CASE  2011-0107: JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO VS. REMEDIOS LOYOLA (G.R. No. 181370, 9 MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: CERTIFICATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP, TRANSFER OF RIGHTS (BRIEF TITLE: LEBRUDO VS. LOYOLA)

SECOND DIVISION

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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition¹ for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution² dated 4 January 2008 and Decision³ dated 17 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

The Facts

Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, known as Lot No. 723-6, Block 1, Psd-73149 (lot), awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act No. 6657⁴ (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered by Certificate of Land Ownership⁵ (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered on 14 March 1991 under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.

On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an action⁶ for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudo’s favor.

In a Decision⁷ dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. On 11 March 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action.⁸

Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to redeem the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a cavan of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo’shelp in obtaining title to the lot in her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from her mother, Cristina Hugo. In exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay⁹ dated 28 December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed two more SinumpaangSalaysay¹⁰ dated 1 December 1992 and 3 December 1992, committing herself to remove her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.

Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of theSangguniang Barangay of Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the Department of Agrarian Reform to mediate. However, despite steps taken to amicably settle the issue, as evidenced by certifications from the PNP and the barangay, there was no amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against Loyola.

In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied promising one-half portion of the lot as payment for the transfer, titling and registration of the lot. Loyola explained that the lot was her only property and it was already being occupied by her children and their families. Loyola also denied the genuineness and due execution of the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992. The records do not show whether Loyola renounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 1 December 1992.

In a Decision¹¹ dated 13 February 2002, the PARAD of Trece Martires City,Cavite decided the case in Lebrudo’s favor. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring Respondent Remedios Loyola disqualified as farmer beneficiary of the subject land identified asLot723-6, Block 1, under TCT/CLOA No. 998;

b) Declaring the Deed of sales over the subject lot illegal and ordered the same set aside;

c) Declaring Plaintiff JULIAN LEBRUDO entitled to one half (½) of the subject property under TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name ofRemedios Loyola;

d) Ordering the other one half (½) of the subject lot ready for allocation to qualified beneficiary;

e) Ordering the DAR PARO Office thru the Operations Division to cancel TCT/CLOA No. 998 and in lieu thereof, to generate and issue another title over the 120 square meters in the name of JULIAN LEBRUDO;

f) Ordering the survey of the subject lot at the expense of the petitioner so that title be issued to plaintiff herein;

g) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires Cityto cancel TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of Remedios Loyola;

h) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires Cityto register the title in the name [of] Julian Lebrudo as presented by the DAR or its representative over the lot in question;

No pronouncement as to costs and damages.

SO ORDERED.¹²

Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).¹³ In a Decision¹⁴ dated 24 August 2004, the DARAB reversed the decision of the PARAD and ruled in Loyola’s favor. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:

1. Upholding and maintaining the validity and effectivity of TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of the respondent;

2. Declaring the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and December 3, 1992 attached to the petition as Annex C and F, null and void without legal force and effect;

3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City,Caviteto reinstate TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of the respondent.

The status quo ante order issued by this Board on November 3, 2003 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.¹⁵

Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied in a Resolution¹⁶ dated 12 April 2005. Lebrudo then filed a petition¹⁷ for review with the CA.

In a Decision¹⁸ dated 17 August 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the DARAB. Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution¹⁹ dated 4 January 2008.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992 allegedly executed by Loyola in his favor.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700,²⁰ which provides for the transferability of awarded lands, states:

SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. – Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform must indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award and the subsequent transfer title must also indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.

In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.

Lebrudo’s assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v. Ellano,²¹ we held that the waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysayexecuted by Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.

Lebrudo asserts that he is a qualified farmer beneficiary who is entitled to the lot under the CARP. DAR Administrative Order No. 3,²²series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary:

1. Landless;

2. Filipino citizen;

3. Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and

4. Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.

Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records,²³ Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a homelot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona,Cavite. Next, Lebrudois not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP.

Further, the CA, in its Decision dated 17 August 2007, correctly observed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title and after the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the registration decree upon which it is based, the title becomes incontrovertible. The CA also declared that the basis of Lebrudo’s claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992, were illegal and void ab initio for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian law. The relevant portions of the decision provide:

x x x It is undisputed that CLOA 20210 was issued to the respondent on December 27, 1990 and was registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on March 14, 1991, resulting in the issuance of TCT/CLOA No. 998 in her name.

Under Sec. 43, P.D. 1529, the certificate of title that may be issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the land shall be the transfer certificate of title, which shall show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was previously registered, giving the record number of the original certificate of title and the volume and page of the registration book in which the original certificate of title is found.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, the title becomes incontrovertible.

Accordingly, by the time when original petitioner Julian Lebrudo filed on June 27, 1995 the first case (seeking the cancellation of the respondent’s CLOA), the respondent’s certificate of title had already become incontrovertible. That consequence was inevitable, for as the DARAB correctly observed, an original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding was as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Clearly, the respondent, as registered property owner, was entitled to the protection given to every holder of a Torrens title.

The issue of whether or not the respondent was bound by her waiver and transfer in favor of Julian Lebrudo, as contained in the several sinumpaangsalaysay, was irrelevant. Worse for the petitioner, the DARAB properly held that the undertaking of the respondent to Julian Lebrudo under thesinumpaang salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and December 3, 1992 – whereby she promised to give him ½ portion of the homelot in consideration of his helping her work on the release of the CLOA to her and shouldering all the expenses for the purpose – was “clearly illegal and void ab initio” for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian laws and their implementing rules. He could not, therefore, have his supposed right enforced. x x x²⁴

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. The main purpose of the agrarian reform law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiary’s continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land he tills.²⁵ To do otherwise is to revert back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land and thus circumvent the government’s program of freeing the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.²⁶

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 17 August 2007 and Resolution dated 4 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

*Designated additional member per Special Order No. 933 dated 24 January 2011.

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, p. 19. Penned by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) with Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring.

3Id. at 20-29.

4An Act Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to Promote Social Justice and Industrialization, Providing the Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes. Approved on 10 June 1988.

5Document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in R.A. 6657 and other applicable laws.

6Docketed as DARAB Case No. 269-95.

7Rollo, p. 32.

8Docketed as DARAB Case No. 0357-96.

9Rollo, p. 73.

10Id. at 74-75.

11Id. at 31-39.

12Id. at 38-39.

13Docketed as DARAB Case No. 11565 (Reg. Case No. 0357-96).

14Rollo, pp. 44-53.

15Id. at 52.

16Id. at 56-57.

17Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

18Supra note 3.

19Supra note 2.

20An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Took effect on 1 July 2009.

21G.R. No. 162721, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 440, 452, citing Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation v. Estita, 490 Phil. 137, 152 (2005).

22Revised Rules and Procedure Governing Distribution and/or Titling of Lots in Landed Estates Administered by DAR. Issued on May 1990.

23Rollo, p. 50.

24Id. at 27-29.

25Corpuz v. Sps. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1110 (2000). See also Torres v. Ventura, G.R. No. 86044, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 96.

26Corpuz v. Sps. Grospe, supra.

CASE 2011-0106: PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE VS. GERALDINE VELASCO (G.R. NO. 177467, 9 MARCH 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: BACKWAGES, REINSTATEMENT. (BRIEF TITLE: PFIZER ET AL VS. VELASCO)

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

          This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to annul and set aside the Resolution^[1] dated October 23, 2006 as well as the Resolution^[2] dated April 10, 2007 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88987 entitled, “Pfizer, Inc. and/or Rey Gerardo Bacarro, and/or Ferdinand Cortes, and/or Alfred Magallon, and/or Aristotle Arce v. National Labor Relations Commission Second Division and Geraldine Velasco.”  The October 23, 2006 Resolution modified upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration the Decision^[3] dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals by requiring PFIZER, Inc. (PFIZER) to pay respondent’s wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision^[4] dated December 5, 2003 until it was eventually reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.  The April 10, 2007 Resolution, on the other hand, denied PFIZER’s motion for partial reconsideration.

          The facts of this case, as stated in the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, are as follows:

Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003.

            On 26 June 2003, while Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a “Show-cause Notice” dated 25 June 2003. Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding “unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks” and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under “preventive suspension” for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently ordered to surrender the following “accountabilities;” 1) Company Car, 2) Samples and Promats, 3) CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOA and other related Company Forms, 4) Cash Card, 5) Caltex Card, and 6) MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund. The following day, petitioner Cortez together with one Efren Dariano retrieved the above-mentioned “accountabilities” from Velasco’s residence.

            In response, Velasco sent a letter addressed to Cortez dated 28 June 2003 denying the charges. In her letter, Velasco claimed that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch covered by her check (no. 1072) in the amount of P23,980.00 was merely to accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo. In support thereto, Velasco attached the Doctor’s letter and the affidavit of the latter’s secretary.

            On 12 July 2003, Velasco received a “Second Show-cause Notice” informing her of additional developments in their investigation. According to the notice, a certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented text messages originating from Velasco’s company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons. Again, Velasco was given 48 hours to submit her written explanation on the matter. On 16 July 2003, Velasco sent a letter to PFIZER via Aboitiz courier service asking for additional time to answer the second Show-cause Notice.

            That same day, Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, 17 July 2003, PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing “can be tackled during the hearing of her case” or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice.  On 25 July 2003, Velasco received a “Third Show-cause Notice,” together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally, on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed Velasco of its “Management Decision” terminating her employment.

            On 5 December 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages.^[5]

The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant was illegally dismissed. Respondents are ordered to reinstate the complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and to pay the complainant the following:

1.     Full backwages (basic salary, company benefits, all allowances

      as of December 5, 2003 in the amount of P572,780.00);

2.     13^th Month Pay, Midyear, Christmas and performance bonuses

      in the amount of P105,300.00;

3.     Moral damages of P50,000.00;

4.     Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00;

5.     Attorney’s Fees of 10% of the award excluding damages in the

      amount of P67,808.00.

The total award is in the amount of P758,080.00.^[6]

PFIZER appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but its appeal was denied via the NLRC Decision^[7]dated October 20, 2004, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling but deleted the award for damages, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal and the motion praying for the deposit in escrow of complainant’s payroll reinstatement are hereby denied and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is affirmed with the modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted and attorney’s fees shall be based on the award of 13^th month pay pursuant to Article III of the Labor Code.^[8]

PFIZER moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied for lack of merit in a NLRC Resolution^[9] dated December 14, 2004.

Undaunted, PFIZER filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances.  In a Decision dated November 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of respondent’s dismissal from employment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the NLRC dated 20 October 2004 as well as its Resolution of 14 December 2004 is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Having found the termination of Geraldine L. Velasco’s employment in accordance with the two notice rule pursuant to the due process requirement and with just cause, her complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED.^[10]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals resolved in the assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2006 wherein it affirmed the validity of respondent’s dismissal from employment but modified its earlier ruling by directing PFIZER to pay respondent her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, to wit:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the dismissal of private respondent Geraldine Velasco is AFFIRMED, but petitioner PFIZER, INC. is hereby ordered to pay her the wages to which she is entitled to from the time the reinstatement order was issued until November 23, 2005, the date of promulgation of Our Decision.^[11]

Respondent filed with the Court a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which assailed the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005 and was docketed as G.R. No. 175122. Respondent’s petition, questioning the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of her complaint, was denied by this Court’s Second Division in a minute Resolution^[12] dated December 5, 2007, the pertinent portion of which states:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues.

On the other hand, PFIZER filed the instant petition assailing the aforementioned Court of Appeals Resolutions and offering for our resolution a single legal issue, to wit:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco’s dismissal valid.^[13]

The petition is without merit.

PFIZER argues that, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement in its assailed Decision dated November 23, 2005, the ruling in Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.^[14] is not applicable in the case at bar, particularly with regard to the nature and consequences of an order of reinstatement, to wit:

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of the Court.^[15] (Emphases supplied.)

It is PFIZER’s contention in its Memorandum^[16] that “there was no unjustified refusal on [its part] to reinstate [respondent] Velasco during the pendency of the appeal,”^[17] thus, the pronouncement in Roquero cannot be made to govern this case.  During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals and prior to its November 23, 2005 Decision, PFIZER claimed that it had already required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005.  However, according to PFIZER, it was respondent who refused to return to work when she wrote PFIZER, through counsel, that she was opting to receive her separation pay and to avail of PFIZER’s early retirement program.

In PFIZER’s view, it should no longer be required to pay wages considering that (1) it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter; (2) it was allegedly ready to reinstate respondent as of July 1, 2005 but it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to report for work; (3) it would purportedly be tantamount to allowing respondent to choose “payroll reinstatement” when by law it was the employer which had the right to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement; (4) respondent should be deemed to have “resigned” and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation pay; and (5) this Court should not mechanically apply Roquero but rather should follow the doctrine inGenuino v. National Labor Relations Commission^[18] which was supposedly “more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice.”^[19]

          We do not agree.

           At the outset, we note that PFIZER’s previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00 (representing her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision, until May 5, 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiter’s Writ of Execution dated May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor.  Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted PFIZER’s unreasonable delay in complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter.  A perusal of the records, including PFIZER’s own submissions, confirmed that it only required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005, as shown by its Letter^[20] dated June 27, 2005, which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed down in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003.

As far back as 1997 in the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[21]the Court held that an award or order of reinstatement is immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 223^[22] of the Labor Code.  In that case, we discussed in length the rationale for that doctrine, to wit:

The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223,i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be prevented. x x x In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Republic Act No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. x x x^[23] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a writ of execution.  Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under the aforementioned writ of execution. At most, PFIZER’s payment of the same can only be deemed partial compliance/execution of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated October 23, 2006 and would not bar respondent from being paid her wages from May 6, 2005 to November 23, 2005.

It would also seem that PFIZER waited for the resolution of its appeal to the NLRC and, only after it was ordered by the Labor Arbiter to pay the amount of P1,963,855.00 representing respondent’s full backwages from December 5, 2003 up to May 5, 2005, did PFIZER decide to require respondent to report back to work via the Letter dated June 27, 2005. 

PFIZER makes much of respondent’s non-compliance with its return- to-work directive by downplaying the reasons forwarded by respondent as less than sufficient to justify her purported refusal to be reinstated.  In PFIZER’s view, the return-to-work order it sent to respondent was adequate to satisfy the jurisprudential requisites concerning the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee.

It would be useful to reproduce here the text of PFIZER’s Letter dated June 27, 2005:

Dear Ms. Velasco:

Please be informed that, pursuant to the resolutions dated 20 October 2004 and 14 December 2004 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission and the order dated 24 May 2005 issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose, you are required to report for work on 1 July 2005, at 9:00 a.m., at Pfizer’s main office at the 23^rd Floor, Ayala Life–FGU Center, 6811 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila.

Please report to the undersigned for a briefing on your work assignments and other responsibilities, including the appropriate relocation benefits.

For your information and compliance.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)

Ma.EdenGrace Sagisi

Labor and Employee Relations Manager^[24]

To reiterate, under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement “shall either be admitted back to workunder the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.” 

 It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated.  The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal.  Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee.^[25]

Applying the foregoing principle to the case before us, it cannot be said that with PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 Letter, in belated fulfillment of the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order, it had shown a clear intent to reinstate respondent to her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position.  To begin with, the return-to-work order PFIZER sent respondent is silent with regard to the position or the exact nature of employment that it wanted respondent to take up as of July 1, 2005.  Even if we assume that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 letter that such reinstatement was not “under the same terms and conditions” as her previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent to report to its main office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondent’s previous job had her stationed in Baguio City (respondent’s place of residence) and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including her relocation benefits.

The Court is cognizant of the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause.^[26]  Likewise, the management prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.  There must be no showing that it is unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.^[27]

The June 27, 2005 return-to-work directive implying that respondent was being relocated to PFIZER’s Makatimain office would necessarily cause hardship to respondent, a married woman with a family to support residing in BaguioCity.  However, PFIZER, as the employer, offered no reason or justification for the relocation such as the filling up of respondent’s former position and the unavailability of substantially equivalent position in BaguioCity.  A transfer of work assignment without any justification therefor, even if respondent would be presumably doing the same job with the same pay, cannot be deemed faithful compliance with the reinstatement order.  In other words, in this instance, there was no real, bona fide reinstatement to speak of prior to the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the finding of illegal dismissal.     

In view of PFIZER’s failure to effect respondent’s actual or payroll reinstatement, it is indubitable that the Roquero ruling is applicable to the case at bar.  The circumstance that respondent opted for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as manifested in her counsel’s Letter^[28] dated July 18, 2005 is of no moment.  We do not see respondent’s letter as taking away the option from management to effect actual or payroll reinstatement but, rather under the factual milieu of this case, where the employer failed to categorically reinstate the employee to her former or equivalent position under the same terms, respondent was not obliged to comply with PFIZER’s ambivalent return-to-work order.  To uphold PFIZER’s view that it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to work when PFIZER did not reinstate her to her former position, and worse, required her to report for work under conditions prejudicial to her, is to open the doors to potential employer abuse.  Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-to-work directives that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to non-reinstatement by capitalizing on the employee’s purported refusal to work.  In sum, the option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith.    

Moreover, while the Court has upheld the employer’s right to choose between actually reinstating an employee or merely reinstating him in the payroll, we have also in the past recognized that reinstatement might no longer be possible under certain circumstances.  In F.F. Marine Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[29] we had the occasion to state:

  It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages.^[30]  (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, we have previously held that an employee’s demand for separation pay may be indicative of strained relations that may justify payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.^[31]  This is not to say, however, that respondent is entitled to separation pay in addition to backwages.  We stress here that a finding of strained relations must nonetheless still be supported by substantial evidence.^[32]  

In the case at bar, respondent’s decision to claim separation pay over reinstatement had no legal effect, not only because there was no genuine compliance by the employer to the reinstatement order but also because the employer chose not to act on said claim. If it was PFIZER’s position that respondent’s act amounted to a “resignation” it should have informed respondent that it was accepting her resignation and that in view thereof she was not entitled to separation pay.  PFIZER did not respond to respondent’s demand at all.  As it was, PFIZER’s failure to effect reinstatement and accept respondent’s offer to terminate her employment relationship with the company meant that, prior to the Court of Appeals’ reversal in the November 23, 2005 Decision, PFIZER’s liability for backwages continued to accrue for the period not covered by the writ of execution dated May 24, 2005 until November 23, 2005.

Lastly, PFIZER exhorts the Court to re-examine the application of Roquero with a view that a mechanical application of the same would cause injustice since, in the present case, respondent was able to gain pecuniary benefit notwithstanding the circumstance of reversal by the Court of Appeals of the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC thereby allowing respondent to profit from the dishonesty she committed against PFIZER which was the basis for her termination.  In its stead, PFIZER proposes that the Court apply the ruling in Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission^[33] which it believes to be more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice.  In that case, we canceled the award of salaries from the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding reinstatement in light of our subsequent ruling finding that the dismissal is for a legal and valid ground, to wit:

Anent the directive of the NLRC in its September 3, 1994 Decision ordering Citibank “to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision,” the Court hereby cancels said award in view of its finding that the dismissal of Genuino is for a legal and valid ground.

Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, which states:

x x x x  

If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.

Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.^[34] (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, PFIZER implores the Court to annul the award of backwages and separation pay as well as to require respondent to refund the amount that she was able to collect by way of garnishment from PFIZER as her accrued salaries.

The contention cannot be given merit since this question has been settled by the Court en banc.

In the recent milestone case of Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,^[35] the Court wrote finis to the stray posture in Genuinorequiring the dismissed employee placed on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries in case a final decision upholds the validity of the dismissal.  In Garcia, we clarified the principle of reinstatement pending appeal due to the emergence of differing rulings on the issue, to wit:

On this score, the Court’s attention is drawn to seemingly divergent decisions concerning reinstatement pending appeal or, particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. On the one hand is the jurisprudential trend as expounded in a line of cases including Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, while on the other is the recent case of Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission. At the core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code x x x.

x x x x

The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. 

The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:

If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries [he] receivedwhile the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from [his] employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.

Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

It has thus been advanced that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust enrichment.

Prior to Genuino, there had been no known similar case containing a dispositive portion where the employee was required to refund the salaries received on payroll reinstatement. In fact, in a catena of cases, the Court did not order the refund of salaries garnished or received by payroll-reinstated employees despite a subsequent reversal of the reinstatement order.

The dearth of authority supporting Genuino is not difficult to fathom for it would otherwise render inutile the rationale of reinstatement pending appeal.

x x x x

x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family.^[36] 

Furthermore, in Garcia, the Court went on to discuss the illogical and unjust effects of the “refund doctrine” erroneously espoused in Genuino:

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the “refund doctrine” easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.

Advisably, the sum is better left unspent. It becomes more logical and practical for the employee to refuse payroll reinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to work. Prior to Genuino, it is unthinkable for one to refuse payroll reinstatement. In the face of the grim possibilities, the rise of concerned employees declining payroll reinstatement is on the horizon.

Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice principles behind the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management. Under such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond posted in installment by the employer. For in the event of a reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering reinstatement, the employer gets back the same amount without having to spend ordinarily for bond premiums. This circumvents, if not directly contradicts, the proscription that the “posting of a bond [even a cash bond] by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.”

In playing down the stray posture in Genuino requiring the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries in case a final decision upholds the validity of the dismissal, the Court realigns the proper course of the prevailing doctrine on reinstatement pending appeal vis-à-vis the effect of a reversal on appeal.   

x x x x                   

The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. x x x.^[37] (Emphasis supplied.)

In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed.  Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received.  It cannot be denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential framework, respondent is entitled to payment of her wages for the period after December 5, 2003 until the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her dismissal was legal and for just cause.  Thus, the payment of such wages cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment on respondent’s part.     

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated April 10, 2007 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88987 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

^[1]               Rollo, pp. 42-44. 

^[2]               Id. at 65-66.

^[3]               Id. at 307-323; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.

^[4]               Id. at 187-201.

^[5]               Id. at 307-310.

^[6]               Id. at 201.

^[7]               Id. at 234-248; penned by NLRC Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, concurring.

^[8]               Id. at 247.

^[9]               Id. at 265-266.

^[10]             Id. at 322-323.

^[11]             Id. at 43.

^[12]             Rollo (G.R. No. 175122), p. 238.

^[13]             Id. at 403.

^[14]             449 Phil. 437 (2003).         

^[15]             Id. at 446.

^[16]             Rollo, pp. 394-415.

^[17]             Id. at 405.

^[18]             G.R. Nos. 142732-33 and 142753-54, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 342.

^[19]             Rollo, p. 411.

^[20]             Id. at 304.

^[21]             345 Phil. 1057 (1997).

^[22]             In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

^[23]             Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 21 at 1075-1076.

^[24]             Rollo, p. 304.

^[25]             Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 143219, November 28, 2006, 508 SCRA 346, 352.

^[26]             Norkis Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 279, 289.

^[27]             Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138379, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 84, 95.

^[28]             Rollo, pp. 305-306.

^[29]             495 Phil. 140 (2005).

^[30]             Id. at 159.

^[31]             F.R.F. Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 313 Phil. 493, 502 (1995). 

^[32]             Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.

^[33]             Supra note 18.

^[34]             Id. at 363-364.

^[35]             G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 479.

^[36]             Id. at 488-491.

^[37]             Id. at 491-493.

CASE 2011- 0105: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO SALCEDO ALIAS “DIGOL,” (G.R. NO. 178272, 14 MARCH 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECTS: MURDER, DYING DECLARATION, ALIBI, DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. SALCEDO).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision^[1]  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00113, affirming with modifications the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras in Criminal Case No. 0122 finding appellant Rodrigo Salcedo alias Digol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

The Information against the appellant reads as follows:

That on or about the 6^th day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Jordan, Province of Guimaras, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, taking advantage of his superior strength and the darkness of the night, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a knife one Analyn Elevencione, who is pregnant at the time, hitting said Analyn Elevencione at the vital parts of her body which caused her instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[2] 

Appellant was arraigned on March 22, 1995^[3] and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution follows:

Geraldino Galido (Geraldino) testified that at 9 o’clock in the evening of November 6, 1994, while he was in his house together with his two brothers, his brother-in-law and second cousin, they heard three (3) shouts for help coming from the house of Efren Galido (Efren).  They immediately went to the place and at the distance of about 7 to 8 meters,^[4]  he saw appellant stabbed the victim Analyn twice while she was lying on her back.  He was able to identify the appellant because of the torch being carried by the women near him.

Efren, live-in partner of Analyn, testified that appellant is known as “Digol” in their place.  At 9 o’clock in the evening ofNovember 6, 1994, he was at the house of his elder brother Geraldino, which is about 100 meters away from his house.  While at the house of his brother, he heard a shout coming from his niece, Ivy Jean Borra. Upon hearing Ivy, he immediately ran home. When he arrived home, he saw his son sleeping, so he went downstairs and proceeded to the road where he met his sister-in-law holding a torch.  He got a torch from his sister-in-law, went ahead and looked for Analyn.  He found Analyn lying and moaning on the grassy portion of the side of the road about 20 meters away from their house. He lifted Analyn and saw blood coming from her breast.  He asked Analyn who did it to her and Analyn answered, “Digol.” He placed Analyn on the ground and tried to run after the person who did it to her, but he was restrained by his brother.

Dr. Edgardo Jabasa testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Analyn.  He found nine (9) stab wounds in the body of Analyn.  Two of the stab wounds penetrated the heart, making it impossible for the victim to survive.  He also testified that Analyn’s uterus was enlarged at 6 to 7 months gestation with a dead male fetus.  He further testified that the wounds appear to have been inflicted by a single sharp bladed and pointed instrument.

Upon the other hand, the defense adduced the testimonies of the appellant, Felimon Salcedo, Marcelina Lecta and Mario Manatoc. Appellant’s main defense is alibi.

Felimon Salcedo, father of the appellant, testified that in the evening of November 6, 1994, before going home, he was at the house of his daughter, Marcelina Lecta.  While there, appellant arrived and when Felimon left Marcelina’s house at around 8:30 o’clock in the evening, appellant was still there.

Marcelina Lecta testified that the appellant is her younger brother. She said that at around 8 o’clock in the evening ofNovember 6, 1994, appellant arrived at their house and slept there. Appellant then left the following morning and reported for work at the highway. At around 9 o’clock in the morning, the policemen arrived at their house looking for the appellant. Thereafter, she learned that appellant was arrested when he reported for work.

Mario Manatoc testified that he was a detainee at the Municipal Jail of Jordan.  At around 2 o’clock in the morning ofNovember 7, 1994, Efren arrived at the police station to report the killing of his wife. Investigator George Galon then interviewed Efren.  After the interview, the police officers left the police station to look for the person who killed Analyn.  At 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, Police Officer George Galon arrived with the appellant and brought the latter to the investigation room. During the investigation, he heard moaning and thudding sounds.  Mario said that appellant was mauled and was made to admit the killing of Analyn.

Appellant testified that in the afternoon of November 6, 1994, he was invited by the group of  Efren, Geraldino,  Ludrito, Pablo, Virgilio and Luis to drink, so they all proceeded to the house of Botchoy Galia located at Barangay Alaguisoc. They arrived there at 5 o’clock in the afternoon and they finished drinking four bottles of whisky at around 7 o’clock in the evening. After drinking, they all went home going their separate ways.  Appellant went to the house of his sister, Marcelina Lecta, which is one (1) kilometer away from the house of Botchoy.  He arrived at his sister’s house at about 8 o’clock in the evening where he met his father.  He immediately went upstairs to sleep.  He woke up at 6 o’clock in the morning the following day and went home to his father’s house where he learned that Analyn died.  He reported to work and was arrested by the policemen.  At the police station he was mauled and was threatened to be killed if he will not admit killing Analyn.  He was then forced to admit that he killed Analyn.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras rendered a Decision^[5] finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding the accused RODRIGO SALCEDO alias “DIGOL” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Said accused is penalized to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of Reclusion Perpetua, together with all accessory penalties attached thereto.

Said accused is directed to pay the heirs of Analyn Elevencione the amount of:

         PhP50,000.00 – for the death of Analyn Elevencione;

         PhP10,000.00 – as reimbursement for burial expenses;

         PhP40,000.00 – as moral damages;

or a total of PhP100,000.00.

The detention of the accused during the pendency of the case shall be credited in his favor.

SO ORDERED.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and the case was elevated to this Court for review.  However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,^[6] the case was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated November 30, 2006 affirming with modification the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 0122. The CA ruled that the appellant is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. The CA did not appreciate the other aggravating circumstances alleged in the information for failure of the prosecution to establish them during the trial. The CA deleted the award of burial expenses amounting to PhP10,000.00 for failure of the prosecution to present receipts in support thereof. Further, the award of moral damages was increased from PhP40,000.00 to PhP50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of PhP25,000.00 was also awarded, both in consonance with existing jurisprudence.

On January 3, 2007, appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Appellant had assigned two (2) errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF EFREN GALIDO AND GERALDINO GALIDO.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In the main, appellant put in issue the credibility of Efren and Geraldino. He contends that the testimonies of said witnesses did not establish his guilt for murder.

The Court affirms the appellant’s conviction. There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt made by the RTC and affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial of the case. The Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness, because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.^[7]

Geraldino’s testimony was categorical, convincing and unequivocal.  He positively identified the appellant as the author of the crime.  This witness declared, thus:

Public Prosecutor Rolando Nielo:

Q. While you were there in your house, did you hear anything unusual?

A.  Yes, sir.

Q. What was that, that came to your attention?

A.  I heard three (3) shouts.

Q. What was the nature of that shout that you heard?

A. Three (3)  shouts for help.

Q. What did you do when you heard those shouts for help?

A. We jumped out of our house and went to the place where the shouts came from.

Q. Where did the shout came (sic) from, if you know?

A. At the house of Efren Galido.

Q. How far is this house of Efren Galido from your own house?

A. About 100 meters.^[8] 

x x x x

Q. Were you able to reach the place where those shouts came from?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you witness or what did you see when you reached the place where the shouts came from?

A. I have seen Digol Salcedo stabbing Analyn Elevencione.^[9] 

x x x x

Q. How did you happen to see Rodrigo Salcedo stabbed Analyn Elevencione since it was already 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 4, 1994?^[10] 

A. Because the women from our house were carrying torch and I was following them that is why I saw Analyn Elevencione.

Q. You were able to know Analyn Elevencione and Rodrigo Salcedo from that light coming from that torch?

A. Yes, sir.^[11] 

x x x x

Q. And you said you saw Analyn Elevencione stabbed by Rodrigo Salcedo. How many times [did] you saw (sic) this Rodrigo Salcedo stabbed Analyn Elevencione?

A. Only twice.

Q. What was the position of Analyn Elevencione when you saw her being stabbed by the accused?

A. She was lying on her back.^[12] 

x x x x

Geraldino on cross examination by Atty. Padilla.

Q. How about you? When you saw the accused stabbed Analyn Elevencione, how far were you from Analyn Elevencione and the accused.

A.   About 7 to 8 meters.^[13]

Clearly, Geraldino positively identified the appellant as the author of the crime. He testified that with the aid of the light cast by the torch carried by the women near him, he was able to see the appellant stab Analyn twice while she was lying on her back. Thus, even if the crime was committed during the night, it was not totally dark, as a torch illuminated the place where Analyn was stabbed by the appellant. The Court has consistently held that the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight in proper situations is considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons.^[14]

Appellant’s allegation that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, as Geraldino could not have seen the appellant stabbing Analyn because his brother Efren said in his testimony that Analyn was alone when he saw her lying on the ground.^[15] 

The Court finds no inconsistencies in the testimonies of Efren and Geraldino. The CA correctly explained the events that transpired on the fateful night:

It could be gleaned from [the] records that when the Galidos heard the shouts coming from their niece Ivy Jean Borra, they went outside and Efren went directly to his house to check his family. Geraldino and his other companions were not far behind him. When they reached the crime scene, Geraldino witnessed appellant (petitioner herein) stabbed (sic) Analyn Elevencione twice, then he tried to follow the perpetrator until the latter reached a dark place. So, when Efren arrived to (sic) the place coming from his house, he did no (sic) longer see the aggressor but was able to ask his live-in partner who her assailant was.^[16] 

x x x x

It could be understood that when Efren was still inside his house, that was the time Geraldino saw appellant (petitioner herein) stabbed the victim.x x x^[17] 

Clearly, Geraldino, after witnessing the incident was no longer at the scene of the crime when Efren arrived because he tried to pursue the appellant.  That is the reason why Efren saw Analyn alone as she laid on the ground.

Appellant also averred that the alleged dying declaration of Analyn was merely concocted in order to pin the blame upon herein appellant. Appellant argued that there is no chance for Efren to have talked to Analyn since he became hysterical^[18] when he saw Analyn lying prostrate on the ground. The appellant’s arguments are unavailing.

Appellant misconstrued the correct sequence of events that transpired that night. Efren testified as follows:

Public Prosecutor Rolando Nielo:

Q. What did you do when you heard your niece Ivy Jean Borra shouting for help?

A. I ran immediately towards my house.

Q. And, were you able to reach your house?

A. Yes, I reached my house and I only found my son sleeping.

Q. What did you do when you found your son sleeping, when you reached your house?

A. I placed him near the door and went down.

Q. What did you do after you went downstairs?

A. I went to the road where I met my sister-in-law holding a torch.

Q. Who is that sister-in-law of yours whom you met?

A. Melanie Galido.

Q. What kind of torch was she holding?

A. A torch made of a pocket size whisky bottle.

Q. What did you do when you met Melanie Galido, your sister-in-law having a torch there?

A. I also got a torch to look for my wife.

Q. Where did you get that torch you used?

A. From my sister-in-law.

Q. And then, after that, when you got the torch were you able to see your wife?

A. Yes. When I got the torch, I went ahead then I later on saw her near the side of the road, she was moaning.^[19] 

x x x x

Q. You said you saw Analyn Elevencione. Where was she lying when you saw her?

A. On the grass beside the road.^[20]

x x x x

Q. What did you do when you saw Analyn lying? What was her position when you saw your wife?

A. She was lying on the ground.

Q. What did you do when you saw her lying on the ground?

A. I lifted her and asked her who did it.

Q. What was the condition of Analyn your wife when you lifted her?

A. She was moaning and the blood is coming out of her wounds.

Q. Have you seen the wounds where the blood was oozing from?

A. Yes, sir. It was coming from below her breast because her breast was open.^[21]  

x x x x

Q. Did your wife say anything to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did your wife tell you if any?^[22]

x x x x

A.    I asked her who stabbed her, and she answered, “Digol.”

Q. That was all that your wife said?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After that, what did you do?

A. I laid her down and ran.

Q. What was your purpose in putting her down and ran (sic)?

A. To run after the person who did it to her.

Q. Did you have a specific person in mind to run after when your wife told you about the statement?

A. Yes, but I was restrained by my brother not to go to their house.^[23] 

Clearly, before Efren became hysterical and was restrained by Geraldino,^[24] he was able to talk to Analyn, who identified the appellant as the person who stabbed her.   As correctly found by the CA:

When Efren went to the crime scene, Analyn was still alive and she was able to utter the name of her attacker. But when Efren came back after he failed to catch her aggressor, she was already dead and that was the time he became hysterical.^[25]

Having established that Analyn indeed uttered the name of her assailant, the question to be resolved is whether her statement can be considered as a dying declaration.

Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

           Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying person’s declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.^[26] 

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.^[27] 

All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met.  First, the statement of the deceased concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding her death. When asked who stabbed her, Analyn uttered the name of the appellant. Further, as proven during trial, appellant was the only person referred to as “Digol” in their place. Second, the victim must have been fully aware that she was on the brink of death, considering her bloodied condition and the gaping wounds on her chest when Efren saw her. True, she made no express statement showing that she was conscious of her impending death, however, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that she was in a dying condition.^[28]  Third, the declarant, at the time she uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.  Fourth, the victim’s statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for her murder. Thus, Analyn’s condemnatory ante mortem statement naming appellant as her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation.^[29]

Going now to the appellant’s main defense of alibi, appellant claims that at the time of the incident he was at the house of his sister Marcelina. Marcelina corroborated appellant’s testimony, while Felimon alleged that before he left Marcelina’s house at around8:30 in the evening, appellant was still there.

Aside from the foregoing testimonies of the defense witnesses, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.^[30]  Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.^[31]  

During the trial of the case, Marcelina testified that Analyn’s house, which is near the crime scene, is one (1) kilometer away from her house.^[32]  In People v. Cristobal,^[33] the Court ruled out alibi when it was proven that the appellant was only three kilometers from where the crime was committed, “a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.”  Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.

Further, the Court gives less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. One can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused whose defense is alibi, courts have more reason to view such testimony with skepticism.^[34] In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.^[35]   Given the positive identification of the appellant by Geraldino, who is a credible witness, and the lack of physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing, the defense of alibi must fail.

Appellant insisted that Efren and Geraldino’s failure to immediately disclose the appellant’s identity to the authorities show that they do not know the identity of the perpetrator. The argument does not hold water. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained.^[36]  

In his testimony,^[37] Efren explained that he did not inform the police of the identity of the appellant because he feared that the appellant might escape.^[38]  In his sworn statement executed before the police, Geraldino explained that he did not inform the police of the identity of the appellant because it might result in the escape of the appellant.^[39]  Apparently, Geraldino thought it best to wait for the right time to reveal to the police authorities that he saw the appellant stab the victim, so as not to alarm the appellant, who may not know that Geraldino saw him stab Analyn. Otherwise, the immediate revelation might compromise appellant’s arrest.

Appellant also cites the testimony of Mario Manatoc that when he asked Efren, in the early morning of November 7, 1994 at the police station, who killed his wife, Efren allegedly answered “I do not know.”^[40]  Thus, appellant would like to impress upon the Court that Efren did not know the identity of Analyn’s attacker. The Court is inclined to believe that Efren’s failure to divulge the identity of the perpetrator to Mario is consistent with his reasoning that he did not inform anybody of the appellant’s identity because the appellant might escape.  Mario is a total stranger to Efren and the latter cannot be faulted in not trusting Mario. The Court therefore finds that Efren and Geraldino have sufficiently explained their failure to immediately report the identity of the appellant.

Further, there was no considerable delay in reporting the incident to the police. As testified to by Mario, Efren went to the police station to seek assistance because his wife was killed.^[41] After reporting the incident, Efren and the policemen went to look for the perpetrator,^[42]  and later on, the police arrested the appellant.^[43]

Additionally, one thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to lie against the appellant. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.^[44]  In the present case, there was no shred of evidence to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were impelled by improper motives to implicate appellant in the crime.

The testimonies of Mario and appellant that the latter was forced to admit the killing of Analyn deserve scant consideration. As found by the trial court, the prosecution did not present evidence to show that the appellant admitted having killed the victim. The appellant interposed the defense of alibi.^[45]

Appellant further argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the crime committed is murder. The fact that the victim is a woman and seven months pregnant cannot be considered as qualifying or an aggravating circumstance.

Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it.  The aggressor must have taken advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of the crime.^[46]  

In the present case, the Court finds that there was abuse of superior strength employed by the appellant in committing the killing. The evidence shows that the victim was a sixteen (16)-year-old female,^[47]  who is 6 to 7 months pregnant.^[48] The victim was also stabbed by the appellant with a sharp bladed and pointed instrument while she was lying on her back. The victim was also unarmed when she was attacked. The Court has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.^[49]   The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the CA, as qualifying the offense to murder.

From all of the foregoing, we hold that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.

THE PENALTY

The penalty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already qualified the killing to murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable penalty. We note that while other aggravating circumstances, i.e., evident premeditation, treachery and nighttime, were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to support the presence of these circumstances. Hence, the RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.  It must be stressed that under R.A. No. 9346, appellant is not eligible for parole.^[50]

THE DAMAGES

The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.^[51]   The Court affirms the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court and the CA in the amount of PhP50,000.00.

Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.^[52]  The CA correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief to her family.^[53]   

Further, the CA correctly awarded exemplary damages. The award of exemplary damages is warranted because of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in the commission of the crime.^[54]  The amount of PhP25,000.00 granted by the trial court and the CA should, however, be increased to PhP30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.^[55] 

The CA deleted the award of burial expenses for failure of the prosecution to substantiate the same with receipts. Althoughtemperate damages may be awarded when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,^[56] the Court is inclined to deny the award of temperate damages.  Efren testified that he did not spend any amount for the burial of Analyn, as the expenses were shouldered by his employer and by other people he knew.^[57]  

On a final note, the prosecution should have been more prudent in determining the proper crimes that should have been filed against the appellant. Clearly, at the time of the death of the woman, she was carrying a 6 to 7-month-old fetus which probably died because of the stabbing incident. If indeed the fetus died at the time the woman was stabbed, then the crime of murder, defined in and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, complexed with unintentional abortion, defined in and penalized under Article 257 of the same Code, should have been filed against the appellant.  Had this been done, the penalty of Death, which is the maximum penalty for the gravest offense among the two crimes committed as provided under Article 48^[58]of the Revised Penal Code, should have been the proper penalty. Although, the penalty of death cannot be imposed in light of Republic Act No. 9346,^[59] and that the same penalty of Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed, like in the present case,^[60] the heirs of the victim should have been entitled to a higher civil indemnity and moral damages at PhP75,000.00^[61] each. 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00113, datedNovember 30, 2006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.  Appellant Rodrigo Salcedo, alias Digol, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without any benefit of parole under R.A. No. 9346. He is further ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Analyn Elevencione the amounts of PhP50,000.00, as civil indemnity ex delicto, PhP50,000.00, as moral damages, and PhP30,000.00, as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

                                                DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.              ROBERTO A. ABAD       

             Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                  Associate Justice

                                                Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice 

^*               Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

^[1]              Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 4-18.

^[2]               Records, p. 1.

^[3]               Id. at 45.

^[4]               TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 20.

^[5]               Records, pp. 297-317.

^[6]              G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, modifying Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

^[7]               People v. Pillas, 458 Phil. 347, 369 (2003).

^[8]               TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 7.

^[9]               Id. at 8.

^[10]             The correct date should be November 6, 1994.

^[11]             TSN, May 2, 1995, pp. 9-10.

^[12]             Id. at 10-11.

^[13]             Id. at 20.

^[14]            Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 301; People v. Escote, G.R. No. 151834, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 345, 351; People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 744 (2003).

^[15]             TSN, June 23, 1995, p. 24.

^[16]             Rollo, p. 10.

^[17]             Id. at 11.

^[18]            Prosecutor Nielo to Geraldino:

Q. How about your brother Efren? What did he do if he did anything?

A. He became hysterical and I restrained him. TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 11.

^[19]             TSN, June 23, pp. 9-10.

^[20]             Id. at 10-11.

^[21]             Id. at 12.

^[22]             Id. at 14.

^[23]             Id. at 15-16.

^[24]             TSN, May 2, 1995, pp. 10-11.

^[25]             Rollo, p. 11.

^[26]           Marturillas v. People, supra note 14, at 305.

^[27]             People of the Philippines v. Jonel Fabrica Serenas and Joel Lorica Labad, G.R. No. 188124, June 29, 2010.

^[28]             People v. Tañeza, 389 Phil. 398, 411 (2000).

^[29]              Marturillas  v. People, supra note 14, at 306.

^[30]              People v. Delim, G.R. No. 175942, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 366, 379.

^[31]              People v. Felipe Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 412, 439.

^[32]             TSN, January 14, 1997, p. 7.

^[33]             322 Phil. 551, 563 (1996).

^[34]              People v Sumalinog, Jr., 466 Phil. 637, 651 (2004).

^[35]             People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 425 (2003).

^[36]             People v. Lovedorial, 402 Phil. 446, 460 (2001).

^[37]             Records, p. 8.

^[38]             TSN, June 23, 1995, p. 20.

^[39]             Records, p. 7.

^[40]             TSN, September 8, 1999, p. 5.

^[41]             Id. at 4.

^[42]             Id. at 5.

^[43]             Id. at 6-7.

^[44]             Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 216, 226.

^[45]             Records, p. 315.

^[46]           People v. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592, 611 (2003).

^[47]             Records, p.  9.

^[48]             TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 13.

^[49]              People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004, 433 SCRA 389, 411; People v. Loreto, supra note 46, at 612; People v. Barcelona, Jr., 438 Phil. 335, 348-349 (2002).

^[50]             R.A. 9346, Section 3.  Person convicted of an offense punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

^[51]             People v. Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 519, 542.

^[52]             Id.

^[53]             People v. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 555, 571.

^[54]             Id. at 571-572.

^[55]             People of the Philippines v. Pedro Ortiz, Jr. y Lopez, G.R. No. 188704, July 7, 2010.

^[56]             People v. Delima, Jr., G.R. No. 169869, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 526, 540.

^[57]             TSN, June 23, 1995, pp. 20-21.

^[58]             Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.   

^[59]             An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

^[60]             R.A. No. 9346, Section 2.

^[61]             People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 179714, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 517, 530.