J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2012-0071: APO CHEMICAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and MICHAEL CHENG VS. RONALDO A. BIDES (G.R. NO. 186002, 19 SEPTEMBER 2012, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT/S: WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY GIVEN IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT?; THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS; HOW MUCH SHOULD BE GIVEN AS SEPARATION PAY?  (BRIEF TITLE: APO CHEMICAL VS. BIDES).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed October 23, 2008 Decision and January 12, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91323, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

CAN THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS?

AS A RULE NO BECAUSE IT IS A FACTUAL QUESTION.

BUT IT CAN IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS EQUITY  JURISDICTION WHEN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITER AND THE NLRC ARE CONFLICTING AS IN THIS CASE.

As the records bear out, the LA found that patent animosity existed between ACMC and Bides considering the confrontation that took place between the latter and Matthew. This confrontation coupled with Bides’ refusal to be reinstated led to the LA’s finding of “strained relations” necessitating an award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The NLRC, on the other hand, deleted the said award for lack of factual basis. The CA reinstated the LA’s finding of “strained relations” and explained that toomuch enmity had developed between ACMC and Bides that necessarily barred the latter’s reinstatement.

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WHAT IS REALLY THE RULE: REINSTATEMENT OR SEPARATION PAY?

THE RULE IS REINSTATEMENT.

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WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY APPLICABLE?

WHEN  THERE IS “STRAINED RELATIONS”.

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WHEN IS THERE “STRAINED RELATIONS”?

WHEN IT IS LIKELY THAT, IF REINSTATED, AN ATMOSPHERE OF ANTIPATHY AND ANTAGONISM WOULD BE GENERATED AS TO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY OF THE EMPLOYEE CONCERNED.

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WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS?

UNDER THIS DOCTRINE THE PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY IS CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO REINSTATEMENT WHEN THE LATTER OPTION IS NO LONGER DESIRABLE OR VIABLE.

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WHAT IS THE BENEFIT THAT CAN BE DERIVED FROM SUCH DOCTRINE?

ON ONE HAND, SUCH PAYMENT LIBERATES THE EMPLOYEE FROM WHAT COULD BE A HIGHLY OPPRESSIVE WORK ENVIRONMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT RELEASES THE EMPLOYER FROM THE GROSSLY UNPALATABLE OBLIGATION OF MAINTAINING IN ITS EMPLOY A WORKER IT COULD NO LONGER TRUST.

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SUPPOSE THE EMPLOYEE ASKS FOR SEPARATION INSTEAD OF REINSTATEMENT. CAN THE EMPLOYER INSISTS ON REINSTATEMENT.

NO. IF THE EMPLOYEE DECIDES NOT TO BE REINSTATED AND DEMANDS FOR SEPARATION PAY, THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS APPLIES.

Moreover, the doctrine of strained relations has been made applicable to cases where the employee decides not to be reinstated and demands for separation pay.

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HOW MUCH SHOULD BE THE  SEPARATION PAY?

IN POLYFOAM-RGC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION V. CONCEPCION, 22 THE COURT RULED THAT “IF REINSTATEMENT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE X X X, SEPARATION PAY EQUIVALENT TO ONE MONTH SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE SHALL BE AWARDED AS AN ALTERNATIVE.”

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BUT IN THIS CASE THE CA AWARDED ONLY ONE HALF MONTH PAY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE. SHALL IT BE INCREASED TO ONE MONTH PER YEAR OF SERVICE?

NO. CONSIDERING, HOWEVER, THAT BIDES DID NOT QUESTION THAT PORTION OF THE CA DECISION, THE COURT IS OF THE VIEW THAT HE WAS SATISFIED.

TO READ THE WHOLE DECISION PLEASE DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2012-0071-APO CHEMICAL

CASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL. (G.R. No. 196231) WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 196232) (04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA)

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 DISPOSITIVE:

      “WHEREFORE,  in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio  A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages  corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed  with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.

In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against  Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman  Act is hereby DENIED.

         SO ORDERED.”

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

DOES THE OFFICE OF THE  PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?

YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

x x x x

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

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WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT?

NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.

PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.

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Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.

To read the full DECISION please download the file below:

SCD-2012-0070-GONZALES

CASE 2012-0069: HEIRS OF  ROGELIO ISIP, SR., NAMELY: CELEDONIA, ROLANDO, ROGELIO, .JR., ALL SURNAMED ISIP, AND IRENE ISIP-SILVESTRE, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROLANDO ISIP VS. RODOLFO QUINTOS, RODOLFO DE GUZMAN AND ISAGANI ISIP, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME RONIRO ENTERPRISES COMPANY (G.R. NO. 172008, 01 AUGUST 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT/S: FORCIBLE ENTRY, FACTS NOT TRIED CANNOT BE TAKEN UP ON APPEAL. (BRIEF TITLE: HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP SR. VS. QUINTOS ET AL.)

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

PONTINO OWNS A LOT. ROGELIO SR. TOOK POSESSION OF THE LOT. PONTINO SOLD HIS  LOT TO DATU BUT DATU FAILED TO PAY THE FULL PRICE. DESPITE NON-PAYMENT OF THE FULL PRICE, DATU SOLD THE LOT TO TOYO KEIKI WHO EMPLOYED ROGELIO SR.  TO MANAGE ITS WATER SYSTEM PUT UP IN SAID LOT. THE LOT WAS ULTIMATELY SOLD FROM PONTINO  TO DE GUZMAN. DE GUZMAN WITH RESPONDENTS PUT UP THE RONIRO ENTERPRISES WHICH TOOK THE WATER SYSTEM.   ROGELIO SR. DIED BUT HIS HEIRS WERE STILL OCCUPYING THE LOT. RESPONDENTS ENTICED THE HEIRS TO PUT UP A CAR REPAIR SHOP TO UNDERTAKE  REPAIRS FOR AN INSURANCE COMPANY. ON THE PRETEXT BY RESPONDENTS THAT DURING AN INSPECTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY THE HEIRS MUST FIRST VACATE THE PROPERTY, THE HEIRS VACATED THE PROPERTY. WHEN THEY CAME BACK THEY WERE NO LONGER ALLOWED BY RESPONDENTS TO ENTER THE PREMISES.  PETITIONER FILED AN EJECTMENT CASE ON GROUND OF FORCIBLE ENTRY.

PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT RESPONDENTS DEPRIVED THEM OF THE POSSESSION OF THEIR LOT THROUGH DECEIT, STRATEGY, AND STEALTH. THEY AVER THAT RESPONDENTS DECEIVED THEM TO TEMPORARILY VACATE THE PREMISES ON THE PRETEXT THAT THEY MUST CONVINCE THE INSURANCE INSPECTORS THAT THE PREMISES ARE BEING USED SOLELY FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. THEY WERE THUS ALLEGEDLY TRICKED TO MOVE OUT AND ONCE THE RESPONDENTS ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL, THEY WERE PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE PREMISES BY POSTING SECURITY GUARDS AT THE GATES.

DID RESPONDENTS COMMIT FORCIBLE ENTRY?

NO. THERE IS FORCIBLE ENTRY IF POSSESSION IS ILLEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING. RESPONDENTS HAVE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. THEIR POSSESSION OF THE  PROPERTY IS THEREFORE NOT ILLEGAL. THUS, THEY DID NOT COMMIT FORCIBLE ENTRY DESPITE THEIR ALLEGED STRATEGY.

Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible entry may be filed by, “a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth x x x.” In cases of forcible entry, “the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.”

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PETITIONERS FURTHER ASSERT THAT THE LOT THEY OCCUPY IS DIFFERENT FROM THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE RESPONDENTS. THEY CLAIM THAT THEIR LOT IS LOCATED AT NO. 2, BARRAMEDA ST., UPPER BICUTAN, TAGUIG WHILE THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE RESPONDENTS IS LOCATED IN LOWER BICUTAN.

CAN SC INQUIRE INTO SUCH FACT?

NO. THE POINT RAISED BY THE [PETITIONERS] X X X IN RESPECT OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE CONTROVERSY MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ANYMORE AT THIS POINT SINCE IT WAS NEVER RAISED AS AN ISSUE IN THEIR APPEAL, NAY EVEN WHEN THE CASE WAS HEARD BY THE COURT A QUO. THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT  A TRIER OF FACTS. ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE ENTERTAINED SUBJECT ONLY TO CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, NONE OF WHICH ARE PRESENT IN THE INSTANT PETITION.

IT IS THE FUNCTION OF TRIAL COURTS TO RESOLVE ACTUAL ISSUES WHOSE FINDINGS ON THESE MATTERS ARE ACCORDED RESPECT AND CONSIDERED BINDING BY THE SUPREME COURT ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELLATE COURT. IN THIS CASE, THE METC, THE RTC AND THE CA ARE ONE IN THEIR FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT FORCIBLY ENTER THE SUBJECT PREMISES. ALL THREE TRIBUNALS FOUND THAT RESPONDENTS’ POSSESSION IS LAWFUL AND LEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING.

TO READ THE CASE PLEASE DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW:

SCD-2012-0069-ISIP-AUG 2102