J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0234: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA (G.R. NO. 186131, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. AMANSEC).

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DISPOSITIVE:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 15, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the April 15, 2008 Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) August 30, 2006 Decision^[2][2] in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187,^[3][3] wherein accused-appellant Benjamin Amansec y Dona (Amansec) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

On June 18, 2003, Amansec was charged before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 of violation of Sections 11 and 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.  The pertinent portions of the Informations^[4][4] are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Q-03-118186

The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA of violation of Section 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as follows:

That on or about the 15^th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control zero point zero nine (0.09) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydroc[h]loride otherwise known as “SHABU” a dangerous drug.^[5][5]

Crim. Case No. Q-03-118187

The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA a.k.a. “Benjie” for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15^th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero nine (0.09) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydroc[h]loride otherwise known as “SHABU” a dangerous drug.^[6][6]

Amansec pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment^[7][7] on August 7, 2003.  After the termination of the pre-trial conference^[8][8] held on October 2, 2003, trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution’s first witness was Engineer Bernardino M. Banac, Jr., a forensic chemist from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.  However, upon agreement by the prosecution and the defense, his testimony was dispensed with, and in lieu thereof, the following stipulations and admissions were made by the parties:

1. That on June 16, 2003, a request for laboratory examination was prepared and sent by La Loma Police Station 1 to the Central Police District Crime Laboratory together with the specimens which were received by the said office on June 16, 2003, as shown in the stamp marked received attached to the said request for laboratory examination;

1. That upon receipt of the said request, a qualitative examination was conducted by the Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office, examined by Engr. Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. and that the specimens were found to be positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug which findings conducted contained in Chemistry Report No. D-472-03 dated June 16, 2003;

1. That attached to said Chemistry Report is a small brown envelope which when opened by the Court Interpreter yielded three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with markings : A (JR-BA)= 0.09 gram; B (RP-BA)= 0.09 gram; C (RV-JM)= 0.09 gram; [and]

1. That the forensic chemical officer has no personal knowledge leading to the arrest of the accused as well as the source of specimens.^[9][9]

On July 15, 2004, the RTC granted the prosecution’s motion^[10][10] to try the two cases jointly.

The prosecution’s version, which was primarily lifted from the testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, is summarized below:

Police Officer (PO) 1 Alfredo Mabutol, Jr. and PO2 Ronald Pascua, members of the PNP assigned at Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the La Loma Police Station, testified that on June 15, 2003, at around 11:00 p.m., while they, along with PO1 Roderick Valencia and their Officer-in Charge (OIC), Police Inspector Oliver Villanueva were on duty, an informant, whose identity remained confidential, arrived at the station to talk to Villanueva.  After talking to the informant, Villanueva formed a team for a buy-bust operation against Amansec, at Santos St., Barangay Damayan, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City.  The team consisted of Mabutol as the poseur-buyer and Pascua and Valenciaas his back-up members.  Villanueva then gave Mabutol a one hundred peso (₱100.00) bill to be used as his buy-bust money.  Mabutol marked this with his initials “JR” on the lower left side portion and listed its serial number in his dispatch book.  The team, with their informant, then proceeded to the target area using a white marked vehicle with red plate.  As soon as they reached the place, Mabutol and the informant moved ahead to the house of Amansec at Santos St., corner Caragay St., while the rest of the team positioned themselves at a strategic location, keeping Amansec within viewing distance.  The informant then introduced Mabutol to Amansec as a drug addict, in dire need of drugs.  Mabutol had just told Amansec that he was going to purchase one hundred pesos worth of shabu when another buyer, later identified as Jerome Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy shabu.  Amansec then showed both Pintis and Mabutol three plastic sachets containing crystalline substance.  Pintis gave a one hundred peso bill to Amansec who in return, let him pick one of the three plastic sachets.  After Pintis left, Amansec continued his transaction with Mabutol, and gave Mabutol another of the remaining two plastic sachets after receiving the buy-bust money.  Mabutol thereafter examined the plastic sachet he obtained from Amansec, and suspecting it to be shabu, scratched the right side of his head with his right hand to signal his team to approach the target.  Valencia immediately arrested Pintis and recovered from the latter one plastic sachet, while Pascua went after Amansec, who, upon seeing Pintis’ arrest, tried to run away.  Pascua thereafter frisked Amansec and retrieved the buy-bust money that Mabutol had given Amansec, and another plastic sachet.  The team then brought Pintis and Amansec to the Station Investigator.  The team also marked with their initials the plastic sachets that they had recovered and turned them over to their Investigator.  They later brought the plastic sachets to the Crime Laboratory to have their contents examined for the presence of shabu.^[11][11]

The examination made by Engr. Banac on June 16, 2003, yielded the following results, as stated in his Chemistry Report No. D-472-03^[12][12]:

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED:          1200H          16 JUNE 2003

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT:           OIC, SDEU

                                                            PS-1  CPD

                                                           LalomaQC

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

            Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance having the following markings and recorded net weights:

                        A(JR-BA)  =  0.09 gram          C(RV-JM)  =  0.09 gram

                        B(RP-BA)  =  0.09 gram

x x x x

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

            To determine the presence of dangerous drugs.  xxx

FINDINGS:

            Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE results to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.  x x x.

CONCLUSION:

            Specimens A, B, and C contain Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.  x x x.

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:  1400H 16 JUNE 2003

This report, along with the three plastic sachets with white crystalline substance, and the ₱100.00 bill^[13][13] recovered from Amansec, were presented in court, and, except for the plastic sachets, were submitted to the court as evidence.

The defense presented Amansec who vehemently denied, on the witness stand, the charges against him.  He testified that on June 15, 2003, he was in his residence when two police officers, whom he later came to know as Mabutol and a certain PO1 Lozada, entered his room and thoroughly searched it.  He was then brought to the precinct where he was instructed to call somebody who could help him settle his case.  As he knew no one who could help him, Mabutol asked him to give a name of a big-time drug seller/pusher who could take his place, or “pamalit-ulo.”^[14][14]  Since Amansec did not know any big-time drug pusher, reasoning that he had been in his residence for only six months then, the police officers proceeded with the case and he was brought to the Inquest Prosecutor.  Amansec averred that he did not file a case against the police officers because he did not know how to go about it.^[15][15]  On cross-examination, he said that he was denying the allegations as the police officers had “no proof [of] what they [were] saying.”^[16][16]  Amansec also stated that the first time he saw Mabutol and Pascua was when he was arrested, and he did not know of any grudge or ill motive that they might have against him.^[17][17]

On August 30, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

          WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187 for violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drugs) and he is hereby sentenced him (sic) to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos.

            However, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118186 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

            The pieces of evidence [that is the] subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of as provided by law.^[18][18]

In convicting Amansec of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish and satisfy the elements in the sale of illegal drugs.  The RTC averred that Amansec failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers whom he admitted to have met only after his arrest.  Moreover, the RTC found the testimonies of Mabutol and Pascua to be consistent, clear, direct, positive, and corroborative of the material and significant aspects of what actually transpired.^[19][19]

 However, the RTC acquitted Amansec of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs charge, ratiocinating in this wise:

            Anent the second offense, the public prosecutor was able to prove that indeed the accused was caught in possession of illegal drugs known as “shabu” after the entrapment.  After the arrest of the accused for selling illegal drugs, PO2 Ronald Pascua was able to recover another plastic sachet containing shabu from the accused.  However, the Court is convinced that the second plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhibit “E-2”) was intended by the accused to be sold to the buyer at the time of the buy-bust operation.  In People vs. Hindoy [357 SCRA 692], possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.  In the case at bar, it is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the second plastic sachet of shabu was shown and offered by the accused during the transaction in the buy-bust operation.^[20][20]

On September 11, 2006, Amansec filed his Notice of Appeal with the RTC.  In his Brief, ^[21][21] Amansec cited irregularities, which allegedly create a reasonable doubt that a buy-bust operation was conducted.  He also questioned the admissibility of the evidence against him.

However, the Court of Appeals was not convinced by Amansec’s arguments.  The Court of Appeals found the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to uphold the conviction of Amansec.^[22][22]  The Court of Appeals held that “[n]on-compliance by the apprehending officer with Section 21 of [Republic Act] No. 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. x x x.”^[23][23]

On April 15, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, with the following fallo:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 30, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187 convicting accused-appellant BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA for violation of Section 5, Article II of  R.A. No. 9165, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED.^[24][24]

Aggrieved, Amansec appealed^[25][25] the above ruling to this Court, assigning the same errors he assigned before the Court of Appeals, to wit:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE ITS APPARENT UNREALITY AS TO HOW THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF SELLING ILLEGAL DRUGS DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SPECIMENS.^[26][26]

The Ruling of this Court

Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, which provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier” of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a “protector/coddler” of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

and conduct of the buy-bust operation

Amansec argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as they failed to pass the test in determining the value of a witness’s testimony that such must be “in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.”^[27][27]

Amasec claims that the charges against him were merely planted and enumerates the following as evidence, which supposedly “creates reasonable doubt as to the allegation of the prosecution that a buy-bust operation was conducted”^[28][28]:

1. Only Amansec was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, and not Pintis, whom the police officers alleged to have bought shabu from him, while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.
2. The prosecution failed to produce and present in court the ₱100.00 bill Pintis allegedly used to buy shabu from Amansec.
3. The informant was not presented in court, and no explanation was given by the prosecution for their failure to do so.
4. There was no surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers.
5. The buy-bust money used by Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet powder.

Amansec’s arguments are untenable.  As we have held before, “[i]t is for the party to plan its own strategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to submit to support its own cause.”^[29][29]

Non-inclusion of Pintis in this case and

Non-presentation of Pintis’ ₱100.00 bill

Recovered from Amansec

          It is not within the province of this Court to speculate or make presumptions as to what happened to Pintis after he was arrested.  Suffice it to say that he was apprehended for not only a different, but also, a separate illegal act.  He was caught in flagrante delicto of purchasing shabu from Amansec, and when he was caught, a plastic sachet, similar to the ones sold to Mabutol and recovered from Amansec, was found in his possession.  Since this had nothing to do with Amansec’s own acts, this Court sees no reason why they should have been tried jointly.

          Anent the ₱100.00 bill Pintis used to buy shabu from Amansec, this Court also sees no need for its presentation before the RTC because Amansec was charged with violation of Section 5, or the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, for selling shabu to Mabutol, and not to Pintis.  Thus, even if Pintis’ ₱100.00 peso bill were presented in court, it would serve very little purpose for the prosecution, and even for the RTC, as, to reiterate, Amansec was on trial for his act of selling dangerous drugs to Mabutol, who was then a poseur-buyer, and not to Pintis, who just happened to buy from him while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.

Non-Presentation of Informant

          This point need not be belabored as this Court, has time and again, held that “the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.”^[30][30]  If Amansec felt that the prosecution did not present the informant because he would testify against it, then Amansec himself should have called him to the stand to testify for the defense.^[31][31]  The informant’s testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the prosecution.^[32][32]  In People v. Ho Chua,^[33][33] we said:

The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.  In People v. Nicolas, the Court ruled that “[p]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court.  Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants.  It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret.”  In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely corroborative.^[34][34]

No prior surveillance conducted

          This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by this Court.  We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.^[35][35]  In People v. Eugenio,^[36][36] we held:    

There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant.  Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one.  We have held that when time is of [the] essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.^[37][37]

Buy-bust money was not

dusted with ultraviolet powder

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham.  “The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.”^[38][38]  In People v. Rivera,^[39][39] we declared:

It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not render the exhibit inadmissible.  Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases.^[40][40]

Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence

Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165.  He claims that Section 21 of the aforesaid act was violated when the police officers who arrested him did not take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or any elected public official.  Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner.^[41][41]

He also avers that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence obtained from him as the station investigator, to whom the specimens were turned over, was not presented in court.  Moreover, Amansec claims, there was no evidence to show that the forensic chemist examined the same articles allegedly confiscated from him.  Amansec says that the stipulations made as regards the testimony of the forensic chemist mentioned nothing about the chemist’s actual receipt of the specimens from the Investigator or from any other person.  Amansec argues that the prosecution’s failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal and leads to the unavoidable suspicion on its integrity.^[42][42]

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21.    Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

 (a)   The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

(b)  Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(c)   A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, that a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(d)  After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall, within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter, proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, that a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(e)   The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In cases of seizures where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA may order the immediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(f)   The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(g)  After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and 

(h)  Transitory Provision:

h.1) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel; and

h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence rooms, as well as the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the existing National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forensic laboratories shall continue to examine or conduct screening and confirmatory test on the seized/surrendered evidence whether these be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall continue to have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or destroyed in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation of the full complement of the representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public official, the inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting NBI and PNP operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in writing by the DOH or PDEA, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken.  However “a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.”^[43][43]  Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not render Amansec’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence.^[44][44]  This Court has consistently held that “what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.”^[45][45]

The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.  Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis.  These were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself.  As soon as the police officers, together with Amansec and Pintis, reached the La Loma Police Station, the seized sachets were marked with the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet he personally retrieved from the suspects.  This was done before the specimens were turned over to the station investigator for the preparation of the request for laboratory examination.  Thereafter, the specimens were forwarded to the crime lab by the police officers themselves.^[46][46]  The Chemistry Report prepared by the forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the police officers, and which were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as the plastic sachets they marked with their initials.

Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence.  Amansec bears the burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties.^[47][47]  This, Amansec failed to do.

Furthermore, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and everyone who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court.  “As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.”^[48][48]  This Court, in People v. Hernandez,^[49][49] citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,^[50][50] ruled:

After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.^[51][51]

It is worthy to note, and we agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation, that Amansec questioned the chain of custody of the evidence only when he appealed his conviction.  Not once did he raise this defense or mention these procedural gaps before the trial court.  Thus, whatever justifiable ground the prosecution has will remain a mystery in light of Amansec’s failure to raise this issue before the trial court, viz:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.^[52][52]

Amansec’s theory, from the very beginning, were that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for his failure to give the police officers either money or some big-time pusher to take his place.  In other words, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.  However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.  In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.  In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.^[53][53]

          Equally important is the fact that Amansec has not ascribed any improper motive on the part of the police officers as to why they would hand-pick him, and falsely incriminate him in such a serious crime.  No evidence has been offered to show that Mabutol and Pascua, were motivated by reasons other than their duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs.^[54][54]  Amansec himself admitted that he only came to know his arresting officers after his arrest.  He also testified that he knew of no grudge that they might have against him.  Hence, until Amansec can show clear and convincing evidence that the members of the entrapment operation team were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. ^[55][55]    

Elements of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs established

The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction of the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. ^[56][56]

To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that “[i]n prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.”^[57][57]

It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.^[58][58]

Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.  He had been caught red-handed in the entrapment operation conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police.  Such positive identification must prevail over Amansec’s uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.^[59][59]

The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.  Amansec gave one of the two remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol after receiving the ₱100.00 buy-bust money.^[60][60]  In People v. Legaspi,^[61][61] we said:

The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.

This Court therefore finds no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in convicting Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 15, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0233: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (G.R. NO. 172458, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE REVISED RULES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND THE RULES OF COURT IN FILING A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE CTA EN BANC.  (BRIEF TITLE: PNB VS. CIR)

=================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

=================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1][1] seeks to reverse and set aside the January 27, 2006^[2][2] and April 19, 2006^[3][3] Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) in C.T.A. E.B. NO. 145, which dismissed outright the Petition for Review filed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) dated December 27, 2005 for being filed four days beyond the additional 15 days granted to file such petition.

On April 15, 1999, petitioner PNB filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its Tentative Return for 1998 with the documents enumerated in the “List of Attachments to Annual Income Tax Return Calendar Year Ended December 31, 1998” enclosed.  On September 30, 1999, PNB filed its Amended Income Tax Return for 1998, with the corresponding attachments to an amended annual income tax return appended, including copies of the Certificates and Schedule of Creditable Withholding Taxes for 1998.  PNB likewise filed its Corporate Quarterly Returns for the calendar year 1998.^[4][4]

On February 8, 2001, PNB filed with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim for refund in the amount of ₱6,028,594.00, which were payments made in excess of its income tax liability for 1998.^[5][5]

As BIR did not act upon PNB’s claim for refund, PNB, on March 30, 2001, filed with the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Division) a Petition for Review,^[6][6] and prayed that it be refunded or issued a tax credit certificate in the amount of ₱6,028,594.00, representing creditable taxes withheld from PNB’s income from the sale of real property, rental income, commissions, and management fees for the taxable year 1998.

In his Answer,^[7][7] the CIR alleged that PNB’s claim for refund/tax credit is subject first to an investigation and that it failed to establish its right to a refund.

After PNB had rested its case, the CIR manifested that he would not be presenting evidence.  The parties were thereafter required to submit their memoranda.^[8][8]

On May 19, 2003, the BIR issued in PNB’s favor Tax Credit Certificate No. SN 023837 for ₱4,154,353.42, leaving a balance of ₱1,874,240.58 out of PNB’s total claim of ₱6,028,594.00.  PNB then informed the CTA Division of such tax credit certificate, and manifested that its acceptance was without prejudice to recovering the balance of its total claim.^[9][9]

Consequently, the CIR filed a Motion,^[10][10] asking that he be allowed to present evidence on PNB’s excluded claim.  The CIR argued that the amount of ₱1,874,240.58 was disallowed because it was not remitted to the BIR, as verified by its Regional Accounting Division.^[11][11]

On August 11, 2005, the CTA Division rendered its Decision,^[12][12] the dispositive portion of which reads:

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition For Review is hereby partially GRANTED.  Respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND or ISSUE a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of herein petitioner in the amount of ₱1,428,661.66, representing the latter’s unutilized creditable withholding tax for the year 1998.^[13][13]

The CTA Division held that payments of withholding taxes for a certain taxable year were creditable to the payee’s income tax liability as determined after it had filed its income tax returns the following year.  The CTA Division said that since PNB posted net losses, it was not liable for any income tax and consequently, the taxes withheld during the course of the taxable year, which was 1998, while collected legally under Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, Section 2.57 (B), became untenable and took on the nature of erroneously collected taxes at the end of that year.  The CTA Division averred that while the right to a refund is not automatic and must be established by sufficient evidence, there is nothing in the Tax Code that would suggest that the actual remittance of the withholding tax is a condition precedent to claim for a tax refund.  Moreover, the CTA Division added, that the CIR failed to present the certification to prove his contention of PNB’s non-remittance of the disallowed amount.  However, the CTA Division affirmed the disallowance of eight transactions, amounting to ₱445,578.92 as they had already been reported as income for other years, had not been recorded, or were not supported by pertinent documents.^[14][14] 

On September 14, 2005, PNB filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,^[15][15] asserting its entitlement to be refunded the amount of ₱445,578.92, by explaining each transaction involved and pinpointed by the CTA Division.  This however was still denied by the CTA Division in its Resolution^[16][16] dated November 15, 2005, for lack of merit.

Aggrieved, PNB, filed a partial appeal by way of Petition for Review^[17][17] under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 9282^[18][18] before the CTA En Banc, to review and modify  the CTA Division’s August 11, 2005 Decision.  This petition was received by the CTA En Banc on December 27, 2005, four days beyond the additional 15 days granted to PNB to file its petition.

Thus, on January 27, 2006, the CTA En Banc issued a Resolution^[19][19]  denying due course and consequently dismissing PNB’s petition for the following reasons:

1)                  The Petition For Review was filed four (4) days late on December 27, 2005, the reglementary deadline for the timely filing of such petition being December 23, 2005.

Appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised in the manner provided by law.  Therefore, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and non-compliance is fatal having the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory (Cabellan vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 119).  Not only that, late appeals deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less entertain the appeal (Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373).

2)                  The petition is not accompanied by the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed Decision dated August 11, 2005 and Resolution dated November 15, 2005, in violation of Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, in relation to Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

3)                  The Petition does not contain an Affidavit of Service, in violation of Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

In the case of Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344, 351, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to dismiss the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service.

Lastly, Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that:

            SEC. 7.  Effect of failure to comply with requirements.– The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”

Persistent in its claim, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation of Compliance^[20][20] on February 23, 2006, and answered each ground propounded by the CTA En Banc in its Resolution.

PNB asserted that its petition was filed on December 23, 2005, which was the last day of the additional 15-day period granted by the CTA En Banc, via LBC Express, as shown by the copy of LBC Official Receipt No. 12990350^[21][21] dated December 23, 2005.  PNB explained that its counsel, Atty. Flerida P. Zaballa-Banzuela, accompanied by her administrative assistant, tried to personally file the petition with the CTA En Banc on December 23, 2005.  However, PNB claimed, that due to heavy traffic, Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela arrived at the CTA office in Quezon City at 4:30 p.m., just as the CTA personnel were leaving the CTA premises in their shuttle bus.^[22][22]

PNB attached to its Motion the Affidavit^[23][23] of Christopher Sarmiento, the Security Guard who was then assigned at the CTA main gate.  Sarmiento averred that he did not allow Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela to enter the CTA compound because there was no one left to receive her document.  He also alleged that Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela even tried to ask some of the CTA personnel who were on board the CTA shuttle that passed her by, if they could receive her document, but they declined.  This was corroborated by Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela’s administrative assistant, Macrina J. Cataniag, in her Affidavit,^[24][24] also annexed to PNB’s Motion.

PNB argued that while its petition was deposited with LBC Express on December 23, 2005, very well within the reglementary period, CTA En Banc received it only on December 27, 2005, as December 24 to 26, 2005 were holidays.^[25][25]

 Addressing the second ground that the CTA En Banc used to dismiss the petition, PNB said that its non-submission of the duplicate original or certified true copy of the CTA Division’s decision and resolution was not intended for delay but was “mere inadvertence and unintentional, but an honest mistake, an oversight, an unintentional omission, and a human error occasioned by too much pressure of work.”^[26][26]

In compliance, PNB attached to its Motion the Affidavit of Service^[27][27] and certified true copies of the CTA Division’s decision and resolution supposed to be attached to its petition before the CTA En Banc.

On April 19, 2006, the CTA En Banc denied PNB’s motion for lack of merit.  The CTA En Banc held that “absent any cogent explanation [to not] comply with the rules, the rules must apply to the petitioner as they do to all.”^[28][28]  The CTA En Banc ratiocinated in this wise: 

It is a jurisprudential rule that the date [of] delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading (Benguet Electric Corporation, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 60-61).  Clearly, the present Petition For Review was filed four (4) days late.

            The instant Petition For Review is an appeal from the decision of the Court in Division.  Accordingly, the applicable rule is that the fifteen-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature; that failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review (Armigos vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 1; Jocson vs. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550).  Petitioner had thus lost its right to appeal from the decision of this Court in Division.^[29][29]

The CTA En Banc added:

            Although petitioner subsequently attached to its present motion, certified true copies of the assailed Decision, dated August 11, 2005, and Resolution, dated November 15, 2005, and the Affidavit of Service, this did not stop the questioned decision from becoming final and executory.  It has been held that strict compliance with procedural requirements in taking an appeal cannot be substituted by “good faith compliance”.  To rule otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the rules of procedure, i.e., to “facilitate the orderly administration of justice” (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 806, 810; Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 712).^[30][30]

PNB thereafter filed a Petition for Review^[31][31] before this Court on June 16, 2006, which was the last day of the additional thirty days it was granted^[32][32] to file such petition.

In order to convince this Court to allow its petition, PNB posits the following arguments:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE EXPLANATION SUBMITTED BY PNB IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH MANIFESTATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION ON DECEMBER 23, 2005 (THE DUE DATE FOR FILING THEREOF) VIA LBC SERVICE INSTEAD OF REGISTERED MAIL WITH RETURN CARD.

II

THE PROCEDURAL LAPSE OBSERVED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, AS POSTULATED IN VARIOUS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

III

THE PETITION FILED BY PNB BEFORE THE CTA EN BANC RAISES A MERITORIOUS LEGAL DEFENSE WARRANTING JUDICIAL RESOLUTION.^[33][33]

PNB once again narrated the circumstances leading to its counsel’s decision to mail its petition for review via LBC Express, a private letter-forwarding company, instead of registered mail.  It claims that since this Court has repeatedly pronounced the primacy of substantive justice over technical rules, then its procedural lapses should likewise be excused, especially since no substantial rights of the CIR are affected.

This Court’s Ruling

 The only issue to be resolved here is whether or not this Court should require the CTA En Banc to give due course to C.T.A. E.B. No. 145 despite PNB’s failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Rules of Court in filing a petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

Not having been successfully convinced by PNB, we answer the above issue in the negative.

This Court would like to underscore the fact that PNB failed to comply with not just one, but three procedural rules when it filed its petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

Petition was filed late

It is stated under Section 3, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals that the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.  Thus, the manner in which petitions are filed before the CTA is also covered by the relevant provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:

          Rule 13. x x x.

                x x x x

Sec. 3. Manner of filing.  The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail.  In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing.  In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court.  The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case.  (Emphases ours.)

To recall, PNB filed its petition with the CTA En Banc four days beyond the extended period granted to it to file such petition.  PNB argues that it was filed on time since it was mailed on the last day of the extended period, which was on December 23, 2005.  It has been established that a pleading “filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service x x x is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, and not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service.”^[34][34]  In Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[35][35] we said:

The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.^[36][36]

It is worthy to note that PNB already asked for an additional period of 15 days within which to file its petition for review with the CTA En Banc.  This period expired on December 23, 2005.  Knowing fully well that December 23, 2005 not only fell on a Friday, followed by three consecutive non-working days, but also belonged to the busiest holiday season of the year, PNB should have exercised more prudence and foresight in filing its petition. 

It is, however, curious why PNB chose to risk the holiday traffic in an effort to personally file its petition with the CTA En Banc, when it already filed a copy to the other party, the CIR, via registered mail.^[37][37]  Considering the circumstances, it would have been more logical for PNB to send its petition to the CTA En Banc on the same occasion it sent a copy to the CIR, especially since that day was already the last day given to PNB to file its petition.  Moreover, PNB offered no justification as to why it sent its petition via ordinary mail instead of registered mail.  “Service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no registry service exists.”^[38][38]  Rule 13, Section 7 reads:

Sec. 7. Service by mail.  Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (l0) days if undelivered.  If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (Emphasis ours.)

Petition was not accompanied by the

required duplicate originals or certified

true copies of the decision and resolution

being assailed, and Affidavit of Service

          The following provisions are instructive:

Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals:

SEC. 2. Petition for review; contents. – The petition for review shall contain allegations showing the jurisdiction of the Court, a concise statement of the complete facts and a summary statement of the issues involved in the case, as well as the reasons relied upon for the review of the challenged decision.  The petition shall be verified and must contain a certification against forum shopping as provided in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.  A clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the decision appealed from shall be attached to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 4(b), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals:

Sec. 4(b) An appeal from a decision or resolution of the Court in Division on a motion for reconsideration or new trial shall be taken to the Court by petition for review as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.  The Court en banc shall act on the appeal.

Sections 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis ours.)

This Court has already upheld the mandatory character of attaching duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed decision to a petition for review.^[39][39]  Moreover, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, non-compliance with such mandatory requirement is a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition, viz:

            Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.  (Emphasis ours.)

          Anent the failure to attach the Affidavit of Service, Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 13. Proof of service.  Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.  The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

          Although the failure to attach the required affidavit of service is not fatal if the registry receipt attached to the petition clearly shows service to the other party, ^[40][40] it must be remembered that this was not the only rule of procedure PNB failed to satisfy.  In Suarez v. Judge Villarama, Jr.^[41][41] we said: 

It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.  Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.^[42][42]

This Court agrees with the CTA En Banc that PNB has not demonstrated any cogent reason for this Court to take an exception and excuse PNB’s blatant disregard of the basic procedural rules in a petition for review.  Furthermore, the timely perfection of an appeal is a mandatory requirement.  One cannot escape the rigid observance of this rule by claiming oversight, or in this case, lack of foresight.  Neither can it be trifled with as a “mere technicality” to suit the interest of a party.  Verily, the periods for filing petitions for review and for certiorari are to be observed religiously.  “Just as [the] losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner have the x x x right to enjoy the finality of the decision.”^[43][43]  In Air France Philippines v. Leachon,^[44][44] we held:

Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing an appellate petition are generally inviolable.  It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege.  Hence, parties who seek to avail of the privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.  The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must, as a rule, be strictly followed.  Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays, and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business.  For sure, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well.  Failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.^[45][45]

While it is true that the Court may deviate from the foregoing rule, this is true only if the appeal is meritorious on its face.  The Court has not hesitated to relax the procedural rules in order to serve and achieve substantial justice.  “In the circumstances obtaining in this case however, the occasion does not warrant the desired relaxation.”^[46][46]  PNB has not offered any meritorious legal defense to justify the suspension of the rules in its favor.  The CTA Division has taken into consideration all of the evidence submitted by the PNB, and actually allowed it a refund of ₱1,428,661.66, in addition to the ₱4,154,353.42 the BIR already gave.  The CTA Division explained why it disallowed the remaining balance of ₱445,578.92 in its Decision dated August 11, 2005.  When PNB moved to reconsider this decision, it did not offer the CTA any other evidence or explanation aside from the ones the CTA Division had already evaluated.  Nevertheless, the CTA carefully considered and deliberated anew PNB’s grounds, albeit they found them lacking in merit.  Thus, it cannot be said that PNB was deprived of its day in court, as in fact, it was given all the time it had asked for. 

While PNB may believe that it has a meritorious legal defense, this must be weighed against the need to halt an abuse of the flexibility of procedural rules.  It is well established that faithful compliance with the Rules of Court is essential for the prevention and avoidance of unnecessary delays and for the organized and efficient dispatch of judicial business.^[47][47] 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0232: MA. JOY TERESA BILBAO VS. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (G.R. NO. 183915, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J ) SUBJECT: RESIGNATION (BRIEF TITLE: BILBAO VS. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE)

=======================

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated May 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

=======================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the May 30, 2008 Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 and its July 22, 2008 Resolution^[2][2] denying petitioner Ma. Joy Teresa O. Bilbao’s (Bilbao) motion for reconsideration.  The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which held thatBilbao was not illegally dismissed and had voluntarily resigned.  The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter which ruled that Bilbao, together with two other complainants, was illegally dismissed by respondent Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and ordered the payment of full backwages, separation pay, and attorney’s fees. 

          The facts are as follows:

         Bilbaowas a former employee of respondent Saudia, having been hired as a Flight Attendant on May 13, 1986 until her separation from Saudia in September 2004.  During the course of her employment,Bilbaowas assigned to work at the Manila Office, although the nature of her work as a flight attendant entailed regular flights fromManilatoJeddah,Saudi Arabia, and back.

          On August 25, 2004, the In-Flight Service Senior Manager of Saudia assigned in Manilareceived an inter-office Memorandum dated August 17, 2004 from its Jeddah Office regarding the transfer of 10 flight attendants from Manilato Jeddah effective September 1, 2004.  The said memorandum explained that such transfer was made “due to operational requirements.”^[3][3] Bilbao was among the 10 flight attendants to be transferred.

         Bilbaoinitially complied with the transfer order and proceeded to Jeddah for her new assignment.  However, on September 7, 2004, she opted to resign and relinquish her post by tendering a resignation letter, which reads:

Jeddah IFS Base Manager (F)

F/A  Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao

PRN:  3006078

22  /  07  /  1425 H     7  /  09  /  2004

RESIGNATION

I am tendering my resignation with one (1) month notice effective 18 October 2004.  Thank you for the support you have given me during my 18 years of service.

                                                            (signed)

                                                            ________________

                                                            F/A’s SIGNATURE

                                                            3006078         

(signed)                                                September 7, 2004

_________________

AMIN GHABRA

SNR. MGR. IFS JED (F)

(signed)

ABDULLAH BALKHOYOUR

GM IFS CABIN CREW

8/8/1425

21/9/04                                                ADMIN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / DATE^[4][4]

           On October 28, 2004, Bilbao executed and signed an Undertaking^[5][5] similar to that of a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim wherein she acknowledged receipt of a sum of money as “full and complete end-of-service award with final settlement and have no further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian Airlines.”^[6][6] 

          In spite of this signed Undertaking, however, on July 20, 2005,Bilbaofiled with the NLRC a complaint for reinstatement and payment of full backwages; moral, exemplary and actual damages; and attorney’s fees.  Two of the other flight attendants who were included in the list for transfer to Jeddah, Shalimar Centi-Mandanas and Maria Lourdes Castells, also filed their respective complaints against Saudia.  These complaints were eventually consolidated into NLRC-NCR Case Nos. 00-07-06315-05 and 00-08-06745-05, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes.

          For her part,Bilbaomaintained that her resignation from Saudia was not voluntary.  She narrated that she was made to sign a pre-typed resignation letter and was even reminded that the same was a better option than termination which would tarnish her record of service with Saudia. Bilbaoand her co-complainants shared a common theory that their transfer to Jeddah was a prelude to their termination since they were all allegedly between 39 and 40 years of age.

          Upon the other hand, Saudia averred that the resignation letters fromBilbaoand her co-complainants were voluntarily made since they were actually hand-written and duly signed.  Saudia asserted thatBilbaoand her co-complainants were not subjected to any force, intimidation, or coercion when they wrote said resignation letters and even their undertakings, after receiving without protest a generous separation package despite the fact that employees who voluntarily resign are not entitled to any separation pay.  Saudia also added that the transfer of flight attendants from their Manila Office to the Jeddah Office was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. 

          On August 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Reyes rendered a Decision^[7][7] declaring that Bilbao, together with co-complainants Centi-Mandanas and Castells, was illegally dismissed, and ordering Saudia to pay each of the complainants full backwages from the time of the illegal dismissal until the finality of the decision, separation pay of one month for every year of service less the amount already received, plus ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees on the amounts actually determined to be due the complainants. 

           Saudia filed an appeal before the NLRC alleging thatBilbaoand her co-complainants voluntarily executed their resignation letters and undertakings; thus, they were not illegally dismissed.  Moreover, Saudia opined thatBilbaoand her co-complainants’ claim of illegal dismissal was a mere afterthought as they waited for almost one year from the date of their alleged dismissal to file their respective complaints. 

         Bilbaofollowed suit and also appealed before the NLRC, arguing that she was entitled to the payment of moral and exemplary damages since her termination was allegedly attended by bad faith, fraud and deceit. 

          On June 25, 2007, the NLRC granted Saudia’s appeal, and reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter.  The decretal portion of the NLRC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the respondents’ appeal is hereby GRANTED.  The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is issued finding the respondent not guilty of illegal dismissal.

For lack of merit, the complainant Bilbao’s appeal is DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED.^[8][8]

          In a Resolution^[9][9] dated October 26, 2007, the NLRC amended its earlier Resolution dated June 25, 2007, to state that Castells and Centi-Mandanas were also not entitled to moral and exemplary damages.  Moreover, the NLRC failed to find any compelling justification or valid reason to modify, alter or reverse its earlier resolution, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Appeals and Motions for Reconsideration of complainants Maria Lourdes Castells and Shalimar Centi-Mandanas are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Likewise, the Motion for Reconsideration of Maria Joy Teresa Bilbao is DENIED.

No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.^[10][10]

          Bilbaowent to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that she was not illegally dismissed and not entitled to the payment of moral and exemplary damages. 

          On May 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC dated June 25, 2007 and October 26, 2007, and held that the resignation of Bilbaowas “of her own free will and intelligent act.”^[11][11] 

          Dissatisfied,Bilbaofiled a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated July 22, 2008. 

          Hence, the instant petition for review filed byBilbaoon the following grounds:

6.  GROUND FOR THIS PETITION/ISSUES

6.1.  The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the erroneous Decision of the NLRC, Third Division which Decision reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings.  The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.

6.2.  The Court of Appeals committed palpable error in ruling that petitioner was not forced to resign; the Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law and contrary to applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.

6.3.  The Court of Appeals committed patent mistake in ruling that the petitioners’ (sic) termination was valid because respondent had the right to terminate the petitioner even without just cause; this is an outright violation of the Labor Code and applicable laws and jurisprudence; The Court of Appeals likewise erred in validating the resignation because it was accompanied with words of gratitude and payment of separation benefits.^[12][12]

In her Petition^[13][13] dated September 15, 2008, Bilbao asserts that the initial step of Saudia in transferring her to Jeddah was, by itself, constructive dismissal since the transfer order was unreasonable, discriminatory, attended by bad faith, and would result to demotion in rank or diminution in pay.  Moreover,Bilbao maintains that her resignation letter was not voluntarily made as it was in a pre-typed form supplied by Saudia, and was accomplished when she was under pressure and had no choice but to resign.  Lastly,Bilbao insists that the undertaking or waiver and quitclaim that she signed in favor of Saudia was invalid as she particularly puts in issue the voluntariness of its execution.

In its Comment^[14][14] dated November 14, 2008, Saudia preliminarily asserts that the petition raises the factual issue of whether or not Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment with Saudia, which is not proper for a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting its outright dismissal.  Nonetheless, Saudia presents its arguments and contends that it validly exercised its management prerogative in transferringBilbao to another work station.  Saudia then enumerates the following factual circumstances which allegedly reveal the voluntariness ofBilbao’s resignation, to wit:

a)      [Bilbao’s] resignation letter was penned in her own handwriting and duly signed by her;

b)      [Bilbao] tendered her letter of resignation in Jeddah, KSA on 07 September 2004;

c)      [Bilbao] is of sufficient age and discretion, could read, write, and understand English and a college graduate;

d)     There is no proof that any material or physical force was applied on her person or her family;

e)      [Bilbao] then voluntarily executed an Undertaking acknowledging receipt of various sums of money and irrevocably and unconditionally releasing Saudia, its directors, stockholders, officers and employees from any claim or demand whatsoever in law or equity which they may have in connection with her employment with respondent;

f)       [Bilbao] received generous financial benefits without protest;

g)      It took [Bilbao] at least one (1) year from the date of the alleged dismissal to file her Complaint against [Saudia]; and 

h)      The intimidation, force or coercion allegedly employed by [Saudia] surfaced, for the first time, when the Complaint were (sic) filed on 20 July 2005, which was then amended on 01 September 2005.^[15][15]

Lastly, Saudia claims thatBilbaois not entitled to any award of moral and exemplary damages since there is no dismissal, much less illegal dismissal committed by Saudia, asBilbaovoluntarily resigned from her employment.

This Court finds no merit in the petition.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is generally confined only to errors of law.  It does not extend to questions of fact.  This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as in the instant case, where the findings of fact and the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.^[16][16]  To recall, the Labor Arbiter found that Saudia illegally dismissedBilbao, while the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are in agreement thatBilbao voluntarily tendered her resignation. 

          After a review of the case, we uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals thatBilbaovoluntarily resigned from her employment with Saudia.  Her resignation letter and undertaking that evidenced her receipt of separation pay, when taken together with her educational attainment and the circumstances surrounding the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal, comprise substantial proof ofBilbao’s voluntary resignation. 

          Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment.  It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment.  As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.^[17][17]

          In the instant case,Bilbaotendered her resignation letter a week after her transfer to the Jeddah office.  In the said letter,Bilbaoexpressed her gratitude for the support which Saudia had given her for her eighteen years of service.  Clearly, her use of words of appreciation and gratitude negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign.  Besides, the resignation letter was hand-written byBilbaoon a Saudia form and was in English, a language she is conversant in. 

Additionally, instead of immediately filing a complaint for illegal dismissal after she was allegedly forced to resign,Bilbaoexecuted an Undertaking in favor of Saudia, wherein she declared that she received her full and complete end-of-service award with final settlement, to wit:

I, the undersigned employee

Name/ MARIA JOY TERESA O. BILBAO

PRN/ 3006078

hereby declare that I have received my full and complete end-of-service award with final settlement and have no further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian Airlines.

By signing this undertaking, I also fully Understand that any other future claims filed by me shall not be considered, accepted, or entertained.

Name: MARIA JOY TERESA O. BILBAO

PRN: 3006078

Signature: (SGD.)

Date: October 25, 2004^[18][18]

What is more,Bilbaowaited for more than 10 months after her separation from Saudia to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. 

Despite the foregoing circumstances,Bilbaomaintains that she was forced and coerced into writing the said resignation letter in the form prepared by Saudia, and that she was left with no other option but to resign.  Saudia, on the other hand, claims thatBilbao’s resignation was voluntary, thus, there could be no illegal dismissal.

Even assuming that Saudia prepared the form in whichBilbaowrote her resignation letter as claimed, this Court is not convinced that she was coerced and intimidated into signing it. Bilbaois no ordinary employee who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize the consequences of her acts.  She is an educated individual.  It is highly improbable that with her long years in the profession and her educational attainment, she could be tricked and forced into doing something she does not intend to do.  Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said thatBilbaowas coerced into resigning from Saudia.

Besides, Bilbaodid not adduce any competent evidence to prove that she was forced or threatened by Saudia.  It must be remembered that for intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.^[19][19]  In the instant case,Bilbao did not prove the existence of any one of these essential elements.  Bare and self-serving allegations of coercion or intimidation, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not constitute proof to sufficiently support a finding of forced resignation.  It would be utterly unfair and unjust to hold that Saudia illegally dismissedBilbao and to impose upon it the burden of accepting backBilbao who unequivocally and voluntarily manifested her intent and willingness to sever her employment ties.

Anent the Undertaking signed by Bilbao, this Court is of the opinion that the same was validly and voluntarily executed.  Indeed, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.  There are legitimate waivers and quitclaims that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of workers’ claims which should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.^[20][20]  And if such agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and should not later be disowned. 

Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[21][21] held that:

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.  If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.  It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.  But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. x x x.^[22][22]

This Court quotes with approval the finding of the NLRC, to wit:

Having signed the waiver, it is hard to conclude that [Bilbaowas] merely forced by the necessity to execute the “undertaking.” [Bilbaois] not [a] gullible nor unsuspecting [person] who can easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus, need the extra protection of law.  [She is a] well-educated and highly experienced flight [attendant].  The “undertaking” executed by [Bilbaois] therefore considered valid and binding on [her] and [Saudia].

Due to [her] voluntary resignation, [Bilbaois] actually not entitled to any separation pay benefits.  Thus, the financial package given to [her] is more than sufficient consideration for [her] execution of the “undertaking.”^[23][23]

          Clearly then,Bilbao’s claim that she was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained.  There is no showing that the Undertaking and resignation letter were executed byBilbaounder force or intimidation. Bilbao’s claims for reinstatement, payment of backwages without loss of seniority rights and with interest, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees must inevitably fail. 

          This Court has always reminded that:

Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.  An employee who resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally stopped from filing any further money claims against the employer arising from the employment.^[24][24]

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated May 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                Chief Justice