Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES


CASE 2016-0065: JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO – VERSUS – LUIS G. ANSON  (G.R. NO. 204494, 27 JULY 2016, REYES, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: SALGADO VS ANSON)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of “due search and inability to find” a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,93 such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.

 

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina’s marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded.

 

Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis’ failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter’s lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina’ s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.94 All those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

 

“The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. “95

 

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 scd-2016-0065-salgado

 

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CASE 2016-0064: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,  V.  N.E. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION, INC., (G.R. 208181, 31 AUGUST 2016, , PEREZ J.) (SUBJECT/S: HOW TO COUNT THE 60 DAY PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI) (BRIEF TITLE: MERALCO VS. N.E. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.”


SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

PETITIONER FILED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEYOND 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF DENIAL OF THEIR FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BUT WITHIN THE 60 DAYS FROM DENIAL OF THEIR SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. WAS SUCH PETITION FILED ON TIME?

 

NO.

 

THE RULE CLEARLY STATES THAT THE 60 DAY PERIOD SHALL BE FROM NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IF ONE WAS FILED.

 

PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION RAISED NEW MATTERS. THEREFORE THE 60 DAY PERIOD MUST RUN FROM NOTICE OF THE DENIAL OF THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IT THIS CORRECT?

 

NO. OTHERWISE, THERE WILL BE NO END IN THE LITIGATION.

 

THE FINALITY OF A DECISION IS A JURISDICTIONAL EVENT WHICH CANNOT BE MADE TO DEPEND ON THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES.24 TO RULE OTHERWISE WOULD COMPLETELY NEGATE THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE ON COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE, WHICH IS TO PLACE THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENT AND PROCESSES BEYOND THE POWER OF THE PARTY TO DETERMINE AT HIS PLEASURE.25

 

IS THE 60 DAY PERIOD EXTENDIBLE?

 

NO.

 

THE 60-DAY PERIOD IS INEXTENDIBLE TO AVOID ANY UNREASONABLE DELAY THAT WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THEIR CASE.


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scd-2016-0064-meralco

 

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CASE 2016-0062: EDUARDO C. SILAGAN V. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC., VICTORIANO A. BASCO and/o HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARITIME, CO., LTD.,* (G.R. 202808 , 14 SEPTEMBER 2016, PEREZ, J)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

This is not the first time that the Court upheld the findings of the company designated physician who has an unfettered opportunity to track the physical condition of the seaman in prolonged period of time versus the medical report of the seafarer’s personal doctor who only examined him once and who based his assessment solely on the medical records adduced by his patient. Thus in Formerly INC Shipmanagement, Incorporated v. Rosales, 33 we ruled:

 

“Even granting that the complaint should be given due course, we hold that the company-designated physician’s assessment should prevail over that of the private physician. The company-designated physician had thoroughly examined and treated Rosales from the time of his repatriation until his disability grading was issued, which was from February 20, 2006 until October 10, 2006. In contrast, the private physician only attended to Rosales once, on November 9, 2006. This is not the first time that this Court met this situation. Under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and d~agnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.” (Emphasis omitted)


Second, petitioner failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer’s personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment. This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. 34 In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for a referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties.

 

We are thus compelled to dismiss the present complaint, as we had similarly done in Philippine Hammonia, to impress upon the public the significance of a binding obligation. This pronouncement shall not only speed up the processing of mantlme disability claims and decongest court dockets; more importantly, our ruling would restore faith and confidence in obligations that have voluntarily been entered upon. As an institution tasked to uphold and respect the law, it is our primary duty to ensure faithful compliance with the law whether the dispute affects strictly private interests or one imbued with public interest. We shall not hesitate to dismiss a petition wrongfully filed, or to hold any persons liable for its malicious initiation. “36 (Citation omitted)

 

In fine, given that petitioner’s permanent disability was not established through substantial evidence for the reasons above-stated, the Court of Appeals did not err iJ.?. reversing the NLRC ruling for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Verily, while the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEASEC, when the evideJ;ice presented negates compensability, the claim for disability benefits must necessarily fail,37 as in this case.


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scd-2016-0062-silagan

 

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