has never reported for work again. Petitioner further avers that respondent badmouthed petitioner’s daughter and displayed defiance, disrespect and insubordination toward them.

On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding illegal complainant’s dismissal. Consequently, respondents are hereby held liable and ordered to reinstate complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages initially computed at this time at P110,436.04.

IN CASE REINSTATEMENT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO SOME SUPERVENING EVENT, RESPONDENTS ARE ALSO ORDERED TO PAY COMPLAINANT’S SEPARATION PAY COMPUTED at one month’s pay for every year of service.

Respondents are likewise ordered to pay complainant’s service incentive leave of P3,332.50, 13^th month pay (pro-rata) of P1,551.66 and salary differential of P1,723.41.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.⁸

The Labor Arbiter found that the place of business of petitioner is the same as his place of residence and that respondent works for petitioner as well as for his business which is based in his home. Thus, the Labor Arbiter concluded that “while complainant may have started her employ doing chores for the [petitioner’s] family, she also fulfilled tasks connected with the [petitioner’s] business such as cooking, filling orders, baking orders, and other clerical work, all of which are usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of the respondent. Inescapably, complainant is a regular employee and thus, entitled to security of tenure.”⁹

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The NLRC concluded that respondent was not employed as a baker at petitioner’s bakeshop but was merely petitioner’s housemaid who left her employ voluntarily. The NLRC found petitioner not guilty of illegal dismissal.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 June 2010, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals annulled the NLRC Decision and reinstated the 30 October 2004 Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals ruled:

[I]t is clear that petitioner [Lina B. Vargas] is not a househelper or domestic servant of private respondents [Nathaniel Bakeshop and Fernando Co]. The evidence shows that petitioner is working within the premises of the business of private respondent Co and in relation to or in connection with such business. In the Memorandum of Appeal filed by private respondents before the NLRC, the place of business of respondent Co and his residence is located in the same place, Brgy. Juliana, San Fernando, Pampanga. Thus, respondent Co exercised control and supervision over petitioner’s functions. Respondent Co’s averment that petitioner had the simple task of cleaning the house and cooking at times and was not involved in the business was negated by the fact that petitioner likewise takes the orders of private respondents’ customers. Even if petitioner was actually working as domestic servant in private respondent’s residence, her act of taking orders, which was ratiocinated by the NLRC as not leading to the conclusion that petitioner in fact took the orders, would warrant the conclusion that petitioner should be considered as a regular employee and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant of respondent Co.

Private respondents relied heavily on the recantation (through an Affidavit of Recantation) by Joseph Baybayon of his Affidavit stating that petitioner was an employee, to boast [sic] their theory that petitioner is a mere domestic helper. Nonetheless, this Court is convinced that the allegations in the first affidavit are sufficient to establish that petitioner is an employee of private respondent and not a housemaid. Granting arguendo, that the second affidavit validly repudiated the first one, courts generally do not look with favor on any retraction or recanted testimony, for it could have been secured by considerations other than to tell the truth and would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. A recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration, but like any other testimony, the same is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with caution.

Having resolved the issue that petitioner was an employee of private respondents and not a housemaid, was petitioner illegally dismissed? The answer is in the affirmative. Since petitioner is an employee of private respondents, she is entitled to security of tenure. The NLRC observed that it was petitioner who left private respondents on April 6, 2003 when petitioner was allegedly driven away from work by Nely Co. Private respondents’ witnesses, Jay dela Cruz and Maria Fe Reniva, averred that it was petitioner who abandoned her job by not reporting for work. But their affidavits did state that the two were employees of private respondent. The other two documents considered by the NLRC were the affidavits of Felisa Borason San Andres (who allegedly helped petitioner to be employed as housemaid of Nely Co) and Alma P. Agorita (an alleged co-housemaid of petitioner in the Co residence). Surprisingly, the affidavit of Felisa Borason San Andres was written in English, considering the statement that she was employed as househelper of Nely Co. The question is whether the said househelper understood what was written in her affidavit or if the same was explained to her in her native language, for she was a resident of San Felipe,NagaCity, where she allegedly executed her affidavit. All told, the said affidavits cannot be given credence to refute the fact that petitioner was an employee of private respondent Co doing work in relation to private respondent’s business, which is that of a bakeshop.

Assuming further that petitioner abandoned her job, the Supreme Court held in Ultra Villa Food Haus and/or Rosie Tio vs. NLRC that to constitute abandonment, two requisites must concur: (1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts, with the second requisite as the more determinative factor. The burden of proving abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is on the employer. Private respondents failed to discharge this burden. The only evidence adduced by private respondents to prove abandonment were the affidavits of their househelpers and employees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division dated June 11, 2008 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 30, 2004 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.¹⁰ (Boldfacing supplied)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 5 January 2011. Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the “Court of Appeals erred in ruling that at the time Respondent was working with the Co family, the business was being conducted at the residence.”¹¹

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

In this case, it was only in petitioner’s Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision that petitioner raised the issue that contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and the Court of Appeals, the bakery was not located at his residence at the time respondent was in their employ. Furthermore, petitioner would even have this Court evaluate additional documentary evidence which were not offered during the proceedings in the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and the Court of Appeals. The additional evidence were only submitted after the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, when petitioner attached the additional evidence in his Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.¹²

The issue raised by petitioner is clearly a question of fact which requires a review of the evidence presented. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.¹³ It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again,¹⁴ specially on evidence raised for the first time on appeal.¹⁵

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law, thus:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal,¹⁶ subject to exceptions such as those enumerated by this Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank:¹⁷

The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court’s function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.¹⁸

Petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. The finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner’s bakery and his residence are located at the same place was not reversed by the NLRC.¹⁹ Furthermore, the Court of Appeals upheld this finding of the Labor Arbiter. We find no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and ruling of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 June 2010 Decision and the 5 January 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110728.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

*Also known as “Nathaniel’s Bakeshop.”

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, pp. 12-25. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. DeLeon, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.

3Id. at 86-87.

4CA rollo, pp. 245-264.

5Id. at 110-125.

6Id. at 28-29.

7Id. at 30-31.

8Id. at 124-125.

9Id. at 121.

10Rollo, pp. 22-24.

11Petition for Review, p. 24.

12Rollo, pp. 88-145.

13Aliño v. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 159550, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 139; Diesel Construction Co., Inc. v. UPSI Property Holdings, Inc., G.R. Nos. 154885 & 154937, 24 March 2008, 549 SCRA 12.

14Alicer v. Compas, G.R. No. 187720, 30 May 2011.

15China Banking Corporation v. Asian Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 158271, 8 April 2008, 550 SCRA 585.

16Sps. Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, 23 February 2011; Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 159490, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 150; Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550 (2004).

17G.R. No. 171982, 18 August 2010, 628 SCRA 404.

18Id. at 413-414.

19Although the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and held that respondent was not employed as a baker at petitioner’s bakeshop but was merely petitioner’s housemaid, the NLRC did not reverse the Labor Arbiter’s finding that the bakery is located at petitioner’s residence.

LEGAL NOTE 0102: RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES AS AMENDED (EFFECTIVE 18 MARCH  2010)

RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

AS AMENDED1

SECTION 1. Title.—This Rule shall be known as “The Rule of Procedure for Small

Claims Cases.”

SEC. 2. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does

not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Plaintiff refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term

includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim against plaintiff;

(b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims

action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a

claim, or a person who replies to the claim;

(c) Person is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability

partnership, association, or other juridical entity endowed with personality

by law;

(d) Individual is a natural person;

(e) Motion means a party’s request, written or oral, to the court for an

order or other action. It shall include an informal written request to

the court, such as a letter;

(f) Good cause means circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order

or other action, as determined by the judge; and

(g) Affidavit means a written statement or declaration of facts that are sworn

or affirmed to be true.

SEC. 4. Applicability.—The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in

Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in

all actions which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the

plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect

of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved

upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules

Of Criminal Procedure.

These claims or demands may be:

(a) For money owed under any of the following:

1. Contract of Lease;

2. Contract of Loan;

3. Contract of Services;

4. Contract ofSale; or

5. Contract of Mortgage;

(b) For damages arising from any of the following:

1. Fault or negligence;

2. Quasi-contract; or

3. Contract;

(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration

award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417

1 SC En Banc Resolution dated October 27, 2009 in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC

of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of

1991.

SEC. 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action.—A small claims action is

commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim

(Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping

(Form 1-A, SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s

subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support

the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or

submitted together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of

additional evidence.

No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in this Rule, is

necessary to initiate a small claims action.

SEC. 6. Joinder of Claims.—Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or

more separate small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed,

exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed P100,000.00.

SEC. 7. Affidavits.—The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts

of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence.

A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted

the party in the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action.

The inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.

SEC. 8. Payment of Filing Fees.—The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other legal

fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to litigate

as an indigent.

A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the

Executive Judge for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts, or to the Presiding

Judge of the court hearing the small claims case. If the motion is granted by the

Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court designated to hear

small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be given five (5) days

within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be dismissed without

prejudice. In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from the

payment of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes in civil cases.

SEC. 9. Dismissal of the Claim.—After the court determines that the case falls

under this Rule, it may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim

and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright on any of the

grounds apparent from the Claim for the dismissal of a civil action.

SEC. 10. Summons and Notice of Hearing.—If no ground for dismissal is found, the

court shall forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the Statement

of Claim, directing the defendant to submit a verified Response.

The court shall also issue a Notice (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing them to

appear before it on a specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that no unjustified

postponement shall be allowed, as provided in Section 19 of this Rule.

The summons and notice to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a

copy of the Statement of Claim and documents submitted by plaintiff, and a copy of the

Response (Form 3-SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant. The Notice shall contain

an express prohibition against the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other motion under

Section 14 of this Rule.

SEC. 11. Response. — The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the

plaintiff a duly accomplished and verified Response within a non-extendible period of ten

(10) days from receipt of summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified

photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in

support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached

to or submitted together with the Response, unless good cause is shown for the admission

of additional evidence.

The grounds for the dismissal of the claim, under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,

should be pleaded.

SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Response. — Should the defendant fail to file his

Response within the required period, and likewise fail to appear at the date set for

hearing, the court shall render judgment on the same day, as may be warranted by the

facts.

Should the defendant fail to file his Response within the required period but appears

at the date set for hearing, the court shall ascertain what defense he has to offer and

proceed to hear, mediate or adjudicate the case on the same day as if a Response has been

filed.

SEC. 13. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule.—If at the time the action

is commenced, the defendant possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the

coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same

transaction or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim; (c) does not require

for its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the subject of another

pending action, the claim shall be filed as a counterclaim in the Response; otherwise, the

defendant shall be barred from suit on the counterclaim.

The defendant may also elect to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not

arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided that the amount and nature

thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and other legal fees

are paid.

SEC. 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. — The following pleadings, motions,

or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for

reopening of trial;

(d) Petition for relief from judgment;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other

paper;

(f) Memoranda;

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any

interlocutory order issued by the court;

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply;

(k) Third-party complaints; and

(l) Interventions.

SEC. 15. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel.—The Clerk of

Court or other court personnel shall provide such assistance as may be requested by a

plaintiff or a defendant regarding the availability of forms and other information about

the coverage, requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.

SEC. 16. Appearance. — The parties shall appear at the designated date of hearing

personally.

Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of

an individual-party must not be a lawyer, and must be related to or next-of-kin of the

individual-party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by a lawyer in any capacity.

The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 5-

SCC) to enter into an amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or

admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.

SEC. 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed.—No attorney shall appear in behalf

of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.

If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense

and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not

an attorney to assist that party upon the latter’s consent.

SEC. 18. Non-appearance of Parties.—Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be

cause for the dismissal of the claim without prejudice. The defendant who appears shall

be entitled to judgment on a permissive counterclaim.

Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a

Response under Section 12 of this Rule. This shall not apply where one of two or more

defendants who are sued under a common cause of action and have pleaded a common

defense appears at the hearing.

Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the

claim and counterclaim.

SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed.—A request for postponement of a hearing

may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the

court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

SEC. 20. Duty of the Court.—At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall

read aloud a short statement explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of procedure of

small claims cases.

SEC. 21. Hearing. — At the hearing, the judge shall exert efforts to bring the

parties to an amicable settlement of their dispute. Any settlement (Form 7-SCC) or

resolution (Form 8-SCC) of the dispute shall be reduced into writing, signed by the

parties and submitted to the court for approval (Form 12-SCC)

Settlement discussions shall be strictly confidential and any reference to any

settlement made in the course of such discussions shall be punishable by contempt.

Sec. 22. Failure of Settlement. — If efforts at settlement fail, the hearing shall

proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be terminated within one (1) day.

Either party may move in writing (Form 10-SCC) to have another judge hear and decide

the case. The reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance with existing

issuances.

The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be made within the

same day the motion is filed and granted, and by the Executive Judge to the designated

judge within the same day of the referral. The new judge shall hear and decide the case

within five (5) working days from receipt of the order of reassignment.

SEC. 23. Decision.—After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the

same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision

shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and

a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

SEC. 24. Execution.—If the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, execution

shall issue upon motion (Form 9-SCC).

SEC. 25. Applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure.—The Rules of Civil

Procedure shall apply suppletorily insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Rule.

SEC. 26. Effectivity*.—This Rule shall take effect on October 1, 2008 for the pilot

courts designated to apply the procedure for small claims cases following its publication

in two newspapers of general circulation.

The amendments to this Rule shall take effect ninety (90) days from publication in

two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

_____________________

* Effectivity of the Rule to all pilot courts for small claims cases – October 1, 2008

Effectivity of the amendments to the Rule – November 3, 2009

Effective date of the implementation/roll-out of the Rule, as amended, to all first

level courts, except the Shari’a Circuit Courts – March 18, 2010

LEGAL NOTE 0101: NOTES ON ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT. WHEN RESORTED TO. WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS.

SOURCE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THROUGH THE HON. SECRETARY, HERMOGENES EBDANE  VS. ALBERTO A. DOMINGO (G.R. NO. 175299, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: SUMMONS TO THE REPUBLIC; APPEARANCE OF OSG; ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT. (BRIEF TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. DOMINGO)

============================

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813 are REVERSED.  The Decision dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the original action in the proper Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.”

============================

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

WHEN IS REMEDY OF ANNULMENT RESORTED TO?

WHEN  THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE THROUGH NO FAULT OF THE PETITIONER.

          Section 1, Rule 47^[1][26] of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT?

EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

          Under the first paragraph of Section 2, Rule 47^[2][27] of the Rules of Court, the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.  As a ground for annulment of judgment, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.^[3][28]  

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WAS THE PROCEEDINGS THEN NULL AND VOID?

YES BECAUSE THE REPUBLIC WAS NOT VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS. THERE WAS THEREFORE LACK OF JURISDICTION. BUT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REFILING OF THE CASE.

In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Hence, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic.  Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision dated February 18, 2003 are hereby declared void.

In accordance with Section 7, Rule 47^[4][35] of the Rules of Court, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

============================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:

          In this Petition for Review on Certiorari^[5][1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to reverse and set aside the Decision^[6][2] dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution^[7][3] dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813, as well as to declare null and void the Decision^[8][4] dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.   

          As culled from the records, the factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

          On April 26, 2002, herein respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages^[9][5] against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region III, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18.  Domingo averred that from April to September 1992, he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment to said government agency.^[10][6]  The lease contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the DPWH Region III, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in the adjacent towns in the provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga.  After the completion of the projects, Domingo claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region III amounted to P6,320,163.05.  Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations.  Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above case for the payment of the P6,320,163.05 balance, plus P200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.^[11][7]

          Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC. The Proof of Service^[12][8] of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 stated, thus:

PROOF OF SERVICE

            The undersigned personally served the copy of the Summons together with the complaint issued in the above-entitled case upon defendant The Department of Public Works and Highways, Region III, San Fernando Pampanga on May 6, 2002 through Nora Cortez, Clerk III of said office as shown by her signature and stamped mark received by said office appearing on the original Summons.

            WHEREFORE, the original Summons respectfully returned to the Court “DULY SERVED”, for its record and information.

            Malolos, Bulacan, May 9, 2002.

            Subsequently, on July 30, 2002, Domingo filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default^[13][9] in view of the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period as required under the Rules of Court.  During the hearing of the motion on August 8, 2002, the RTC directed the counsel of Domingo to submit proof of service of said motion on the DPWH Region III.  Thereafter, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution.^[14][10]  Counsel for Domingo timely filed a Manifestation,^[15][11] showing compliance with the order of the trial court.

          In an Order^[16][12] dated September 2, 2002, the RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and thereafter set the date for the reception of Domingo’s evidence ex parte. 

After the ex parte presentation of Domingo’s evidence, the RTC rendered judgment on February 18, 2003, finding that:

          From the evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.

            In his seven causes of actions, [Domingo] has religiously undertaken what is incumbent upon him in the contracts of lease signed by both [Domingo] and [the DPWH Region III].  As a matter of course, the [DPWH Region III] has the duty to pay [Domingo] the amount equivalent to the services performed by [Domingo] which [in] this case now amount to P6,320,163.05 excluding interest.

            Considering that there was a long delay in the payment of the obligation on the part of the [DPWH Region III], Article 2209 of the New Civil Code finds application as to imputation of legal interest at six (6%) percent per annum, in the absence of stipulation of interest on the amount due.

            With respect to the claim for attorney’s fees, although as a general rule, attorney’s fees cannot be rewarded because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate, this rule does not apply in the case at bar in the face of the stubborn refusal of [the DPWH Region III] to respect the valid claim of [Domingo] x x x.  Award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.00 appears proper.  Moreover, as to [the] demand for moral and exemplary damages, the same are hereby denied for lack of persuasive and sufficient evidence.^[17][13]

          Thus, the RTC disposed:

Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Alberto Domingo and against defendant DPWH Region III, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:

1.  the sum of Six Million Three Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Sixty[-]Three and 05/100 Pesos (P6,320,163.05) representing the principal obligation of the defendant plus interest at six percent (6%) per annum from 1993 until the obligation is fully paid;

2.  to pay attorney’s fees in the total amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and

3.  to pay the costs of suit.^[18][14]

          On March 12, 2003, Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,^[19][15] asserting that the DPWH Region III failed to file an appeal or a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration despite its receipt of a copy of the RTC decision on February 19, 2003.  On March 20, 2003, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion of Domingo.^[20][16]  A Writ of Execution^[21][17] was then issued on March 24, 2003, commanding the sheriff to enforce the RTC Decision dated February 18, 2003. 

          On August 27, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.^[22][18]  The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78813.  The Republic argued that it was not impleaded as an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  The seven contracts sued upon in the trial court stated that they were entered into by the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director and/or Project Manager of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines, which purportedly was the real party to the contract.  Moreover, the Republic averred that, under the law, the statutory representatives of the government for purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor General or the Legal Service Branch of the Executive Department concerned.  Since no summons was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the Republic.  The absence of indispensable parties allegedly rendered null and void the subsequent acts of the trial court because of its lack of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.  The Republic prayed for the annulment of the RTC Decision dated February 18, 2003 and the dismissal of the said case, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

          On May 19, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.  The appellate court elaborated that:

          The hair-splitting distinction being made by [the Republic] between the DPWH as a department under the Republic, and the Regional Office of the DPWH fails to persuade Us.  Instead, We uphold [Domingo’s] position that the regional office is an extension of the department itself and service of summons upon the former is service upon the latter. x x x.

            x x x x

x x x [A] regional office of the DPWH is part of the composition of the department itself and is therefore, not an entity that is altogether separate from the department.  This conclusion lends credence to [Domingo’s] position that service of summons upon the regional office is service upon the department itself because the former is essentially part of the latter.  Indeed, what militates heavily against [the Republic’s] theory is the simple fact that the regional office is not a different entity at all, but, as can be gleaned from the manner of its creation, a part of the department itself, so much so that it does not even have a juridical personality of its own. x x x.

            Anent the claim that the procedure for service of summons upon the Republic was not followed because service should have been made on the OSG or the Legal Service Department of the DPWH, We are likewise not persuaded.  A perusal of the Revised Administrative Code of thePhilippinessuggests nothing of this import. x x x.

            x x x x

            Clearly, nothing [in the functions of the OSG] remotely suggests that service of summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively on the OSG.  What the [provisions] merely state is that the OSG will represent the government in all proceedings involving it.  It cannot be deduced nor implied from this, however, that summons should be served upon it alone.

            The same conclusion applies to the legal service branch of the DPWH, as there is also nothing in the law that suggests that service of summons on the DPWH should be made upon it alone. x x x.

            x x x x

            Obviously, petitioner’s conclusion that the proper procedure for service of summons was not observed is a mere conjecture because We find nothing in the provisions invoked by it that such indeed is the procedure sanctioned by law.  We are thus inclined to give more credence to [the Republic’s] argument that it was the regional office’s fault if it failed to bring the subject case to the attention of the OSG for proper representation.  To allow it to benefit from its own omission in order to evade its just and valid obligation would be the height of injustice.

            Finally, anent the argument that the Republic is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court, We rule in the negative.  The existence of another case against the regional office of the DPWH where the OSG appeared is of no moment as it concerns a totally different transaction.  Thus, it would be erroneous for Us to rule on that basis alone, that the OSG is already acknowledging the service of summons upon the regional office, especially considering the categorical stand taken by the OSG on the matter in the case now before Us.  Be that as it may, however, We still rule, as We have discussed above, that [Domingo’s] position is more impressed with merit.

            WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.^[23][19]

          The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[24][20] of the above decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in the assailed Resolution dated October 25, 2006.

Consequently, the Republic filed the instant petition before this Court.  In a Resolution^[25][21] dated February 19, 2007, we denied the Republic’s petition for failure to properly verify the petition and that the jurat in the verification and certification against forum shopping did not contain any competent evidence of the affiant’s identity.  In addition, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues payment (under IBP O.R. No. 663485) of one of the counsels who signed the petition was not updated.  The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[26][22] of the above resolution.^[27][23]  On July 2, 2007, the Court resolved^[28][24] to grant the Republic’s motion, thereby reinstating its petition.

In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Republic brings to fore the following arguments:

I.

If in the act by which the Republic consents to be sued, no designation is made as to the officer to be served with summons, then the process can only be served upon the Solicitor General.

[II.]

The State is not bound by the errors or mistakes of its agents.

III.

Respondent can recover on the government contracts sued upon in Civil Case No. [3]33-M-2002 only on a quantum meruit basis.^[29][25]

          In essence, the primary issue that must be resolved in the instant petition is whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.

          Section 1, Rule 47^[30][26] of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

          Under the first paragraph of Section 2, Rule 47^[31][27] of the Rules of Court, the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.  As a ground for annulment of judgment, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.^[32][28]   

In the petition at bar, the Republic argues that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the former.  The Republic reiterates that the service of summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was insufficient.   According to the Republic, the applicable rule of procedure in this case is Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that when the defendant is the Republic of thePhilippines, the service of summons may be effected on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).  The DPWH and its regional office are simply agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  The Republic posits that, since it was not impleaded in the case below and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 are null and void. 

On the other hand, Domingo argues that the DPWH Region III is part of the DPWH itself; hence, a suit against the regional office is a suit against the said department and the Republic as well.  Domingo stresses that the case he filed was against the Republic, that is, against the DPWH Region III, and it was clear that the summons and a copy of the complaint was duly served on the said regional office.  Likewise, Domingo submits that the Republic is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in the instant case given that he has filed two other civil actions for specific performance and damages against the DPWH Region III and, in the said cases, the OSG formally entered its appearance for and in behalf of the Republic.  Domingo alleges that the foregoing action of the OSG proved that it recognized the validity of the service of summons upon the DPWH Region III and the jurisdiction of the trial court over the said regional office.

          The Court finds merit in the Republic’s petition.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.  Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.  Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to the court.^[33][29]

Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.  (Emphasis ours.)

          Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State.^[34][30]  In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals,^[35][31] where summons was served on the Bureau of Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, we held that:

Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 13.          Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of thePhilippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.

It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General.   

We now turn to the question of whether summons was properly served according to the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely solely on the sheriff’s return to prove that summons was properly served. We quote its contents, viz:

“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May 1999, the undersigned caused the service of Summons and Complaint upon defendant J.A. Development Corporation at the address indicated in the summons, the same having been received by a certain Jacqueline delos Santos, a person employed thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive such process, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon defendant Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons, a copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.”

It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof. We find that this burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein are null and void.^[36][32]    (Emphases supplied.)

In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III.  As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

          Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision.  A perusal of the Decision dated May 19, 2006 shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the functions and organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH and its regional offices, as well as to refute the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively upon the OSG.  Such an oversight on the part of the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to the instant case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid provision in its petition before the appellate court.^[37][33]

The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged entry of appearance of the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in the other civil cases supposedly filed by Domingo against the DPWH Region III.  As held by the appellate court, the other civil cases presumably pertained to transactions involving Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally different from the contracts involved in the instant case.  The fact that the OSG entered its appearance in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case now before us.  All this indicates is that, despite the improper service of summons in these other civil cases, there appeared to be notice to the OSG and voluntary appearance on the latter’s part.

Here, there was no indication, and Domingo did not insist otherwise, that the OSG had any notice of the filing of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Domingo speculates that, in the subsequent civil actions against the DPWH Region III, the latter most likely brought the said cases to the attention of the OSG.  On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Accordingly, Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor.  The Court disagrees.  Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.^[38][34]  It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead the proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law, that is, the OSG.  As Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.   

In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Hence, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic.  Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision dated February 18, 2003 are hereby declared void.

In accordance with Section 7, Rule 47^[39][35] of the Rules of Court, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

In view of the above ruling of the Court declaring the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC, the Court shall no longer pass upon the other issues raised by the parties in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813 are REVERSED.  The Decision dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the original action in the proper Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

  Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice