J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0136: HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION VS. R-II BUILDERS INC. and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (G.R. NO. 192649, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: COLLABORATING COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO COPIES OF NOTICES; FILING FEES; HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACTION FOR NULLIFICATION OF A CONTRACT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. (BRIEF TITLE: HOME GUARNTEE VS. R-II BUILDERS).

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

SUBJECT: IS A COLLABORATING COUNSEL ENTITLED TO SERVICE OF COURT PROCESSES?

NO. ONLY THE LEAD COUNSEL IS ENTITLED.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a)      NOTE the Entry of Appearance of Atty. Lope E. Feble of Tuquero Exconde  Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc.; and DENY counsel’s prayer to be furnished with all pleadings notices and other court processes at Unit 2704-A, West Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center Pasig, since only the lead counsel is entitled to service of court processes;

. . . . . .

SUBJECT: IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE WHICH RULED THAT PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES IS BOTH MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL?

YES, WHEN THERE IS NO INTENTION TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT.

Having consistently sought the transfer of possession and control of the properties comprising the Asset Pool over and above the nullification of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of HGC, it follows R-II Builders should have paid the correct and appropriate docket fees, computed according to the assessed value thereof.  This much was directed in the 19 May 2008 Order issued by Branch 22 of the Manila RTC which determined that the case is a real action and admitted the Amended and Supplemental Complaint R-II Builders subsequently filed in the case.^[1][11]  In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties comprising the same.  In the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,^[2][12] this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.  Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply despite insufficient filing fees when there is no intent to defraud the government,^[3][13] R-II Builders’ evident bad faith should clearly foreclose the relaxation of said rule.

SUBJECT: HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACTION TO NULLIFY A CONTRACT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION?

FIRST, DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTION. IF THE PRINCIPAL ACTION IS TO RECOVER PROPERTY, THEN IT IS NOT INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION.

In De Leon v. Court of Appeals,^[4][8] this Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real property.  Taking into consideration the allegations and the nature of the relief sought in the complaint in the subsequent case of Serrano v. Delica,^[5][9] however, this Court determined the existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the appropriate docket fees for a complaint for cancellation of sale which prayed for both permanent and preliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in litigation is a real action.  In discounting the apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule as follows in Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran,^[6][10] to wit:

The Court x x x does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and the Spouses De Leon.  The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses De Leon: “A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.”  Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each.  What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was “solely for annulment or rescission” of the contract of sale over a real property. There appeared to be no transfer of title or possession to the adverse party x x x.  (Underscoring Supplied)

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SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

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RESOLUT I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are: (a) the Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Lope E. Feble of the Toquero Exconde Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders), with prayer to be furnished all pleadings, notices and other court processes at its given address; and (b) the motion filed by R-II Builders, seeking the reconsideration of Court’s decision dated 9 March 2011 on the following grounds:^[7][1]

I

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RTC MANILA, BRANCH 22, HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE SINCE RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 24, TO WHICH THE INSTANT CASE WAS INITIALLY RAFFLED HAD NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THE CASE BEING A SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES WERE NOT PAID.

          In urging the reversal of the Court’s decision, R-II Builders argues that it filed its complaint with the Manila RTC which is undoubtedly vested with jurisdiction over actions where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation; that through no fault of its own, said complaint was raffled to Branch 24, the designated Special Commercial Court (SCC) tasked to hear intra-corporate controversies; that despite the determination subsequently made by Branch 24 of the Manila RTC that the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute, the Manila RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the same and its Executive Judge correctly directed its re-raffling to Branch 22 of the same Court; that the re-raffle and/or amendment of pleadings do not affect a court’s jurisdiction which, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated; that since its original Complaint, Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Second Amended Complaint all primarily sought the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) transferring the Asset Pool in favor of petitioner Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC), the subject matter of the case is clearly one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation; and, that the court erred in holding that the case was a real action and that it evaded the payment of the correct docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed value of the realties in the Asset Pool.

          R-II Builders’ motion is bereft of merit.

          The record shows that, with the raffle of R-II Builders’ complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila RTC and said court’s grant of the application for temporary restraining order incorporated therein, HGC sought a preliminary hearing of its affirmative defenses which included, among other grounds, lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.  It appears that, at said preliminary hearing, it was established that R-II Builders’ complaint did not involve an intra-corporate dispute and that, even if it is, venue was improperly laid since none of the parties maintained its principal office in Manila.  While it is true, therefore, that R-II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot be gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction over the case.  Rather than ordering the dismissal of the complaint, however, said court issued the 2 January 2008 order erroneously ordering the re-raffle of the case.  In Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.^[8][2] and Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142^[9][3] which involved SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were found to be civil in nature, this Court significantly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to another branch.

Even then, the question of the Manila RTC’s jurisdiction over the case is tied up with R-II Builder’s payment of the correct docket fees which should be paid in full upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding.^[10][4]  While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be easily ousted,^[11][5] it is equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.^[12][6]  Already implicit from the filing of the complaint in the City of Manila where the realties comprising the Asset Pool are located, the fact that the case is a real action is evident from the allegations of R-II Builders’ original Complaint, Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Second Amended Complaint which not only sought the nullification of the DAC in favor of HGC but, more importantly, prayed for the transfer of possession of and/or control of the properties in the Asset Pool.  Its current protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, no less than R-II Builders – in its opposition to HGC’s motion to dismiss – admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property or an interest therein.^[13][7]  Having only paid docket fees corresponding to an action where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, R-II Builders cannot expediently claim that jurisdiction over the case had already attached.  

In De Leon v. Court of Appeals,^[14][8] this Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real property.  Taking into consideration the allegations and the nature of the relief sought in the complaint in the subsequent case of Serrano v. Delica,^[15][9] however, this Court determined the existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the appropriate docket fees for a complaint for cancellation of sale which prayed for both permanent and preliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in litigation is a real action.  In discounting the apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule as follows in Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran,^[16][10] to wit:

The Court x x x does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and the Spouses De Leon.  The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses De Leon: “A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.”  Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each.  What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was “solely for annulment or rescission” of the contract of sale over a real property. There appeared to be no transfer of title or possession to the adverse party x x x.  (Underscoring Supplied)

Having consistently sought the transfer of possession and control of the properties comprising the Asset Pool over and above the nullification of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of HGC, it follows R-II Builders should have paid the correct and appropriate docket fees, computed according to the assessed value thereof.  This much was directed in the 19 May 2008 Order issued by Branch 22 of the Manila RTC which determined that the case is a real action and admitted the Amended and Supplemental Complaint R-II Builders subsequently filed in the case.^[17][11]  In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties comprising the same.  In the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,^[18][12] this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.  Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply despite insufficient filing fees when there is no intent to defraud the government,^[19][13] R-II Builders’ evident bad faith should clearly foreclose the relaxation of said rule.

In addition to the jurisdictional and pragmatic aspects underlying the payment of the correct docket fees which have already been discussed in the decision sought to be reconsidered, it finally bears emphasizing that the Asset Pool is comprised of government properties utilized by HGC as part of its sinking fund, in pursuit of its mandate as statutory guarantor of government housing programs.  With the adverse consequences that could result from the transfer of possession and control of the Asset Pool, it is imperative that R-II Builders should be made to pay the docket and filing fees corresponding to the assessed value of the properties comprising the same.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a)      NOTE the Entry of Appearance of Atty. Lope E. Feble of Tuquero Exconde  Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc.; and DENY counsel’s prayer to be furnished with all pleadings notices and other court processes at Unit 2704-A, West Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center Pasig, since only the lead counsel is entitled to service of court processes;

(b)     DENY with FINALITY R-II Builders, Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 9 March 2011 for lack of merit, the basic issues having been already passed upon and there being no substantial argument to warrant a modification of the same.  No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained herein.

Let an Entry of Judgment in this case be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.       TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

    Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                           RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                        Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0135: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSAURO ASETRE Y DURAN (G.R. NO. 175834, 08 JUNE 2011,DELCASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: RAPE (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. ASETRE).

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the September 1, 2006 Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00367 which affirmed in its entirety the March 8, 2004 Decision^[2][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 21 finding appellant Rosauro Asetre y Duran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of the crime of rape.

Factual Antecedents

On June 11, 2001, four Informations^[3][3] were filed charging appellant with four counts of rape. Except for the dates of commission, the Informations similarly read as follows:

                That on or about (the first week of March 2001,^[4][4]  the second week of March 2001,^[5][5] the third week of March 2001,^[6][6] the 23^rd day of March 2001,^[7][7]) at Barangay “BBB,”^[8][8] “CCC,” and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat, and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously did lie, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of “AAA,” a thirteen year-old minor.

                CONTRARY TO LAW.

During his arraignment on September 26, 2001, appellant entered the plea of “not guilty”.^[9][9]  Thereafter, the four cases were jointly tried.  During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted, among others, that “AAA” was born on March 23, 1988 as shown in her birth certificate^[10][10] and was thus only 13-years of age when the alleged rape incidents happened.

Version of the Prosecution

            The prosecution established that appellant was the common-law husband of “DDD”, who is the aunt of “AAA”.  According to “AAA”, she started living with “DDD” and appellant when she was still small.^[11][11]  “AAA” narrated that in March 2001, particularly during her summer vacation at “BBB”, appellant raped her four times.^[12][12]  The first rape happened during the first week^[13][13] of March 2001 at around noontime.^[14][14]  Appellant took off her clothes^[15][15] then inserted his penis into her vagina.^[16][16]  “AAA” felt pain in her private parts.^[17][17]  “AAA” struggled against the advances of appellant^[18][18] but to no avail.  Appellant even threatened “AAA” that she and “DDD” would be killed if she would report the incident. Thereafter, appellant sexually molested “AAA” three more times.  The second rape transpired during the second week of March 2001;^[19][19] while the third rape was committed shortly thereafter.^[20][20]  The fourth and last rape incident happened on March 23, 2001.^[21][21]  

            Another witness for the prosecution was Dr. Jeffrey M. Barcena (Dr. Barcena) who testified that on April 25, 2001, he conducted a medical examination on “AAA”.^[22][22]  He testified that “AAA” had multiple old hymenal lacerations which could have been caused by anything which penetrated her vagina.^[23][23]  He also noted a recent abrasion on the labia minora.^[24][24]

Version of the Defense

            The first witness for the defense was Rosita Clarin (Clarin) who testified that appellant was her neighbor for four years.^[25][25]  Clarin asserted that at the time the alleged rapes were committed, “AAA” was not in “BBB” but in “EEE” attending school,^[26][26] hence appellant could not have raped her.  Clarin averred that “AAA” arrived at “BBB” only on March 24, 2001,^[27][27] or one day after the latest alleged rape was committed.

            Romualdo Dulay (Dulay), another defense witness, testified that he was also a neighbor of the appellant.^[28][28]  He claimed that during the time material to this case, “AAA” was not in “BBB” but in “EEE” attending school.^[29][29]  He allegedly saw “AAA” in “BBB” only on March 25, 2001.^[30][30]

            The last witness for the defense was the appellant himself.  He denied having raped “AAA”.  He claimed that from the first week up to the third week of March 2001, he was at “BBB” together with “DDD”, his live-in partner, and his helpers.  He averred that at that time, or until March 23, 2001, “AAA” was not in “BBB” but in “EEE” attending school.^[31][31]  Appellant insisted that “AAA” arrived at “BBB” only on March 24, 2001^[32][32] at around 2 o’clock in the afternoon.^[33][33]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court 

In its Decision dated March 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged.  The trial court found “AAA’s” testimony to be credible and without any showing of ulterior motive to falsely testify against the appellant.^[34][34]  The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

            WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused Rosauro Asetre y Duran GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and hereby sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the four (4) cases.  He is also ordered to pay “AAA” the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in each of [these] cases or a total of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

                SO ORDERED.^[35][35]

                Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal;^[36][36] hence, the trial court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the CA.^[37][37]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals  

            On September 1, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the appeal and affirming in its entirety the Decision of the trial court.  Just as the trial court disregarded appellant’s arguments on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of “AAA” regarding the dates of the commission of the crimes, the appellate court likewise found the same to be inconsequential. 

            The appellate court also found no compelling reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the credibility of “AAA”,^[38][38] more so because there was no evidence of any improper motive on her part.^[39][39]

            The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant APPEAL is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of Branch 21 of theRegionalTrialCourtofSantiagoCity, in Criminal Case Nos. 21-3516 to 21-3519, is hereby AFFIRMED.

                SO ORDERED.^[40][40]

                On February 19, 2007, we accepted appellant’s appeal and required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.^[41][41]  However, on April 17, 2007^[42][42] and May 7, 2007,^[43][43] respectively, appellee and appellant manifested that they are no longer filing their supplemental briefs considering that they have already exhaustively discussed their arguments in their respective briefs filed before the CA.  Hence, this appeal is being resolved based on the briefs submitted by the parties before the CA.

Issues

            In his brief,^[44][44] appellant assigns the following errors:

I.                THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.           THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

Appellant argues that he deserves an acquittal considering the glaring inconsistencies in “AAA’s” testimony regarding the dates of the commission of the offenses and the places where the crimes were allegedly committed.^[45][45]  Citing People v. Ladrillo,^[46][46] appellant claims that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the failure of “AAA” to specify the dates of the commission of the crimes creates serious doubts on whether she was indeed raped.  Appellant also insists that “AAA” contradicted herself as to who reported the incidents to her aunt “DDD”.

On the other hand, appellee insists that the issue boils down to the credibility of the witnesses and that the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of “AAA”^[47][47] which is consistent, candid and steadfast.^[48][48]  Appellee argues that any inconsistency in the testimony of “AAA” as regards the dates of the commission of the crimes is understandable considering her young age and the traumatic experience she had undergone.^[49][49]  Besides, it claims that said inconsistencies did not discredit the credibility of “AAA” because “discrepancies on the exact dates of the sexual abuses are inconsequential, the exact date of  the  commission of  the  rape not  being  an  essential element  of  the

crime.”^[50][50]

Finally, appellee asserts that in addition to civil indemnity, “AAA” is likewise entitled to an award of moral damages as well as exemplary damages for each count of rape.^[51][51]

Our Ruling

            The appeal is partially meritorious.

            We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the case and we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution showed that appellant is guilty of only one count of rape, and not four counts. 

            The Informations charged appellant with having raped “AAA” on the first week, second week, and third week, of March 2001, and on March 23, 2001.  However, as argued by the defense, the testimony of “AAA” with regard to the first three incidents particularly on the dates when and the places where the offenses were supposedly committed contains disturbing discrepancies.

During her direct examination, “AAA” testified, viz:

Q            You stated [that] you were staying with “DDD” and the [appellant] in the month of March, 2001 in a tent located in “BBB”, “CCC”, do you recall x x x any incident that happened?

A             x x x I was raped, sir.

x x x x

Q            You stated that you were rape[d], who raped you?

A             He was the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

                Witness pointed to the accused x x x

PROS. DAMASEN:

Q            When did the accused [rape] you?

A             March 23, sir.

Q            What year?

A             2001, sir.

Q            Do you recall how many times the accused raped you?

A             Four (4) times, sir.

Q            When was the first time?

A             During the first week, sir.

Q            First week of what month?

A             March, 2001, sir.

Q            When the accused first raped you, where was that?

A             In our tent at “BBB,” sir.

x x x x

Q            How did he rape you?

A             He took off my clothes, sir.

x x x x

Q            After the accused removed [your shorts], what happened?

A             x x x [H]e raped me, sir.

x x x x

Q            How did he rape you?

A             He just inserted his penis [into] my vagina, sir.

Q            What did you do when the accused inserted his penis into [your] vagina?

A             I continued struggling, sir.

x x x x

Q            You said you were raped four (4) times in the month of March, 2001[,] where did the second rape [happen]?

A             x x x [A]t “BBB,” sir.

x x x x

Q            Who raped you?

A             Also my [stepfather], sir.

x x x x

Q            How about the 3^rd time where did the rape [happen]?

A             Also at “BBB,” sir.^[52][52]

            However, during cross-examination, “AAA” testified that:

Q            Madam Witness you said that you were raped by the accused x x x in the first week of March, 2001, isn’t it?

A             What I know, sir, that was March 23.

Q            So the accused did not rape you in the first week of March, so you were only raped by the accused [on] the 23^rd of March, is that correct Madam Witness?

A             Yes, sir.

Q            The accused also did not rape you on the second week of March, 2001?

A             Yes, sir.

Q            Also in the third week?

A             Yes, sir.^[53][53]

It will be recalled that in her direct examination, “AAA” testified that she was raped inside their tent in “BBB”.  However, in her re-direct examination, “AAA” testified that she was raped elsewhere, viz:

Q            Now, you said you were raped four times in March 2001 where did the first rape [happen]?

A             “FFF”, sir.

Q            How about the second rape where did it happen x x x?

A             “EEE”, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

Q            How about the third rape where did it [happen]?

A             Also at “EEE,” sir.^[54][54]

We thus could not agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the inconsistencies in the testimony of “AAA” regarding the first three rape incidents are inconsequential.  These inconsistencies create a reasonable doubt in our mind as to whether appellant did in fact rape “AAA” during those occasions.  Consequently, we are constrained to acquit appellant of the charges of rape allegedly committed during the first week, second week, and third week, of March 2001 based on reasonable doubt.

In contrast, “AAA’s” testimony as regards the March 23, 2001 incident was candid and consistent.  She never wavered in her narration that through threats and intimidation, appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will.  During her cross-examination, she testified, viz:

Q            Madam Witness can you remember what time were you raped by the accused on that 23^rd of March, 2001?

A             That was evening because he came to fetch me from my place at about 2:00 o’clock, sir.

Q            2:00 o’clock in the morning or afternoon Ms. Witness?

A             In the afternoon, sir.

Q            Where did the accused fetch you in that afternoon of March 23, 2001?

A             From our house, sir.

Q            And that is in “EEE”, isn’t it?

A             Yes, sir.

Q            What time did you arrive at “BBB”, “CCC” when you were fetche[d] by the accused in “EEE”?

A             It is already night, sir.

Q            Can you estimate the time?

A             No, sir.  I don’t know.

Q            When you arrived at “BBB”, “CCC”, isn’t it that your [aunt] “DDD” was there?

A             She was not there, sir.

Q            Why is it that your [aunt] “DDD” was not there when you arrived from “EEE”?

A             She went to attend [a] wedding x x x

Q            When you arrived at “BBB” where did you go Ms. Witness together with the accused?

A             At the place where [he] raped me, sir.

Q            Where is that place?

A             At the waiting shed which is covered, sir.

Q            Covered with what Ms. Witness?

A             Galvanize[d] iron, sir.

Q            Isn’t it that there are [other] tents near your tent where you stayed when you arrived from “EEE”?

A             There was none, sir.

Q            But when you arrived at the place where the tent is located there are other people around isn’t it Ms. Witness?

A             There was none, sir.

Q            x x x [A]re there no houses around near the tent that you stayed on the night of March 23, 2001?

A             There was none, sir.

Q            How did the accused rape you?

A             He removed my clothing, sir.

Q            How did he [remove] your clothing?

A             I was then wearing skirt and he removed my panty, sir.

Q            And you voluntarily consented isn’t it Ms. Witness?

A             No, sir.

Q            You did not shout isn’t [it] Ms. Witness?

A             I [shouted], sir.  I even cried.

Q            But isn’t it that the accused when he raped you he was not arm[ed] x x x?

A             There is none, sir.

Q            He did not even tell you any threatening words, isn’t it Ms. Witness?

A             He threatened me, sir.  He said that he is going to kill me if I will not accede to his desire.

Q            You said that it was too painful when you were raped?

A             Yes, sir.

Q            And that was the reason why you cried because it was painful?

A             Yes, sir.

Q            And that was also the reason why you struggled because it was painful, isn’t it?

A             Yes, sir.^[55][55]

In her re-direct examination, “AAA” remained consistent in her testimony that she was raped by the appellant.  Thus:

Q            Now, you stated that you were brought by your stepfather to “BBB”, “CCC”, in the month of March 2001, do you still recall when was that, when in March, 2001?

A             March 23, sir.

Q            And who was his companion when he fetch[ed] you in “EEE”?

A             He was alone, sir.

x x x x

Q            Do you recall what time you left “EEE”?

A             2:00 o’clock, sir.

x x x x

Q            Why do you remember March 23, 2001 from among the three (3) rapes that happened earlier?

A             Because that was the time when he fetch[ed] me from our house at “EEE”, sir.

x x x x

Q            How about on March 23, 2001 when the accused raped you[,] where [did it happen]?

A             Here at “BBB,” sir.^[56][56]

As defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed –

1.              By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a.               Through force, threat or intimidation;

b.              When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c.               By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d.             When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

x x x x

As regards the March 23, 2001 incident, the prosecution established that appellant had carnal knowledge of “AAA” through force, threat or intimidation.  “AAA’s” confusion relative to the first three incidents does not warrant his acquittal as regards the March 23, 2001 incident; neither does it detract us from the fact that she was indeed raped by the appellant on March 23, 2001. Notably, “AAA’s” testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Barcena.  Moreover, appellant could not ascribe any ill motive on the part of “AAA” on why she would charge appellant with such a serious crime. 

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for rape committed under the circumstances is reclusion perpetua.  Moreover, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, “AAA” is entitled to an award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as exemplary damages of P30,000.00.  Finally, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of judgment until fully paid.^[57][57]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  Appellant Rosauro Asetre y Duran is hereby ACQUITTED of the three counts of rape docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3516, 3517 and 3519 on reasonable doubt.  He is, however, found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3518 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay “AAA” P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and  P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.  All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0134: YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, ARTURO EGUNA, ARMANDO MALALUAN, DANILO ALONSO, ROMULO DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA, WILFREDO RIZALDO, ROMEO SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS and DOMINGO BAUTRO VS. MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 178409); MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION VS.        BUKLURAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MONTEREY-ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA, YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, CARLITO ABACAN, ARTURO EGUNA, DANILO ROLLE, ALBERTO CASTILLO, ARMANDO MALALUAN, DANILO ALFONSO, RUBEN ALVAREZ, ROMULO DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA, JUANITO TENORIO, WILFREDO RIZALDO, JOHN ASOTIGUE, NEMESIO AGTAY, ROMEO SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS and DOMINGO BAUTRO, (G.R. NO. 178434, 08 JUNE 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECTS: DISMISSAL OF UNION OFFICERS; SLOWDOWNS. (BRIEF TITLE: FADRIQUELAN VS. MONTEREY FOODS).

=============================================

SUBJECT: NO STRIKE AFTER DOLE ASSUME JURISDICTION.

The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute.  A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment.^[1][1]

^{XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}

SUBJECT: DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORDINARY WORKERS’ LIABILITY AND THAT OF UNION OFFICERS FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE

A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in it.  The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike.  There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct.  On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.^[2][2] 

^{XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}

SUBJECT:  DISMISSED EMPLOYEE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENSE.

In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges against him.  The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employee’s dismissal was for just cause.  The employer’s failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified.^[3][16] 

=============================================

SECOND DIVISION

YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, ARTURO              G.R. No. 178409

EGUNA, ARMANDO MALALUAN,

DANILO ALONSO, ROMULO

DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA,

WILFREDO RIZALDO, ROMEO

SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS

and DOMINGO BAUTRO,

                             Petitioners,                                Present:

                                                                               CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

          – versus –                                                        NACHURA,

  PERALTA,

  ABAD, and

  MENDOZA, JJ.

MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION,

Respondent.

x ———————————————— x

MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION,                  G.R. No. 178434

                             Petitioner,

          – versus –

BUKLURAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

SA MONTEREY-ILAW AT BUKLOD NG

MANGGAGAWA, YOLITO FADRIQUELAN,

CARLITO ABACAN, ARTURO EGUNA,

DANILO ROLLE, ALBERTO CASTILLO,

ARMANDO MALALUAN, DANILO

ALFONSO, RUBEN ALVAREZ, ROMULO

DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA, JUANITO

TENORIO, WILFREDO RIZALDO, JOHN

ASOTIGUE, NEMESIO AGTAY, ROMEO

SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS                 Promulgated:

and DOMINGO BAUTRO,

Respondents.                               June 8, 2011

x ————————————————————————————— x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

          These cases are about the need to clearly identify, for establishing liability, the union officers who took part in the illegal slowdown strike after the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

The Facts and the Case

          On April 30, 2002 the three-year collective bargaining agreement or CBA between the union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired.  On March 28, 2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).  To head off the strike, on April 30, 2003 the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute in view of its dire effects on the meat industry.  In an Order dated May 12, 2003, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the union from holding any strike.  It also directed the union and the company to desist from taking any action that may aggravate the situation. 

On May 21, 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on the alleged ground that the company committed unfair labor practices.  On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers, charging them with intentional acts of slowdown.  Six days later or on June 16 the company sent new notices to the union officers, informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE Secretary’s assumption order. 

On June 23, 2003, acting on motion of the company, the DOLE Secretary included the union’s second notice of strike in his earlier assumption order.  But, on the same day, the union filed a third notice of strike based on allegations that the company had engaged in union busting and illegal dismissal of union officers.  On July 7, 2003 the company filed a petition for certification of the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration but the DOLE Secretary denied the motion.  He, however, subsumed the third notice of strike under the first and second notices.

On November 20, 2003 the DOLE rendered a decision that, among other things, upheld the company’s termination of the 17 union officers.  The union and its officers appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

          On May 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the company’s termination of 10 union officers but declaring illegal that of the other seven.  Both parties sought recourse to this Court, the union in G.R. 178409 and the company in G.R. 178434.

The Issues Presented

          The issues these cases present are:

1.       Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the company’s farms; and

2.       Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work.

The Rulings of the Court

First.  The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute.  A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment.^[4][1]  Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike.  Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company.  They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post.  

The Court finds that the union officers and members in this case held a slowdown strike at the company’s farms despite the fact that the DOLE Secretary had on May 12, 2003 already assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute.  The evidence sufficiently shows that union officers and members simultaneously stopped work at the company’s Batangas andCavitefarms at 7:00 a.m. on May 26, 2003. 

The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform members of the developments in the CBA negotiation, not protest demonstrations over it.  But as the CA correctly observed, if the meetings had really been for the stated reason, why did the union officers and members from separate company farms choose to start and end their meetings at the same time and on the same day?  And if they did not intend a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work.  There is no allegation that the company prevented the union from holding meetings after working hours.

Second.  A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in it.  The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike.  There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct.  On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.^[5][2] 

Still, the participating union officers have to be properly identified.^[6][3]  The CA held that the company illegally terminated union officers Ruben Alvarez, John Asotigue, Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, Danilo Rolle, and Juanito Tenorio, there being no substantial evidence that would connect them to the slowdowns.  The CA said that their part in the same could not be established with certainty. 

But, although the witnesses did not say that Asotigue, Alvarez, and Rolle took part in the work slowdown, these officers gave no credible excuse for being absent from their respective working areas during the slowdown.  Tenorio allegedly took a break and never went back to work.  He claimed that he had to attend to an emergency but did not elaborate on the nature of such emergency.  In Abacan’s case, however, he explained that he was not feeling well on May 26, 2003 and so he decided to take a two-hour rest from work.  This claim of Abacan is consistent with the report^[7][4] that only one officer (Tenorio) was involved in the slowdown at the Calamias farm. 

At the Quilo farm, the farm supervisor did not include Castillo in the list of employees who failed to report for work on May 26, 2003.^[8][5]  In Agtay’s case, the evidence is that he was on his rest day.  There is no proof that the union’s president, Yolito Fadriquelan, did not show up for work during the slowdowns.  The CA upheld his dismissal, relying solely on a security guard’s report that the company submitted as evidence.  But, notably, that report actually referred to a Rolly Fadrequellan, another employee who allegedly took part in the Lipa farm slowdown.  Besides, Yolito Fadriquelan was then assigned at the General Trias farm in Cavite, not at the Lipa farm.  In fact, as shown in the sworn statements^[9][6] of theCavite farm employees, Fadriquelan even directed them not to do anything which might aggravate the situation.  This clearly shows that his dismissal was mainly based on his being the union president.   

          The Court sustains the validity of the termination of the rest of the union officers.  The identity and participations of Arturo Eguna,^[10][7] Armando Malaluan,^[11][8] Danilo Alonso,^[12][9] Romulo Dimaano,^[13][10] Roel Mayuga,^[14][11] Wilfredo Rizaldo,^[15][12] Romeo Suico,^[16][13] Domingo Escamillas,^[17][14] and Domingo Bautro^[18][15] in the slowdowns were properly established.  These officers simply refused to work or they abandoned their work to join union assemblies. 

In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges against him.  The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employee’s dismissal was for just cause.  The employer’s failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified.^[19][16]  Here, the company failed to show that all 17 union officers deserved to be dismissed.

Ordinarily, the illegally dismissed employees are entitled to two reliefs: reinstatement and backwages.  Still, the Court has held that the grant of separation pay, instead of reinstatement, may be proper especially when as in this case such reinstatement is no longer practical or will be for the best interest of the parties.^[20][17]  But they shall likewise be entitled to attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award for having been compelled to litigate in order to protect their interests.^[21][18]

          WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 82526, DECLARES Monterey Foods Corporation’s dismissal of Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, and Yolito Fadriquelan illegal, and ORDERS payment of their separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service up to the date of their termination.  The Court also ORDERS the company to pay 10% attorney’s fees as well as interest of 6% per annum on the due amounts from the time of their termination and 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such monetary awards are paid.    

          SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice