J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE NO. 2011-0021: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAY LORENA Y LABAG (G.R. NO. 184954, 10 JANUARY 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.) SUBJECTS: PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF PROHIBITED DRUGS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. LORENA)

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DOCTRINES:

WHAT ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN IN A PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUG.

The following must be proven under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165:

(1)   the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;

(2)   the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.^[1][13]

WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OF ILLEGAL DRUG?

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides such procedure:

(1)   The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

WHAT IS RATIONALE FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE:

The illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

IS NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE AUTHORITIES OF AFORESAID SECTION 21 FATAL.

People v. Pringas^[2][16] teaches that non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal.  Its non-compliance will not automatically render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.^[3][17] 

As provided in Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

          (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 

          x x x x  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) 

WHY IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE ABOVE?

Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.^[4][18]

TO BE COVERED BY THE SAVING CLAUSE, WHAT MUST BE PROSECUTION DO?

Even so, for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.^[5][19]

It must be shown that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen seized from the accused. This function is performed by the “chain of custody” requirement to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist and finally to the court.^[6][20]  Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defines “chain of custody” as follows:

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous           drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature  of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]^[7][21]

Every link must be accounted for.

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The instant appeal assails the Decision^[8][1] dated November 22, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620 which affirmed with modification the August 30, 2005 judgment^[9][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Naga City, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”

In an Information^[10][3] dated July 10, 2003, appellant Jay Lorena y Labag was charged as follows:

          That on or about February 9, 2003, at about 7:30 o’clock (sic) in the evening, at Pier Site, Sta. Rosa, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride, with a total weight of 0.21 gram[,] a dangerous drug, contained in a plastic sachet, to a poseur[-]buyer, without authority of law, and one (1) Five Hundred Peso bill with serial number MS [979614]^[11][4] was confiscated from the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the People of the Philippines.

            ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

During pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:

1.      Identity of the accused;

2.      That the arresting officers were organic members of the PNP Pasacao, Camarines Sur;

3.      That the accused was within the premises of [P]ier [S]ite, Sta. Rosa, Pasacao, Camarines Sur on February 9, 2003 at around 7:30 o’clock (sic) in the evening; and

4.      That the accused knew a certain Iris Mae Cleofe.^[12][5]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.^[13][6]  In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses: P/Insp. Mauro E. Solero, SPO1 Constantino Espiritu, SPO2 Ernesto Ayen, P/Insp. Josephine Macura Clemen, P/Insp. Ma. Cristina Nobleza, Police Chief Insp. Jerry Bearis, and P/Insp. Nelson del Socorro. Taken altogether, the evidence for the prosecution tried to establish the following facts:

On February 9, 2003, around 8:00 in the morning, Iris Mae Cleofe (Iris), a civilian informant, came to the Pasacao Police Station to report appellant’s alleged drug trafficking activities. Acting on said information, Pasacao Police Station Officer-in-Charge Police Chief Insp. Jerry Bearis (Bearis) directed P/Insp. Mauro E. Solero (Solero), SPO3 Tomas Llamado, SPO3 Oscar Angel, SPO2 Ernesto Ayen (Ayen) and SPO1 Constantino Espiritu (Espiritu), all members of Task Force Ubash, a unit charged with monitoring drug trafficking activities in the area, to go with Iris and conduct a surveillance upon appellant. Around 5:00 in the afternoon, after their surveillance yielded a positive result, Task Force Ubash coordinated by phone with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office in Naga City for the conduct of the buy-bust operation which will take place that same night at the house of one Edgar Saar (Saar) located in Pier Site, Pasacao.  Thereafter, Solero, Commander of Task Force Ubash, gave a briefing to the members of the buy-bust team. They were likewise instructed to synchronize their watches because at exactly 7:30 in the evening, they will enter the place immediately after Iris, the designated poseur-buyer, utters the words “Uya na ang bayad ko” (Here is my payment) as a signal that the transaction has been perfected.

Around 7:00 in the evening, when it was already dark, the buy-bust team arrived in the area and positioned themselves infront of the house of Saar. They were approximately five meters away hiding in the dark behind the plants but had a good view of the well-lit porch of Saar’s house. Moments later, Iris arrived and entered Saar’s house. She immediately proceeded with the transaction and handed over the marked P500-bill to appellant who was then sitting down. While handing over the money, Iris uttered the words “O, uya na an bayad ko kaiyan ha, baad kun wara-waraon mo iyan, uya na an bayad ko ha” (This is my payment, you might misplace it), her voice deliberately made louder for the buy-bust team to hear. Simultaneously, appellant handed over a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to Iris. At that point, Solero, Espiritu and Ayen rushed to the porch, arrested appellant and handcuffed him. Ayen recovered from appellant’s pocket the P500-bill while Iris turned over the sachet of shabu to Espiritu. Then they brought appellant to the police station where he was detained.  The sachet containing white crystalline substance was thereafter personally submitted by Bearis to the Camarines Sur Provincial Crime Laboratory, where it was tested by P/Insp. Ma. Cristina D. Nobleza.

The initial field test showed that the white crystalline substance contained in the sachet was Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. Thus, it was submitted to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 5 for confirmatory testing by P/Insp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist.  There, the specimen likewise tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

The defense, for its part, presented an entirely different version.  Testifying as sole witness for the defense, appellant tried to establish the following facts:

During the first week of February 2003, appellant, a resident of San Felipe, Naga City, went to Pasacao to find a job. While in Pasacao, he stayed in the house of his friend Saar, in Pier Site.

On February 9, 2003, around 7:00 in the evening, while appellant was lying on a hammock near Saar’s residence, he saw Iris enter the yard and go into Saar’s house. A little later, she went out of the house so appellant asked her who she was looking for. Iris replied that she was looking for one Bongbong Ditsuso. Appellant told Iris to just wait for Bongbong inside the house. In the meantime, he went to the kitchen to cook rice. A little while later, he returned to the living room to talk to Iris. While they were talking, several men barged in and Iris suddenly gave him something which he later found out to be crumpled money when it fell on the floor. The men then handcuffed him after punching him and hitting him with a Caliber .45 in the nape. Afterwards, they boarded him on an owner-type jeep and brought him to the police station where he was detained.

          On August 30, 2005, the RTC promulgated its judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentencing him to life imprisonment.  The fallo reads:

            WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JAY LORENA y Labag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 5, … [Article] II of R.A. 9165. This court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

Since the accused has been undergoing preventive detention during the pendency of the trial of this case, let the same be credited in the service of his sentence.

SO ORDERED.^[14][7]

The trial court found the prosecution evidence credible and sufficient to prove appellant’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It held that even if the prosecution failed to present the poseur-buyer by reason of her death, her failure to testify was not fatal to the prosecution’s evidence since prosecution witnesses Solero, Espiritu and Ayen were able to observe the transaction between Iris and appellant, and the shabu and buy-bust money recovered from him were presented as evidence to prove the sale. The trial court also ruled that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence that they were motivated by spite, ill will, or other evil motive. The trial court did not give credence to appellant’s defense of denial, frame-up and maltreatment. It held that his claim cannot prevail over the positive identification made by credible prosecution witnesses and in light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of law enforcers.

Appellant appealed to the CA.  In his brief, appellant alleged that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY [OF] VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 [DESPITE] THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.^[15][8]

On November 22, 2007, the CA rendered a decision affirming with modification the RTC decision and disposing as follows:

            WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25. Appellant Jay Lorena y Labag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Since the accused has been undergoing preventive detention during the pendency of the trial of this case, let the same be credited in the service of his sentence.

            SO ORDERED.^[16][9]

          Aggrieved, appellant filed the instant appeal.

On December 15, 2008, the Court directed the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire.^[17][10]  The Office of the Solicitor General manifested^[18][11] that it is dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief as it finds no new issues to raise before this Court. Appellant, on the other hand, in addition to the lone assignment of errors he raised before the CA, raised the following errors in his Supplemental Brief:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE BUY-BUST TEAM’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, R.A. NO. 9165.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.^[19][12]

Appellant questions the validity of his warrantless arrest, contending that none of the circumstances provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which justify a warrantless arrest is present.  He likewise points out that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer coupled with the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their testimony to the effect that they did not see the sale itself, taint the credibility of the buy-bust operation. He adds that the lower court misapplied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function, especially since the arresting officers failed to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs as mandated by Section 21, R.A. No. 9165.

          We reverse appellant’s conviction.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.^[20][13]

Further, considering the illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise, there is a need to comply strictly with procedure in its seizure and custody.^[21][14] Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides such procedure:

            (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

Evident from the records of this case, however, is the fact that the members of the buy-bust team did not comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Nothing in the testimony of Solero, Commander of Task Force Ubash, would show that the procedure was complied with. He even admitted that he has not seen the inventory of the confiscated drugs allegedly prepared by the police officers and that he only read a little of R.A. No. 9165:

Q         Now, Mr. Witness, did you prepare an inventory insofar as the apprehension of the shabu allegedly taken from the suspect?

A         That is the work of the Investigator, sir, we were just after the buy-bust operation.

Q         Was there any inventory prepared insofar as the operation is concerned?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         Where is that inventory?

A         At the Investigation Section, sir.

Q         Are you sure that there was indeed an inventory prepared?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         So, you are telling this court that the shabu that was allegedly taken from Jay Lorena was endorsed to the Investigation Section?

A         To the desk officer on duty first for the recording.

Q         Do you know what is investigation, Mr. Witness?

A         The details, the money involved including the suspect.

Q         This case was filed in the year 2003 and I suppose you are already aware of Rep. Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         And the persons who prepare the inventory are the persons who apprehended, are you aware of that?

A         Yes sir, but the desk officer is also a member of the police station.

Q         So, you turned over the shabu to the desk officer?

A         Yes sir, including the suspect.

Q         And to your own knowledge, there was an inventory prepared by the desk officer?

A         The Investigation Section, sir.

Q         And in that inventory, Insp. Del Socorro signed?

A         No, sir.

Q         Or the local elected official signed that inventory?

A         I did not see the inventory, sir.

Q         So, you are talking about a particular document which you have not seen?

A         But I know it was inventoried.

Q         Now, during the supposed buy-bust operation, upon apprehending Jay Lorena and the shabu that your group allegedly taken from him, was there any photograph taken?

A         None, sir.

Q         Was there any police officer from the Pasacao Police Station or even the Chief of Police himself instructed your group about the requirements prescribed under Rep. Act No. 9165?

A         None, sir.

Q         But personally you are aware of Rep. Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         Have you read that?

A         A little.^[22][15]

Nonetheless, People v. Pringas^[23][16] teaches that non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal.  Its non-compliance will not automatically render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.^[24][17]  We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.^[25][18] As provided in Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

            (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 

            x x x x  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Even so, for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.^[26][19] It must be shown that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen seized from the accused. This function is performed by the “chain of custody” requirement to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist and finally to the court.^[27][20]  Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defines “chain of custody” as follows:

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous        drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature  of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]^[28][21]

          In this case, there was no compliance with the inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drug and marked money immediately after the buy-bust operation.  We have held that such non-compliance does not necessarily render void and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs.  There must, however, be justifiable grounds to warrant exception therefrom, and provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/s.^[29][22]  While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange.  Hence, every link must be accounted for.^[30][23]

          Prosecution witnesses Solero, Ayen and Espiritu were united in testifying that after the consummation of the transaction and immediately upon appellant’s apprehension, Iris turned over the plastic sachet to Espiritu.  It was likewise clear that Espiritu turned over to Solero the specimen allegedly seized from appellant at the police station.

          However, as to the subsequent handling of said specimen at the police station until it was presented in court, the prosecution failed to clearly account for each link in the chain due to the vagueness and patent inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Solero testified that after he got hold of the specimen, the same was turned over to the desk officer whose name he cannot remember.^[31][24] During his direct examination, he promised that he will find out who the desk officer was during that particular day.^[32][25]  He however failed to name the said desk officer when he came back on another hearing date for his cross examination and still referred to him or her as “the desk officer on duty.”^[33][26]  And when asked what their office did to the specimen, he declared that what he knows is that it was brought to the provincial crime laboratory for testing but cannot remember who brought it to the provincial crime laboratory.^[34][27]

Bearis, on the other hand, testified that it was he who brought the specimen to the provincial crime laboratory and when asked from whom he got the specimen, he stated that it was Solero who handed it over to him (Bearis).^[35][28]  He identified in court that it was the same specimen he brought to the provincial crime laboratory since it had the marking “MES,” presumably corresponding to the initials of Solero, and claimed that it was marked in his presence.^[36][29]  There was no evidence to show, however, if Solero indeed made said marking in the presence of Bearis since there was no mention of this when Solero testified.  We find Solero’s failure to mention the supposed marking as consistent with his claim that he turned over the specimen to the unidentified desk officer and not to Bearis. It is thus unclear whether after Solero, the next person who came into possession of the specimen was the unidentified desk officer OR Bearis, given the latter’s testimony that he directly got the same from Solero.

Also unaccounted for is the transfer of the specimen from the provincial crime laboratory to the regional crime laboratory. Nobleza, who received the specimen from Bearis and conducted the initial field test on it, testified that after the examination and preparing the result, she turned over the same to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Augusto Basagre.^[37][30] Clemen, the chemist who conducted the confirmatory test at the regional crime laboratory, testified that she received the specimen from one P/Insp. Alfredo Lopez,^[38][31] Deputy Provincial Officer of the Provincial Crime Laboratory, the signatory of the memorandum for request for laboratory examination.^[39][32] The prosecution failed to present evidence to show how the specimen was transferred from Basagre to Lopez.

Given the foregoing lapses committed by the apprehending officers, the saving clause cannot apply to the case at bar. Not only did the prosecution fail to offer any justifiable ground why the procedure required by law was not complied with, it was also unable to establish the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly taken from appellant. The obvious gaps in the chain of custody created a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimen seized from appellant was the same specimen brought to the crime laboratories and eventually offered in court as evidence.  Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, appellant’s conviction cannot stand.

As a result of the irregularities and lapses in the chain of custody requirement which unfortunately the trial and appellate courts overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot be used against appellant. It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.^[40][33]

WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the November 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620. Appellant JAY LORENA y LABAG is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause/s.

          The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision with deliberate dispatch and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

          With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

          C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 (DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) ANTONIO LEJANO VS.  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176389); PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG (18 JANUARY 2011, ABAD, J.)

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DOCTRINES:

AS A GENERAL RULE CAN JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BE RECONSIDERED? NO, BECAUSE IT IS PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

          But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy.  The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

            Section 21.  No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  x x x

WHAT IS THE EFFECT IF A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BE RECONSIDERED? IT WILL PUT HIM TWICE IN JEOPARDY OF BEING PUNISHED FOR THE SAME CRIME. THIS SCHEME IF ALLOWED CAN MAKE THE GOVT AN INSTRUMENT OF OPPRESSION.

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.  There is reason for this provision of the Constitution.  In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused.  If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.  

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:^[1][2]

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.  The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.  Society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.^[2][3] 

BUT IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT  JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL WILL NOT BE RECONSIDERED? YES, IF THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.  But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.^[3][4]

DID VIZCONDE PROVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION? NO. HE DID NOT SPECIFY THE ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. HIS CLAIM IS MERE CONCLUSION DRAWN FROM PERSONAL PERCEPTION.

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.  For instance, he avers that the Court “must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence.”^[4][5]  But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed.  His claim that “the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision”^[5][6] is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception. 

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan^[6][7] as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case.  But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was “dictated, coerced and scripted.”^[7][8]  It was a sham trial.  Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA.  He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. 

WHAT WAS THE SUBSTANCE OF VIZCONDE’S MOTION FOR RECON? IT QUESTIONS THE COURT’S APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE. IT WANTS THE COURT TO RE-EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE. IT IS A REPEATED ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE CONVICTION OF WEBB ET AL. IT IS PROHIBITED.

          Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility.  He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation.  This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction.  The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

RESOLUTION

ABAD, J.:

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it “denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.”^[1][1] 

          But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy.  The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

            Section 21.  No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.  There is reason for this provision of the Constitution.  In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused.  If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.  

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:^[2][2]

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.  The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.  Society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.^[3][3] 

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.  But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.^[4][4]

          Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.  For instance, he avers that the Court “must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence.”^[5][5]  But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed.  His claim that “the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision”^[6][6] is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception. 

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan^[7][7] as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case.  But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was “dictated, coerced and scripted.”^[8][8]  It was a sham trial.  Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA.  He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. 

          Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility.  He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation.  This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction.  The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizconde’s motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.  

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                                                                                                                                                                       I vote to grant the M.R.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

No part, prior inhibition

      ANTONIO T. CARPIO              CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES    

  Associate Justice                                               Associate Justice

No part due to relastionship to a party           No part; filed pleading as Sol Gen

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.     ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

               Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration                   Same vote as J. Villarama

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                     Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice

       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                     LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                 Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice        

No part                                     I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration

 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO             MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

              Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

  JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                           JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

            Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

See concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

          Chief Justice

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM AND LELY KUNG LIM VS. SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. AND GIL SILOS (G.R. NO. 176339, 10 JANUARY 2011, ABAD, J) SUBJECTS: FILING FEES; EX-PARTE HEARING; TERMINATION OF LEASE. (BRIEF TITLE: DO-ALL METALS ET AL. VS. SECURITY BANK ET AL.)

x —————————————————————- x

DOCTRINES

PETITIONERS FILED SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT BUT FAILED TO PAY THE FILING FEES. BANK SAID RTC DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES. IS THIS CORRECT? NO BECAUSE WHEN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS FILED FILING FEES WERE PAID AND THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.  SUCH JURISDICTION PERSISTS.

One.  On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. 

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.  The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.^[1][6] 

THE BANK FAILED TO APPEAR DURING TRIAL. EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED EX-PARTE. LATER THE BANK ARGUED THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF PETITIONERS’ WITNESSES SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN CREDENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE GIVEN EX-PARTE. SC RULED THAT AN EX PARTE HEARING CANNOT BE ASSAILED AS LESS CREDIBLE.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court.  But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible.  It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing.  It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. 

THE BANK CONTENDED THAT THE LEASE HAVE ALREADY EXPIRED. THEREFORE THEY CAN TAKE OVER THE BUILDING FROM THE PETITIONERS. SC RULED THAT THE BANK HAD NO BUSINESS HARASSING PETITIONERS.

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees.  The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards. 

PETITIONERS EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAVE NOT PAID THE FILING FEES FOR THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT BECAUSE ANYWAY THESE FEES CONSTITUTED A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT. SC RULED THAT AFTER-JUDGMENT LIEN APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE FEES WERE INCORRECTLY ASSESSED OR PAID OR WHERE THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO FIX THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD. NO SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE/S EXITS.

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award.  But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award.^[2][8]  None of these circumstances obtain in this case. 

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank.  Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same.  And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.  They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.  But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.^[3][9]  The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES PERTINENT TO A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT? SUCH SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT SHALL BE TREATED AS NOT HAVING BEEN FILED.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in.  Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.  Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. 

PETITIONERS ARGUED THAT THE BANK BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ITS OBJECTION TO THE NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES BECAUSE THEY RAISED THE ISSUE ONLY AFTER THE RTC HAD RENDERED ITS DECISION ON THE CASE. SC RULED THAT A PARTY OR EVEN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT WAIVE THE PAYMENT OF THE FILING FEES. ONLY THE SUPREME COURT CAN GRANT EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE RULES.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.  The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission.  But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.  Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.

x—————————————————————————-x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.

The Facts and the Case

From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled P92,454,776.45.  Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.^[4][1] 

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence.  DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease.  The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999.  Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase.  DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million instead.  DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the same. 

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their business.  But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA).  The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred the Lims as well as DMI’s employees from entering the property.  One of the guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired.  Because of this, DMI was unable to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients.  Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the property. 

The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos.^[5][2]  Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal.  DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option.  On September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to a third party.  DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it.  But the parties could not agree on a purchase price.  The Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do so.  As a result, the Bank’s buyer backed-out of the sale.  Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but they came to no agreement. 

The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the Lims.  To protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the building even before it leased the same to DMI.  Indeed, this arrangement benefited both parties.  The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the parties could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.

The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the building.  For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there.  The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the movable properties they left there.  In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001.  On that date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding.  The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex parte.  The court eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their case.  The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs’ witnesses for cross- examination but allowed the Bank to present its evidence.^[6][3]  This prompted the Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from this Court but to no avail.^[7][4]

During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant Payongayong, a bank officer.  For repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims.  It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffs P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  But the court absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint.  The RTC denied the motion.  On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaims.^[8][5]  DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence this petition.

The Issues Presented

          The issues presented in this case are:

          1.       Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;

2.       Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed against DMI and its representatives; and

3.       Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.

The Court’s Rulings

One.  On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. 

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.  The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.^[9][6] 

Two.  As to the claim that Bank’s representatives and retained guards harassed and intimidated DMI’s employees and the Lims, the RTC found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages to the plaintiffs.  But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police officers regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers were not present when they happened.  The CA may be correct in a way but the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal knowledge.  The police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble at the place and their investigations yielded their findings.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court.  But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible.  It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing.  It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. 

Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards’ unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower.  Their testimonies were never refuted.  Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked in the building.  When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone from taking any property out of the premises.  It was only after Dela Paz talked to the Bank representative that they let Lim out.^[10][7]

Payongayong, the Bank’s sole witness, denied charges of harassment against the Bank’s representatives and the guards.  But his denial came merely from reports relayed to him.  They were not based on personal knowledge. 

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees.  The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards. 

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award.  But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award.^[11][8]  None of these circumstances obtain in this case. 

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank.  Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same.  And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.  They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.  But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.^[12][9]  The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in.  Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.  Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. 

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.  The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission.  But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.  Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.

Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the movable properties in question had remained in the premises and that the bank was responsible for their loss.  The only evidence offered to prove the loss was Domingo Lim’s testimony and some undated and unsigned inventories.  These were self-serving and uncorroborated. 

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184.  The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees.  The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00.

          SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD 

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice