J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2014-0017: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, – versus – HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents. (G.R. NO. 176830; RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner, – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Offict-r-in- Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, m his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents (G.R. NO. 185587; RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in- Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacify as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, m his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents; VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,  – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.  (G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587, 185636 and 190005, G .R. No. 185636, G .R. No. 190005) SUBJECTS: PROBABLE CAUSE; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST; DUE PROCESS IN PRELIM INVESTIGATION; POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE  (11 FEBRUARY 2014, SERENO, CJ)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT FROM THE EMBARRASSMENT, EXPENSE AND ANXIETY OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS ONLY STATUTORY NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. THUS, IS IT NOT A PROCEDURAL RIGHT ONLY?

IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT AND A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.” It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.

WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

IT MEANS TO ACCORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF RESPONDENT’S SIDE WITH REGARD TO THE ACCUSATION.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS?

IT IS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ONE’S DEFENSE.”

WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IN DUE PROCESS?

THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense.”88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90

CERTAIN RESPONDENTS CLAIMED THEY WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HEY WERE NOT FURNISHED DOCUMENTS. IS  THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO,  BECAUSE THEY COULD NO LONGER BE FOUND IN THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES.

WHAT IS THE RULE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?

AS LONG AS EFFORTS TO REACH A RESPONDENT WERE MADE, AND HE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REMAINS VALID. THE RULE WAS PUT IN PLACE IN ORDER TO FOIL UNDERHANDED ATTEMPTS OF A RESPONDENT TO DELAY THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.

OCAMPO CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HE WAS NOT FURNISHED COPY OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO. HIS INDICTMENT WAS BASED NOT ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT ALONE BUT ON THE COLLECTIVE AFFIDAVITS OF SEVERAL OTHER WITNESSES.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

OCAMPO ALLEGED THAT JUDGE ABANDO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT “NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE.”  THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT ANY EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.  SC HAS RULED THAT  A HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DETERMINATION THEREOF. IN FACT, THE JUDGE’S PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES IS NOT MANDATORY AND INDISPENSABLE FOR DETERMINING THE APTNESS OF ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST. IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE JUDGE PERSONALLY EVALUATES THE PROSECUTOR’S REPORT AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE INDICTMENT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST; OR IF, ON THE BASIS OF HIS EVALUATION, HE FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE, TO DISREGARD THE PROSECUTOR’S RESOLUTION AND REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES TO AID HIM IN DETERMINING ITS EXISTENCE.113

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.

ECHANIS AND BAYLOSIS CLAIM THAT IF JUDGE ABANDO HAVE PAINSTAKINGLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT. BY NOT DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT HE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION? ARE THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.

THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST PETITIONERS IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF JUDGE ABANDO. JUDGES ARE GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE IN ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST. THE TRIAL COURT’S EXERCISE OF ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION SHOULD NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE INTERFERED WITH IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. INDEED, CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE TO CURE ERRORS IN THE TRIAL COURT’S APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES, THE CONCLUSION OF FACTS IT REACHED BASED ON THE SAID FINDINGS, AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:

x x x. The trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. x x x. Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations.

WHAT IS THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE?

UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE, “COMMON CRIMES, PERPETRATED IN FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, ARE DIVESTED OF THEIR CHARACTER AS ‘COMMON’ OFFENSES AND ASSUME THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE MAIN CRIME.”

The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.”

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

WHO HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE POLITICAL MOTIVATION?

THE BURDEN MUST BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENSE SINCE MOTIVE IS A STATE OF MIND WHICH ONLY THE ACCUSED KNOWS.

We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.

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SCD-2014-0017-FEB 2014-OCAMPO

CASE 2014-0016: DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. and KENNETH SY, Petitioners – versus – LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Respondent.  (G.R. No. 193966, 19 FEBRUARY 2014, SERENO, CJ.)  SUBJECT: EXCLUSION OF WITNESS. (BRIEF TITLE: DESIGN SOURCES VS. ERISTINGCOL)

DISPOSITIVE:

“Therefore, this Court finds that the R TC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen to testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation of Kenneth’s testimony.

In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is now rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

STEPHEN, A WITNESS, WAS IN COURT WHEN WITNESS KENNETH WAS TESTIFYING. RTC DID NOT ALLOW STEPHEN TO TESTIFY BECAUSE HE ALREADY HEARD THE TESTIMONY OF KENNETH. WAS RTC CORRECT?

NO, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ORDER FOR EXCLUSION OF OTHER WITNESSES DURING THE PRESENTATION OF KENNETH’S TESTIMONY.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth.  Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners.

WHAT IS THE BASIS IN THE RULES FOR EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES?

SECTION 15, RULE 132 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WHICH PROVIDES:

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined. 

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING WITNESSES FROM THE COURTROOM?

TO ENSURE THAT THE WITNESSES TESTIFY TO THE TRUTH BY PREVENTING THEM FROM BEING INFLUENCED BY THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHERS.

Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with one another.  The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.  However, without any motion from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.

BASED ON THE SANDAL CASE, THE RTC AND THE CA MOVED ON TO DETERMINE THE MATERIALITY OF THE TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN WHICH BECAME THEIR BASIS FOR NOT ALLOWING THE LATTER TO TESTIFY. IS THE SANDAL CASE APPLICABLE?

NO BECAUSE IN THE SANDAL CASE THERE WAS AN ORDER OF EXCLUSION AND THE SUBJECT WITNESS DID NOT FOLLOW THE ORDER. HERE THERE WAS NO ORDER OF EXCLUSION.

The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify.  Applying Sandal, the CA ruled that the absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.

 We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced.  Contrary to the present case, in Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the witness.  The defiance of the order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the

witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of the materiality of Stephen’s testimony in relation to the strengthening of petitioners’ defense was uncalled for.

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent’s counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen’s, then respondent’s counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.

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SCD-2014-0016-FEB 2014-DESIGN SOURCES

CASE 2014-0015: PROCTER & GAMBLE ASIA PTE LTD., Petitioner, – versus – COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent (G.R. No. 202071, 19 FEBRUARY 2014, SERENO, CJ.) (BRIEF TITLE: PROCTER & GAMBLE VS. CIR).

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 746 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is hereby REMANDED to the CTA  First Division for further proceedings and a determination of whether the claims of petitioner for refund or tax credit of unutilized input value- added tax are valid.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

“On 3 June 2013, we required 12 respondent to submit its Comment, which it filed on 4 December 2013. Citing the recent case CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, respondent counters that the 120-day period to file judicial claims for a refund or tax credit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the waiting period violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, rendering the judicial claim premature. Thus, the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the judicial claim.

Respondent is correct on this score. However, it fails to mention that San Roque also recognized the validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. The ruling expressly states that the “taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.

The Court, in San Roque, ruled that equitable estoppel had set in when respondent issued BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. This was a general interpretative rule, which effectively misled all taxpayers into filing premature judicial claims with the CTA. Thus, taxpayers could rely on the ruling from its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal on 6 October 2010, when CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, lnc. 16 was promulgated.”

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SCD-2014-0015-FEB 2014-PROCTER & GAMBLE