J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE NO. 2011-0092: EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEONILO B. APITA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY VS. MARISSA M. ESTANISLAO, COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY (A.M. NO. P-06-2206, 16  MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.)  SUBJECT: DUTIES OF LEGAL RESEARCHER; DUTIES OF COURT INTERPRETER; JUDGE CANNOT ASSIGN ONE TO PERFORM THE TASKS OF ANOTHER INDEFINITELY. (BRIEF CASE TITLE: JUDGE APITA VS. ESTANISLAO).

SECOND DIVISION

EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEONILO                               A.M. No. P-06-2206

B. APITA, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 7, Tacloban City,                                               Present:

Complainant,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,^*

PERALTA,

– versus –                                                     ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

MARISSA M. ESTANISLAO,

Court Legal Researcher II,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,                                   Promulgated:

Tacloban City,

Respondent.                                                                    March 16, 2011

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for insubordination filed by Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) of Tacloban City against respondent Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II in Branch 34 of the same court.

The Facts

In 2004, Atty. Pamela A. Navarrete, Court Interpreter in Branch 7 of the RTC of Tacloban City, was appointed as Clerk IV under Justice Pampio Abarintos of the Court of Appeals, leaving the position of Court Interpreter in Branch 7 vacant. Judge Apita designated respondent to act as Court Interpreter in the said Branch until the vacancy was filled up.¹

However, respondent refused to act as Court Interpreter claiming that her designation was a demotion tantamount to removal from the service without cause; that interpreting during trials was not included in the duties and responsibilities of her present position; and that she was not defying Judge Apita’s directive, but merely asserting her right as a civil service employee holding a permanent appointment.²

In his Complaint³ for insubordination filed in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Judge Apita requested the OCA to rule whether his directive designating respondent as Court Interpreter in Branch 7 was valid and if so, whether respondent may be subjected to administrative sanctions for insubordination.

The Complaint was docketed as OCA-IPI No. 04-2051-P. The OCA forthwith required respondent to submit her Comment.⁴

In her Comment,⁵ respondent maintained that acting as Court Interpreter was outside the scope of her job description as Legal Researcher and constituted a demotion tantamount to removal from the service without cause.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

The OCA, in its Report and Recommendation,⁶ found respondent liable for insubordination. According to the OCA, Judge Apita acted well within his authority in designating respondent as Court Interpreter in view of the vacancy in the position. The OCA explained that respondent had no right to defy Judge Apita’s directive in the absence of any showing of abuse of discretion or any proof that the designation was due to some improper motive. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely, thus:

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:

1.      This matter be FORMALLY DOCKETED as an administrative complaint against Marissa M. Estanislao, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City; and

2. Marissa M. Estanislao be SUSPENDED for one (1) month and one (1) day for insubordination with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.⁷

The Court’s Ruling

This is an administrative complaint of first impression involving the designation of court personnel by an executive judge. Judge Apitaadmitted he was unsure whether he could designate a Legal Researcher from one branch to act as a Court Interpreter in another branch of the same court. Hence, he brought the matter to the OCA for a ruling.

In Castro v. Bague,⁸ the Sheriff IV of the RTC (Branch 1) of Tagbilaran City was designated to act as Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Clerk of Court to fill a temporary vacancy. The Court did not question the designation since the duties of a Sheriff IV are identical with the duties of a Deputy Sheriff as described in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court⁹ (Manual), which defines the general functions of all court personnel in the judiciary.

Under 2.2.4 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual, the Sheriff IV is tasked with serving writs and processes of the court; keeping custody of attached properties; and maintaining the record book on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes. Under 2.1.5 of the same Chapter, the Deputy Sheriff serves writs and processes of the court; keeps custody of attached properties; and maintains the record book on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes. Unarguably, the Sheriff IV and the Deputy Sheriff perform exactly the same functions.

The duties of a Legal Researcher in the RTC are described under 2.2.1 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual, to wit:

1.      verifies authorities on questions of law raised by parties- litigants in cases brought before the Court as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge;

2.      prepares memoranda on evidence adduced by the parties after the hearing;

3.      prepares outlines of the facts and issues involved in cases set for pre-trial for the guidance of the Presiding Judge;

4.      prepares indexes to be attached to the records showing the important pleadings filed, the pages where they may be found, and in general, the status of the case;

5.      prepares and submits to the Branch Clerk of Court a monthly list of cases or motions submitted for decision or resolution, indicating therein the deadlines for acting on the same; and

6.      performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge or the Branch Clerk of Court.

On the other hand, 2.2.3 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual describes the functions of a Court Interpreter in the RTC thus:

1.      acts as translator of the court;

2.      attends court hearings;

3.      administers oath to witnesses;

4.      marks exhibits introduced in evidence and prepares the corresponding list of exhibits;

5.      prepares and signs minutes of the court session;

6.      maintains and keeps custody of record book of cases calendared for hearing;

7.      prepares court calendars and the records of cases set for hearing; and

8.      performs such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned by the Presiding Judge and/or Branch Clerk of Court.

Notably, the duties of a Legal Researcher are vastly different from those of a Court Interpreter. A Legal Researcher focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track of the status of cases. On the other hand, a Court Interpreter is limited to acting as translator of the court, administering oaths to witnesses, marking exhibits, preparing minutes of court session, and preparing the court calendar.

While the Manual provides that court personnel may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel’s job description. However, in case of a sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may temporarily designate a court personnel with the competence and skills for the position even if the duties for such position are different from the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The temporary designation shall last only for such period as is necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel with the appropriate prescribed duties. Such temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite period, or until the vacancy is filled up like in the designation by Judge Apita to respondent in this case.

Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel¹⁰ expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job description, thus:

Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description. (Emphasis supplied)

In Re: Report of Senior Chief Staff Officer Antonina A. Soria on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Accounts of Clerk of Court Elena E. Jabao, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Ecija, Guimaras,¹¹ the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia in Guimaras was designated to act as Court Stenographer in addition to her duties as Clerk of Court to fill in for the newly appointed Court Stenographer who was not yet well-versed in stenography. The designation passed the Court’s scrutiny as the duties of a Court Stenographer are subsumed under the general responsibilities of a Clerk of Court since Clerks of Court exercise control and supervision over Court Stenographers.

In the instant case, both Legal Researcher and Court Interpreter are subject to the control and supervision of the Clerk of Court.¹² Since Legal Researchers do not exercise control and supervision over Court Interpreters,¹³ the duties of a Court Interpreter cannot be deemed subsumed under the general functions of a Legal Researcher.

While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires, after consultation with the presiding judges of the branches concerned. Section 6, Chapter VII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC Re: Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties¹⁴ so provides:

Sec. 6. Reassignment of lower court personnel. – (a) Executive Judges of the RTCs shall continue to have authority to effect the following temporary assignments within his/her area of administrative supervision:

1.      Personnel of one branch to another branch of a multiple-branch court;

x x x x

Reassignments shall be made only in case of vacancy in a position in a branch, or when the interest of the service so requires. In either case, the assignment shall be made only after consultation with the Presiding Judges of the branches concerned. In case of any disagreement, the matter shall be referred to the OCA for resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

However, consistent with Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the reassignment of court personnel in multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the executive judge’s administrative supervision must involve (1) workwithin the scope of the court personnel’s job description or (2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court personnel’s present functions.

In this case, since respondent’s job description is that of Legal Researcher, Judge Apita may not designate her to act as Court Interpreter indefinitely or until the vacancy is filled up. The said designation will require respondent to perform work, which is outside the scope of her job description and which involves duties not identical with or subsumed under respondent’s current functions. To do so would violate the express language of Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.

This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that public office is a public trust. Hence, all public officers and employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve the public with utmost responsibility and efficiency.¹⁵ Exhorting court personnel to exhibit the highest sense of dedication to their assigned duty necessarily precludes requiring them to perform any work outside the scope of their assigned job description, save for duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions.

Indeed, requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another, her qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but compromise court personnel’s professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the performance of their respective roles in the dispensation of justice.

Judge Apita may not designate respondent to act as Court Interpreter for an indefinite period or until a new Court Interpreter is appointed. To meet a sudden vacancy or emergency, Judge Apita may only designate respondent in an acting capacity pending designation of a Court Interpreter from another branch of the RTC of Tacloban City to temporarily fill the vacancy in Branch 7 of the same court. This would have been in accord with pertinent rules governing the reassignment of, and the code of conduct for, court personnel.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS for lack of merit the instant administrative complaint for insubordination filed by Executive Judge LeoniloB. Apita of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) of Tacloban City against respondent Marissa M. Estanislao, Legal Researcher II in Branch 34 of the same court.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

*Designated additional member per Special Order No. 933-A dated 24 January 2011.

1Rollo, p. 24.

2Id. at 25-26, 28-30.

3Id. at 2-6.

4Id. at 14.

5Id. at 16-23.

6Id. at 35-36.

7Id. at 36.

8411 Phil. 532 (2001).

9Dated 8 March 2002.

10Otherwise known as A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Effective 1 June 2004.

11359 Phil. 385 (1998).

12Chapter VI, Volume I of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

13Id.

14Approved 27 January 2004.

15Court Personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court-San Carlos City v. Llamas, 488 Phil. 62 (2004).

CASE 2011-0091: ATTY. RAFAEL T. MARTINEZ, AND SPOUSES DAN AND EDNA REYES VS. JUDGE GRACE GLICERIA F. DE VERA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SAN CARLOS CITY,PANGASINAN (A.M. NO. MTJ-08-1718, 16 MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.)  SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: ATTY MARTINEZ ET AL VS. JUDGE DE VERA)

SECOND DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

Atty. Rafael T. Martinez (Atty. Martinez) and spouses Dan and Edna Reyes (spouses Reyes) (collectively, complainants) filed the present administrative complaint against Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera (Judge De Vera), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Carlos City, Pangasinan, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, relative to Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 entitled “Letecia Samera v. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes.” The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge De Vera be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be fined P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The Facts

The memorandum from the OCA narrated the facts as follows:

The following were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator:

1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated January 18, 2008 (with enclosures) of Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Dan and Edna Reyes charging Judge GraceGliceria F. De Vera, [Presiding Judge of] MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 entitled “Letecia Samera vs. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes.”

Complainants narrated that they are defendants in Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 for ejectment with damages heard before the sala of the respondent judge. Complainant Atty. Rafael T. Martinez was their counsel of record.

After the termination of the preliminary conference, the complainant averred that respondent issued a pre-trial order directing the parties to submit their position paper within ten (10) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. The pre-trial order was received by complainant Atty. Rafael T. Martinez on November 21, 2007. Hence, they have until December 1, 2007 within which to file their position paper. However, since the last day of filing falls on Saturday, the complainants filed their position paper together with their evidence by registered mail on December 3, 2007.

Complainant Martinez narrated that on December 28, 2007, his attention was called by Ms. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan about the order promulgated by the respondent denying the admission of the position paper of the complainants on the ground that the same was filed out of time. On the same day, his wife informed him that a certain “JR” of the MTCC delivered the order of the court dated December 12, 2007. On January 2, 2008, complainant Martinez filed, by registered mail, a motion for reconsideration.

On January 6, 2008, complainant Martinez received the adverse decision dated December 28, 2007 in favor of the plaintiff therein.

The complainants claimed that the respondent judge, in denying the admission of their position paper and the evidence attached to it, is obviously ignorant of the basic and elementary provision of the rules. They also abhorred the hastily [sic] rendition of decision of the respondent judge. The said decision of the respondent judge is unjust because it was rendered in violation of the complainants’ substantive right to be heard and to present evidence.

Finally, the complainants contended that the respondent judge, who has shown her inability to observe a very simple and elementary provision of the rules and her disposition to trample upon the rights of litigants, should not be allowed to stay in her lofty position which requires competence, impartiality and probity.

2. COMMENT dated April 23, 2008 (with enclosure) of respondent Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera.

In her Comment dated April 23, 2008, the respondent judge contended that the administrative complaint lodged against her is devoid of merit and is meant to harass her when she rendered an adverse Decision dated December 28, 2007 against the complainant[s] Dan & Edna Reyes in Civil Case No. MTCC-1613.

She denied that she gave instructions to serve the extra copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 at the residence of complainant Atty. Martinez. She averred that she does not even know the residence of the latter. This was later corroborated by Mr. Austria Jr., when he admitted in front of his other officemates on March 4, 2008, that it was his own idea to serve the extra copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 at the house of the complainant Atty. Martinez.

The respondent asserted that the copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 was sent to the complainant Atty. Martinez on December 17, 2007 as evidenced by Registry Receipts [sic] No. 893 dated December 17, 2007 and not on December 28, 2007 as claimed by the complainants.

Anent the early resolution of the MTCC Case No. 1613, the respondent judge contended that it is in compliance with her duty to promptly decide a case within the period required by law. She claimed that there is nothing wrong if a judge renders judgment on the day after the case is submitted for resolution.

The respondent argued that the complainants’ position paper dated December 3, 2007 is a mere rehash of the Answer with Counterclaim dated July 18, 2007. Assuming that she committed a mistake in the computation of the period, the respondent claimed that said error was made in good faith and done without any malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations since the complainants submitted their position paper on the twelfth (12) day, not the tenth (10) day.

OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION: The respondent assails the conduct of the complainant Atty. Martinez in filing what she claims as unfounded administrative complaint and prayed that complainant Atty. Martinez be held responsible, as member of the BAR, for violating his oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility.

3. REPLY TO THE COMMENT dated May 8, 2008

The complainants, in their reply to the comment of the respondent judge, disagreed with the contention of the respondent judge that she should not be subject to disciplinary action for the error she allegedly commits in the absence of malice, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. They asserted that the respondent judge failed to consider the basic and elementary provision of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. The complainants continued to cite several instances to show that the respondent judge has a continuing pattern of committing legal error. Lastly the complainants averred that the explanation proffered by the respondent judge should never be allowed.¹

Complainants filed their Complaint² dated 18 January 2008 before the OCA. Then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño (CAElepaño) directed Judge De Vera to file her comment within ten days from receipt of the indorsement from OCA.³

Atty. Martinez moved for the preventive suspension of Judge De Vera.⁴ Atty. Martinez filed a motion for inhibition of Judge De Vera in all cases where Atty. Martinez is counsel of record in Judge De Vera’s court, and cited the present administrative complaint as the ground for inhibition. Judge De Vera then issued orders in three cases directing Atty. Martinez to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt because the allegations in the motion for inhibition undermine the integrity of Judge De Vera’s court. Atty. Martinez thus moved for Judge De Vera’s preventive suspension pending the resolution of the present administrative complaint.

Judge De Vera moved to extend the filing of her comment twice.⁵ She finally filed her comment on 24 April 2008, one day after the due date, with heavy workload as her excuse.⁶

Complainants filed their reply on 27 May 2008.⁷

The OCA’s Ruling

On 11 July 2008, the OCA, under then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez⁸ and Assistant Court Administrator Reuben P. Dela Cruz,issued its Evaluation and Recommendation on the present complaint.

The OCA underscored that the issue in the instant case is whether or not respondent Judge De Vera could be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in denying the admission of the position paper and the evidence attached to it in Civil Case No. MTCC No. 1613 entitled “Letecia Samera vs. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes.” The OCA stated that ordinarily, before the judge can be held liable, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties should be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, and the judge must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Although there is absence of bad faith or malice in the present case, the OCA opined that respondent Judge De Vera cannot be excused from applying a basic law. When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it also constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The OCA’s recommendation reads as follows:

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant complaint against Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera [of] MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and that the respondent judge be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (PHP10,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.⁹

This Court, in a Resolution¹⁰ dated 11 August 2008, re-docketed administrative complaint OCA-IPI No. 08-1969-MTJ as regular administrative matter A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718. Judge De Vera filed a Rejoinder¹¹ on 4 September 2008.

In a Resolution¹² dated 15 October 2008, this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten days from notice, if they were willing to submit the administrative matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they were willing to have the case so decided. Atty. Martinez stated his willingness to resolve the present administrative matter based on the pleadings after the submission of the envelope showing that the position paper was indeed sent via registered mail on 3 December 2007.¹³ Judge De Vera stated her willingness to submit the case for resolution after the submission of her supplemental rejoinder.¹⁴ Judge De Vera submitted her Supplemental Rejoinder¹⁵ on 12 January 2009.

Issue

The sole issue is whether respondent Judge De Vera should be held administratively liable for issuing the Order dated 12 December 2007 denying the admission of the position paper of the complainants on the ground that the same was filed out of time.

Both parties raise other issues and detail other facts which, to our mind, deviate from the proper subject matter.

The Court’s Ruling

We reverse and set aside the recommendation of the OCA.

Relevant portions of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court read:

Section 9. How to compute time. – x x x If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

From the OCA’s recommendation, we glean the following pertinent facts: (1) After the pre-trial conference, Judge De Vera issued a pre-trial order directing the parties to submit their position paper within ten days from receipt. Atty. Martinez received the order on 21 November 2007. Hence, he had until 1 December 2007 to submit his position paper. (2) Atty. Martinez filed, via registered mail, his position paper on 3 December 2007 as 1 December 2007 fell on a Saturday; and (3) Judge De Vera denied, in an order dated 12 December 2007, Atty. Martinez’s position paper for being filed out of time.

From Judge De Vera’s Supplemental Rejoinder, we learn that “the envelope showing that the position paper was sent through registered mail on December 3, 2007 was not stitched to the Record and was in fact found in the drawer of Verna Galvez (Galvez), a courtpersonnel, on October 27, 2008.”¹⁶ Judge De Vera’s explanation continues:

Thus, respondent thought all along that the Position Paper was filed personally by complainants on December 6, 2007 [date of receipt of the Position Paper by the trial court], or on the 15^th day from receipt of the complainants of the Order dated November 5, 2007 on November 21, 2007. The record, when forwarded to the undersigned, prior to the release of the interlocutory order dated December 12, 2007 denying the Position Paper of the complainants shows only Registry Receipt No. 8677, showing that the complainants have sent Atty. Juvy F. Valdez, counsel for the plaintiffs, through registered mail on December 3, 2007 the said position paper. For this reason, the respondent, in good faith, denied the said Position Paper for being filed out of time. Good faith is a defense in a charge of gross ignorance of the law.¹⁷

Despite the existence of Registry Receipt No. 8677 showing that the position paper sent to the counsel of the adverse party was served through registered mail on 3 December 2007, which was well within the allowed period, Judge De Vera presumed that complainants’ position paper was filed late, on 6 December 2007, and through personal filing with the Court. Given this presumption, it was correct for Judge De Vera to deny complainants’ position paper for being filed out of time.

Judge De Vera prepared the questioned order between 6 December and 12 December 2007. However, Judge De Vera failed to effectively verify whether the presumption in her 12 December 2007 order was correct. Eight months later, Judge De Vera found herself saying that she would conduct an investigation as to whether complainants’ position paper was sent via registered mail.¹⁸

Judge De Vera issued a Memorandum¹⁹ dated 10 October 2008, ten months after the 12 December 2007 order, and required Julie Soriano (Soriano), clerk responsible for the receipt of pleadings filed by litigants²⁰ before Judge De Vera’s court, to file a comment as to whether complainants’ position paper was sent via registered mail.

In her Comment²¹ dated 15 October 2008, Soriano explained that she indeed received complainants’ position paper through registered mail on 6 December 2007 at 2:05 in the afternoon. Soriano stated that she attached all pleadings received that day, with their respective envelopes, to the records of the cases concerned and submitted them to Mrs. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court.

In a Memorandum²² dated 27 October 2008, Judge De Vera asked Soriano to explain why there was no envelope attached to the record. In her Comment²³ dated 5 November 2008, Soriano stated that the envelope was stapled on top of the record of Civil Case MTCC-1613. However, the envelope was found in the drawer of Galvez on 27 October 2008, and might have been inadvertently detached from the position paper.

Judge De Vera reprimanded Soriano in a Memorandum²⁴ dated 5 January 2008.

You should be more circumspect in the performance of your duties. Your failure to attach the mailing envelope in the record shows that you failed to apply appropriate measure[s] to ensure that all pertinent documents are securely attached thereto to the record of MTCC No. 1613.

This led to the filing of the administrative case against the undersigned when the Position Paper was denied as the undersigned thought that the said pleading was filed personally by the complainants on the 15^th day, not on the 10^th day as mandated.

You are, likewise expected to discharge your duty of keeping court records with care, efficiency and professionalism. Proper and efficient court management is a judge’s responsibility. But while I have supervision over you, I cannot be expected to constantly check on your performance of your duties.

As your superior, I have a right to expect that all mailing envelopes are stitched to the record. You are hereby reprimanded for this negligence. A repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.²⁵

Subsequently, in a motion²⁶ filed on 19 November 2008, Atty. Martinez alleged that Judge De Vera is suppressing evidence because the envelope which proves that the complainants’ position paper was sent via registered mail is in Judge De Vera’s possession. Portions of Atty. Martinez’s motion read:

2.      In the said rejoinder, the respondent asseverated among others that no envelope showing that the position paper the complainants filed in Civil Case No. 1613 was sent by registered mail on December 3, 2007;

3.      Recently, an employee of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, the court being presided by the respondent handed to the undersigned a xerox copy of the envelope of the said position paper, the said xerox copy of the said envelope is hereto attached as Annex “A”;

4.      Today, the undersigned went to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Carlos City, Pangasinan for the purpose of securing a certified xeroxcopy of the said envelope;

5.      The undersigned was able to talk with Mrs. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. In the course of the said conversation, the undersigned informed Mrs. Basa of his intention to secure a certified xerox copy of the envelope;

6.      Mrs. Basa informed the undersigned that the said envelope is in the possession of the respondent judge;

7.      The said envelope is a vital piece of evidence considering that the respondent is claiming in her rejoinder that the complainants are lying when they stated in their complaint that their position paper was filed in December 3, 2007;

8.      The said envelope would clearly show that the position paper was mailed in Dagupan City on December 3, 2007;

9.      There is a need for the Honorable Court to safeguard the integrity of the present proceedings by not allowing any of the parties to suppress a vital piece of evidence. Hence, the Honorable Supreme Court should order the respondent to surrender the envelope to the Honorable Court and once the envelope is surrendered, the same be considered as part of the evidence for the complainants;

10.  The undersigned complainant, due to oversight, failed to attach to the copy of the position paper submitted as an annex to the complaint the original copy of the registry receipt of the said position paper;

11.  He is submitting herewith the original copy of the said registry receipt bearing the number 8679[.]²⁷

The circumstances related above were not yet known when the OCA made its recommendation. It is for this reason that we modify the OCA’s findings.

Contrary to Atty. Martinez’s allegations, the circumstances surrounding the loss and subsequent discovery of the envelope point to Judge De Vera’s good faith. We acknowledge that compared to the present administrative proceedings, it would have been far simpler for Judge De Vera to immediately verify the submission of complainants’ position paper to the court at the time of her preparation of the questioned order. Albeit belated, Judge De Vera exerted reasonable efforts to rectify the errors of her staff. The inconvenience caused by the present administrative case could be considered as sufficient penalty against Judge De Vera, and should serve as a reminder to her to “diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, [and to] maintain professional competence in court management x x x.”²⁸

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.²⁹

Judge De Vera would do well to keep in mind that “[a] judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.”³⁰ A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.³¹

Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her position doubly unbearable.³²

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. All the other charges and countercharges between the parties are also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 933 dated 24 January 2011.

1 Rollo, pp. 609-611.

2 Id. at 1-6.

3 Id. at 112.

4 Id. at 114-116.

5 Id. at 196-203.

6 Id. at 210-265.

7 Id. at 473-506.

8 Now Supreme Court Justice.

9 Rollo, p. 612.

10 Id. at 628.

11 Id. at 639-743.

12 Id. at 1528.

13 Id. at 1529-1538.

14 Id. at 1553-1558.

15 Id. at 1677-1706.

16 Id. at 1688.

17 Id. at 1689-1690.

18 Id. at 1597-1598.

19 Id. at 1712-1713.

20 Under Chapter VII, D.2 of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, Clerk III Soriano had the following functions:

2.1.12.1. Receives and dockets cases filed with the Court;

2.1.12.2. Receives and records all pleadings, documents and communications pertaining to the Court;

2.1.12.3. Refers to the Clerk of Court or Branch Clerk of Court all cases, pleadings, documents and communications received;

2.1.12.4. Takes charge of all mail matters and maintains a systematic filing of criminal, civil, special civil actions, land registration and administrative cases;

2.1.12.5. Maintains and keeps custody of record books on pending cases, record book on disposed cases, books on appealed cases;

2.1.12.6. Checks and verifies in the docket book applications for clearances and certifications;

2.1.12.7. Prepares weekly reports to the court on the status of individual cases;

2.1.12.8. Checks and reviews exhibits and other documents to be attached to records on appeal;

2.1.12.9. Keeps record book on warrants of arrest issued, record book on accused persons who are at-large, and record book on judgment against bail bonds;

2.1.12.10. Prepares subpoenas, notices, processes, and communications for the signature of the Judge and/or the Clerk of Court;

2.1.12.11. Releases decisions, orders, processes, subpoenas and notices as directed by the Judge or Clerk of Court by delivering them in addressed envelopes and with return cards to the process server for service or mailing; and

2.1.12.12. Performs other duties that may be assigned to him.

21 Rollo, pp. 1714-1716.

22 Id. at 1719-1720.

23 Id. at 1725-1727.

24 Id. at 1730-1732.

25 Id. at 1731-1732.

26 Id. at 1529-1534.

27 Id. at 1529-1531.

28 Rule 3.08, Code of Judicial Conduct.

29 Lumbos v. Baliguat, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1641, 27 July 2006, 496 SCRA 556, 573 (citations omitted).

30 Rule 3.09, Code of Judicial Conduct.

31 Nidua v. Lazaro, A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 581, 586.

32 De Vega v. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA 1, 5 citing De Guzman v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 22.

CASE NO. 2011-0090: SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALAGAR AND AURORA ALAGAR VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (G.R. NO. 171870, 16 MARCH 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECTS: CASE WHERE PROCEEDS OF WRIT OF EXECUTION WERE ORDERED RETURNED; CERTIORARI; MANDAMUS; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES ALAGAR VS. PNB)

SECOND DIVISION

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALAGAR                  G.R. No. 171870

AND AURORA ALAGAR,

                             Petitioner,                       Present:

                                                                     CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

          – versus –                                             CARPIO MORALES,^*

  PERALTA,

  ABAD, and

  MENDOZA, JJ.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

                             Respondent.                            Promulgated:

                                                                      March 16, 2011

x ———————————————————————————— x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

          This case is about a) a claim that the defendant is estopped from questioning the validity of a writ of execution that he subsequently complied with; b) an assertion that a supplemental petition cannot elevate to the higher court those orders of the lower court that were issued more than 60 days earlier; and c) a contention that the petition was not one for mandamus which is the proper remedy when the trial court refuses to give due course to an appeal.

The Facts and the Case

          On April 14, 1992 petitioner spouses Antonio and Aurora Alagar (the Alagars) got a personal loan of P500,000.00 from respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB), secured by a mortgage over a 368-square meter lot on General Luna Street in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.^[1]  The Alagars subsequently increased their loan to P1,700,000.00 and later to P2,900,000.00 with corresponding amendments to the mortgage.

          Meanwhile, in 1995 PNB gave New Taj Resources, Inc., a corporation owned by the Alagars, a loan of P9,300,000.00, secured by a mortgage on an 8,086-square meter lot in Pantay Daya, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.  The Alagars also executed a joint and solidary agreement that bound them with other persons to pay the corporate loan to the bank.^[2]

          After a few years, the Alagars’ outstanding balance on their personal loan with PNB rose to P4,003,134.36 as of May 31, 1997.  In the face of this, they negotiated with the bank and requested the condonation of interests so they could settle their debt. Meantime they paid the bank P3,900,000.00 while awaiting approval of their request. When the bank granted it, the Alagars paid the balance of P330,221.50 and sought the release of the General Luna title to them.  The bank refused, however, citing the Alagars’ other unsettled account.

          On January 12, 2001 the Alagars filed a petition for mandamus^[3] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur to compel PNB to release the General Luna title to them.  They claimed that PNB had no reason to retain the title since they already paid their personal loan. They insisted that the unsettled account cited by PNB referred to the corporate loan of New Taj Resources, Inc. which was secured by the Pantay Daya title.  The Alagars claimed moral and exemplary damages for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of their property.      

          In its answer,^[4] PNB alleged that the petition did not state a cause of action since mandamus is not the proper remedy for compelling the performance of contractual obligations.  Further, the bank had the right to retain the General Luna title since, as solidary debtors in the corporate loan, which had then become due, the Alagars still had an outstanding obligation with the bank. The mortgage contract between PNB and the Alagars provided that the property on General Luna was to secure, not only their personal loan, but also “any and all other obligations of the Mortgagors to the Mortgagees of whatever kind and nature.”

          At the trial, the Alagars presented their evidence and on June 26, 2001 formally offered their documentary exhibits.  The RTC set PNB’s presentation of its evidence on July 30, 2001 but its counsel failed to appear.  Consequently, the RTC deemed PNB to have waived presentation of evidence and submitted the case for decision.  It appears, however, that on the day of the hearing, the PNB branch manager in Vigan wrote the RTC a letter, explaining that the bank could not come to the hearing due to the retirement of its counsel of record.  PNB asked the court for 60 days within which to find another lawyer.^[5]          

          On August 6, 2001 Atty. Benjamin V. Sotero entered his appearance as PNB’s new counsel.  He then filed a motion for reconsideration asking that PNB be allowed to present evidence.  He set the motion for hearing on September 17, 2001.  On August 7, 2001 the RTC denied PNB’s motion on the ground that it violated Sections 3^[6] and 5^[7] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.^[8] PNB failed to accompany its motion with supporting affidavits and other papers and set it for hearing more than 10 days after its filing.

          Subsequently, Atty. Sotero failed to appear during the hearing on September 17, 2001 that he himself set for the bank’s motion for reconsideration. This prompted the trial court to issue another order on that date,^[9] reiterating its earlier order submitting the case for decision. The trial court also noted that PNB did not react to its August 7, 2001 order that was sent to it by registered mail.

          On October 5, 2001 PNB filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the orders of July 30, August 7, and September 17, 2001.  The bank again asked for an opportunity to present evidence in support of its defense.  In an order dated October 29, 2001,^[10] the trial court denied the omnibus motion for its failure to state when the bank received the questioned orders.  Moreover, the trial court rejected counsel’s excuse for not reacting to the August 7, 2001 order.  Counsel claimed that he had to attend to other urgent legal matters of equal importance.

          On January 15, 2002 the trial court rendered judgment^[11] in favor of the Alagars.  It held that, although the pleading was denominated as a petition for mandamus, its allegations actually made out a case for specific performance. Since the Alagars’ personal loan had already been fully paid, the real estate mortgage had nothing more to secure, such that both law and equity required that the collateral given to secure it be released to the owners. 

          PNB filed a motion for new trial or for reconsideration.  It asserted in addition to its arguments on the merit of the case that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the issue of whether or not the controversial stipulation in the mortgage contract was valid and binding. The only issues presented by the pleadings were: 1) whether or not the petition stated a cause of action; (2) whether or not the title should be released to the Alagars upon full payment of their personal loan; and (3) whether or not the Alagars were entitled to damages.

          Meanwhile, PNB filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 68661, seeking to annul and set aside the trial court orders of August 7 (which denied PNB’s motion for reconsideration due to technical defects), September 17 (reiterating the August 7 order when PNB’s counsel failed to show up at the hearing he set for its motion for reconsideration), and October 29, 2001 (which denied as unmeritorious PNB’s omnibus motion for reconsideration).  Since the trial court had in the meantime already rendered a decision in the case, however, on March 20, 2002 the CA dismissed the petition for being moot and academic.^[12]

          On March 25, 2002 the RTC issued an order, denying PNB’s motion for new trial or for reconsideration for failing to raise new matters and violating the 10-day hearing schedule rule.  This prompted PNB to file a notice of appeal.   The RTC issued an order on April 29, 2002, however, denying due course to the appeal on the ground that the bank filed it beyond the required 15-day period. The court said that, since PNB’s motion for new trial or reconsideration was pro forma, it did not toll the running of the period to appeal.              

          Meantime, on motion of the Alagars, the trial court caused the issuance on June 4, 2002 of a writ of execution against the bank.^[13]  This prompted the PNB to file on June 13, 2002 a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. SP 71116, assailing the RTC’s March 25, April 29, and June 4, 2002 orders as well as the writ of execution that it issued.^[14]  In a parallel move, PNB asked the trial court to quash the writ of execution, claiming that it was improvidently issued and that, as a matter of judicial courtesy, it should await the CA action on the bank’s petition before it.

          On July 17, 2002 the RTC denied PNB’s urgent motion to quash the writ.  The court said that issuing the writ was a ministerial duty after its decision became final and executory.  Further, the CA had not issued any restraining order against the RTC.^[15]  PNB moved for reconsideration of this last order but the RTC denied the same on September 16, 2002.^[16]  Thus, an alias writ of execution was issued, compelling PNB to abide by it in full.^[17]    

          Later, the Alagars asked the RTC by motion to order the cancellation of the mortgage annotated on its title, alleging that this was a necessary and logical consequence of the implementation of the writ of execution.  The RTC granted the motion on August 4, 2003, stating that although the dispositive part of the decision did not say so, the order to release the General Luna title necessarily included with it the cancellation of the mortgage.^[18]    

          Again, PNB sought reconsideration of the RTC’s August 4, 2003 order and the quashal of the second writ of execution.^[19] In response, the Alagars filed a petition to cite the PNB for indirect contempt for failing to release the mortgage. PNB opposed the petition.  On October 21, 2003^[20] the RTC granted PNB’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed the Alagars’ petition for indirect contempt. At the same time, however, it ordered the amendment of the dispositive part of its January 15, 2002 decision to read as follows:

            Wherefore, finding the allegations in the Complaint proven by competent and preponderant evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:

1.         Ordering the defendant Philippine National Bank (PNB), Vigan, Ilocos Sur Branch, through its Manager, Mrs. Rosalia A. Quilala to release Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3576 in the name of Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora J. Alagar to the plaintiffs herein;

2.         Ordering defendant PNB to pay same plaintiffs the amount of P1,825.00 as actual damages;

3.         Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

4.         ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO EXECUTE THE DEED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CANCEL THE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF-SPOUSES ANTONIO ALAGAR AND AURORA ALAGAR AND TO DELIVER SAID DEED TO THE LATTER;

5.         AS AN ALTERNATIVE, SHOULD THE DEFENDANT FAIL OR REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH THE HEREINABOVE ORDER NO. 4, THE DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THIS COURT, MR. TERENCIO FLORENDO IS HEREBY APPOINTED TO EXECUTE THE DEED OF CANCELLATION OF THE MORTGAGE IN SUIT IN BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT PNB FOR REGISTRATION IN THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR.

The counterclaim not having been proven, the same is dismissed.^[21]

The Alagars filed a motion for reconsideration of the above insofar as it granted PNB’s motion for reconsideration of the August 4, 2003 order and motion to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt.  On December 18, 2003 the RTC issued an order,^[22]granting the Alagars’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating its August 4, 2003 order that directed the issuance of a writ of execution.  The order also deleted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the amended dispositive portion of the decision, thus reinstating the original version.

PNB moved for reconsideration of the RTC’s December 18, 2003 order and prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance in view of CA-G.R. SP 71116 which was pending before the CA.  But the RTC denied the motion on March 11, 2004, stating that it had the inherent power to amend its decision to make it conform to law and justice.  It also declined to hold matters in abeyance since the RTC had not been amply informed about the CA action and since there was no possibility that the issues before the CA would be rendered moot if the proceedings below continued.^[23]

In view of the trial court’s conflicting directives, PNB filed a motion for clarification of the March 11, 2004 order.  Further, on June 3, 2004 it also filed a supplemental petition^[24] in CA-G.R. SP 71116, assailing all the RTC actions and orders subsequent to the filing of the original petition.  On June 14, 2004 the RTC issued an order,^[25] resolving PNB’s motion for clarification and recalling in the meantime the writ of execution that it issued on August 4, 2003. It also deleted paragraph 5 of the amended dispositive portion of its decision but retained paragraph 4 ordering PNB to execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage in favor of the Alagars.

On September 30, 2005 the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP 71116, annulling and setting aside all the RTC’s orders beginning March 25, 2002, when the RTC denied as pro forma PNB’s motion for reconsideration of its January 12, 2002 decision. The CA held that the motion was not pro forma and, therefore, it tolled the running of the period to appeal.  PNB did not belatedly file its notice of appeal, as it still had three days to elevate the trial court’s decision to the CA.  Consequently, the decision did not become final and executory and could not be the subject of a writ of execution.^[26]

Moreover, said the CA, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it substantially amended its decision which, by its own ruling, had already become final and executory.  Inasmuch as the RTC decision merely ordered the PNB to release the mortgaged title to the Alagars, the additional order directing the bank to cancel and release the mortgage constituted on that title cannot be regarded as a simple clerical correction since it would substantially prejudice PNB’s rights as mortgagee.^[27]                     

The Alagars filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it for lack of merit,^[28] hence this petition for review.

The Issues Presented

          The case presents the following issues:

1.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that PNB was estopped from assailing the validity of the writ of execution after it had been implemented;

2.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that it could no longer nullify the RTC’s orders that PNB assailed by supplemental petition beyond 60 days from the issuance of such orders; and

3.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that PNB’s petition before it was not the proper remedy for assailing the order that denied due course to its appeal.

The Rulings of the Court

FIRST.  The Alagars contend that the issue of whether the RTC validly issued a writ of execution in the case had become moot since PNB willingly obeyed the writ, returned the General Luna title to the Alagars, and paid them the damages that the RTC awarded in its decision.  Going further, the Alagars argue that the full implementation of the writ foreclosed any question concerning the validity of the decision itself.^[29]   

But the execution of a judgment pending an action in a higher court essentially challenging its finality cannot be deemed an abandonment of that action.  The rules grant parties the right to question by special civil actions those orders and rulings that inferior courts issue with grave abuse of discretion.  That the PNB complied with the writ of execution after its several attempts to stop it cannot be deemed a voluntary abandonment of its action before the CA.  PNB had no choice but to obey the RTC orders, given that the CA did not then deem it appropriate to issue a restraining order.  And PNB did not relent in pursuing its action before the CA. Besides, the Alagars did not raise this issue of estoppel before the CA.  Consequently, they cannot raise the same for the first time before the Court.              

SECOND. The Alagars point out that PNB can no longer question the RTC orders that were issued from July 17, 2002 onwards since more than 60 days had elapsed when PNB challenged their validity by supplemental petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116. These orders have thus become final under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.^[30]   

          Again, the Alagars did not raise this issue before the CA.  Indeed, they did not file a comment on the supplemental petition despite having been required to do so.  They also failed to mention it in their memorandum before the CA.^[31]  Consequently, the Court cannot adjudicate the issue. 

          Besides, the RTC’s subsequent orders were founded on the assumption that it correctly denied for being pro forma PNB’s motion for reconsideration of its decision.  All such orders assumed that the RTC decision had become final and executory.  As it turned out, however, the CA held that PNB filed a valid motion for reconsideration, that it filed a timely appeal after the motion was denied, and that, therefore, the RTC decision had not become final and executory.

THIRD.  Finally, the Alagars assert that PNB availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action of certioraribefore the CA rather than one of mandamus to compel the RTC to give due course to its notice of appeal after the latter held that itspro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the period of appeal which had then already elapsed.^[32]

          But a reading of PNB’s allegations in its petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116 shows that its action was not only for certiorari and prohibition but also for mandamus.  The bank alleged that by its whimsical, capricious and arbitrary actions the RTC deprived the PNB of its appeal, leaving it with no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  The PNB petition also specifically prayed the CA to direct the trial court to give due course to its appeal.^[33]  Following the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the pleading and the character of the relief sought, it is unmistakable that CA-G.R. SP 71116 was also a petition for mandamus.

          The Alagars fail to show any reversible error in the CA’s decision. That court’s finding that PNB’s motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and, therefore, tolled the running of PNB’s period to appeal, is supported by the evidence on record.  The motion for reconsideration specified the RTC’s findings and conclusions in its decision that PNB thought to be contrary to law.  The latter even raised new arguments, not previously considered by the trial court, which even the latter recognized in its assailed March 25, 2002 order.  From all indications, the motion for reconsideration complied with requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.^[34]  Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to have simply concluded that the motion was pro forma and did not toll the running of the period to appeal.  The RTC should have given due course to PNB’s appeal.

          WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP 71116 dated September 30, 2005 in its entirety.  The petitioner spouses Antonio and Aurora Alagar are further ordered to RETURNto respondent PNB OCT 0-3576, as well as the amount of P181,825.00 and all other amounts that they received under the Alias Writ of Execution dated October 22, 2002.

          SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES                  DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                 Associate Justice                                Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

^* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order 933-B dated January 24, 2011.

^[1]  Registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 0-3576; CA rollo, pp. 32-36.

^[2]  Id. at 37-46.

^[3]  Id. at 50-54; docketed as Civil Case 5534-V.

^[4]  Id. at 55-58.

^[5]  Id. at 82.

^[6]  SEC. 3. Contents. – A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers.

^[7]  SEC. 5. Notice of Hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

^[8]  CA rollo, p. 83.

^[9]  Id. at 84.

^[10]  Id. at 85-87.

^[11]  Rollo, pp. 56-70.

^[12]  CA rollo, pp. 114-116.

^[13]  Rollo, pp. 79-80.

^[14]  CA rollo, pp. 2-23.

^[15]  Rollo, pp. 81-83.

^[16]  Id. at 91-93.

^[17]  Id. at 98.

^[18]  Id. at 102-104.

^[19]  Id. at 106-109.

^[20]  Id. at 112-118.

^[21]  Id. at 117-118.

^[22]  Id. at 119-120.

^[23]  Id. at 123-125.

^[24]  CA rollo, pp. 189-206.

^[25]  Rollo, p. 126.

^[26]  Id. at 42-47.

^[27]  Id. at 49.

^[28]  Id. at 52-55.

^[29]  Id. at 305.

^[30]  Id.

^[31]  Id. at 54; CA rollo, p. 291.

^[32]  Rollo, p. 306.

^[33]  CA rollo, p. 20.

^[34]  SEC. 1.  Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

x x x x

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.

SEC. 2.  Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.

x x x x

                A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.

                A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.