Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES


CASE 2016-0025: LEVI STRAUSS & CO.,  PETITIONER, -VERSUS-  ATTY. RICARDO R. BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, RESPONDENT (G.R. NO. 206779, 20 APRIL 2016, BRION JUSTICE) (SUBJECT: FAILURE TO FILE APPEAL ON TIME; SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME DENIED) (BRIEF TITLE: LEVI STRAUSS VS. BLANCAFLOR)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, WE HEREBY DENY THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI. THE RESOLUTIONS DATED AUGUST 13, 2012 AND APRIL 17, 2013, OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 123957 ARE AFFIRMED. COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT ARE THE  BASIC FACTS?

 

PETITIONER FILED WITH IPO A TRADEMARK APPLICATION FOR TAB DEVICE TRADEMARK WHICH IT  DESCRIBED AS A SMALL MARKER OR TAB OF TEXTILE MATERIAL, APPEARING ON AND AFFIXED PERMANENTLY TO THE GARMENT’S EXTERIOR AND IS VISIBLE WHILE THE GARMENT IS WORN.

 

IPO EXAMINER DENIED SAID APPLICATION. LEVI STAUSS FILE AN APPEAL WITH THE IPO DIRECTOR GENERAL. THEIR APPEAL WAS ALSO DENIED. THEY HAVE UNTIL 29 MARCH 2012 TO FILE AN APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.

 

ON MARCH 28, 2012, LEVI’S FILED A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION) TO FILE A VERIFIED PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE CA; IT SOUGHT AN ADDITIONAL 15 DAYS, OR UNTIL APRIL 13, 2012, TO FILE THE PETITION FOR REVIEW.27 LEVI’S COUNSEL AVERRED THAT IT NEEDED THE EXTENSION BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM OTHER EQUALLY IMPORTANT PROFESSIONAL WORK AND IT NEEDED TO GATHER FURTHER EVIDENCE.28 

 

ON APRIL 13, 2012, LEVI’S FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME;29 IT ASKED THIS TIME FOR AN ADDITIONAL 15 DAYS, OR UNTIL APRIL 28, 2012, TO FILE THE PETITION FOR REVIEW.  

 

LEVI’S CLAIMED THAT WHILE THE DRAFT OF THE PETITION WAS ALMOST COMPLETE, THERE WAS YET AGAIN PRESSURE FROM OTHER EQUALLY URGENT PROFESSIONAL WORK; AND THE CONSULARIZED SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA) NEEDED FOR THE FILING OF THE PETITION AND ITS VERIFICATION WERE STILL EN ROUTE FROM THE UNITED STATES.30 LEVI’S CLAIMED THAT THE DELAY IN THE SPA CONSULARIZATION WAS DUE TO THE CLOSED PHILIPPINE CONSULATE OFFICE IN SAN FRANCISCO, USA, FROM APRIL 5, 2012 TO APRIL 9, 2012, IN OBSERVANCE OF THE HOLY WEEK AND THE ARAW NG KAGITINGAN HOLIDAY.

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS  ISSUED A RESOLUTION34 DISMISSING LEVI’S PETITION OUTRIGHT. THE CA HELD THAT LEVI’S FAILED TO PRESENT A COMPELLING REASON FOR THE CA TO GRANT THE SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION.35 ACCORDING TO THE CA, LEVI’S SHOULD HAVE SECURED THE NECESSARY SPA EARLIER AND ANTICIPATED THE CLOSURE OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSULATE OFFICE DUE TO THE PHILIPPINE HOLIDAYS.36 FURTHER, PRESSURE FROM OTHER EQUALLY URGENT PROFESSIONAL WORK IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON FOR AN EXTENSION.

 

IS CA’S DISMISSAL OF LEVI’S PETITION VALID?

 

YES.

 

MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS ARE NOT GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT.

 

LAWYERS SHOULD NEVER PRESUME THAT THEIR MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS OR POSTPONEMENT WILL BE GRANTED OR THAT THEY WILL BE GRANTED THE LENGTH OF TIME THEY PRAY FOR.51

 

FURTHER, THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION IS NOT GRANTED, EXCEPT WHEN THE CA FINDS A COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT THE EXTENSION.52 

 

WAS  CA CORRECT WHEN IT HELD THAT LEVI’S FAILED TO PRESENT A COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT THE SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION?.53  

 

YES.

 

LEVI’S, BY ITS OWN ADMISSION, ONLY DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE FILING OF THE CA PETITION FOR REVIEW AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING.54 LEVI’S LATE DECISION NECESSARILY DELAYED THE EXECUTION AND NOTARIZATION OF THE SPA AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE PHILIPPINE CONSULATE OFFICES’ AUTHENTICATION OF THE SPA. LEVI’S CANNOT EXCUSE ITS DELAY BY CITING ITS FAILURE     TO ANTICIPATE THE PHILIPPINE CONSULATE OFFICE’S CLOSURE DUE TO THE OBSERVANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE HOLIDAYS. CERTAINLY, LEVI’S OWN DELAY IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON FOR THE GRANT OF A SECOND EXTENSION TO FILE A CA PETITION FOR REVIEW. 

 

LEVI’S ASSUME THAT ITS SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION WOULD BE GRANTED SINCE THE CA DID NOT IMMEDIATELY ACT ON THE FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION? IS THIS ASSUMPTION CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

IN GO V. BPI FINANCE CORPORATION IT WAS HELD THAT THAT A PARTY CANNOT USE THE CA’S DELAYED ACTION ON A MOTION FOR EXTENSION AS AN EXCUSE TO DELAY THE FILING OF THE PLEADING AS A PARTY CANNOT MAKE ANY ASSUMPTION ON HOW HIS MOTION WOULD BE RESOLVED.

 

“IN FACT, FACED WITH THE FAILURE TO ACT, THE CONCLUSION IS THAT NO FAVORABLE ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THE MOTION HAD BEEN DENIED.”56

 

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL?

 

THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS A STATUTORY RIGHT, NOT A NATURAL NOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.57 

 

THE PARTY WHO INTENDS TO APPEAL MUST COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES AND RULES GOVERNING APPEALS; OTHERWISE, THE RIGHT OF APPEAL MAY BE LOST OR SQUANDERED.58

 

THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE PERIOD PERMITTED BY LAW IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY, BUT JURISDICTIONAL, AND THE FAILURE TO PERFECT THAT APPEAL RENDERS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT FINAL AND EXECUTORY.59  

 

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE>

 

YES.

 

IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, THE COURT HAS RELAXED THE GOVERNING PERIODS OF APPEAL IN ORDER TO SERVE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.60

 

THE INSTANT CASE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT PRESENT ITSELF TO BE AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE TO WARRANT THE RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON PROCEDURE.

 

PETITIONER PLEADS THAT A LIBERAL, NOT LITERAL, INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES SHOULD BE THE COURT’S POLICY GUIDANCE. DOES PETITIONER HAS BASIS?

 

NO.

 

PROCEDURAL RULES ARE NOT TO BE DISDAINED AS MERE TECHNICALITIES. THEY MAY NOT BE IGNORED TO SUIT THE CONVENIENCE OF A PARTY.

 

ADJECTIVE LAW ENSURES THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS THROUGH THE ORDERLY AND SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

 

RULES ARE NOT INTENDED TO HAMPER LITIGANTS OR COMPLICATE LITIGATION. BUT THEY HELP PROVIDE FOR A VITAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE WHERE SUITORS MAY BE HEARD IN THE CORRECT FORM AND MANNER, AT THE PRESCRIBED TIME IN A PEACEFUL THOUGH ADVERSARIAL CONFRONTATION BEFORE A JUDGE WHOSE AUTHORITY LITIGANTS ACKNOWLEDGE. PUBLIC ORDER AND OUR SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ARE WELL SERVED BY A CONSCIENTIOUS OBSERVANCE OF THE RULES OF 61 PROCEDURE X X X.

 

CAN THE SC  STILL REVIEW THE PETITION ON THE MERITS?

 

NO.

 

THE RULING OF THE IPO BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AFTER THE PERIOD TO APPEAL EXPIRED WITHOUT THE PERFECTION OF LEVI’S’ APPEAL.

 

THE COURT, THEREFORE, MAY NO LONGER REVIEW IT.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

 SCD-2016-0025-LEVI STRAUSS

 

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CASE 2016-0024: HARLIN C. ABAYON, PETITIONER, -VERSUS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) AND RAUL A. DAZA, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 222236, G.R. NO. 223032, 03 MAY 2016,  MENDOZA J.) (SUBJECT/S: POWERS OF HRET; POWERS OF COMELEC; ELECTORAL PROTESTS; ANNULMENT OF ELECTIONS; DECLARING FAILURE OF ELECTIONS) (BRIEF TITLE: ABAYON VS. HRET ET AL)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, THE FEBRUARY 3, 2016 DECISION AND THE MARCH 7, 2016 RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ARE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. PETITIONER HARLIN C. ABAYON IS DECLARED TO BE THE LAW.FULLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF NORTHERN  SAMAR IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS.

 

THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POWER OF HRET AND THE POWER OF COMELEC?

 

HRET HAS THE POWER TO ANNUL ELECTIONS. COMELEC HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE FAILURE OF ELECTIONS.

 

WHAT IS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF HRET?

 

TO DECIDE ALL ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHICH INCLUDES THOSE WHICH RAISE THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, TERRORISM OR OTHER IRREGULARITIES COMMITTED BEFORE, DURING OR AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

 

WHAT ARE THE THREE TYPES OF POWERS OF THE COMELEC?

 

ADMININSTRATIVE, QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL.

 

WHAT DOES QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER EMBRACE?

 

IT EMBRACES THE POWER TO RESOLVE CONTROVERSIES ARISING FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF ELECTION LAWS, AND TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES; AND OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTIONS, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS.

 

WHAT ARE ITS QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER?

 

REFERS TO ISSUANCE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE ELECTION LAWS.

 

WHAT ARE ITS ADMINSTRATIVE FUNCTION?

 

REFERS TO THE ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTION LAWS.

 

WHAT ELECTION CONTESTS DOES COMELEC DECIDES?

 

ELECTION CONTESTS NOT OTHERWISE RESERVED TO OTHER ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS.

 

WHEN COMELEC DECLARES FAILURE OF ELECTION, WHAT KIND OF POWER DOES IT EXERCISE?

 

ADMINISTRATIVE. PART OF COMELEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION OF ENSURING THAT ELECTIONS ARE FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE.

 

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANNULMENT OF ELECTIONS BY ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTIONS BY COMELEC?

 

FIRST, THE FORMER IS AN INCIDENT OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS WHILE THE LATTER IS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE COMELEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION.

 

SECOND, ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ONLY ANNUL THE ELECTION RESULTS CONNECTED WITH THE ELECTION CONTEST BEFORE IT WHEREAS THE DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTIONS BY THE COMELEC RELATES TO THE ENTIRE ELECTION IN THE CONCERNED PRECINCT OR POLITICAL UNIT. AS SUCH, IN ANNULLING ELECTIONS, THE HRET DOES SO ONLY TO DETERMINE WHO AMONG THE CANDIDATES GARNERED A MAJORITY OF THE LEGAL VOTES CAST. THE COMELEC, ON THE OTHER HAND, DECLARES A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF HOLDING OR CONTINUING THE ELECTIONS, WHICH WERE NOT HELD OR WERE SUSPENDED, OR IF THERE WAS ONE, RESULTED IN A FAILURE TO ELECT. WHEN COMELEC DECLARES A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED. 34

 

IS THERE AN OVERLAP?

 

THERE IS NO OVERLAP OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE WHEN THE COMELEC DECLARES A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS ON THE GROUND OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, TERRORISM OR OTHER IRREGULARITIES, IT DOES SO IN ITS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY. IN CONTRAST, WHEN ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ANNUL ELECTIONS UNDER THE SAME GROUNDS, THEY DO SO IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.

 

HOW SHOULD THE POWER TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS SHOULD BE EXERCISED?

 

IT SHOULD BE EXERCISED WITH UTMOST CARE AND ONLY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DEMONSTRATE BEYOND DOUBT THAT THE DISREGARD OF THE LAW HAD BEEN SO FUNDAMENTAL OR SO PERSISTENT AND CONTINUOUS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH WHAT VOTES ARE LAWFUL AND WHAT ARE UNLAWFUL, OR TO ARRIVE AT ANY CERTAIN RESULT WHATSOEVER, OR THAT THE GREAT BODY OF THE VOTERS HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND THREATS FROM EXERCISING THEIR FRANCHISE.”35

 

WHAT MUST A PROTESTANT ALLEGING TERRORISM IN AN ELECTION PROTEST DO?

 

HE MUST ESTABLISH BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY HAS BEEN MUTED BY”VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION OR THREATS.

 

IN THIS CASE DID THE CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT NULLIFICATION OF ELECTION?

 

NO.

 

PROTESTANT’S EVIDENCE IS UTTERLY WEAK, UNCLEAR AND UNCONVINCING.

 

WHAT ARE THE TWO INDISPENSABLE REQUISITES THAT MUST CONCUR IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE DRASTIC ACTION OF NULLIFYING THE ELECTION?

 

(1) THE ILLEGALITY OF THE BALLOTS MUST AFFECT MORE THAN FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF THE VOTES CAST ON THE SPECIFIC PRECINCT OR PRECINCTS SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED, OR IN CASE OF THE ENTIRE MUNICIPALITY, MORE THAN FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF ITS TOTAL PRECINCTS AND THE VOTES CAST THEREIN; AND

 

(2) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY BETWEEN THE LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL BALLOTS. XXX

 

WAS THE DECISION OF HRET SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE?

 

NO.

 

THUS, THE HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ANNULLING THE ELECTIONS IN THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS AND DISREGARDING THE RESPECTIVE NUMBER OF VOTES RECEIVED BY ABAYON AND DAZA FROM THE PRECINCTS, WHICH LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT DAZA WAS THE ONE ELECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF VOTERS IN THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR TO BE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS. HENCE, ABAYON SHOULD BE REINSTATED AS THE DULY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAID LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0024-ABAYONSCD-2016-0024-ABAYON

 

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CASE 2016-0023: REPUBLIC ET AL VS. HON. MUPAS ET AL (G.R. NO. 181892); REPUBLIC ET AL VS. PIATCO ET AL  (G.R. NO. 209917); TAKENAKA ET AL VS REPUBLIC ET AL (G.R. NO. 209699) PIATCO VS. REPUBLIC ET AL (G.R. NO. 209731) (19 APRIL 2016, BRION, J)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we:

 

(1) SUSTAIN our September 8, 2015 Decision, thus:

 

 a) The principal amount of just compensation is fixed at $326,932,221.26 as of December 21, 2004. Thereafter, the amount of $267 ,493 ,61 7 .26, which is the difference between $326,932,221.26 and the proffered value of $59,438,604.00, shall earn a straight interest of 12% per annum from September 11, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and a straight interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment;

 

 b) The Republic is hereby ordered to make direct payment of the just compensation due to PIATCO; and

 

c) The Republic is hereby ordered to defray the expenses of the BOC in the sum of P3,500,000.00.

 

(2) PARTLY GRANT the Republic’s motion for reconsideration by declaring that full ownership over the NAIA-IPT III shall be vested in the Republic upon full payment of the just compensation as computed in the immediately preceding paragraph; ·

 

(3) DENY PIATCO’s motion for partial reconsideration;

 

( 4) DENY Takenaka and Asahikosan’s motion for partial reconsideration; and

 

(5) RECTIFY THE FOLLOWING TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS in our Decision dated September 8, 2015:

 

(a) The last paragraph of page 41 of our Decision should read as follows:

 

Interest. The CA further held that interest shall be added to just compensation as of December 21, 2004. xxx

 

(b) Page 99 of the Decision should reflect the proper quote of item 3.1.17 of the Scott Wilson Report, as follows:

 

3.1.17 On the basis of a construction cost valuation of the order of US$322 million we would expect the cost of construction supervision to be a minimum of US$9 .5 million. It is understood that PIATCO has paid US$7.9 million to the QA Inspectors (JAC) and US$4.2 million to PCI, SOM, PA CI CON and JGC and this therefore appears not unreasonable.

 

(c) Pages 123-124 of the Decision should reflect the proper number of days in years 2008 and 2012, which is 366 days, and hence should be corrected as follows:

 

. . . . .

 

This Resolution is final and no further pleadings shall be entertained. Let judgment be entered in due course.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0023-PIATCO

 

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