J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2014-0020: FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., PETITIONER, – VERSUS – REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENT (G.R. NO. 189434) IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, PETITIONER , – VERSUS – REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT (G.R. NO. 189505) (12 MARCH 2014, SERENO, CJ) SUBJECT/S: THE NATURE OF FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS (SHORT TITLE: MARCOS VS REPUBLIC)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 April 2012 filed by petitioners Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN DOES NOT POSSESS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE RES OR THE ARELMA PROCEEDS, WHICH ARE HELD BY MERRILL LYNCH IN THE UNITED STATES.   DOES THE PHILIPPINE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE RES WHICH IS IN THE U.S.?

YES. TO RULE OTHERWISE CONTRAVENES THE INTENT OF THE FORFEITURE LAW, AND INDIRECTLY PRIVILEGES VIOLATORS WHO ARE ABLE TO HIDE PUBLIC ASSETS ABROAD: BEYOND THE REACH OF THE COURTS AND THEIR RECOVERY BY THE STATE

XXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS?

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS ARE ACTIONS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN REM OR QUASI IN REM.

XXXXXXXXXX

HOW IS JURISDICTION OVER THE REM ACQUIRED?

JURISDICTION OVER THE RES IS ACQUIRED EITHER

(A) BY THE SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY UNDER LEGAL PROCESS, WHEREBY IT IS BROUGHT INTO ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE LAW; OR

(B) AS A RESULT OF THE INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, IN WHICH THE POWER OF THE COURT IS RECOGNIZED AND MADE EFFECTIVE.

XXXXXXXXXX

IN THE CASE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, MUST THE PROPERTY BE IN THE ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE COURT?

NO. POTENTIAL CUSTODY IS SUFFICIENT.

In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.9   The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held: “In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2014-0020-MAR 2014-MARCOS

CASE 2014-0019: T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION, STINNES HUANG, BEN HUANG and ROGELIO MADRIAGA, Petitioners – versus – T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, ELPIDIO ZALDIVAR, DARI OS GONZALES, WILLIAM DOMINGO, BOBBY CASTILLO, JIMMY M. PASCUA, GERMANO M. BAJO, RICO L. MANZANO, ALLAN L. CALLORINA, ROMEO BLANCO, GILBERT M. GARCIA, CARLOS F. GERILLO, EDUARDO A. GRANDE, EDILBRANDO MARTICIO, VIVENCIO SUSANO, ROLANDO GARCIA, JR., MICHAEL FABABIER, ROWELL MADRIAGA, PRESNIL TOLENTINO, MARVIN VENTURA, FRANCISCO RIV ARES, PLACIDO TOLENTINO and ROLANDO ROMERO (G.R. No. 191714, 26 FEBRUARY 2014, MENDOZA) (BRIEF TITLE: T&H SHOPFITTERS ET AL. VS. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP UNION ET AL.)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the November 12, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 24, 2010 Resolution, in CA-G.R. SP No. 107188, are AFFIRMED, except with respect to the award of attorney’s fees which 1s hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2014-0019-FEB 2014-T & H SHOPFITTERS

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES: 

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:  

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications; 

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.  

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL: 

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies; 

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); 

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel. 

Further, the Court DECLARES: 

1. 1.    Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

1. 2.    Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.  

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of: 

1.   Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as  

1. 2.       Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2014-0018-FEB 2014-DISINI