Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES


CASE 2013-0021: FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL ORPORATION, PETITIONER, -VERSUS- RAQUEL M. CALIMBAS AND LUISA P. MAHILOM, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 179256, 10 JULY 2013, PERALTA J.) SUBJECT/S: LABOR ONLY CONTRACTING; PERMISSIBLE JOB CONTRACTING; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. (BRIEF TITLE: FIRST PHIL INDUSTRIAL VS. CALIMBAS ET AL.)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated March 6, 2007 and Resolution dated August 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90527 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondents shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

FIRST PHIL INDUSTRIAL ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS WERE THE EMPLOYEES OF DGMS WHO ACTED AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO. DGMS IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT JOB CONTRACTOR BUT WAS ENGAGED IN LABOR ONLY CONTRACTING.

 

PROOFS: THEY HAVE NO SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL AND HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EQUIPMENT IN THE FORM OF TOOLS, EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY.

 

Given the foregoing standards, we sustain the findings of the CA that respondents are petitioner’s employees and that DGMS is engaged in labor only contracting.

 

First, in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,12 this Court categorically stated that the actual paid-in capital of P75,000.00 could not be considered as substantial capital. Thus, DGMS’s actual paid-in capital in the amount of P75,000.00 does not constitute substantial capital essential to carry out its business as an independent job contractor. In spite of its bare assertion that the Vinoya case does not apply in the present case, DGMS has not shown any serious and cogent reason to disregard the ruling in the aforementioned case. Records likewise reveal that DGMS has no substantial equipment in the form of tools, equipment and machinery. As a matter of fact, respondents were using office equipment and materials owned by petitioner while they were rendering their services at its offices.

 

Second, petitioner exercised the power of control and supervision over The respondents. As aptly observed by the CA, “the daily time records of respondents even had to be countersigned by the officials of petitioner to check whether they had worked during the hours declared therein.

 

Furthermore, the fact that DGMS did not assign representatives to supervise over respondents’ work in petitioner’s company tends to disprove the independence of DGMS. It is axiomatic that the test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subjected to the control of the employer, except only to the results of the work. Obviously, on this score alone, petitioner cannot rightly claim that DGMS was an independent job contractor inasmuch as respondents were subjected to the control and supervision of petitioner while they were performing their jobs.”13

 

Third, also worth stressing are the points highlighted by respondents: (1) Respondents worked only at petitioner’s offices for an uninterrupted period of five years, occupying the same position at the same department under the supervision of company officials; (2) Three weeks ahead of the termination letters issued by DGMS, petitioner’s HR Manager Lorna Young notified respondents, in a closed-door meeting, that their services to the company would be terminated by July 31, 2001; (3) In the termination letters prepared by DGMS, it was even stressed that the said termination letters will formalize the verbal notice given by petitioner’s HR Administration personnel; (4) The direct superiors of respondents were managerial employees of petitioner, and had direct control over all the work-related activities of the latter. This control included the supervision of respondents’ performance of their work and their compliance with petitioner’s company policies and procedures. DGMS, on the other hand, never maintained any representative at the petitioner’s office to oversee the work of respondents.

 

All told, an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and respondents. And having served for almost five years at petitioner’s company, respondents had already attained the status of regular employees.

 

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WERE RESPONDENTS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED?

 

YES. PETITIONER FAILED TO FOLLOW BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW ANY VALID OR JUST CAUSE UNDER THE LABOR CODE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF SERVICES. THEY ALSO FAILED TO NOTIFY RESPONDENTS REGARDING THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS WHICH LED TO THEIR TERMINATION.

 

In the present case, petitioners failed to show any valid or just cause under the Labor Code on which it may justify the termination of services of respondents. Also, apart from notifying that their services had already been terminated, petitioner failed to comply with the rudimentary requirement of notifying respondents regarding the acts or omissions which led to the termination of their services as well as giving them an ample opportunity to contest the legality of their dismissal. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements of termination of employment under the Labor Code, respondents’ dismissal is tainted with illegality.

 

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SUPPOSE AN EMPLOYER ENGAGES A CONTRACTOR AND THE CONTRACTOR FAILS TO PAY THE WAGES OF HIS EMPLOYEES WHAT IF ANY IS THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER?

 

THE EMPLOYER SHALL BE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH HIS CONTRACTOR TO SUCH EMPLOYEES TO THE EXTENT OF THE WORK PERFORMED UNDER THE CONTRACT, IN THE SAME MANNER AND EXTENT THAT HE IS LIABLE TO EMPLOYEES DIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY HIM.

 

Article 106. Contractor or subcontractor. – Whenever an

employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

 

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.

 

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IS CONTRACTING-OUT OF LABOR ILLEGAL?

 

PER SE IT IS NOT ILLEGAL. ONLY REGULATED TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS.  IT CAN BE LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING OR JOB CONTRACTING. LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING IS PROHIBITED. JOB CONTRACTING IS REGULATED.

 

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under the Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and jobcontracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.

 

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WHEN IS THERE LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING?

 

WHEN THE  PERSON SUPPLYING WORKERS TO AN EMPLOYER:

 

A)  DOES NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL OR INVESTMENT IN THE FORM OF TOOLS, EQUIPMENT, MACHINERIES, WORK PREMISES, AMONG OTHERS; AND

 

B) THE WORKERS RECRUITED AND PLACED BY SUCH PERSON ARE PERFORMING ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PRINCIPAL BUSINESS OF SUCH EMPLOYER.

 

There is “labor-only” contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

 

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WHEN IS JOB CONTRACTING PERMISSIBLE?

 

IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE MET:

 

(1) THE CONTRACTOR CARRIES ON AN INDEPENDENT BUSINESS AND UNDERTAKES THE CONTRACT WORK ON HIS OWN ACCOUNT UNDER HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY ACCORDING TO HIS OWN MANNER AND METHOD, FREE FROM THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF HIS EMPLOYER OR PRINCIPAL IN ALL MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK EXCEPT AS TO THE RESULTS THEREOF; AND

 

(2) THE CONTRACTOR HAS SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL OR INVESTMENT IN THE FORM OF TOOLS, EQUIPMENT, MACHINERIES, WORK PREMISES, AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH ARE NECESSARY IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS BUSINESS.

 

Sec. 8. Job contracting. – There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:

 

(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and

 

(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. (RULES)

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SC-2013-0021-JULY 2013 – FIRST PHIL INDUSTRIAL – B

CASE 2013-0020: ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND MINERALS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, -VERSUS- TUSCAN REAL TV, INC., RESPONDENT. (G.R. NO. 195481, 10 JULY 2013, ABAD J.) SUBJECT/S: BROKER’S COMMISSION; PRINCIPLE OF PROCURING CAUSE. (BRIEF TITLE: ORIENTAL PETROLIUM VS. TUSCAN REALTY)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 86417 dated August II, 2010.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

TUSCAN REALTY WAS ENGAGED BY ORIENTAL PETROLEUM TO LOOK FOR BUYERS FOR ITS CONDOMINIUM UNITS IN CORINTHIAN PLAZA. TUSCAN INTRODUCED GATEWAY TO ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND A CONTRACT TO SELL WAS EXECUTED. HOWEVER GATEWAY ASSIGNED ITS RIGHT UNDER THE CONTRACT TO SELL IN FAVOR OF ANCHETA WHO ULTIMATELY BOUGHT THE PROPERTY. IS TUSCAN ENTITLED TO BROKER’S COMMISSION?

 

YES.

 

BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF “PROCURING CAUSE”.

 

IT WAS ON ACCOUNT OF TUSCAN REALTY’S EFFORT THAT ORIENTAL PETROLEUM GOT CONNECTED TO GATEWAY, THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER, RESULTING IN THE LATTER TWO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT TO SELL INVOLVING THE TWO CONDOMINIUM UNITS. ALTHOUGH GATEWAY TURNED AROUND AND SOLD THE CONDOMINIUM UNITS TO ANCHETA, THE FACT IS THAT SUCH ULTIMATE SALE COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT GATEWAY’S INDISPENSABLE INTERVENTION AS INTERMEDIATE BUYER.

 

 

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WHAT IS MEANT BY “PROCURING CAUSE”?

 

THE TERM “PROCURING CAUSE” REFERS TO A CAUSE WHICH STARTS A SERIES OF EVENTS AND RESULTS, WITHOUT BREAK IN THEIR CONTINUITY, IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A BROKER’S PRIME OBJECTIVE OF PRODUCING A PURCHASER WHO IS READY, WILLING, AND ABLE TO BUY ON THE OWNER’S TERMS.

 

THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE CONCEPT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN TORTS, WITHOUT WHICH THE INJURY WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

 

TO BE REGARDED AS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF A SALE, A BROKER’S EFFORTS MUST HAVE BEEN THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY RESULTED IN A SALE.

 

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ORIENTAL PETROLEUM  CLAIMS THAT GATEWAY WAS NOT A READY, WILLING, AND ABLE PURCHASER AND THAT IT IN FACT ASSIGNED ITS RIGHT TO ANCHETA WHO BECAME THE ULTIMATE BUYER AND THAT, MOREOVER, IT WAS NOT TUSCAN REALTY THAT INTRODUCED ANCHETA TO ORIENTAL PETROLEUM. IS THIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO. 

 

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE CONTRACT TO SELL THAT ORIENTAL PETROLEUM CONCLUDED WITH GATEWAY WAS A VALID AND BINDING CONTRACT TO SELL, WHICH PRECLUDED ORIENTAL PETROLEUM FROM PEDDLING THE PROPERTIES TO OTHERS. INDEED, ORIENTAL PETROLEUM EXECUTED A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IN ANCHETA’S FAVOR BY VIRTUE OF GATEWAY’S ASSIGNMENT TO HIM OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACT TO SELL. CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT ORIENTAL PETROLEUM FOUND A DIRECT BUYER IN ANCHETA WITHOUT THE INTERMEDIATE CONTRACT TO SELL IN FAVOR OF GATEWAY, TUSCAN REALTY’S PROPOSED BUYER.

 

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ORIENTAL PETROLEUM FURTHER POINTS OUT THAT TUSCAN REALTY TOOK NO PART IN ITS NEGOTIATION WITH GATEWAY. IS THEIR ARGUMENT MERITORIOUS?

 

NO.

 

THAT MAY BE THE CASE BUT THE REASON WHY TUSCAN REALTY REFRAINED FROM DOING SO WAS BECAUSE OF ORIENTAL PETROLEUM’S ADVICE THAT IT WOULD HENCEFORTH DIRECTLY NEGOTIATE THE SALE WITH GATEWAY.

 

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ASSUMING THE ADVICE AMOUNTED TO A REVOCATION OF TUSCAN REALTY’S AUTHORITY TO SELL, IS TUSCAN STILL ENTITLED TO COMMISSION?

 

YES.

 

THE COURT HAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THE BROKER’S RIGHT TO HIS COMMISSION, ALTHOUGH THE OWNER REVOKED HIS AUTHORITY AND DIRECTLY NEGOTIATED WITH THE BUYER WHOM HE MET THROUGH THE BROKER’S EFFORTS. IT  WOULD BE UNFAIR NOT TO GIVE THE BROKER THE REWARD HE HAD EARNED FOR HELPING THE OWNER FIND A BUYER WHO WOULD PAY THE PRICE.

 

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LASTLY, ORIENTAL PETROLEUM ARGUES THAT THIS IS JUST A SIMPLE CASE OF NON-FULFILLMENT OF A SUSPENSIVE CONDITION. IT CLAIMS THAT THE COMMISSION IS ONLY TO BE AWARDED IF THE PROPERTIES WERE SOLD AT A MINIMUM OF PL20,000.00 PER SQUARE METER AND THAT THE DELIVERY MUST BE MADE WITHIN THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY 1997. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

 

NO. 

 

THESE ARE JUST LAME EXCUSES TO AVOID LIABILITY. AS THE CA CORRECTLY NOTED, ORIENTAL PETROLEUM DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE REGARDING THE DELIVERY DEADLINE IN ITS ANSWER. AS FOR THE FACT THAT THE PROPERTIES WERE EVENTUALLY SOLD FOR LESS THAN THE ORIGINAL ASKING PRICE, THAT ACTION WAS WITHIN ORIENTAL PETROLEUM’S DISCRETION. IT DECIDED THE MATTER UNILATERALLY WITHOUT CONSULTING ITS BROKER. CONSEQUENTLY, IT SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ITS OWN MINIMUM PRICE REQUIREMENT.

 

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SCD-2013-0020 -JULY 2013 – 0RIENTAL PETROLEUM

CASE 2013-0019: UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION AND LANCE Y. GOKONGWEI, PETITIONERS, -VERSUS- WILFREDO Z. CASTILLO, RESPONDENT. (G.R. NO. 189686, 10 JULY 2013, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECT/S: SEPARATION PAY IN CASE OF DISMISSAL FOR LEGAL CAUSE  (BRIEF TITLE: URC VS. CASTILLO)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 July 2009 Decision and 17 September 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G. R. SP. No. 105604 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated 31 March 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

MR. CASTILLO WAS DISMISSED AS REGIONAL SALES MANAGER OF ROBINA SALES CORPORATION FOR JUST CAUSE, SPECIFICALLY,  LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE UNDER ART. 282. HE WAS FOUND TO HAVE ACCEPTED GIFT CHECKS FROM A SUPPLIER. THE LABOR ARBITER RULED THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. NLRC REVERSED THE DECISION. CA AFFIRMED THE NLRC DECISION BUT AWARDED CASTILLO WITH SEPARATION PAY AS A FORM OF EQUITABLE RELIEF. WAS CA CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

THE AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY IS AUTHORIZED IN THE SITUATIONS DEALT WITH IN ARTICLE 283 AND 284 OF THE LABOR CODE, BUT NOT IN TERMINATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT BASED ON INSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 282.

“x x x [L]abor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur theaward of separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family— grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide

full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the

undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law.”

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2013-0019 -JULY 2013 – UNIVERSAL ROBINA