Archive for August, 2016


CASE 2016-0052: DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. “DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE,” PETITIONER, -VERSUS – MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE ( G.R. NO. 215723, 27 JULY 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE, SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS BUT CAN REFER CASE TO CA) (BRIEF TITLE: MEDINA VS. KOIKE ET AL).

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

 

SO ORDERED.”

                                 

 SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

PETITIONER SOUGHT AT RTC THE RECOGNITION OF A DIVORCE DECREE ISSUED IN JAPAN. RTC DENIED THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERTINENT LAW IN JAPAN GOVERNING DIVORCE. PETITIONER FILED PETITION DIRECTLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT FOR REVIEW OF RTC RULING UNDER RULE 45. IS HER ACTION CORRECT?

 

NO, BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. WHAT IS RAISED ON APPEAL IS A FACTUAL ISSUE: WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BEFORE THE RTC ARE ADEQUATE.

 

THUS THE SC REFERRED THE CASE TO CA FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION INCLUDING THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE FACTUAL ISSUES.

 

DOES PHILIPPINE LAW ALLOWS A FILIPINO SPOUSE MARRIED TO AN ALIEN  TO CONTRACT A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE IN CASE A DIVORCE IS OBTAINED BY THE  ALIEN SPOUSE ABROAD?

 

YES, UNDER ART. 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT:

 

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

 

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

 

IS TRIAL NECESSARY?

 

IT SEEMS THAT UNDER ART. 26, TRIAL IS NOT NECESSARY.

 

BUT OUR COURTS DO NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

 

AS A RULE NO SOVEREIGN IS BOUND TO GIVE EFFECT WITHIN ITS DOMINION TO A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A TRIBUNAL OF ANOTHER COUNTRY.

 

THUS, THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT AND ITS AUTHENTICITY MUST BE PROVEN AS FACTS UNDER OUR RULES ON EVIDENCE, TOGETHER WITH THE ALIEN’S APPLICABLE NATIONAL LAW TO SHOW THE EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT ON THE ALIEN HIMSELF OR HERSELF.

 

BOTH THE DIVORCE DECREE AND THE GOVERNING PERSONAL LAW OF THE ALIEN SPOUSE WHO OBTAINED THE DIVORCE MUST BE PROVEN LIKE ANY OTHER FACT.


TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0052-MEDINA

 

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CASE 2016-0051: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA VS. JUDGE ROLANDO MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY (A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2369, [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 12-3907-RTJ])

HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JOSE ROBERTO F. PO VS. JUDGE ROLANDO MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY   (A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2372 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 11-3736-RTJ])

(26 JULY 2016, PER CURIAM) (SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW) (BRIEF TITLE: DOJ AND HDMF VS. JUDGE MISLANG)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds Judge Rolando G. Mislang, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 167, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 and A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 and ORDERS his DISMISSAL from the service with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

DELFIN LEE FACED 2 DOJ CASES. HE FILED A PETITION FOR INJUNCTION (WITH APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR TRO) AGAINST THE DOJ, WHICH WAS RAFFLED TO THE SALA OF JUDGE MISLANG.  LEE SOUGHT TO SUSPEND THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE DOJ IN THE 2ND DOJ CASE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, TO LIKEWISE PREVENT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IN THE 1ST DOJ CASE. THE PARTIES, WITH THE PERMISSION OF JUDGE MISLANG, THEN AGREED TO SUBMIT FOR RESOLUTION THE PETITION FOR INJUNCTION UPON SUBMISSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMORANDA WITHIN FIFTEEN ( 15) DAYS. HOWEVER  AFTER LEE HAD SUBMITTED HIS MEMORANDUM, THE FOLLOWING DAY HE FILED AN UNVERIFIED URGENT MOTION FOR THE EX-PARTE RESOLUTION OF HIS APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TRO. WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE DOJ’S MEMORANDUM, JUDGE MISLANG ISSUED ORDERS DATED AUGUST 16, 2011 AND AUGUST 26, 2011, GRANTING LEE’S PETITION. WAS   THE ACTION OF JUDGE MISLANG PROPER?

 

HE VIOLATED DOJ’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND TO DUE PROCESS.

 

WHAT OTHER QUESTIONABLE EVENTS/ACTS ATTENDED THE CASE?

 

JUDGE MISLANG NEVER CONDUCTED A HEARING ON EITHER THE APPLICATION FOR TRO OR ON THE MOTION FOR RESOLUTION OF THE TRO.

 

ALTHOUGH THE APPLICATION FOR TRO WAS CONTAINED IN A VERIFIED PETITION, THE DOJ WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE PETITION OR THE URGENT MOTION FOR HEARING.

 

DOJ  WAS NOT LIKEWISE SERVED WITH ANY NOTICE OF HEARING. AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF PROOF OF SERVICE, JUDGE MISLANG STILL PROCEEDED TO HEAR THE APPLICATION FOR TRO AGAINST THE 1ST DOJ CASE DURING THE HEARING ON THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE 2ND DOJ CASE.

 

JUDGE MISLANG RULED THERE WAS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST DOJ CASE. WAS HIS RULING CORRECT?

 NO.

 BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS FILED AHEAD OF THE CIVIL ACTION WHICH LEE USED AS BASIS FOR HIS MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN VIEW OF  THE EXISTENCE OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.

 

THE RULE ON PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IS: THE CIVIL ACTION MUST BE INSTITUTED PRIOR TO THE INSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION.

 

WHAT IS GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 

IT IS THE DISREGARD OF BASIC RULES AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.

 

IS EVERY JUDICIAL ERROR BESPEAKS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 

NO, IF COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF TOLERABLE MISJUDGMENT.

 

WHEN IS THERE GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 

WHERE THE LAW IS STRAIGHTFORWARD AND THE FACTS SO EVIDENT, FAILURE TO KNOW IT OR TO ACT AS IF ONE DOES NOT KNOW IT CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

 

WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION ON THE JUDGE’S PERFORMANCE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS?

 

HE IS PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED WITH REGULARITY AND GOOD FAITH?

 

WHEN IS THIS PRESUMPTION SET ASIDE?

 

WHEN HE COMMITS A BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE PROVISIONS OF A STATUTE, AS WELL AS SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS ENJOINING THEIR STRICT COMPLIANCE.

 

WHEN HE WAS MOVED BY BAD FAITH, DISHONESTY, HATRED, OR SOME OTHER LIKE MOTIVE.

 

WHY ARE JUDGES EXPECTED TO KNOW THE LAW?

 

JUDGES ARE EXPECTED TO EXHIBIT MORE THAN JUST CURSORY ACQUAINTANCE WITH STATUTES AND PROCEDURAL LAWS.

 

THUS, UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE RULES IS A SIGN OF INCOMPETENCE. BASIC RULES MUST BE AT THE PALM OF HIS HAND.

 

WHEN A JUDGE DISPLAYS UTTER LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE RULES, HE BETRAYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE COURTS. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS THE MAINSPRING OF INJUSTICE.

 

JUDGES OWE IT TO THE PUBLIC TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE, HENCE, THEY ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE MORE THAN JUST A MODICUM OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE STATUTES AND PROCEDURAL RULES; THEY MUST KNOW THEM BY HEART.
 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0051-JUDGE MISLANG 

 

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CASE 2016-0050: THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,  v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,  (G.R. 205728, 05 JULY 2016, LEONEN, J.)


DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

 

 SO ORDERED.”

 

 SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

 This Court’s Decision discussed that the tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that “primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily-even almost incidentally-will cause the election or nonelection of a candidate.”34 It is not election propaganda as its messages are different from the usual declarative messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression with political consequences, and “[t]his court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech.”35

 

We recognize that there can be a type of speech by private citizens amounting to election paraphernalia that can be validly regulated.36 J However, this is not the situation in this case. The twin tarpaulins consist of  a social advocacy, and the regulation, if applied in this case, fails the reasonability test.

 

Lastly, the regulation is content-based. The Decision discussed that “[t]he form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression[,]”38 and size does matter. 39”

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0050-DIOCESE OF BACOLOD

 

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