J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2012-0025: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. JAN CARLO GALA (G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304, March 7, 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: APPLICATION OF TECHICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN LABOR CASES MAY BE RELAXED; DISMISSAL OF PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE SUSTAINED; SAMPLE OF CONDITIONS IN PROBATIONARY EMPLOY  AGREEMENT.  (BRIEF TITLE: MERALCO VS. GALA).

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DISPOSITIVE:

        WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

        SO ORDERED.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

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          D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

          We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,^[1][1] seeking to annul the decision^[2][2] dated August 25, 2009 and the resolution^[3][3] datedFebruary 10, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 105943 and 106021.

The Antecedents

The facts are summarized below.

          On March 2, 2006, respondent Jan Carlo Gala commenced employment with the petitioner Meralco Electric Company (Meralco) as a probationary lineman. He was assigned at Meralco’s Valenzuela Sector. He initially served as member of the crew of Meralco’s Truck No. 1823 supervised by Foreman Narciso Matis. After one month, he joined the crew of Truck No. 1837 under the supervision of Foreman Raymundo Zuñiga, Sr.

          OnJuly 27, 2006, barely four months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical supplies, particularly, for the incident which took place onMay 25, 2006. On that day, Gala and other Meralco workers were instructed to replace a worn-out electrical pole at the Pacheco Subdivision inValenzuelaCity. Gala and the other linemen were directed to join Truck No. 1891, under the supervision of Foreman Nemecio Hipolito.

          When they arrived at the worksite, Gala and the other workers saw that Truck No. 1837, supervised by Zuñiga, was already there.  The linemen of Truck No. 1837 were already at work.  Gala and the other members of the crew of Truck No. 1891 were instructed to help in the digging of a hole for the pole to be installed.

          While the Meralco crew was at work, one Noberto “Bing” Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, arrived. He appeared to be known to the Meralco foremen as they were seen conversing with him.  Llanes boarded the trucks, without being stopped, and took out what were later found as electrical supplies. Aside from Gala, the foremen and the other linemen who were at the worksite when the pilferage happened were later charged with misconduct and dishonesty for their involvement in the incident.

          Unknown to Gala and the rest of the crew, a Meralco surveillance task force was monitoring their activities and recording everything with a Sony video camera. The task force was composed of Joseph Aguilar, Ariel Dola and Frederick Riano.

          Meralco called for an investigation of the incident and asked Gala to explain. Gala denied involvement in the pilferage, contending that even if his superiors might have committed a wrongdoing, he had no participation in what they did. He claimed that: (1) he was at some distance away from the trucks when the pilferage happened; (2) he did not have an inkling that an illegal activity was taking place since his supervisors were conversing with Llanes, giving him the impression that they knew him; (3) he did not call the attention of his superiors because he was not in a position to do so as he was a mere lineman; and (4) he was just following instructions in connection with his work and had no control in the disposition of company supplies and materials. He maintained that his mere presence at the scene of the incident was not sufficient to hold him liable as a conspirator.

          Despite Gala’s explanation, Meralco proceeded with the investigation and eventually terminated his employment on July 27, 2006.^[4][4] Gala responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint against Meralco.^[5][5]

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

          In a decision dated September 7, 2007,^[6][6] Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. She held that Gala’s participation in the pilferage of Meralco’s property rendered him unqualified to become a regular employee.

         Gala  appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its decision of May 2, 2008,^[7][7] the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s ruling.  It  found that Gala  had  been  illegally  dismissed, since there was “no concrete showing of complicity with the alleged misconduct/dishonesty[.]”^[8][8] The NLRC, however, ruled out Gala’s reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of his probationary period. It awarded him backwages and attorney’s fees.

          Both parties moved for partial reconsideration; Gala, on the ground that he should have been reinstated with full backwages, damages and interests; and Meralco, on the ground that the NLRC erred in finding that Gala had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motions. Relying on the same grounds, Gala and Meralco elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Decision

          In its decision of August 25, 2009,^[9][9] the CA denied Meralco’s petition for lack of merit and partially granted Gala’s petition. It concurred with the NLRC that Gala had been illegally dismissed, a ruling that was supported by the evidence. It opined that nothing in the records show Gala’s knowledge of or complicity in the pilferage. It found insufficient the joint affidavit^[10][10] of the members of  Meralco’s task force testifying that Gala and two other linemen knew Llanes.

          The CA modified the NLRC decision of May 2, 2008^[11][11] and ordered Gala’s reinstatement with full backwages and other benefits. The CA also denied Meralco’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.^[12][12]

The Petition

          The petition is anchored on the ground that the CA seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in –

1. ruling that Gala was illegally dismissed; and
2. directing Gala’s reinstatement despite his probationary status.

Meralco faults the CA for not giving credit to its witnesses Aguilar, Dola and Riano, and instead treated their joint affidavit (Samasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay)  as  inconclusive  to  establish  Gala’s participation in  the  pilferage  of  company  property  on May 25, 2006. It submits that the affidavit of the three Meralco employees disproves the CA’s findings, considering that their statements were based on their first-hand account of the incident during their day-long surveillance onMay 25, 2006. It points out  that  the  three  Meralco  employees  categorically  stated  that  all  of the company’s foremen and linemen present at that time, including Gala, had  knowledge of the pilferage that was happening at the time. According to Aguilar, Dola and Riano, the trucks’ crew, including Gala, was familiar with Llanes who acted as if his presence — particularly, that of freely collecting materials and supplies — was a regular occurrence during their operations.

Meralco maintains that Gala himself admitted in his own testimony^[13][13] that he had been familiar with Llanes even before the May 25, 2006 incident where he saw Zuñiga, the foreman of Truck No. 1837, conversing with Llanes.  Meralco submits that Gala’s admission, instead of demonstrating “his feigned innocence,”^[14][14] even highlights his guilt, especially considering that by design, his misfeasance assisted Llanes in pilfering company property; Gala neither intervened to stop Llanes, nor did he report the incident to the Meralco management.

Meralco posits that because of his undeniable knowledge of, if not participation in, the pilferage activities done by their group, the company was well within its right in terminating his employment as a probationary employee for his failure to meet the basic standards for his regularization. The standards, it points out, were duly explained to him and outlined in his probationary employment contract. For this reason and due to the expiration of Gala’s probationary employment, the CA should not have ordered his reinstatement with full backwages.

Finally, Meralco argues that even if Gala was illegally dismissed, he was entitled to just his backwages for the unexpired portion of his employment contract with the company.

Gala’s Case

        By way of his Comment (to the Petition) dated September 2, 2010,^[15][15]  Gala asks for a denial of the petition because of (1) serious and fatal infirmities in the petition; (2) unreliable statements of Meralco’s witnesses; and (3) clear lack of basis to support the termination of his employment.

        Gala contends, in regard to the alleged procedural defects of the petition, that the “Verification and Certification,” “Secretary’s Certificate” and “Affidavit of Service” do not contain the details of the Community or Residence Tax Certificates of the affiants, in violation of Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 465 (an Act to Impose a Residence Tax). Additionally, the lawyers who signed the petition failed to indicate their updated Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) certificate numbers, in violation of the rules.

        With respect to the merits of the case, Gala bewails Meralco’s reliance on the joint affidavit^[16][16] of Aguilar, Dola and Riano not only because it was presented for the first time on appeal to the CA, but also because it was a mere afterthought. He explains that Aguilar and Dola were the very same persons who executed a much earlier sworn statement or transcription dated July 7, 2006. This earlier statement did not even mention Gala, but the later joint affidavit “splashes GALA’s name in a desperate attempt to link him to an imagined wrongdoing.”^[17][17]

        Zeroing in on what he believes as lack of credibility of Meralco’s evidence, Gala posits that there is clear lack of basis for the termination of his employment. Thus, he wonders why Meralco did not present as evidence the video footage of the entire incident which it claims exists. He suspects that the footage was adverse to Meralco’s position in the case.

        Gala adds that the allegations of a “reported pilferage” or “rampant theft or pilferage” committed prior toMay 25, 2006by his superiors were  not established, for even the labor arbiter did not make a finding on the foremen’s involvement in the incident. He stresses that the same is true in his case as there is no proof of his participation in the pilferage.

        Gala further submits that even if he saw Llanes on May 25, 2006 at about the time of the occurrence of the pilferage near or around the Meralco trucks, he was not aware that a wrongdoing was being committed or was about to be committed. He points out at that precise time, his superiors were much nearer to the trucks than he as he was among the crew digging a hole.  He presumed at the time that his own superiors, being the more senior employees, could be trusted to protect company property.

        Finally, Gala posits that his reinstatement with full backwages is but a consequence of the illegality of his dismissal. He argues that even if he was on probation, he is entitled to security of tenure. Citing Philippine Manpower Services, Inc. v. NLRC,^[18][18] he claims that in the absence of any justification for the termination of his probationary employment, he is entitled to continued employment even beyond the probationary period.

The Court’s Ruling

The procedural issue

        Gala would want the petition to be dismissed outright on procedural grounds, claiming that the “Verification and Certification,” “Secretary’s Certificate” and “Affidavit of Service” accompanying the petition do not contain the details of the Community Tax Certificates of the affiants, and that the lawyers who signed the petition failed to indicate their updated MCLE certificate numbers, in violation of existing rules.

We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed.^[19][19] In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union,^[20][20] “the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice.”

The substantive aspect of the case

        We find merit in the petition.

Contrary to the conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, there is substantial evidence supporting Meralco’s position that Gala had become unfit to continue his employment with the company. Gala was found, after an administrative investigation, to have failed to meet the standards expected of him to become a regular employee and this failure was mainly due to his “undeniable knowledge, if not participation, in the pilferage activities done by their group, all to the prejudice of the Company’s interests.”^[21][21]

        Gala insists that he cannot be sanctioned for the theft of company property onMay 25, 2006. He maintains that he had no direct participation in the incident and that he was not aware that an illegal activity was going on as he was at some distance from the trucks when the alleged theft was being committed. He adds that he did not call the attention of the foremen because he was a mere lineman and he was focused on what he was doing at the time. He argues that in any event, his mere presence in the area was not enough to make him a conspirator in the commission of the pilferage.

        Gala misses the point. He forgets that as a probationary employee, his overall job performance and his behavior were being monitored and measured in accordance with the standards (i.e., the terms and conditions) laid down in his probationary employment agreement.^[22][22] Under paragraph 8 of the agreement, he was subject to strict compliance with, and non-violation of the Company Code on Employee Discipline, Safety Code, rules and regulations and existing policies. Par. 10 required him to observe at all times the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, free from any form of conflict or contradicting with his own personal interest.

        The evidence on record established Gala’s presence in the worksite where the pilferage of company property happened. It also established that it was not only on May 25, 2006that Llanes, the pilferer, had been seen during a Meralco operation. He had been previously noticed by Meralco employees, including Gala (based on his admission),^[23][23] in past operations. If Gala had seen Llanes in earlier projects or operations of the company, it is incredulous for him to say that he did not know why Llanes was there or what Zuñiga and Llanes were talking about.  To our mind, the Meralco crew (the foremen and the linemen) allowed or could have even asked Llanes to be there during their operations for one and only purpose — to serve as their conduit for pilfered company supplies to be sold to ready buyers outside Meralco worksites.

        The familiarity of the Meralco crew with Llanes, a non-Meralco employee who had been present in Meralco field operations, does not contradict at all but rather support the Meralco submission that there had been “reported pilferage” or “rampant theft,” by the crew, of company property even before May 25, 2006. Gala downplays this particular point with the argument that the labor arbiter made no such finding as she merely assumed it to be a fact,^[24][24] her only “basis” being the statement that “may natanggap na balita na ang mga crew na ito ay palagiang hindi nagsasauli ng mga electric facilities na kanilang ginagamit o pinapalitan bagkus ito ay ibinenta palabas.”^[25][25] Gala impugns the statement as hearsay. He also wonders why Meralco’s supposed “video footage” of  the incident onMay 25, 2006 was never presented in evidence.

        The established fact that Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, was often seen during company operations, conversing with the foremen, for reason or reasons connected with the ongoing company operations, gives rise to the question: what was he doing there? Apparently, he had been visiting  Meralco worksites, at least in the Valenzuela Sector, not simply to socialize, but to do something else. As testified to by witnesses, he was picking up unused supplies and materials that were not returned to the company. From these factual premises, it is not hard to conclude that this activity was for the mutual pecuniary benefit of himself and the crew who tolerated the practice. For one working at the scene who had seen or who had shown familiarity with Llanes (a non-Meralco employee), not to have known the reason for his presence is to disregard the obvious, or at least the very suspicious.

        We consider, too, and we find credible the company submission that the Meralco crew who worked at the Pacheco Subdivision inValenzuelaCityonMay 25, 2006had not been returning unused supplies and materials, to the prejudice of the company. From all these, the allegedly hearsay evidence that is not competent in judicial proceedings (as noted above), takes on special meaning and relevance.

With respect to the video footage of the May 25, 2006incident, Gala himself admitted that he viewed the tape during the administrative investigation, particularly in connection with the accusation against him that he allowed Llanes (binatilyong may kapansanan sa bibig) to board the Meralco trucks.^[26][26] The choice of evidence belongs to a party and the mere fact that the video was shown to Gala indicates that the video was not an evidence that Meralco was trying to suppress. Gala could have, if he had wanted to, served a subpoena for the production of the video footage as evidence. The fact that he did not does not strengthen his case nor weaken the case of Meralco.

        On the whole, the totality of the circumstances obtaining in the case convinces us that Gala could not but have knowledge of the pilferage of company electrical supplies on May 25, 2006; he was complicit in its commission, if not by direct participation, certainly, by his inaction while it was being perpetrated and by not reporting the incident to company authorities. Thus, we find substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Gala does not deserve to remain in Meralco’s employ as a regular employee. He violated his probationary employment agreement, especially the requirement for him “to observe at all times the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the performance of their duties and responsibilities[.]”^[27][27] He failed to qualify as a regular employee.^[28][28]      

        For ignoring the evidence in this case, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and, in sustaining the NLRC, the CA committed a reversible error.

        WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

        SO ORDERED.

                                      ARTURO D. BRION

                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                RENATO C. CORONA

                                                 Chief Justice

CASE 2012-0024: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BEN RUBIO y ACOSTA (G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012,  VELASCO, JR., J) SUBJECT: RAPE; INACCURACIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN RAPE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY EXPECTED; TRIAL COURT’S ASSESSMENT BINDING; ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED RAPE; APPROPRIATE MORAL DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. RUBIO)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03489 is hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is increased to PhP 75,000 and exemplary damages to      PhP 30,000. The civil indemnity and damages shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.^[1][40] Costs against accused-appellant.

          SO ORDERED.

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Republic of thePhilippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

         This is an appeal from the July 26, 2010 Decision^[2][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03489, which affirmed in toto the June 30, 2008 Decision^[3][2] in Criminal Case No. 117310-H of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused Ben Rubio y Acosta (Rubio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

On January 6, 2006, Rubio was charged before the RTC with qualified rape. The accusatory portion of the Information provides:

On or about January 8, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the defendant, being her father, with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA],^[4][3] 15 years old, against her will and consent.

Contrary to Law.^[5][4]

          Upon arraignment, Rubio pleaded “not guilty.” During the pre-trial conference, Rubio admitted being the father of private complainant AAA and that she was under eighteen (18) years of age when the alleged rape happened. Trial ensued.

          Through the testimony of AAA, it was established that on January 8, 2000 at around two o’clock in the afternoon, she was sleeping inside their house with her two-year old sister and three-year old brother, when the accused approached her and removed her shorts and panty. AAA tried to push him away but he was too strong, and he succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. AAA continued resisting despite being afraid that the accused would hurt her. After some time, the accused ejaculated outside her vagina.

          At around four o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, AAA went to a neighbor, a certain “Kuya Gene” who is a Barangay Tanod, and informed him that she was raped by her own father. They then proceeded to the Barangay Hall and to the Police Headquarters to file a complaint against her father.^[6][5]

          AAA further testified that she did not tell her mother about the incident, because she knew the latter would not believe her. AAA averred that she was first raped by her father in 1993, and when she reported this to her mother, she was casually told to forget about the incident, because it would bring shame to their family.^[7][6]

          Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, a medico-legal expert who examined the private complainant after the alleged rape incident, testified that he found a shallow-healed laceration at a three o’clock position as well as a deep-healed laceration at a six o’clock position on the complainant’s labia minora which showed that she had been subjected to numerous sexual assaults.^[8][7]

          For the defense, Rubio took the witness stand. He described the place where the alleged rape occurred as a small house made of wood with one room, and a floor area of around 10 x 12 meters. At that time, three families were occupying the house including the complainant’s grandmother, aunt, uncle, and cousin. Considering the cramped space, the accused asserted that if anything happened within its confines, such as rape, it could be easily noticed by other persons in the room. He also declared that AAA, sometime in 1991, threatened to kill him because of his alleged womanizing.^[9][8]

Rulings of the RTC and the CA

          On June 30, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty of qualified rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the defendant BEN RUBIO y ACOSTA beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby meted out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole. Accused is likewise ordered to pay the victim the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages without necessity of proving the same. An amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is also in order to deter fathers with perverse behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.

The Warden of Nagpayong City Jail,PasigCity, Metro Manila is hereby directed to immediately transfer the defendant to the Bureau of Corrections, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa.

SO ORDERED.^[10][9]

            Rubio filed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The decretal portion of the July 26, 2010 Decision of the CA reads:

            WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.^[11][10]

Hence, We have this appeal.  The Office of the Solicitor General, for the People and by Manifestation and Motion, opted not to file a supplemental brief.  Accused-appellant entered a similar manifestation.   Thus, in resolving the instant appeal, We consider the issues and arguments he earlier raised in his Brief for the Accused-Appellant before the CA.

Accused-appellant raises the following issues for Our consideration:

1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED; AND

II.         THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE.^[12][11]

Our Ruling

          We uphold the ruling of the CA.

Guiding Principles in Rape Cases

          In deciding rape cases, We are guided by these three well-entrenched principles:

(a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.^[13][12]

As a result of these guiding principles, the credibility of the victim becomes the single most important issue.^[14][13]

Core Issue: Credibility of the Victim-Complainant

          When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.^[15][14] The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.^[16][15] As this Court held in People v. Gabrino:

We have held time and again that “the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality.”  As We have reiterated in the recent People v. Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses.  This is clearly because the judge in the trial court was the one who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during trial.  Accordingly, the trial court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.^[17][16]

Accused-appellant alleges that the testimony of the victim is replete with material inconsistencies and questions her credibility, to wit:

1. AAA first testified that she returned to their house on September 15, 1997^[18][17] but during cross-examination she stated that she returned to the house of her parents in 1999.^[19][18]

1. AAA alleged at one point that the accused-appellant had physically beaten her once prior to the sexual assault subject of the instant case^[20][19] but she then categorically stated that accused-appellant never laid a hand on her.^[21][20]

1. AAA at first alleged that there was a store in their house at the time of the rape,^[22][21] but later said it was already closed.^[23][22]

Although there are inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the rape victim’s testimony are to be expected.^[24][23] This Court finds that these inconsistencies are not material to the instant case. We held, “Rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that they might in fact be trying to obliterate it from their memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.”^[25][24]

There is no showing that the trial court’s findings were tainted with arbitrariness or oversight; hence, the trial court’s finding as to the credibility of the victim is final and binding on this Court.

Furthermore, it bears stressing that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. In People v. Perez, the Court aptly held:

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.^[26][25]

Elements of Qualified Rape Duly Proved

The elements of rape as provided in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledgeof a woman under any of the following circumstances:
   
   
   
   1. Through force, threat or intimidation;
   
   
   2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
   
   
   3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
   
   
   4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)

And one of the aggravating circumstances that would qualify the crime and raise the penalty to death is:

ART. 266-B. Penalties –

x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1)      When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)

          The testimony of the victim-complainant is as follows:

Q:        On January 8, 2000 at about 2 o`clock in the afternoon, do you recall where you were?

A:         Yes, Sir.

Q:        Where were you then at the said date and time?

A:         I was at our room, sir.

Q:        What were you doing in your room at that time?

A:         I was sleeping, sir.

Q:        While you were sleeping was there anything unusual that happened?

x x x x

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:        What was that?

A:         Ben Rubio removed my shorts and my panty, sir.

Q:        What did you do when Ben Rubio removed your shorts and your panty?

A:         I pushed him, sir.

Q:        How did you know that it was Ben Rubio who removed your shorts and panty when you said you were sleeping at that time?

A:         When I woke up he was already in front of me, he was laying [sic] face down, sir.

Q:        You said Ben Rubio, if he is inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:        Will you point to him?

Interpreter:

            The witness pointed to the only accused seated on the first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants, who, when asked, identified himself as Ben Rubio.

Q:        You said that when Ben Rubio removed your shorts and panty you pushed him, were you able to push him?

A:         No, sir because he was stronger than me.

            Q:        Was he able to remove your shorts and panty?

            A:         Yes, sir.

Q:        What happened after he was able to remove your shorts and panty?

A:         He inserted his penis inside my vagina, sir.

Q:        What did you do when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A:         I resisted, sir.

Q:        How did you resist?

A:         I moved my body but I was not able to resist because he was stronger than me, sir.

Q:        Did you shout?

A:         No, sir.

Q:        Why?

A:         Because if I shout he would hurt me, sir.^[27][26]

The testimony of AAA stated that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with her, and, thus, being AAA’s father, he is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation.  The fear towards her father was more than enough to intimidate her to submit to his lewd advances without shouting for help.^[28][27]

The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to convict.^[29][28] The complainant’s testimony––if credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things––may suffice to support a conviction of rape.^[30][29] This Court finds that the testimony of AAA is straightforward and convincing with no inconsistency with regard to the material elements of the crime of rape.

Furthermore, the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were stipulated upon during pre-trial; thus, there is no further need to prove them during trial.

          Accused-appellant seeks to deny the charge against him by stating that the victim did not shout during the alleged bestial act. The Court has declared repeatedly that “[f]ailure to shout or offer tenacious resistance [does] not make voluntary [the victim’s] submission to [the perpetrator’s] lust. Besides, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape.”^[31][30]

          Accused-appellant further claims that it is unlikely that rape was committed, because the house where it allegedly occurred only has one room and was then being occupied by three families. This is of no consequence. This Court has reiterated that lust is no respecter of time and place.^[32][31] Rape may even be committed in the same room where other family members also sleep.^[33][32] Besides, it must be noted that the rape occurred in the early afternoon and not in the evening when the rest of the occupants are presumably sleeping in the cramped space.

Medical Findings Corroborate Rape

          Accused-appellant also questions the conclusion of the medical examination done by Dr. Reyes. He alleges that since the hymenal lacerations have already healed, then these could not have been due to what AAA claimed, and that even if there were lacerations, it could not be determined if he was the one who caused them.

          We are not convinced.

We must bear in mind that “a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctor’s certificate is merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape.”^[34][33]

The presence of healed or fresh hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.^[35][34] However, it is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.^[36][35] Thus, the findings of Dr. Reyes corroborate and support the testimony of AAA.

Proper Penalties

          Since all the elements of qualified rape were duly alleged and proved during the trial, the proper penalty should be death according to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, the penalty to be meted out should be reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

The trial court correctly awarded PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, but the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded has to be modified consonant to current jurisprudence. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.^[37][36] Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case without need of further proof other than the fact of its commission, for it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.^[38][37] According to prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be PhP 75,000.^[39][38] Likewise, exemplary damages should have been PhP 30,000, and this is awarded in order to serve as public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse.^[40][39]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03489 is hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is increased to PhP 75,000 and exemplary damages to      PhP 30,000. The civil indemnity and damages shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.^[41][40] Costs against accused-appellant.

          SO ORDERED.

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD                            MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

     Associate Justice                                                 Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

       Associate Justice

          Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                            Chief Justice                                                                                                                                             

CASE 2012-0023: JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON A. LOYOLA,   VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND MICHAEL ALUNAN (G.R. NO. 152272,       MARCH 5, 2012, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: HOW CAUSE OF ACTION IS DETERMINED; ELEMENTS OF CLASS SUIT; REQUIREMENTS FOR WRIT OF PRELIM INJUNCTION. (BRIEF TITLE: JUANA COMPLEX VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND)

==================

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

==================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

X ————————————————————————————– X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31, 2001 Decision^[1][1] and February 21, 2002 Resolution^[2][2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999 Order^[3][3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order^[4][4] denying the motion to dismiss.

The Facts:

On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint^[5][5] for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).

The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.

Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use ofLa Paz Road.

On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. ^[6][6]

Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.

 On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss^[7][7]  arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment^[8][8] on the motion to dismiss to which respondents filed a reply.^[9][9] 

On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order ^[10][10] granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.

On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration^[11][11] arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their opposition to the motion.^[12][12]

The RTC then issued itsJune 16, 2000Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.

Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.^[13][13]

OnJuly 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order datedMarch 3, 1999granting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order datedJune 16, 2000denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.

SO ORDERED.^[14][14]

The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right overLa Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.

Hence, these petitions for review.

In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following issues:

(A)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.

(B)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.^[15][15]

In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition on the following issues:

I.

The Court of Appeals’ declaration that respondents’ Complaint states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

II.

The Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that respondents’ complaint was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

III.

The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence.^[16][16]

JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CA’s pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to the San Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.

JCHA, et al. argue thatLa Paz Roadhas attained the status and character of a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way. They point out thatLa Paz Roadis the widest road in the neighborhood used by motorists in going toHalang Roadand in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no other road as wide asLa Paz Roadexisting in the vicinity. For residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang is alongRosario AvenuejoiningLa Paz Road.

Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Biñan, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is undeniable.

In their Memorandum,^[17][17] Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name ofLa Paz. The purpose of constructingLa Paz Road was to provide a passageway forLa Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Biñan. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. TheLa Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently,La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real properties in Biñan, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock,La Paz contributed some of its real properties to theMunicipality ofBiñan, including the properties constitutingLa Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.

Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right overLa Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to such right. According to them,La Paz Roadis a torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it. They claim thatLa Paz Roadis a private property registered under the name ofLa Pazand the beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to FEEC whenLa Pazjoined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.

Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading.

They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of interest overLa Paz Road. They claim that the excavation ofLa Paz Roadwould not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of  action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.  

The Court’s Ruling

          The issues for the Court’s resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(1)     the legal right of the plaintiff,

(2)     the correlative obligation of the defendant, and

(3)     the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.^[18][18]

The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant.^[19][19]  Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.^[20][20]  To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered.^[21][21] 

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.^[22][22] Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.^[23][23]

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein. 

With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. 

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:  1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.^[24][24] 

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who useLa Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of theLa Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating theLa Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:  

 (a)       That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b)       That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c)        That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.  

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.^[25][25]  The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.^[26][26]  For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive.^[27][27] This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.^[28][28]

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use ofLa Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right over theLa Paz Road– which was sought to be protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported right over theLa Paz Roadon the bare allegation that they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.

Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.

Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct from the trial on the merits of the main case. ^[29][29] The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or complete for only a “sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.^[30][30] There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ.^[31][31] Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one is different from that for the other.^[32][32]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                                JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

                                                           Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                      ROBERTO A. ABAD

            Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice    

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                         Associate Justice

                                                                 Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                               Chief Justice