Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES


CASE 0036: HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES VS. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 29, 9TH JUDICIAL REGION, SAN MIGUEL, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR AND VILMA V. MINOR (G.R. NO. 157852, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. LEONARDO- DE CASTRO) SUBJECTS: QUIETING OF TITLE; LACHES. BRIEF TITLE: HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. HON. RAMAS ET AL.

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 1 Comment
January 9, 2011

HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES VS. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 29, 9TH JUDICIAL REGION, SAN MIGUEL, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR AND VILMA V. MINOR (G.R. NO. 157852, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. LEONARDO- DE CASTRO) SUBJECTS: QUIETING OF TITLE; LACHES. BRIEF TITLE: HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. HON. RAMAS ET AL.

x — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x 

DIGEST

VALIENTES FILED A CASE TO CANCEL TCT OF MINOR ON GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS CONVEYED BY A FRAUDULENT DEED. MINOR MOVED TO DISMISS ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION. RTC DENIED. MINOR MOVED FOR RECON ON GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING SINCE EARLIER VALIENTES FILED A CASE FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE. RTC DISMISSED CASE. VALIENTES FILED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AT CA. CA DISMISSED ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. THESE GROUNDS WERE NEVER RAISED BY ON APPEAL IN APPELLEES BRIEF.

IS THE DISMISSAL PROPER. IS PRESCRIPTION A VALID GROUND.

SC RULED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN DISMISS THE PETITION MOTU PROPIO BASED ON GROUNDS IT CONSIDER PROPER.

PRESCRIPTION IS PROPER. PETITIONER WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND. THEREFORE HIS ACTION IS NOT QUIETING TITLE WHICH DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. HIS ACTION IS BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST (HE WHO BY FRAUD OR MISTAKE POSSESS THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER KEEPS THE SAME IN TRUST FOR THE LATTER) AND THEREFORE PRESCIBES IN 10 YEARS. ACTION WAS BROUGHT ONLY AFTER 28 YEARS.

 

 

DOCTRINES

 

 

 

COURT OF APPEALS CAN DISMISS A CASE MOTU PROPIO

 

Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellee’s Brief runs contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel.[1][14]  

We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this issue.

Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court.   

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

 

 

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio.  Furthermore, as regards the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio.  While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.[2][15]

 

 

 

IN CASE OF FORGED SALE, DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE. IF THE PARTY IS NOT IN POSESSION OF THE PROPERTY, THE ACTION IS BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST AND PRESCRIPTION SETS IN AFTER 10 YEARS FROM ISSUANCE OF TITLE. IF PARTY IS IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY THEN IT IS AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. IN THIS CASE PETITIONER IS NOT IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.

 

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned for “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES,” the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not prescribe.  Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,[3][17] which in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,[4][18] are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor forgery was attendant in said cases.

As regards petitioners’ claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-021 is really one of quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,[5][19] wherein we held:

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178).  But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.[6][20]

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they claim that private respondent Minor’s predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust.  In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.  In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property.  Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period. 

 

 

 

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE PRESCRIPTION IS 30 YEARS. THIS IS A GENERAL PROVISION. PD 1529 APPLIES. IT PROVIDES 1 YEAR PRESCRIPTION ONLY. BUT JURISPRUDENCE EXTENDS THIS TO 10 YEARS UNDER THE PROVISION ON IMPLIED TRUST.

 

 

 

As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the prescriptive period for filing their complaint is thirty years, pursuant to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively provide:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137.  Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint, including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA.  Thus, for purposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted that private respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest are in bad faith.  The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which is thirty years.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.  Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.[7][21] 

As previously discussed, however, we have allowed actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts even beyond such one-year period, for such actions respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible.  We explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.[8][22]: 

We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[9][23]

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427.  This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners’ claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently unconvincing. 

[1][14]          Rollo, p. 317, Petitioner’s memorandum.

[2][15]          Logronio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 907, 918 (1999); Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 317, 335-336.

[3][17]          399 Phil. 616 (2000).

[4][18]          G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.

[5][19]          G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330.

[6][20]          Id. at 334-335.

[7][21]          Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 31 and 32 provide:

Section 31. Decree of registration. – x x x

 The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description “To all whom it may concern.”

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. – The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

[8][22]          G.R. No. L-38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.

[9][23]          Id. at 442.

 

X ———————————————————————- X 

 

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

 

This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision[1][1] of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the subsequent Resolution denying reconsideration dated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur then covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-18,208 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur.    In 1939, Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen).  In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen.  Through an allegedly forged document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5,427 in their name.  On February 28, 1970, Maria Valientes Bucoy and Vicente Valientes, legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim[2][2] duly entered in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-5,427.  Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the subject property. 

On June 20, 1979, herein private respondent Minor filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pagadian City a “PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TCT NO. T-5,427 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,” which was docketed as SPL Case No. 1861.[3][3]  On July 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Minor’s prayer to allow the Register of Deeds to have the title to the subject property transferred to her name.

In the meantime, on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur for the “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES.”  The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-021.[4][4]

Private respondent Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.  On August 3, 2000, the RTC issued an order in open court ruling that forum shopping does not apply.  On September 22, 2000, private respondent Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5][5] of the August 3, 2000 Order.  On May 7, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration by dismissing Civil Case No. 98-021 on the ground of forum shopping.[6][6]  Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7][7] on May 30, 2001, but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order[8][8] dated September 18, 2001.

On November 12, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[9][9] assailing the RTC Orders dated May 7, 2001 and September 18, 2001.  Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the trial court was correct in finding that Civil Case No. 98-021 constitutes forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata with SPL Case No. 186.  The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.

The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on said petition on August 16, 2002.  Despite agreeing with petitioners that there was no forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata in the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021, the Court of Appeals, asserting that it has the discretion to review matters not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case,[10][10] held that Civil Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, wherein petitioners raised the following grounds for assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT APPLIED PRESCRIPTION IN THE PRESENT PETITION, AFTER ALL, WHEN SHE DID NOT APPEAL THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE SOLE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA, PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE ALREADY WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION, THE PRESENT ACTION, ALTHOUGH CAPTIONED FOR CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE AND ETC., SUBSTANTIALLY, IS FOR QUIETING OF TITLE, HENCE, PRESCRIPTION WILL NOT LIE.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPLYING THE CASES OF TENIO-OBSEQUIO VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS, 330 SCRA 88, AND DECLARO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 346 SCRA 57 WHEN FACTS OBTAINING IN SAID CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427 ON THE GROUND OF FORGERY OR BY REASON OF FORGED DOCUMENT CAPTIONED VENTA DEFINITIVA.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT [RENEGED] FROM ITS SOLEMN DUTY TO RENDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DUE THE PARTIES RATHER THAN THE SANCTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES OR EQUITY ON PRESCRIPTION.[11][11]

Authority of the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the Complaint on the Grounds of Prescription and Laches Despite Respondent’s Failure to Appeal the Dismissal Order

 

 

Petitioners recount that private respondent Minor interposed prescription as one of her grounds for the dismissal of the case in her Answer with Affirmative Defenses.   When private respondent Minor’s Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in open court, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration dwelling on forum shopping, litis pendentia and/or res judicata.[12][12]  The trial court proceeded to dismiss the case on the ground of forum shopping.[13][13]  Petitioners now claim before us that private respondent Minor’s failure to appeal the RTC’s dismissal of the complaint on the sole ground of forum shopping constituted a waiver of the defense of prescription.  Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellee’s Brief runs contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel.[14][14]  

We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this issue.

Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court.   

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

 

 

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio.  Furthermore, as regards the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio.  While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.[15][15]

Having thus determined the authority of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches despite private respondent Minor’s failure to appeal the dismissal Order, We shall now proceed to determine whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021.

Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title

After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of petitioners on the issue of whether Civil Case No. 98-021 is already barred by forum shopping, res judicata or litis pendentia, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal order, but on the grounds of prescription and laches:

Be that as it may, this Court is imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case (Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. vs. Uy, 344 SCRA 238).

The case cannot prosper because an action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, which must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice (Declaro vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 57).  Where a party has neglected to assert his rights over a property in question for an unreasonably long period, he is estopped from questioning the validity of another person’s title to the property (Ibid.)  Long inaction and passivity in asserting one’s rights over a disputed property precludes him from recovering said property (Po Lam vs. Court vs. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 86).

In conclusion, petitioners’ cause of action has already prescribed and now heavily infirmed with laches.[16][16]

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned for “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES,” the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not prescribe.  Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,[17][17] which in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,[18][18] are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor forgery was attendant in said cases.

As regards petitioners’ claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-021 is really one of quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,[19][19] wherein we held:

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178).  But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.[20][20]

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they claim that private respondent Minor’s predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust.  In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.  In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property.  Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period. 

As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the prescriptive period for filing their complaint is thirty years, pursuant to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively provide:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137.  Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint, including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA.  Thus, for purposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted that private respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest are in bad faith.  The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which is thirty years.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.  Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.[21][21] 

As previously discussed, however, we have allowed actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts even beyond such one-year period, for such actions respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible.  We explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.[22][22]: 

We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[23][23]

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427.  This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners’ claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently unconvincing.

As a final note, it should be pointed out that in choosing to file a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, petitioners are required to prove nothing less than grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.  We have consistently held that “certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.”[24][24]  In the case at bar, petitioners proved neither grave abuse of discretion, nor even a simple error of judgment on the part of the Court of Appeals.  The present petition should, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 

 

 

 

 

 

                                             TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice
   
   
   
   
   
   
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

 

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

[1][1]           Rollo, pp. 111-115; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos with then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, concurring.

[2][2]           CA rollo, pp. 40-41.

[3][3]           Id. at 38-39.

[4][4]           Id. at 30-34.

[5][5]           Id. at 52-53.

[6][6]           Id. at 59-61.

[7][7]           Id. at 62-69. 

[8][8]           Id. at 78-80.

[9][9]           Id. at 5-22.

[10][10]         Id. at 114.

[11][11]         Rollo, pp. 20-21.

[12][12]         CA rollo, pp. 52-53.

[13][13]         Id. at 59-61.

[14][14]         Rollo, p. 317, Petitioner’s memorandum.

[15][15]         Logronio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 907, 918 (1999); Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 317, 335-336.

[16][16]         Rollo, p. 114.

[17][17]         399 Phil. 616 (2000).

[18][18]         G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.

[19][19]         G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330.

[20][20]         Id. at 334-335.

[21][21]         Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 31 and 32 provide:

Section 31. Decree of registration. – x x x

 The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description “To all whom it may concern.”

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. – The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

[22][22]         G.R. No. L-38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.

[23][23]         Id. at 442.

[24][24]         Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1, 41-42 (1996).

Comment

CASE 0035: ROMER SY TAN VS. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM (G.R. NO. 174570, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. PERALTA) SUBJECTS: SEARCH WARRANT; ROBBERY. BRIEF TITLE: TAN VS. GUE ET AL.

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ROMER SY TAN VS. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM (G.R. NO. 174570, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. PERALTA) SUBJECTS: SEARCH WARRANT; ROBBERY. BRIEF TITLE: TAN VS. GUE ET AL. 

x——————————————————————-x

 

 

 

DOCTRINES:

 

 

 

RTC ALLOWED WITHDRAWAL OF INFORMATION IN A ROBBERY CASE FILED ON THE BASIS OF SEARCH WARRANT. THE ISSUE RAISED AT SC ON WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT BECAME MOOT

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance  by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic.  Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.[1][8]

 

 

IF A CASE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT IS FILED THE  EVIDENCE OBTAINED THE ROBBERY CASE  BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT CANNOT BE USED.

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.  Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.  Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.  Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

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R E S O L U T I O N

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

          On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[2][1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED.  The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

          On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[3][2] wherein respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375.  As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

          In his Comment[4][3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision.  Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

          On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[5][4] wherein respondents were required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Court’s directive and submitted a certified true copy of the Order.[6][5] 

In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.[7][6]  The RTC also considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the Resolution[8][7] dated November 12, 2007.  

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents’ motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance  by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic.  Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.[9][8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.  Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.  Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.  Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.  The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

                                                          DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                  Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.     ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

               Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

 

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

                                                                  

 

[1][8]           See Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Inc. v. Jose, G.R. No. 128766, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 9.

[2][1]           Rollo, pp. 241-251.

[3][2]           Id. at 252-272.

[4][3]           Id. at 280-284.

[5][4]           Id. at 346.

[6][5]           Id. at 350-351.

[7][6]           CA-G.R. SP No. 90368, Amended Decision dated August 26, 2006, p. 6; rollo, pp. 180-191.

[8][7]           Rollo (Sy Siy Ho & SONA, Inc. v. Sy Tiong Gui, at al., G.R. No. 177829), pp. 906-907.

[9][8]           See Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Inc. v. Jose, G.R. No. 128766, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 9.

Comment

CASE 0034: RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES (G.R. NO. 182645, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. PERALTA) SUBJECTS: JOINDER OF PARTIES. BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES.

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January 8, 2011

 

CASE 0034: RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES (G.R. NO. 182645, 15  DECEMBER 2010, J. PERALTA) SUBJECTS: JOINDER OF PARTIES. BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES.

 

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

                         

RESOLUTION

 

PERALTA, J.: 

          Before the Court is the Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Jaime M. Robles (Robles) seeking to set aside this Court’s Decision dated December 4, 2009 which nullified the April 16, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57417 and the February 27, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 34 in SP No. IR-1110 and reinstated the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the same RTC in the same case.

          Robles’ Motion is based on the following arguments:

            A.) THE HEREIN MOVANT – JAIME M. ROBLES, BEING A REAL           PARTY-IN-INTEREST – WAS NEVER IMPLEADED AS RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (WITH PRAYER TO CLARIFY JUDGMENT) DATED MAY 10, 2008 WHICH WAS FILED BEFORE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON MAY 13, 2008 – – – BY PETITIONER-RENE B. PASCUAL;

B.) THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER 04, 2009 ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 182645 WAS RENDERED BASED ON A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MEMORANDUM DATED APRIL 7, 2009, WHOSE COPIES THEREOF WERE NEVER SERVED UPON THE HEREIN MOVANT;

C.) THE NAME OF HEREIN MOVANT-JAIME M. ROBLES APPEARS AS RESPONDENT IN THE TITLE OF THIS CASE AS CAPTIONED IN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT’S ASSAILED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 04, 2009. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE COMMENT NOR ANSWER TO THE PETITION, A CLEAR VIOLATION TO (sic) THE RULES OF COURT AND TO (sic) THE CONSTITUTION.

D.) THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PRESENTED THE SALIENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL AND THE RULE THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL. THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DATED APRIL 16, 2002 HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY BY WAY OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT ON NOVEMBER 10, 2005, IN G.R. NO. 168648 ENTITLED JAIME M. ROBLES PETITIONER, VS. HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL., AS RESPONDENTS.[1][1]

          Robles prays for the reversal of the presently assailed Decision and the entry of a new judgment requiring him to file his comment and memorandum to the petition. Robles also seeks the reinstatement of the December 15, 1994 Order of the RTC declaring him as the only forced heir and next of kin of Hermogenes Rodriguez.

          For a clearer discussion and resolution of the instant Motion, it bears to restate the relevant antecedent facts as stated in the assailed Decision of this Court, to wit:

                        On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC [of Iriga City]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.

                        Henry, Certeza and Rosalina’s claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.

                        At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.

                        Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.

                        Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.

                        Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:

                        (1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;

                        (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;

                        (3) Jaime Robles;

                        (4) Florencia Rodriguez;

                        (5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

                        (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez

                        Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.

                        In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.

                        After hearing on Jamie Robles’ application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.

                        On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.

                        On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.[2][2]

          Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles’ failure to file a record on appeal.

          Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

          In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance.

          On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.

          Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004.  Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

          On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory.

          On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.

          On December 4, 2009, this Court rendered the presently assailed Decision which held as follows:

                        In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. x x x

                        x x x x             

The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, x x x

                        x x x x             

                        In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On 12 October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles’ appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality.

                        This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. x x x Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the relaxation of said rule.[3][3]

          The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely affected or injured or benefited by the judgment in the instant case.  He also argues that the failure of service upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as petitioner’s memorandum, and the fact that he was not required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to the said petition nor served with any order, resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to due process.

          In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and the prevailing party. Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded, because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the CA as well as the questioned Order of the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles’ name as respondent in the caption of the instant petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed with this Court involving Robles and the subject estate.

          The Court finds partial merit in the instant motion.

          Petitioner admitted in his Comment and Opposition to Robles’ Motion that in the instant petition he filed, only the CA and the RTC were impleaded as respondents.

          Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

                        Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

                        Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.[4][4]

          In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[5][5] this Court ruled as follows:

                        An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.” Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[6][6]

            In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence.[7][7] Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment.  As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for certiorari defective.[8][8]

          Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.

          The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.[9][9] The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.[10][10] Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just.[11][11] If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner’s failure to comply therewith.[12][12]

          Based on the foregoing, and in the interest of fair play, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision and allow Robles to file his comment on the petition.

          WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2009 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ORDERED to furnish Robles a copy of his petition for certiorari within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Thereafter, Robles is DIRECTED to file his comment on the petition within a period of ten (10) days from notice.

          SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                             Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.        ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA                

            Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice 

 

[1][1]           Rollo, pp. 273-274.

[2][2]           Id. at 228-231.

[3][3]           Id. at 198-200.

[4][4]           Emphasis supplied.

[5][5]           G.R. No. 166302, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA, 591.

[6][6]           Id. at 595-596.

[7][7]           Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 91004-05, August 20, 1992, 212 SCRA 713, 719.

[8][8]           Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium Vol. I (Sixth Revised Edition), p. 724, citing Amargo v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA  64, 75 (1973).

[9][9]           Plasabas v. CA, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 686, 692; 692; Nocom v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 390, 413; Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 88; Pepsico, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 58, 67; Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc. v. Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 421, 433.

[10][10]         Id.

[11][11]         Id.

[12][12]         Id.

Comment