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CASE 2011-0009: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO MANLANGIT Y TRESBALLES (G.R. NO. 189806, 12 JANUARY 2011,VELASCO, JR., J) SUBJECTS: SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; ILLEGAL POSSESSION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. MANLANGIT.)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 1 Comment

January 22, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO MANLANGIT Y TRESBALLES (G.R. NO. 189806, 12 JANUARY 2011,VELASCO, JR., J) SUBJECTS: SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; ILLEGAL POSSESSION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. MANLANGIT.)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA’s August 28, 2009 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

WHAT ARE PUNISHABLE UNDER R.A. 9165?

SALE, TRADING, ADMINISTRATION, DISPENSATION, DELIVERY, DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS AND/OR CONTROLLED PRECURSORS AND ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS

USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous drugs. It provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.¾The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)

While Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.¾A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)

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WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?

(1) THE IDENTITY OF THE BUYER AND THE SELLER, THE OBJECT, AND CONSIDERATION;

(2) AND THE DELIVERY OF THE THING SOLD AND THE PAYMENT THEREFOR.

WHAT IS MATERIAL TO THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS IS THE PROOF THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE, COUPLED WITH THE PRESENTATION IN COURT OF EVIDENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI.

People v. Macatingag^{^[1]}^[11] prescribed the requirements for the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

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IN THIS CASE DID THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS?

YES.

The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the elements of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, which established the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies––particularly those of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credible––are now beyond question. As the Court ruled in Aparis v. People:^{^[2]}^[12]

As to the question of credibility of the police officers who served as principal witnesses for the prosecution, settled is the rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in the present case.

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HOW ABOUT THE ACCUSED’S DEFENSE OF DENIAL?

THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. THEREFORE IT CANNOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS’ PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.

NOTE: DENIAL IS OK AS DEFENSE BUT IT MUST BE BACKED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Moreover, accused-appellant’s defense of denial, without substantial evidence to support it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of the police officers’ performance of official functions. Thus, the Court ruled in People v. Llamado:^{^[3]}^[13]

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial. (Emphasis supplied.)

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DEFENSE ARGUED THAT THE BUY-BUST OPERATION IS NOT VALID BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PRIOR SURVEILLANCE OR TEST BUY. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

NO.

PRIOR SURVEILLANCE OR TEST BUY IS NOT NECESSARY AS LONG AS THE OPERATIVES ARE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR INFORMANT.

Contrary to accused-appellant’s challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation, the Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation.^{^[4]}^[14] (Emphasis supplied.)

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DEFENSE ARGUED THAT THE BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS NOT VALID BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SEARCH WARRANT. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

NO. WARRANTLESS ARREST IS ALLOWED UNDER THE LAW.

Furthermore, accused-appellant’s contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. The Court had the occasion to address this issue in People v. Doria:^{^[5]}^[15]

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.”

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:^{^[6]}^[16]

Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellant’s claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless arrest,” in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.

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ACCUSED ARGUES THAT THE ARRESTING OFFICERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE RULE ON HANDLING THE SEIZED DRUGS. SPECIFICALLY THE MARKING OF THE SPECIMEN WAS DONE IN THE PLACE OF INCIDENT BY MADAC OPERATIVE SORIANO, THE INVENTORY OF THE ITEM WAS DONE AT CLUSTER 4. THERE WAS NO PHOTOGRAPH MADE OF THE PLASTIC SACHET IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, MEDIA, ANY ELECTED LOCAL OFFICIAL, OR THE DOJ. IS THIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAD ESTABLISHED THE UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED DRUGS FROM THE BUY-BUST TEAM, TO THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AND TO THE FORENSIC CHEMIST. THUS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PROHIBITED DRUG PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT A QUO WAS THE ONE SEIZED FROM APPELLANT AND THAT INDEED, HE COMMITTED THE CRIMES IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS, AS LONG AS THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE APPREHENDING OFFICER/TEAM, SHALL NOT RENDER VOID AND INVALID SUCH SEIZURES OF AND CUSTODY OVER SAID ITEMS.

NOTE THE KEY CLAUSE: THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE APPREHENDING OFFICER/TEAM.

Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.¾The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied.)

In particular, accused-appellant argues that:

While the marking of the specimen was done in the place of incident by MADAC operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was done at Cluster 4. There was no photograph made of the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused, media, any elected local official, or the DOJ representatives, in clear violation of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165.^{^[7]}^[17]

Based on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits that he should, therefore, be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.

In People v. Rosialda,^{^[8]}^[18] the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:

Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a violation of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the alleged dangerous drugs seized by the apprehending officers be photographed “in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel.” Rosialda argues that such failure to comply with the provision of the law is fatal to his conviction.

This contention is untenable.

The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v. Rivera:

The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:

The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that ‘non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.’ The same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.

This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.

To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the specimen on site and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However, as ruled by the Court in Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.

And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not broken as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:

Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that Serrano marked the confiscated sachet of shabu in the presence of appellant at the place of incident and was turned over properly to the investigating officer together with the marked buy-bust money. Afterwards, the confiscated plastic sachet suspected to be containing “shabu” was brought to the forensic chemist for examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their “Pinagsanib na Salaysay sa Pag-aresto” immediately after the arrest and at the trial, Serrano positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is no doubt that the prohibited drug presented before the court a quo was the one seized from appellant and that indeed, he committed the crimes imputed against him.

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D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision^{^[9]}^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 12, 2007^{^[10]}^[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-sale and drug-use penalized by Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as follows:

That on or about the 24^th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug.^{^[11]}^[3]

On December 11, 2003, another information was filed against Manlangit for breach of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:

That sometime on or before or about the 24^th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drugs, and having been arrested and found positive for use of Methylamphetamine, after a confirmatory test, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methylamphetamine, a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.^{^[12]}^[4]

During the arraignment for both cases, Manlangit pleaded not guilty. Afterwards, the cases were tried jointly.

At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence as follows:

On November 24, 2003, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 4 office received information from an informant that a certain “Negro” was selling prohibited drugs alongCol. Santos Streetat Brgy. South Cembo,MakatiCity. The MADAC thereafter coordinated with the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSTOF) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to conduct a joint MADAC-police buy-bust operation. A team was assembled composed of several members of the different offices, among which Police Officer 2 Virginio Costa was designated as the team leader, with MADAC operative Wilfredo Serrano as the poseur-buyer and Roberto Bayona as his back-up. The team prepared buy-bust money for the operation, marking two (2) one hundred peso (PhP 100) bills with the initials “AAM.”

Upon arrival on Col. Santos Street, Brgy. Cembo, MakatiCity, the team spotted Manlangit standing in front of his house. The informant approached Manlangit and convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to purchase shabu from him. Manlangit asked Serrano how much shabu he wanted, to which Serrano replied that he wanted two hundred pesos (PhP 200) worth of shabu. Manlangit went inside his house and later reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in turn, gave Manlangit the marked money. Then Serrano gave the pre-arranged signal of lighting a cigarette to indicate to the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been consummated. Thus, the rest of the team approached Manlangit and proceeded to arrest him while informing him of constitutional rights and the reason for his arrest. The marked money was recovered from Manlangit’s pocket. The plastic sachet was then marked with the initials “FTM” and sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for analysis. The PNP crime laboratory identified the white crystalline substance as Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride in Chemistry Report No. D-1190-03. Manlangit was also brought to the PNP crime laboratory for a drug test, which yielded a positive result for use of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.^{^[13]}^[5]

Manlangit denied that such buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that the recovered shabu was not from him. He claimed that he was pointed out by a certain Eli Ballesteros to Serrano and Bayona. Thereafter, he was allegedly detained at the Barangay Hall of Brgy. Pitogo. There, he was allegedly interrogated by Serrano as to the location of the shabu and its proceeds, as well as the identity of the drug pushers in the area. He also claimed that whenever he answered that he did not know what Serrano was talking about, he was boxed in the chest. Later on, he said that he was brought to Camp Crame for drug testing.^{^[14]}^[6]

On July 12, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735, finding accused Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 5, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-sale) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. Said accused shall be given credit for the period of his preventive detention.

2) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735,^{^[15]}^[7] finding accused Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-use), and sentencing him to undergo rehabilitation for at least six (6) months in a government rehabilitation Center under the auspices of the Bureau of Correction subject to the provisions of Article VIII, RA 9165.

It is further ordered that the plastic sachet containing shabu, subject of Criminal Case No. 03-4735, be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the latter’s appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.^{^[16]}^[8]

From such Decision, Manlangit interposed an appeal with the CA.

In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support such contention, accused-appellant claimed that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. He pointed out that he was not in the list of suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the AIDSTOF. He further emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted without first conducting a surveillance or test buy to determine the veracity of the report made by the informant. He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of his identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search warrant.

Accused-appellant also raised the issue that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He argued that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function was overturned by the officers’ failure to follow the required procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust operation, as well as the procedure in the proper disposition, custody, and control of the subject specimen.

On August 28, 2009, the CA rendered the decision which affirmed the RTC’s Decision dated July 12, 2007. It ruled that contrary to accused-appellant’s contention, prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust operation. The case was a valid example of a warrantless arrest, accused-appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto. The CA further stated that accused-appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, in this case the members of the buy-bust team; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. After examining the testimonies of the witnesses, the CA found them credible and found no reason to disturb the RTC’s findings. Finally, the CA found that chain of evidence was not broken.

Hence, the instant appeal.

In a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated February 22, 2010, accused-appellant expressed his desire not to file a supplemental brief and reiterated the same arguments already presented before the trial and appellate courts.

The Issues

The issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated September 29, 2008, are:

1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt.^{^[17]}^[9]

2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody and control of prohibited drugs was complied with.^{^[18]}^[10]

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Accused-appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt

The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous drugs. It provides:

While Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:

People v. Macatingag^{^[19]}^[11] prescribed the requirements for the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:^{^[24]}^[16]

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Second Issue:

The chain of custody of the seized drug was unbroken

Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165:

In particular, accused-appellant argues that:

In People v. Rosialda,^{^[26]}^[18] the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:

This contention is untenable.

The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v. Rivera:

The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:

The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:

And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not broken as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA’s August 28, 2009 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][11] G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.

[2][12] G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.

[3][13] G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.

[4][14] G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.

[5][15] G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.

[6][16] G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.

[7][17] CA rollo, pp. 46-47.

[8][18] G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879.

[9][1] Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Francisco P. Acosta.

[10][2] CA rollo, pp. 17-24. Penned by Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.

[11][3]Id. at 15.

[12][4]Id. at 16.

[13][5]Id. at 100-102.

[14][6]Id. at 102.

[15][7] Should be Criminal Case No. 03-4961.

[16][8] CA rollo, pp. 23-24.

[17][9]Id. at 40.

[18][10]Id. at 46.

[19][11] G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.

[20][12] G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.

[21][13] G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.

[22][14] G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.

[23][15] G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.

[24][16] G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.

[25][17] CA rollo, pp. 46-47.

[26][18] G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879.

Comment

CASE 2011-0008: RE: G.R. NO. 191721: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO DOLORIDO Y ESTRADA (G.R. NO. 191721, 12 JANUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECTS: ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE; UNLAWFUL AGRESSION; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS OF MURDER; AWARD OF DAMAGES IN MURDER. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. DOLORIDO)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 4 Comments

January 21, 2011

RE: G.R. NO. 191721: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO DOLORIDO Y ESTRADA (G.R. NO. 191721, 12 JANUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECTS: ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE; UNLAWFUL AGRESSION; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS OF MURDER; AWARD OF DAMAGES IN MURDER. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. DOLORIDO)

x————————————————————————————–x

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SUBJECTS/ DOCTRINES:

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE?

(1) UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM; (2) REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED TO PREVENT OR REPEL SUCH AGGRESSION; AND (3) LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON RESORTING TO SELF-DEFENSE.

In order for self-defense to be successfully invoked, the following essential elements must be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.^{^[1]}^[11]

WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE ELEMENTS?

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION. UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION MUST BE PROVED FIRST IN ORDER FOR SELF-DEFENSE TO BE SUCCESSFULLY PLEADED, WHETHER COMPLETE OR INCOMPLETE.

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the elements.^{^[2]}^[12] However, the most important among all the elements is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. As this Court said in People v. Catbagan,^{^[3]}^[13] “There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.”

SUBJECT: WHAT IS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION?

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION IS AN ACTUAL PHYSICAL ASSAULT, OR AT LEAST A THREAT TO INFLICT REAL IMMINENT INJURY, UPON A PERSON.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.^{^[4]}^[15] In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.^{^[5]}^[16] It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and intimidating action.”^{^[6]}^[17] It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life.”^{^[7]}^[18]

SUBJECT: WHEN IS PLEA OF SELF DEFENSE JUSTIFIED?

IT MUST BE CREDIBLE AND CORROBORATED.

Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that “a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself.”^{^[8]}^[19] Moreover, “[a]bsent any showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive to testify against the appellant, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.”^{^[9]}^[20]

SUBJECT: WHAT IS TREACHERY?

THE DIRECT EMPLOYMENT OF MEANS, METHODS, OR FORMS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WHICH TEND DIRECTLY AND SPECIALLY TO INSURE ITS EXECUTION, WITHOUT RISK TO THE OFFENDER ARISING FROM THE DEFENSE WHICH THE OFFENDED PARTY MIGHT MAKE.

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF TREACHERY?

AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK, THE VICTIM WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF; AND (2) THE ACCUSED CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY ADOPTED THE PARTICULAR MEANS, METHODS OR FORMS OF ATTACK EMPLOYED BY HIM.^{^[10]}^[21]

. . . In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.^{^[11]}^[21]

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF TREACHERY?

THE “ESSENCE OF TREACHERY IS THE SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED ATTACK BY AN AGGRESSOR ON THE UNSUSPECTING VICTIM, DEPRIVING THE LATTER OF ANY CHANCE TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND THEREBY ENSURING ITS COMMISSION WITHOUT RISK OF HIMSELF.”^{^[12]}^[22]

WHAT IS DECISIVE IS THAT THE ATTACK WAS EXECUTED IN A MANNER THAT THE VICTIM WAS RENDERED DEFENSELESS AND UNABLE TO RETALIATE.

In the case at bar, it was clearly shown that Estose was deprived of any means to ward off the sudden and unexpected attack by accused-appellant. The evidence showed that accused-appellant hid behind a coconut tree and when Estose passed by the tree, completely unaware of any danger, accused-appellant immediately hacked him with a bolo. Estose could only attempt to parry the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded. Furthermore, when Estose tried to retreat, stumbling in the process, accused-appellant even took advantage of this and stabbed him resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by accused-appellant assured himself of no risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased might make. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.^{^[13]}^[23] Without a doubt, treachery attended the killing.

SUBJECT: WHEN DOES SC FINDS NO REASON TO DISTURB THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT?

Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence “x x x that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.”^{^[14]}^[24] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when affirmed by the appellate court.^{^[15]}^[25]

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES DUE IN MURDER CASE?

(1) CIVIL INDEMNITY EX DELICTO FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM; (2) ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; (3) MORAL DAMAGES; (4) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AND (5) TEMPERATE DAMAGES.”^{^[16]}^[28]AND SIX PERCENT INTEREST.

This Court has held in People v. Beltran, Jr. that “[w]hen death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.”^{^[17]}^[28]

Hence, in line with our ruling in People v. Sanchez,^{^[18]}^[29] when the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua, the damages to be imposed are: PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. These are the amounts proper in this case because of the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.

As to the award of temperate damages in the amount of PhP 25,000, such is proper “in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.”^{^[19]}^[30] Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.^{^[20]}^[31] Therefore, we sustain the award of the trial court of PhP 25,000 for temperate damages.

Finally, interest at the rate of six (6) percent should likewise be added to the damages awarded.^{^[21]}^[32]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00575-MIN finding accused-appellant Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages, accused-appellant is likewise sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity and moral, temperate, and exemplary damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of Daniel Estose.

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D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the November 27, 2009 Decision^{^[22]}^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00575-MIN entitled People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada, which affirmed the September 14, 2007 Decision^{^[23]}^[2] in Criminal Case No. 5027 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The RTC found accused-appellant Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada guilty of murder.

The Facts

The charge against Dolorido stemmed from the following Information:

That on the 9^th day of May 2006 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Cagdapao, Municipality of Tago, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack, assault and hack one, DANIEL ESTOSE, causing his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased as follows:

P70,000.00 – as life indemnity

P10,000.00 – as moral damage

P10,000.00 – exemplary damages

CONTRARY TO LAW.^{^[24]}^[3]

On November 15, 2006, Dolorido was arraigned, and he pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged.

During the pre-trial conference on January 18, 2007, Dolorido admitted that he killed the deceased-victim Daniel Estose but invoked self-defense. Likewise, the prosecution and the defense stipulated that the Joint Affidavit of Aniolito Avila and Adrian Avila (the Avilas) would constitute as their direct testimony, subject to cross-examination by the defense; and the Counter Affidavit of the Accused and the Affidavit of Mario Jariol would also constitute as their direct testimony, subject to cross examination by the prosecution.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the Avilas and Loreta Estose. On the other hand, the defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Dolorido.

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

The Avilas were hired laborers of the victim, Estose, tasked to harvest the coconuts in the latter’s farm in Cagdapao, Tago, Surigao del Sur.^{^[25]}^[4]

On May 9, 2006, while the Avilas were walking towards the coconut plantation at around 8:30 in the morning, they saw Dolorido standing near the coconut drier of Estose, appearing very angry. After some time, Dolorido proceeded to Rustica Dolorido’s coconut drier located a hundred meters away and hid behind a coconut tree.^{^[26]}^[5]

Moments later, they saw Estose on his way to his own coconut drier. When Estose passed by Rustica Dolorido’s coconut drier, they saw Dolorido suddenly hack Estose twice, resulting in wounds on his arms. When Estose tried to retreat, he fell down and it was then that Dolorido stabbed him on the left portion of his chest, which caused his death. Dolorido suddenly left the place.

Afraid of Dolorido’s wrath, the Avilas did not immediately proceed to the scene of the crime. It was only after 20 or so minutes that they felt it was safe to approach Estose. When they were near, they saw Estose was already dead.^{^[27]}^[6] They then waited for Estose’s wife and the police.

Version of the Defense

Dolorido’s defense, on the other hand, consisted of the story of self-defense:

On the day of the death of the victim, Dolorido asked Estose why he was gathering Dolorido’s harvested coconuts. Estose just replied, “So, what about it?” and tried to unsheathe his bolo from its scabbard.^{^[28]}^[7] Upon seeing this, Dolorido drew his own bolo and stabbed Estose. When Estose tried to wrestle for the bolo, he sustained some wounds. Afterwards, while Dolorido was pointing the bolo at Estose, the latter suddenly lunged at Dolorido, causing Estose to hit the bolo with his own chest which resulted in his death.^{^[29]}^[8] He denied the prosecutor’s claim that he hid behind a coconut tree and waited for Estose to come. Thereafter, Dolorido, accompanied by one Mario Jariol, voluntarily surrendered to the Tago Police Station.

Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted accused Dolorido. The dispositive portion of its September 14, 2007 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay the heirs of deceased-victim Daniel Estose y Langres the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the cost.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.^{^[30]}^[9]

On November 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC.^{^[31]}^[10]

The Issues

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

The court a quo gravely erred in not appreciating self-defense interposed by accused.

II.

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of treachery.

III.

The court a quo gravely erred in awarding damages despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence to support their claim.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Self-defense is absent

In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the circumstance of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. He contends that he only acted in self-defense, and this is the reason why he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.

We do not agree.

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the elements.^{^[33]}^[12] However, the most important among all the elements is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. As this Court said in People v. Catbagan,^{^[34]}^[13] “There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.”

In this case, we agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. But he maintains that Estose provoked him when the latter started to unsheathe his bolo from his scabbard. Nevertheless, as aptly found by the trial court, his testimony is too incredible to be believed, viz:

Accused’s plea failed to impress the Court. To be sure, his story on how the deceased was killed is too incredible to inspire belief. According to him, it was the deceased who first unsheathed his bolo but did not succeed in his attempt to fully unsheathe it because he (Accused) hacked him. Thereafter, the deceased tried to wrest Accused’s bolo but was injured instead. If the deceased failed to unsheathe his bolo because Accused was able to hack him, how could the deceased then have attempted to dispossess the Accused of the latter’s bolo? The truth, of course, is that the Accused waylaid the deceased, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses.^{^[35]}^[14] x x x

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.^{^[36]}^[15] In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.^{^[37]}^[16] It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and intimidating action.”^{^[38]}^[17] It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life.”^{^[39]}^[18] Such is absent in the instant case.

Moreover, against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses who testified that accused-appellant hacked Estose twice and subsequently stabbed him without any provocation, accused-appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated assertion deserves scant consideration.

Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that “a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself.”^{^[40]}^[19] Moreover, “[a]bsent any showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive to testify against the appellant, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.”^{^[41]}^[20]

Therefore, absent any unlawful aggression from the victim, accused-appellant cannot successfully invoke the defense of self-defense.

Treachery is evident

In addition, accused-appellant argues that the trial court should not have appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He argues that it was impossible for the two prosecution witnesses to see the inception and the actual attack of accused-appellant to the victim because both were busy gathering coconuts. Also, they were 50 meters away from where the actual stabbing occurred, in rolling hills with tall and short shrubs between the witnesses and the place where the actual stabbing occurred.

We disagree.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.^{^[42]}^[21] The “essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.”^{^[43]}^[22]

In the case at bar, it was clearly shown that Estose was deprived of any means to ward off the sudden and unexpected attack by accused-appellant. The evidence showed that accused-appellant hid behind a coconut tree and when Estose passed by the tree, completely unaware of any danger, accused-appellant immediately hacked him with a bolo. Estose could only attempt to parry the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded. Furthermore, when Estose tried to retreat, stumbling in the process, accused-appellant even took advantage of this and stabbed him resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by accused-appellant assured himself of no risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased might make. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.^{^[44]}^[23] Without a doubt, treachery attended the killing.

Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence “x x x that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.”^{^[45]}^[24] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when affirmed by the appellate court.^{^[46]}^[25]

In conclusion, all the elements of the crime of murder, as defined in paragraph 1 of Art. 248 of the RPC, were successfully proved: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.^{^[47]}^[26]

Verily, in criminal cases such as the one on hand, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.^{^[48]}^[27] We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of murder with moral certainty.

Award of Damages

Hence, in line with our ruling in People v. Sanchez,^{^[50]}^[29] when the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua, the damages to be imposed are: PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. These are the amounts proper in this case because of the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.

As to the award of temperate damages in the amount of PhP 25,000, such is proper “in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.”^{^[51]}^[30] Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.^{^[52]}^[31] Therefore, we sustain the award of the trial court of PhP 25,000 for temperate damages.

Finally, interest at the rate of six (6) percent should likewise be added to the damages awarded.^{^[53]}^[32]

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][11] People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 650, 657; People v. Plazo, G.R. No. 120547, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 433, 442-443.

[2][12] People v. Almazan, G.R. Nos. 138943-44, September 17, 2001, 365 SCRA 373, 382.

[3][13] G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 540.

[4][15] People v. Basadre, G.R. No. 131851, February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 573, 583.

[5][16] People v. Catbagan, supra note 13, at 557.

[6][17] People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 463, 478.

[7][18]Id.

[8][19] People v. Aburque, G.R. No. 181085, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 384, 394; citing Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 141749, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 627, 634.

[9][20] People v. Aburque, id.

[10][21] People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 118649, March 9, 1998, 287 SCRA 229, 238.

[11][21] People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 118649, March 9, 1998, 287 SCRA 229, 238.

[12][22] People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 603, 632-633.

[13][23] People v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 546, 558.

[14][24] People v. Bantiling, G.R. No. 136017, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 47, 60. See also People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995, 250 SCRA 676.

[15][25] Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 216, 230.

[16][28] G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740.

[17][28] G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740.

[18][29] G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999, 313 SCRA 254, 271-272.

[19][30] People v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 528, 538.

[20][31] People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 577, 588.

[21][32] See People v. Tabongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 727.

[22][1] Rollo, pp. 3-18. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Leoncia R. Dimagiba.

[23][2] CA rollo, pp. 33-40. Penned by Judge Ermelindo G. Andal.

[24][3] Records, p. 3.

[25][4] TSN, February 22, 2007, p. 5.

[26][5] Records, p. 39.

[27][6]Id.

[28][7]Id. at 15.

[29][8]Id.

[30][9] CA rollo, p. 40.

[31][10] Rollo, p. 18.

[32][11] People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 650, 657; People v. Plazo, G.R. No. 120547, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 433, 442-443.

[33][12] People v. Almazan, G.R. Nos. 138943-44, September 17, 2001, 365 SCRA 373, 382.

[34][13] G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 540.

[35][14] CA rollo, p. 39.

[36][15] People v. Basadre, G.R. No. 131851, February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 573, 583.

[37][16] People v. Catbagan, supra note 13, at 557.

[38][17] People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 463, 478.

[39][18]Id.

[40][19] People v. Aburque, G.R. No. 181085, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 384, 394; citing Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 141749, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 627, 634.

[41][20] People v. Aburque, id.

[42][21] People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 118649, March 9, 1998, 287 SCRA 229, 238.

[43][22] People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 603, 632-633.

[44][23] People v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 546, 558.

[45][24] People v. Bantiling, G.R. No. 136017, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 47, 60. See also People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995, 250 SCRA 676.

[46][25] Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 216, 230.

[47][26] People v. Sameniano, G.R. No. 183703, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 840, 850.

[48][27] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2.

[49][28] G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740.

[50][29] G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999, 313 SCRA 254, 271-272.

[51][30] People v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 528, 538.

[52][31] People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 577, 588.

[53][32] See People v. Tabongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 727.

Comment

CASE 2011-0007: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO CAPITLE AND ARTURO NAGARES (G.R. NO. 175330, 12 JANUARY 2010, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION, WHEN ADMISSIBLE; ALIBI AND DENIAL; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT; DAMAGES WHEN DEATH OCCURS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. CAPITLE ET AL.

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO CAPITLE AND ARTURO NAGARES (G.R. NO. 175330, 12 JANUARY 2010, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION, WHEN ADMISSIBLE; ALIBI AND DENIAL; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT; DAMAGES WHEN DEATH OCCURS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. CAPITLE ET AL.

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the 27 January 2006 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 April 2000 Decision² of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch 267, in Criminal Case No. 105733, convicting appellants Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares for the crime of murder.

The Facts

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

The historical backdrop shows that at around 7:40 a.m. of August 6, 1993, at Orambo Drive, Orambo, Pasig City, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was gunned down by four (4) men who thereafter ran towards Shaw Blvd. The incident was witnessed by Ruiz Constantino and Solomon Molino who were seated six (6) arms length away and conversing on the flower pots planted with bougainvilla lined along Orambo Drive corner St. Jude Street, Orambo, Pasig City. Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was thereafter brought to Medical City Hospital where he expired due to multiple gunshot wounds in the body, in the neck and in the head. The most fatal wound was the one sustained in the head.

On that same day, at around 10:30 a.m., Solomon Molino, a Barangay Kagawad, gave his statement to the District Central Investigation Branch, Eastern Police District Command relating the incident he saw but failed to identify the assailants.

On September 29, 1993, Arturo Nagares was apprehended by the Pasig Police on account of his conviction in another case for Frustrated Homicide. He was later to be taken custody by the National Bureau of Investigation at its detention center along Taft Avenue where the next day, on September 30, 1993, Ruiz Constantino gave his statement identifying Arturo Nagares y De Leon from the four (4) pictures presented to him as one of the three (3) armed assailants of Barangay Captain Pagalunan on August 6, 1993.

Arturo Nagares was likewise identified from the four (4) pictures shown to another witness, Rodolfo Paat, who claims to be at Orambo Drive corner Shaw Blvd., Pasig City, when he heard several gun shots with people shouting “nagbabarilan, nagbabarilan.” Moments later, from the corner of St. Jude St. and Orambo Drive, he saw four (4) men each carrying guns running from Orambo Drive towards Shaw Blvd. and boarded a jeep going to Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

The third witness to give a statement to the NBI on same day was Solomon Molino who likewise identified Arturo Nagares from the four (4) pictures laid before him.

On October 19, 1993, while under detention at the NBI, Arturo Nagares executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan before Atty. Orlando V. Dizon, Chief, SOG, NBI. Assisting him in the confession was practicing lawyer, Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang, who was at the NBI following up the implementation of a warrant of arrest in one of the cases she was handling. In Nagares’ extrajudicial confession, he implicated Vice Mayor Anching De Guzman as the mastermind, and Rodolfo Capitle a.k.a. Putol, Elymar Santos and a John Doe as his cohorts in the killing of the Barangay Chairman.

On January 21, 1994, witness Solomon Molino executed his third affidavit before the NBI and identified Ramil Marquina in a police line-up as one of those who fired at Pagalunan.

Then again, on March 21, 1994, the same Solomon Molino gave a written statement before the Pasig Police identifying Rodolfo Capitle, who was earlier arrested by the police by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa of the Pasig Court for Frustrated Homicide.

On March 26, 1994, witness Rodolfo Paat executed another statement before the NBI identifying Rodolfo Capitle from the 20 pictures shown him as one of those armed men he saw on August 6, 1993 running from Orambo Drive to Shaw Blvd.

On April 4, 1994, a criminal charge sheet for Murder was filed against Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares.

On September 29, 1994, the Information was amended to include Ramil Marquina as one of the accused, together with Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares. The Amended Information reads:

The undersigned 2^nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses RODOLFO CAPITLE, ARTURO NAGARES and RAMIL MARQUINA of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6^thday of August 1993 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Brgy. Chairman Avelino Pagalunan on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal and fatal gunshot wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 17, 1997, all three (3) accused were properly arraigned. Assisted by their respective counsels, they entered a “not guilty” plea. After the case was set for pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.

During the trial, prosecution witness Ruiz Constantino testified and identified accused Arturo Nagares as one of those he saw shooting the victim, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan, but could not identify the rest of the assailants. Another witness for the People, Solomon Molino, with whom Constantino was conversing at the time, claimed to have witnessed the shooting incident and even prepared a sketch as to the respective positions of the victim, the assailants and where they were seated. Nevertheless, he found it hard to identify the gun wielders.

The third eyewitness, Rodofo Paat, who claims that during the incident he was at the end of the tricycle line along Orambo Drive between Shaw Blvd. and St. Peter St. when he heard gunshots coming from Orambo Drive corner St. Jude St. about 80 meters away from where he was. Upon hearing the gunshots, people in the vicinity scampered for cover but he stayed put and saw four (4) persons with guns emerged from the smoke running towards Shaw Blvd. He later on identified two (2) of them in open court as accused Arturo Nagares and Rodolfo Capitle.

Accused Arturo Nagares offered alibi as a defense. He was sleeping at the house of his sister Gaudelia Mercado at 92 F. Asedillo St., Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City, as he was suffering from fever due to boil (“pigsa”) at the right leg, he said. This testimony found corroboration from his sister, Gaudelia, and even narrated she accompanied Arturo to the Rizal Medical Center where he was treated and given medication by a certain Dr. Ong. As to the extrajudicial confession, Nagares claimed that he was violated, forced, coerced and tortured into admitting the crime, and to sign the already prepared extrajudicial confession.

For his part, accused Rodolfo Capitle as well put forth the defense of alibi insisting that on the day of the shooting, he was at their house at Bambang, Pasig, with his wife and children cleaning and feeding the hogs. Afterwards, he continued, he took a bath and rested for the rest of the day. His wife substantiated his testimony. Rodolfo went on saying that on March 18, 1994, he was arrested and detained at the Pasig Police Headquarters for another crime. On March 23, 1994, the NBI took custody of him at the NBI Headquarters along Taft Avenue. While at the NBI Headquarters, he complained of having been tortured by placing a plastic bag on his face, boxed on the chest and abdomen, electrocuted and was forced to admit to the killing of the Barangay Captain but was able to refuse, nonetheless.

x x x x³

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision dated 28 April 2000 finding appellants guilty as charged, while acquitting Ramil Marquina. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARTURO NAGARES and RODOLFO CAPITLE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and each accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Upon the other hand, considering that the Court failed to prove the guilt of the accused RAMIL MARQUINA beyond reasonable doubt, the aforesaid accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Accordingly, the Court orders accused Nagares and Capitle to pay jointly in solidum the widow of the victim, Merlie Pagalunan, the following amounts, to wit:

1. PhP50,000.00 as indemnity;

2. PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages;

3. PhP 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. PhP 50,000.00 representing actual and compensatory damages;

5. PhP 30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

6. And costs.

The Jail Warden of the Pasig City Jail where accused Rodolfo Capitle is presently detained during the pendency of this case, is accordingly ordered to immediately transfer the person of the aforesaid accused to the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, as he is now considered an insular prisoner. Let therefore the corresponding Order/s of Commitment (Mittimus) be issued pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A, dated April 20, 1992 and Circular No. 66-97 dated October 14, 1997 of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, the Director of the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where accused Arturo Nagares is already serving sentence for another crime, is hereby informed of the latter’s conviction in the present case for his appropriate action and guidance.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.⁴

In convicting appellants, the trial court found that two out of three eyewitnesses, in the persons of Ruiz Constantino and Rodolfo Paat, positively identified appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. The trial court discarded appellants’ alibis and denial as such cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The trial court likewise rejected appellants’ claims of “frame-up” and torture as unsubstantiated.

The trial court found no violation of appellant Nagares’ constitutional rights insofar as his confession is concerned. Nagares’ Sinumpaang Salaysay is presumed to be voluntary and Nagares failed to overthrow such presumption. Further, there was sufficient evidence that Nagares was assisted by an independent and effective counsel during the custodial investigation, belying Nagares’ allegations.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, disposing of the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.⁵

In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Court of Appeals found the extrajudicial confession executed by Nagares admissible since it was (1) voluntary; (2) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (3) express; and (4) in writing. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the specific information stated in the impugned confession “not only categorically detailed [Nagares’] participation in the crime, it likewise show[ed] badges and traits of voluntariness of the confession.”

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during the custodial investigation. According to the Court of Appeals, “the photographs during the custodial investigation, and execution of the 6-page 70 questions and answers extrajudicial confession are at war against the presence of uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion.”

As regards Capitle, the Court of Appeals held that “an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the person making it (Nagares) and is not admissible against his co-accused (Capitle).” Hence, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle to the crime. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found sufficient circumstantial evidence warranting Capitle’s conviction for the crime charged.

The Issues

Appellants raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS WERE VIOLATED THEREBY RENDERING THE EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY OBTAINED THROUGH SAID VIOLATION AS NULL AND VOID.

2. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.⁶

The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the appellants’ conviction.

Nagares’ extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence

Nagares challenges the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, claiming that it was made under duress and that he was not assisted by an independent counsel during the custodial investigation. Nagares maintains such flaws in the investigation violated his right guaranteed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. This provision reads:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Based on the records, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, and thus admissible. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details, which makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given.

Likewise negating Nagares’ claim of a coerced confession are the photographs taken during the signing, thumbmarking, and swearing of the extrajudicial confession. All the pictures depicted a “cordial and pleasant atmosphere” devoid of any sign of torture, threat, duress or tension on Nagares’ person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagares smiling.

Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel.⁷ During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation.

Moreover, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.⁸ Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime.⁹ Here, the fact of death and the criminal
agency had been sufficiently established by the death certificate (Exhibit “F”) and the medico-legal report (Exhibit “C”) the veracity of which had been affirmed on the witness stand by the examining physician.¹⁰

Based on the foregoing, there is clearly no basis for Nagares’ plea that his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution.

Nagares was positively identified as one of the victim’s assailants

Apart from Nagares’ valid extrajudicial confession, the positive identification made by Ruiz Constantino strengthened the prosecution’s case. During the trial, Constantino identified Nagares as one of the victims’ assailants, to wit:

ATTY. BLANES:

Q You said you will be able to remember the face of those who shot Avelino Pagalunan, now, if you see them again, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q If they are inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point those who shot Avelino Pagalunan.

INTERPRETER

(witness pointing to a man in the first row wearing orange polo shirt and when asked he answered by the name of Arturo Nagares)¹¹

x x x x

COURT:

You said that you saw the three (3) person who were shooting the victim and you have identified one of the assailants a certain Arturo Nagares are the two (2) others inside the Courtroom?

A I cannot exactly say because my attention at that time was only with Arturo Nagares.¹²

Appellants’ attempt to discredit Constantino must fail since there was no showing of any improper motive on Constantino’s part that would induce him to testify falsely against Nagares.¹³ Further, settled is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal since the trial court was in a better position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.¹⁴

Nagares’ alibi and denial deserve scant consideration. Well-entrenched is the rule that alibi, which is inherently weak, cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses at the crime scene.¹⁵ Here, Constantino positively identified Nagares as one of the perpetrators of the crime overthrowing the latter’s alibi and denial. More importantly, Nagares miserably failed to establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the felony. Nagares testified that on that fateful day, he was sleeping in his sister’s house on F. Asedillo Street, Katipunan, Pasig City. He also claimed that on that day he was treated at Rizal Medical Center. It was not shown that it was impossible for Nagares to reach and be at the crime scene whether he was coming from his sister’s residence or from the hospital. Further, the defense failed to present any hospital record substantiating Nagares’ claim.

Capitle is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder

based on circumstantial evidence

To further establish appellants’ guilt, prosecution witness Paat testified, thus:

Q: What was that incident that took place?

A: I heard successive gun shots.

Q: Now in relation to where you were from what direction did you hear this successive gun shots?

A: At the corner of St. Jude and Oranbo Drive, sir.

Q: What did you notice, if any at the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude?

A: I saw 4 men coming from the smoke.

Q: More or less, Mr. Witness, could you estimate the distance from where you were to the corner of Oranbo Drive & St. Jude?

A: More or less 80 meters.

Q: Now, you said, you saw men coming from the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude where there was smoke, how many men more or less?

A: 4 men, sir.

Q: Where, where they headed to and when you had seen these 4 men coming from that direction?

A: On their way going to Shaw Blvd.

Q: Did you notice if they were holding something?

x x x x

A: I saw each one of them holding a gun.¹⁶

x x x x

Q: Now of these 4 men running and holding caliber 45 did you recognize any of them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If those whom you recognized is or are inside this court room, will you be able to point to them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please point to them, Mr. Witness?

INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to two (2) male persons, one (1) the right wearing an orange polo who when asked his name answered Arturo Nagares and a man beside him wearing yellow t-shirt who when asked his name answered Rodolfo Capitle.¹⁷

x x x x

Q: How at that time, you take a look at the alleged persons, four (4) persons whom you allegedly saw holding a gun?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: Could you make an estimate if it is less than one (1) minute.

ATTY. BLANES:

He said more or less your Honor, from the corner of Oranbo Drive and he said more or less.

Q: Is it less than one (1) minute?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: And that they were running?

A: Yes sir. Almost on the jogging phase.¹⁸

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle to the crime charged, only circumstantial evidence.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.¹⁹

Based on Paat’s testimony, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence justifying Capitle’s conviction. There is more than one circumstance: (1) the victim was gunned down at the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St., Mandaluyong City; (2) Paat heard several gunshots coming from that area; (3) Paat saw four men, including Nagares and Capitle, coming from the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St. and running away towards Shaw Blvd.; (4) the four men, including Nagares and Capitle, were all carrying guns; and (5) prosecution witness Constantino saw Nagares, together with several other men, shot the victim. To the unprejudiced mind, the foregoing circumstances, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion except that of appellants’ culpability for the victim’s death.²⁰

Modification in the award of damages

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the victim’s death; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.²¹
We sustain the award of P50,000 civil indemnity, which is mandatory and granted to the victim’s heirs without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.²²

For lack of factual basis, we delete the award of actual or compensatory damages. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.²³ No such documents were offered as evidence in this case. Nevertheless, we award P25,000 as temperate damages when no evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the victim’s heirs suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.²⁴

While we sustain the award of moral damages, which does not require allegation and proof other than the victim’s death, we reduce the amount from P100,000 to P50,000 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.²⁵

Since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proved in this case, the award of exemplary damages is proper. However, we reduce the amount of exemplary damages from P50,000 to P30,000 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.²⁶

The award of P30,000 attorney’s fees lacks factual and legal basis and thus must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 27 January 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. We award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The amounts of moral damages and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000 and P30,000, respectively. The award of actual damages and attorney’s fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 15 June 2009.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-19. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. De Leon concurring.

2 CA rollo, pp. 36-57. Penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.

3 Rollo, pp. 3-8.

4 CA rollo, pp. 56-57.

5 Rollo, p. 18.

6 CA rollo, p. 95.

7 See Records, p. 572. Nagares’ sworn statement, dated 19 October 1993, given to the police investigators pertinently reads:

02 T: Nais naming ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang hindi kumibo at ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamitin laban sa iyo sa isang kriminal, sibil o administratibong pag-uusig. Naiintindihan mo ba ito?

S: Opo.

03 T: Nais din naming ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. At kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado, kami ay hihirang ng isa para sa iyo na tutulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito. Naiintindihan mo ba ito?

S: Opo.

04 T: Ngayon, matapos mo malaman ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, ikaw ba ay nakahandang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay sa tulong ni ATTY. ESMERALDA GALANG na narito ngayon upang ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas at tulungan ka sa iyong mga sagot dito sa iyong salaysay?

S: Opo.

8 Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

9 People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 350, 355.

10 See People v. Bacor, 366 Phil. 197, 220 (1999).

11 TSN, 5 June 1995, p. 7.

12 Id. at 32-33.

13 People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 749 (2003).

14 People v. Jadap, G.R. No. 177983, 30 March 2010, 617 SCRA 179, 187; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 177740, 5 April 2010, 617 SCRA 318, 331.

15 Arceno v. People, 326 Phil. 576, 594 (1996); People v. Torrefiel, 326 Phil. 388, 396 (1996); People v. Caritativo, 326 Phil. 1, 8 (1996).

16 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 6-9.

17 Id. at 10-11.

18 TSN, 31 July1995, p. 44.

19 Bastian v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160811, 18 April 2008, 552 SCRA 43, 55.

20 People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683, 699 (2001).

21 People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, 2 March 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 456.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 456-457.

25 Id. at 457.

26 People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, 4 February 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 647.

Comment

J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

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