J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN  vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO FABRIGAR, MERLYN VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL, JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN COLIAO and EDGAR JOPSON (G.R. NO. 173326, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION ON FORUM SHOPPING. (BRIEF TITLE: SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORP ET AL VS. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS ET AL.)

x-  – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

DOCTRINES

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION DOES NOT NEED SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE RE PERTINENT BOARD RESOLUTION

Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^[1][15]  In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said corporation without the benefit of a board resolution.  We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”^[2][16] (Emphases supplied.)

REQUIRED CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT JURISDICTIONAL

Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.  However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.  Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.^[3][18]

x-  – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the Resolution^[4][1] dated July 20, 2005 as well as its related Resolution^[5][2] dated May 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.  In essence, the same petition likewise seeks to set aside the Order^[6][3] dated November 8, 2004 and the Order^[7][4] dated February 24, 2005 of public respondent Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) as well as the Order^[8][5] dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director, DOLE Regional XII Office.

The facts of this case, as culled from the Order dated November 8, 2004 of DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas, are as follows:

On the basis of a complaint, an inspection was conducted at the premises of appellant DXCP Radio Station on January 13, 2004, where the following violations of labor standards laws were noted:

1.      Underpayment of minimum wage;

2.      Underpayment of 13^th month pay;

3.      Non-payment of five (5) days service incentive leave pay;

4.      Non-remittance of SSS premiums;

5.      Non-payment of rest day premium pay of some employee;

6.      Non-payment of holiday premium pay; and

7.      Some employees are paid on commission basis aside from their allowances.

A copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was explained to and received by Tony Ladorna for appellants. Later on, or on January 16, 200[4], another copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was received by Felipe S. Galindo, Technical Supervisor of appellant DXCP. The Notice of Inspection Results required the appellants to effect restitution and/or correction of the above violations within five (5) calendar days from receipt of the Notice. Likewise, appellants were informed that any questions on the findings should be submitted within five (5) working days from receipts of the Notice.

A summary investigation was scheduled on March 3, 2004, where only appellees appeared, while appellants failed to appear despite due notice. Another hearing was held on April 1, 2004, where appellees appeared, while a certain Nona Gido appeared in behalf of Atty. Thomas Jacobo. Ms. Gido sought to re-schedule the hearing, which the hearing officer denied.

On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director issued the assailed Order, directing appellants to pay appellees the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos (Php759,752.00).^[9][6]

The dispositive portion of the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director of the DOLE Region XII Office reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, President, is hereby ordered to pay the seven (7) affected workers of their Salary Differential, Underpayment of 13^th Month Pay, Five (5) days Service Incentive Leave Pay, Rest Day Premium Pay and Holiday Premium Pay in the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS (P759,752.00), Philippine Currency as indicated in the Annex “A” hereof and to submit proof of compliance to the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Order.^[10][7]

Petitioners appealed their case to then DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas. However, this appeal was dismissed in an Order dated November 8, 2004 wherein the Secretary ruled that, contrary to their claim, petitioners were not denied due process as they were given reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of their defense in the administrative proceeding before the Regional Director of DOLE Region XII Office.  The dispositive portion of the said Order follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated May 24, 2004 of the Regional Director, directing appellants to pay the nine (9) appellees the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage differentials, 13^th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday premium and rest day premium, is AFFIRMED.^[11][8]

Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary but this was denied in an Order dated February 24, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our Order dated November 8, 2004, affirming the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the OIC-Director, Regional Office No. 12, directing appellants to pay Rolando Fabrigar and eight (8) others, the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage and 13^th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and rest day premium, is AFFIRMED.^[12][9]

In light of this setback, petitioners elevated their case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed in the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005 because of several procedural infirmities that were explicitly cited in the same, to wit:

1.         The petition was not properly verified and the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was not executed by the plaintiff or principal party in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the affiant therein was not duly authorized to represent the corporation. Such procedural lapse renders the entire pleading of no legal effect and is dismissible. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

            A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

            A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. x x x.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:

x x x x

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x.

2.         Annexes A, B, C, E and its attachments and F are not certified true copies contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – x x x

            x x x x

            The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. x x x.

3.         Petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate the date of issue of his IBP Official Receipt. As provided for under Bar Matter 287 dated September 26, 2000:

“All pleadings, motions and papers filed in court whether personally or by mail shall bear counsel’s current IBP official receipt number and date of issue otherwise, such pleadings, motions and paper may not be acted upon by the court, without prejudice to whatever disciplinary action the court may take against the erring counsel who shall likewise be required to comply with the such (sic) requirement within five (5) days from notice. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be ground for further disciplinary sanction and for contempt of court.” x x x.^[13][10]

Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ruled in its assailed Resolution dated May 22, 2006 that petitioners’ subsequent submission made them substantially comply with the second and third procedural errors that were mentioned in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005.  However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that, with regard to the first procedural error, petitioners’ justification does not deserve merit reasoning that “[w]hile it may be true that there are two (2) petitioners and that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition, the records show that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan did not initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his personal interest in the case but was, in fact, only acting for and in the corporation’s behalf as its president.”^[14][11]  Thus, the Court of Appeals noted that “[h]aving acted in the corporation’s behalf, petitioner Benzonan should have been clothed with the corporation’s board resolution authorizing him to institute the petition.”^[15][12]

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that petitioners’ attachment of a “Secretary’s Certificate” to their Motion for Reconsideration (purportedly to remedy the first procedural mistake in their petition for certiorari under Rule 65) was insufficient since their submission merely authorized petitioner Benzonan “to represent the corporation and cause the preparation and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.”^[16][13]

Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition wherein they raised the following issues:

a.                   Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and denied the Motion for Reconsideration on its finding that the petition was not properly verified and the certification of non-forum shopping was not executed by the principal party allegedly in violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?

b.                  Whether petitioners were denied due process of law in the proceedings before the Regional Director and the Office of the Secretary, both of the Department of Labor and Employment?

c.                   Whether there was sufficient basis in the Order issued by the Regional Director, DOLE, Regional Office No. XII, dated May 20, 2004?^[17][14]

Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^[18][15]  In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said corporation without the benefit of a board resolution.  We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”^[19][16] (Emphases supplied.)

It must be stressed, however, that the Cagayan ruling qualified that the better procedure is still to append a board resolution to the complaint or petition to obviate questions regarding the authority of the signatory of the verification and certification.^[20][17]

Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.  However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.  Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.^[21][18]

In the case at bar, the Court holds that there has been substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure on the petitioners’ part in consonance with our ruling in the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International PTY LTD.^[22][19] that we laid down in 2003 with the rationale that the President of petitioner-corporation is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.  Petitioner Benzonan clearly satisfies the aforementioned jurisprudential requirement because he is the President of petitioner South Cotabato Communications Corporation. Moreover, he is also named as co-respondent of petitioner-corporation in the labor case which is the subject matter of the special civil action for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.   

Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari despite substantial compliance with the rules on procedure. For unduly upholding technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case, normal procedure dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with properly disposing the petition, a second time around, on the merits.

The Court is mindful of previous rulings which instructs us that when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits can be made, we may dispense with the time-consuming procedure in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case.^[23][20]  However, based on the nature of the two remaining issues propounded before the Court which involve factual issues and given the inadequacy of the records, pleadings, and other evidence available before us to properly resolve those questions, we are constrained to refrain from passing upon them.

After all, the Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts.^[24][21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

FERNANDO P. CHAN VS. JOVEN T. OLEGARIO (A.M. NO. P-09-2714, 06 DECEMBER 2010, J. ABAD) SUBJECTS: NON-SETTLEMENT OF DEBT BY COURT EMPLOYEE; SETTLEMENT OF DEBT NOT GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

x  –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

CASE STORY

OLEGARIO BORROWED CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FROM CHAN WHO OWNS A HARDWARE. OLEGARIO WAS NOT ABLE TO PAY. ADMIN CASE WAS BROUHT AGAINST OLEGARIO. IN THE COURSE OF THE CASE OLEGARIO PAID CHAN AND CHAN MANIFESTED HE IS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE CASE.

CAN THE CASE NOW BE DISMISSMED? IF NOT WHAT CRIME DID OLEGARIO COMMIT?

SC RULED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINTS CANNOT DIVEST THE COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION NOR STRIP IT OF ITS POWER TO DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF THE CHARGES MADE AND TO DISCIPLINE, SUCH AS THE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATION MAY WARRANT, AN ERRING RESPONDENT.

OLEGARIO IS GUILTY OF WILLFUL FAILURE TO PAY JUST DEBT AND CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A COURT EMPLOYEE.

DOCTRINES:

CONDUCT OF COURT EMPLOYEES MUST  AT ALL TIMES BE CHARACTERIZED BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, UPRIGHTNESS, PROPRIETY AND DECORUM.^[1][1]

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum.^[2][1]

CASE CANNOT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT IS ALREADY SETTLED.

Furthermore, the fact that Chan, on December 12, 2009, manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.^[3][2]

x  –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

                              D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a criminal complaint dated July 30, 2007 filed by Fernando P. Chan (Chan) against respondent Joven Olegario (Olegario), Process Server of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 6, Iligan City, for Estafa. The complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, however, Olegario being a court employee, the instant complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for administrative disciplinary action.

The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Chan is the owner/proprietor of XRG Hardware and Construction Supply located at Tibanga Highway, Iligan City.

On February 3, 2001, Olegario went to Chan’s hardware to obtain construction materials which will be utilized for the construction of his house. He introduced himself to Chan as a court process server at the RTC of Iligan, Branch VI, and showed certain documents as proof. Olegario  explained then to Chan that he was short of funds for the construction of his house and that he had applied for a loan at GSIS. He then asked Chan for construction materials and promised that he will pay his loan as soon as he received the proceeds of his GSIS loan as well as an interest of 20% per annum.

Banking on the words of Olegario and his being a government employee, Chan agreed to his request and delivered to him construction materials, to wit: (1) 10 bags of cement; (2) 10 pcs. of Plywood; and (3) 10 pcs. of corrugated G.I. sheet. The total cost of the construction materials amounted to Four Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P4,510.00).

Three months after, Chan demanded payment from Olegario, but the latter told him that his loan has yet to be released. He promised though that he will pay his obligation with interest. His promise to pay his obligation went on and on.

Chan averred that for seven years, Olegario has not paid him even a single centavo.

On June 15, 2007, Chan sent another demand letter to Olegario to pay his obligation. Again, Olegario merely promised him that he will pay his obligation within 15 days, but he never did.

On October 16, 2007, the Court directed Olegario to submit his comment on the instant complaint against him.

In his Comment dated March 4, 2008, Olegario denied that he had been evading his obligation to pay his debts to Chan. He alleged that his wife died on February 6, 2008 after a month of fighting a massive stroke, thus, he had to attend to the needs of his wife.

Olegario likewise manifested that he attempted to tender partial payment to Chan, but the latter refused it.  He asked the Court to give him more time to settle his obligation to Chan.

Subsequently, in its Memorandum dated September 23, 2009, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It further found Olegario guilty of willful failure to pay just debt and conduct unbecoming of a court employee, thus, also recommended the imposition of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum.^[4][1]

There is no question as to the existence of the debt and its justness as Olegario himself admitted them.  Likewise, Olegario’s allegation of financial difficulties is not a sufficient excuse for failing to pay his debt to Chan. He claimed that he had no intention of evading his obligation, but we are unconvinced. The fact that it took more than seven years before he attempted to pay his obligation clearly negated his claim.

Moreover, we also take note that it was Olegario’s pronouncement that he is a court employee which induced Chan to trust him and extend a loan to him. Thus, Olegario’s non-payment of his debt for more than 7 years not only tainted his name but the court’s image as well. This we will not tolerate.

Furthermore, the fact that Chan, on December 12, 2009, manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.^[5][2]

Likewise, the fact that Olegario settled his obligation with complainant during the pendency of the present complaint does not exculpate him from administrative liability. Willful failure to pay just debt amounts to conduct unbecoming a court employee.^[6][3]

We cannot overlook the fact that Olegario’s unethical conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of his office and stained the image of the judiciary. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming his court’s albatross of infamy.^[7][4] The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegario’s private life, but at his actuation unbecoming a public official.^[8][5]           

WHEREFORE, the Court finds JOVEN T. OLEGARIO, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, GUILTY of CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF COURT EMPLOYEE for which he is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

                                                                                                                                                            DIOSDADO M. PERALTA  

                                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA              ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

RENATO REYES, REPRESENTED BY RAMON REYES VS. LEOPOLDO BARRIOS, SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIA MANALUS-BARRIOS (G.R. NO. 172841, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECTS: TECHNICAL RULES NOT FOLLOWED IN DARAB PROCEEDINGS; PROCEDURE FOR GRANT OF EMANCIPATION PROCEEDINGS; ISSUE ON RIGHT OVER RETAINED AREA UNDER SOLE JURISDICTION OF DAR SECRETARY. BRIEF TITLE: REYES VS. BARRIOS.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 CASE STORY

REYES FILED A CASE TO OUST BARRIOS FROM HIS FARM ON THE GROUND THAT HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING. BARRIOS COUNTERED THAT HE IS A TENANT AND LATER IN THE CASE HE WANTED AN EMANCIPATION PATENT IN HIS NAME. HE PRESENTED AFFIDAVITS AS PROOF HE IS TENANT. BUT THE AFFIANTS WERE NOT PRESENTED. SC RULED THAT REYES HAS TO PROVE THAT HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING AND THAT THE DAR SECRETARY HAS THE SOLE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH ISSUE. AND EVEN IF HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING HE CANNOT ON THAT GROUND EJECT THE TENANT. THE LAW SPECIFIES THE GROUNDS FOR EJECTING A TENANT AND TILLING A RETAINED FARM HOLDING IS NOT ONE OF THEM. BARRIOS IS A TENANT BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED INCLUDING AFFIDAVITS WHOSE AFFIANTS WERE NOT PRESENTED. TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT FOLLOWED IN DARAB PROCEEDINGS.  BUT HE CANNOT BE ISSUED AN EMANCIPATION PATENT BECAUSE HE HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS. THERE IS A PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AND REQUIREMENTS TO BE COMPLIED.

DOCTRINES:

DARAB IS NOT BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES.

Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 3, Rule I of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁶), the Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, thus:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁷) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding the admission and sufficiency of evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Thus, in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,²⁸ the Court held:

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’²⁹

Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.³⁰

STEPS FOR ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENT

The Primer on Agrarian Reform³² enumerates the steps in transferring the land to the tenant-tiller, thus:

a. First step: the identification of tenants, landowners, and the land covered by OLT.

b. Second step: land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use;

c. Third step: the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). To ensure accuracy and safeguard against falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer Center (NCC) at Camp Aguinaldo;

d. Fourth step: valuation of the land covered for amortization computation;

e. Fifth step: amortization payments of tenant-tillers over fifteen (15) year period; and

f. Sixth step: the issuance of the Emancipation Patent.³³

Thus, there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. As regards respondent, the records are bereft of evidence indicating that this procedure has been followed.

DOCUMENTS TO BE SUBMITTED SO ONE CAN BE ENTITLED TO  EMANCIPATION PATENT

Furthermore, there are several supporting documents which a tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent, such as:

a. Application for issuance of Emancipation Patent;

b. Applicant’s (owner’s) copy of Certificate of Land Transfer.

c. Certification of the landowner and the Land Bank of the Philippines that the applicant has tendered full payment of the parcel of land as described in the application and as actually tilled by him;

d. Certification by the President of the Samahang Nayon or by the head of farmers’ cooperative duly confirmed by the municipal district officer (MDO) of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) that the applicant is a full-fledged member of a duly registered farmers’ cooperative or a certification to these effect;

e. Copy of the technical (graphical) description of the land parcel applied for prepared by the Bureau of Land Sketching Team (BLST) and approved by the regional director of the Bureau of Lands;

f. Clearance from the MAR field team (MARFT)or the MAR District Office (MARDO) legal officer or trial attorney; or in their absence, a clearance by the MARFT leader to the effect that the land parcel applied for is not subject of adverse claim, duly confirmed by the legal officer or trial attorney of the MAR Regional Office or, in their absence, by the regional director;

g. Xerox copy of Official Receipts or certification by the municipal treasurer showing that the applicant has fully paid or has effected up-to-date payment of the realty taxes due on the land parcel applied for; and

h. Certification by the MARFT leader whether applicant has acquired farm machineries from the MAR and/or from other government agencies.³⁴

DAR SECRETARY HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUE  ON WHETHER ONE IS ENTITLED TO A RETENTION AREA.

On the issue of petitioner’s claim that the subject landholding forms part of the retained area awarded to him and his sisters, the Court notes that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s claim. Furthermore, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a retention area.³⁸ Indeed, under Section 3 (3.5), Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, the exercise of the right of retention by the landowner is under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR. Besides, even if the subject landholding forms part of petitioner’s retained area, petitioner landowner may still not eject respondent tenant absent any of the causes provided under the law. The landowner cannot just terminate the leasehold relationship without valid cause.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review¹ assails the 8 February 2006 Decision² and the 29 May 2006 Resolution³ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90212. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 29 June 1998 Decision and the 7 December 2004 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 5504, declaring Leopoldo Barrios as bona fide tenant of the subject landholding. The DARAB reversed the 31 October 1996 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Board (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga.

The Facts

On 26 September 1995, petitioner Renato Reyes (petitioner) filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, PARAD of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint for ejectment against respondent Leopoldo Barrios (respondent). The case was docketed as DARAB CASE No. 1089-P’95.

The case involves a parcel of land measuring approximately 3.6 hectares (landholding)⁴ which forms part of the property with an aggregate area of 527,695 square meters (property)⁵ located at Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14488.⁶ The property was co-owned by petitioner and his four sisters.⁷ Petitioner claimed that the property became subject of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27), except the 3.6‒hectare landholding which was allegedly retained. In his Memorandum⁸ dated 18 September 2007, petitioner averred that he and his sister Leticia V. Reyes are the co-owners of the landholding. Petitioner hired respondent as the overseer of the farm and piggery on the landholding. However, petitioner contended that respondent never remitted the proceeds from the piggery business and the fruits from the landholding.⁹

On the other hand, respondent alleged that he was a tenant of the landholding since 1972 and he even built his house on the subject landholding. Respondent also acted as the caretaker of the piggery business on the landholding. Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, respondent stated that petitioner’s wife took all the proceeds from the piggery business, which later ceased operation due to an epidemic.

When respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearings, petitioner moved to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Respondent alleged that his failure to attend the scheduled hearings was because he received the Notice for the 29 February 1996 hearing only on 6 March 1996. Respondent moved for the postponement of the hearing because he was bedridden due to hypertension and heart ailment.¹⁰ However, the PARAD again heard the case ex-parte on 28 March 1996, of which respondent alleged that he was still not notified.

On 31 October 1996, the PARAD rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office renders judgment declaring that herein plaintiff [Renato Reyes] is entitled to recover the possession of the property subject of this present litigation; ordering the defendant [Leopoldo Barrios] or anyone claiming any right or authority under him to vacate the premises in question and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff; and ordering the defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 to the plaintiff as attorney’s fees.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.¹¹

Respondent appealed to the DARAB. Meanwhile, respondent passed away on 13 February 1997¹² and was substituted by his spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.¹³

On 29 June 1998, the DARAB reversed the PARAD decision and held that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the landholding and that he cannot be ejected from the landholding absent any justifiable cause. The DARAB held:

It appears that Respondent-Appellant is listed as farmer-beneficiary of the land transfer program, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Officer-in-charge of Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team. The fact of tenancy is buttressed by the joint statement dated March 5, 1989 of residents of neighboring lots who attest to Respondent-Appellant’s cultivation of subject lot. As tenant thereon, Respondent-Appellant, therefore, cannot just be ejected. The causes for extinguishment of Leasehold Relation pursuant to Section 36, Republic Act No. 6657 are:

1. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the lessor;

2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the lessee, written notice of which shall be served three (3) months in advance;

3. Absence of successor or qualified heir, in case of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee;

4. Judicial ejectment of the lessee for causes provided under Sec. 36 of the Code;

5. Acquisition by the lessee of the landholding;

6. Termination of the leasehold under Sec. 38;

7. Mutual consent of the parties; and

8. Conversion of the landholding for non-agricultural purposes subject to the conditions required by law.

The records are bereft of evidence showing the existence of any of the above-quoted circumstances to justify ejectment of Respondent-Appellant from said landholding.

Under the prevailing circumstances, we hold that Respondent-Appellant Barrios is a bona fide tenant of the landholding.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE, and a new one entered:

1.      Declaring Respondent-Appellant Leopoldo Barrios a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding. However, due to his death during the pendency of this case, the surviving spouse, if qualified, shall succeed; if not, the eldest descendant will succeed or the descending descendant in the order of their age;

2.      Directing the plaintiff-landowner Renato Reyes to reinstate the qualified heir of Respondent-Appellant and to maintain him in peaceful possession as cultivator thereof; and

3.      Directing the DAR Regional Office, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to issue Certificate of Agricultural Lease (CAL) after fixing the lease rental therefor.

SO ORDERED.¹⁴

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking for the reversal of the DARAB decision and the reinstatement of the PARAD decision. Respondent, substituted by his spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios, also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, asking for the modification of the decision by declaring respondent as a beneficiary under PD 27 and to issue an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s surviving spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.

In its 7 December 2004 Resolution, the DARAB denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and granted respondent’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration, thus:

In the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Movant alleged that this Board in its decision has declared that the deceased Defendant-Appellant Leopoldo Barrios is a bona fide tenant on the subject landholding. Moreover, Plaintiff-Appellee maintains that page three (3) of the decision rendered by this Board finds and provides that “Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanisms therefore.” Hence, movant prayed that an Emancipation Patent be issued in lieu of the Certificate of Agricultural Lease in consonance with the findings of this Board and DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1988.

Acting on said motion, this Board finds that the appealed decision shows substantial appreciation that deceased Defendant-Appellant was a bona fide tenant on the subject landholding. Likewise, this Board, in the assailed decision sustained the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, providing “the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil . . .”

From the foregoing findings, the pronouncement of this Board specifically paragraph three (3) of the decision seeks modification. In finding that deceased Defendant-Appellant was a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding and declaring the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, the subsequent issuance of a Certificate of Agricultural Lease as provided in the assailed decision is not in consonance with the findings of the Board. Hence, this Board is constrained to modify or apply the correct conclusions drawn from the facts of the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Motion for Reconsideration dated September 30, 1995 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Whereas, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated October 5, 1998 is GRANTED and a new judgment is rendered, as follows:

1.      Paragraph three (3) of the decision dated June 29, 1998 is hereby modified;

2.      Directing the DAR Regional Director, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), to issue Emancipation Patent in favor of Defendant-Appellant or his heir, herein substitute Defendant-Appellant Lucia Manalus-Barrios;

3.      Directing Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors, co-owners, and the alleged former tenants and all those persons acting on their behalf to vacate the subject landholding and to immediately reinstate the substitute Defendant-Appellant thereto and to maintain her in peaceful possession thereof;

4.      Declaring the landholding fully paid by the defendant-appellant;

5.      Directing the Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors and co-owners to reimburse 75% of palay harvest, of its cash equivalent, on the remaining 12½ croppings to the Defendant-Appellant and deducting therefrom the amount of the expenses incurred by the Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors and co-owners in the present planting season.

Let records of this case be remanded to the Sala of the Honorable Provincial Adjudicator of Pampanga for the immediate issuance of a writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.¹⁵

Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration, which the DARAB denied in its Resolution dated 5 May 2005.¹⁶ Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition for review in its 8 February 2006 Decision. The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its 29 May 2006 Resolution.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the DARAB, thus:

But the petitioner insists that public respondent decided the case at bench against him in defiance of the evidence on record. We do not agree. The DARAB based its findings on the certification dated December 7, 1982 of then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now Department of Agrarian Reform) of Sta. Ana, Pampanga finding Leopoldo Barrios as legitimate farmer-beneficiary over a four (4) hectare unirrigated land owned by Renato Reyes, located at Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga; on the certification issued by the Officer-in-charge of Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team listing respondent-appellant as farmer-beneficiary; and on the joint statement dated March 5, 1989 of residents of neighboring lots who attested to respondent-appellant’s cultivation and occupation of the subject lot.

It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, as in the case at bench, the quantum of evidence required to sustain a judgment is only substantial evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently. Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect, and even finality, by the appellate tribunal, if supported by substantial evidence, this in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.¹⁷

The Issues

In his petition, petitioner submits that:

1.      THE COURT OF APPEALS BY RULING IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX “A”) THAT THE DARAB WAS CORRECT IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST HIM AS THIS IS SUPPORTED BY THE CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM TEAM OF ARAYAT-STA. ANA-CANDABA, PAMPANGA DENIED PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT NOT ONLY ARE THE EVIDENCE OF BARRIOS IRRELEVANT BUT THEY [ARE] ALSO MERE MACHINE COPIES WHICH WERE NEVER PRESENTED IN A PROPER HEARING WHERE THE PETITIONER CAN SCRUTINIZE THEM AND CROSS-EXAMINE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THEM.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS LEGAL ERROR AND/OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO CORRECT THE DARAB IN NOT RECOGNIZING PETITIONER’S RIGHT OVER HIS RETAINED AREA WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AWARD IN CLAIM 83-144 OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES.¹⁸

The Ruling of the Court

We partially grant the petition. We hold that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding, as stated in the 29 June 1998 DARAB Decision in DARAB Case No. 5504. However, the 7 December 2004 DARAB Resolution, modifying the 29 June 1998 DARAB Decision and directing the DAR Regional Director to issue Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent or his heirs, should be set aside.

In this case, the DARAB ruling that respondent is a bona fide tenant is supported by evidence submitted by respondent, which included: (1) certification dated 7 December 1982 of the Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Region III, Pampanga District, stating that respondent is a bona fide farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer of the four (4)-hectare farmholding owned by petitioner;¹⁹ (2) joint statement (“Salaysay”) dated 5 March 1989 of the former farmworkers of the neighboring farmlots attesting to respondent’s occupation and cultivation of the subject landholding;²⁰ (3) pictures of the subject landholding which was planted with palay crops;²¹ and (4) picture of respondent’s house constructed on the subject landholding.²²

Furthermore, in compliance with the Order²³ dated 30 September 2002 of the DARAB, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Pampanga forwarded to the DARAB the status report on the subject landholding,²⁴ which states:

Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Region III

Municipal Agrarian Reform Office

Candaba, Pampanga

Engr. Rodolfo S. Pangilinan

OIC-PARO

DARPO-Del Pilar,

City of San Fernando Pampanga

Sir:

This refers to the Order dated September 30, 2002 issued by DARCO Appeal Board with the instruction to submit status report of the subject landholding owned by Renato Reyes located at Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga.

That the undersigned conducted ocular inspection/verification and reveal the following finding to wit:

1.      That Renato Reyes the landowner and Leopoldo Barrios tenant are both deceased.

2.      That the subject landholding was taken over by Renato Reyes since 1996 and it is being administered by Antonio Manalus.

3.      That at present the land in question is planted to palay by the administrator Antonio Manalus with the used (sic) of farm labor and 30 mango tree[s] are existing of the subject landholding.

4.      That the house of Lucia Vda. De Barrios was constructed to the subject landholding with an area of 450 square meters more or less.

5.      That the qualified tenant beneficiaries [are] among the surviving heirs of Leopoldo Barrios is the wife of (sic) Lucia Vda. M. Barrios.

In view of the foregoing facts and base[d] on the Order dated September 30, 2002[,] [t]he undersigned schedule[d] mediation conference on November 18, 2002 in preparation of the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold.

Very truly yours,

(signed)

SALVADOR S. TOTAAN

M.A.R.O.²⁵

Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 3, Rule I of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁶), the Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, thus:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁷) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding the admission and sufficiency of evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Thus, in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,²⁸ the Court held:

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’²⁹

Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.³⁰

Although we affirm the ruling of the DARAB that respondent is a bona fide tenant, we disagree with its order for the issuance of an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s heir, as provided in its Resolution dated 7 December 2004. The records show that when the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, respondent was not included in the list of tenant beneficiaries who were issued Emancipation Patents, as noted on the title of the property, TCT No. 14488, which was partially canceled in view of the issuance of the new TCTs in favor of the tenant beneficiaries.³¹

The Primer on Agrarian Reform³² enumerates the steps in transferring the land to the tenant-tiller, thus:

a. First step: the identification of tenants, landowners, and the land covered by OLT.

b. Second step: land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use;

c. Third step: the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). To ensure accuracy and safeguard against falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer Center (NCC) at Camp Aguinaldo;

d. Fourth step: valuation of the land covered for amortization computation;

e. Fifth step: amortization payments of tenant-tillers over fifteen (15) year period; and

f. Sixth step: the issuance of the Emancipation Patent.³³

Thus, there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. As regards respondent, the records are bereft of evidence indicating that this procedure has been followed.

Furthermore, there are several supporting documents which a tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent, such as:

a. Application for issuance of Emancipation Patent;

b. Applicant’s (owner’s) copy of Certificate of Land Transfer.

c. Certification of the landowner and the Land Bank of the Philippines that the applicant has tendered full payment of the parcel of land as described in the application and as actually tilled by him;

d. Certification by the President of the Samahang Nayon or by the head of farmers’ cooperative duly confirmed by the municipal district officer (MDO) of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) that the applicant is a full-fledged member of a duly registered farmers’ cooperative or a certification to these effect;

e. Copy of the technical (graphical) description of the land parcel applied for prepared by the Bureau of Land Sketching Team (BLST) and approved by the regional director of the Bureau of Lands;

f. Clearance from the MAR field team (MARFT)or the MAR District Office (MARDO) legal officer or trial attorney; or in their absence, a clearance by the MARFT leader to the effect that the land parcel applied for is not subject of adverse claim, duly confirmed by the legal officer or trial attorney of the MAR Regional Office or, in their absence, by the regional director;

g. Xerox copy of Official Receipts or certification by the municipal treasurer showing that the applicant has fully paid or has effected up-to-date payment of the realty taxes due on the land parcel applied for; and

h. Certification by the MARFT leader whether applicant has acquired farm machineries from the MAR and/or from other government agencies.³⁴

Majority of these supporting documents are lacking in this case. Hence, it was improper for the DARAB to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent without the required supporting documents and without following the requisite procedure before an Emancipation Patent may be validly issued.

Moreover, there was no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent has fully paid the value of the subject landholding. As held in Mago v. Barbin,³⁵ the laws mandate full payment of just compensation for the lands acquired under PD 27 prior to the issuance of Emancipation Patents, thus:

In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266, the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them. Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the amortizations.³⁶

Clearly, respondent is not entitled to be issued an Emancipation Patent considering that he has not fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27.³⁷

On the issue of petitioner’s claim that the subject landholding forms part of the retained area awarded to him and his sisters, the Court notes that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s claim. Furthermore, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a retention area.³⁸ Indeed, under Section 3 (3.5), Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, the exercise of the right of retention by the landowner is under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR. Besides, even if the subject landholding forms part of petitioner’s retained area, petitioner landowner may still not eject respondent tenant absent any of the causes provided under the law. The landowner cannot just terminate the leasehold relationship without valid cause.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 February 2006 Decision and the 29 May 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90212. We REINSTATE the 29 June 1998 Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 5504.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, pp. 8-21. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now SC Associate Justice) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.

3Id. at 23.

4The Certification dated 7 December 1982 of the Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team states that the land owned by petitioner is a 4-hectare unirrigated farmholding, id. at 250. Petitioner’s complaint states that the retained area is 3.6 hectares. However, in his petition for review, petitioner stated that the retained property is a 3.5 hectare orchard farm which is part of the estate covered by TCT No. 14488 with a total area of 527,695 square meters.

5The property covered under TCT No. 14488 consists of five (5) parcels of land with a total aggregate area of 527,695 square meters.

6Rollo, pp. 355-363.

7TCT No. 14488 states that the property is owned by Maria Pilar Dolores V. Reyes, Consolacion V. Reyes, Renato V. Reyes, Leticia V. Reyes, and Martina V. Reyes, id. at 355.

8Id. at 530-541.

9Id. at 97-100.

10Manifestations & Motion to Postpone Hearing, dated 25 March 1996, CA rollo, pp. 191-192.

11Rollo, pp. 110-111.

12Id. at 243.

13Id. at 388.

14 Id. at 84-85.

15Id. at 90-92.

16Id. at 94-95.

17Id. at 54.

18Id. at 33-34.

19Id. at 250.

20Id. at 254.

21Id. at 314.

22Id. at 315.

23Id. at 399-400.

243^rd Indorsement dated 30 October 2002 signed by the OIC-PARO Engr. Rodolfo S. Pangilinan of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Region III, San Fernando City.

25Rollo, p. 401. Emphasis supplied.

26SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. ‒ The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudication Offices shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c. The provision of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board.

27SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. ‒ The proceedings before the Adjudicator shall be non-litigious in nature.

Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply.

The Adjudicator shall employ reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy including a thorough examination or re-examination of witnesses and the conduct of ocular inspection of the premises in question, if necessary.

28G.R. No. 96492, 26 November 1992, 216 SCRA 25.

29 Id. at 32.

30Rule I, Section 2 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.

31TCT No. 14488, rollo, pp. 355-363.

32Produced by the Agrarian Reform Communication Unit, National Media Production Center for the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (1979) and prepared in consultation with the Bureau of Land Tenure Improvement, Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Bureau of Resettlement, Center for Operation Land Transfer and the Public Information Division of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, id. at 377-384.

33Id. at 380.

34Primer on Agrarian Reform, id. at 383.

35G.R. No. 173923, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 383.

36Id. at 393.

37Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE) provides that: “After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.”

38CA Decision, p. 13; rollo, p. 20.