CASE NO. 2011-0063: MARCIANO ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87,QUEZON CITY (A.M. NO. RTJ-11-2272, 16 FEBRUARY 2011, PEREZ, J.)  SUBJECTS: NOTICE OF HEARING; MOTION FOR EXECUTION; JUDGE CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR NOT ACTING ON A MOTION WITH DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF HEARING. (BRIEF TITLE: ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE ASDALA). 

FIRST DIVISION

x———————————————————————————————– x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

          The present administrative matter is based on the following facts:

Prelude

Civil Case No. 32771, entitled “Emelita L. Mariano represented by Marciano Alcaraz, plaintiff, v. Alfredo M. Dualan,defendant,” is an ejectment case originally filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 35 of Quezon City.^[1]

On 28 September 2004, the MeTC rendered judgment in the said case in favor of the plaintiff Emelita Mariano (Emelita).^[2] The fallo reads:^[3]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises located at 340 Roosevelt Ave., Quezon City and to peacefully turn-over possession thereof to the plaintiff.

Defendant is likewise ordered to pay the following to the plaintiff, to wit:

1.      the amount of Seventy Six Thousand (Php 76,000.00) Pesos per month, reckoned from September 2000 until defendant and all persons claiming rights under him shall finally vacate the premises representing compensation for the reasonable use and occupation thereof;

2.      the amount of Eight Thousand (Php 8,000.00) Pesos as and by way of attorney’s fee; and

3.      cost of suit.

On 23 November 2004, Emelita filed a Motion for Execution before the MeTC.^[4] 

On 3 January 2005, the losing defendant, Alfredo M. Dualan (Alfredo), filed his Notice of Appeal.^[5]

In an Order dated 19 January 2005, the MeTC granted Emelita’s Motion for Execution and, at the same time, gave due course to Alfredo’s appeal.^[6]  On 17 February 2005, a writ of execution was issued in favor of Emelita.^[7]

In the meantime or on 14 February 2005, however, Alfredo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the 19 January 2005Order of the MeTC.^[8]  In it, Alfredo asked for the suspension of the execution of judgment in favor of Emelita, in view of thesupersedeas bond the former posted on 25 January 2005.^[9]  Emelita, for her part, manifested through her counsel that she has no objection to the posting of the said supersedeas bond and is withdrawing her Motion for Execution.^[10]

On 29 July 2005, the MeTC issued an Order granting Alfredo’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.^[11]  The Order provides:^[12]

x x x [t]aking into consideration the explanation put forth by defendant and with the manifestation of plaintiff’s counsel that they are withdrawing their motion for execution and that they have no objection to the approval of the supersedeas bond, in the interest of substantial justice, the Motion for Partial Consideration is hereby GRANTED.  Defendant’s Notice of Appeal having been granted by this Court in the Order dated January 19, 2005, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

Consistent with the manifestation of plaintiff’s counsel, the motion for execution dated 28 October 2004 is hereby considered withdrawn and the writ of execution dated 17 February 2005 issued by this court is hereby set aside. (Emphasis supplied)

On 2 August 2005, the records of the case were received, on appeal, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.^[13]   Accordingly, the case was re-docketed as Civil Case No. Q-05-56029.^[14]  On 9 August 2005, the case was raffled to Branch 87—then presided by the respondent, Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala.^[15]

In the Sala of the Respondent Judge

          On 12 November 2005, Emelita filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,^[16] asking for the immediate execution of the MeTC judgment.  She pointed out that Alfredo, during the pendency of the appeal, has not made any rental deposits with the RTC as required by Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.^[17]  This omission, Emelita argued, entitles her to an immediate execution of the MeTC ruling in her favor.^[18]

          About three months after, complainant Marciano Alcaraz—as representative of Emelita in the pending case—inquired with the RTC about the status of the motion for execution pending appeal.^[19]  There, the complainant was informed that the appeal was already deemed submitted for decision but the respondent had not taken any action, much less issued any order or resolution, regarding the motion for execution pending appeal.^[20]

          Distraught about the respondent’s apparent inaction, Emelita filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Order Defendant-Appellant to Deposit the Amount of Rent Due to Plaintiff-Appellee Under the Contract, and to Resolve Plaintiff’s November 12, 2005 Motion for Execution Pending Appeal^[21] (Urgent Motion) on 8 February 2006.  Unlike the previous motion, Emelita’s Urgent Motion was actually scheduled for hearing on 17 February 2006.^[22]

          During the day the Urgent Motion was set for hearing, however, Alfredo failed to appear.^[23]  The respondent, thus, issued an order of even date requiring Alfredo to file his Comment on the Urgent Motion within ten (10) days from its receipt.^[24]  But still, no Comment was filed.^[25]

          On 25 April 2006, the respondent finally resolved the Urgent Motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Emelita.^[26]

The Charge and the Recommendation

          On 8 May 2006, the complainant filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit^[27] charging the respondent of neglect or refusal to act on matters pending before her sala, in violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.^[28]  As chief basis of the charge, the complainant cited the respondent’s inexcusable failure to act on Emelita’s motions immediately or, at the very least, within a reasonable time.

          On 13 June 2006, the Ombudsman issued an Order^[29] deferring action on the charge against the respondent, pursuant to the pronouncements of this Court in Maceda v. Vasquez^[30] and Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Hon. Ombudsman.^[31]  The complaint-affidavit was thus referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for the conduct of an appropriate investigation as to the possible administrative liability of the respondent.

          After receiving the respondent’s comment^[32] to the complaint-affidavit and evaluating the established facts, the OCA submitted its Report^[33] to this Court on 23 March 2007.  In essence, the OCA found the respondent administratively liable for unjust delay in the dispatch of her official duties and recommended the sanction of reprimand.^[34]

Our Ruling

          We disagree with the finding and recommendation of the OCA. 

          At first glance, it would seem that the respondent was guilty of undue delay, if not, absolute neglect in resolving Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal.  The respondent had not taken any action on the said motion and, in fact, came to consider Emelita’s plea for an execution pending appeal only after the latter had filed an Urgent Motion.  From the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal, a period of more than five (5) months had to pass before the respondent finally directed a writ of execution to be issued.  Under these circumstances, it was understandable why the complainant cried out against the inaction.

A deeper look at the records of the case, however, reveals that no administrative fault may be attributed on the part of the respondent.

An inspection of Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal discloses a defective notice of hearing.  Thus:^[35]

NOTICE OF HEARING

The BRANCH CLERK OF COURT

RTC QUEZON CITY

BRANCH 87

Greetings:

            Kindly submit the foregoing MOTION for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof, or at any time convenient to the Honorable Court.

Paranaque City for Quezon City

November 12, 2005

Atty. Nelson B. Bayot (Sgd.)

(Emphasis supplied).

          The Rules of Court require every written motion, except those that the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of an adverse party, to be set for hearing by its proponent.^[36]  When a motion ought to be heard, the same rules prescribe that it must be served to the adverse party with a notice of hearing.^[37]

The substance of a notice of hearing is, in turn, laid out in Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.  The provision states:^[38]

Section 5.  Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all the parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, it is clear that the notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal did not comply with the foregoing standards.

First.  Rather than being addressed to the adverse party, the notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court.  Such gaffe actually contradicts a basic purpose of the notice requirement—i.e., to inform an adverse party of the date and time of the proposed hearing.

          Second.  The notice of hearing did not specify a date and time of hearing.  In fact, there was nothing in the notice that even suggests that the proponent intended to set a hearing with the trial court in the first place.  As may be observed, the notice is merely an instruction for the clerk of court to submit the motion “for the consideration and approval” of the trial court “immediately upon receipt” or “at any time convenient” with the said court.  The notice of hearing in Emelita’s motion does not, in reality, give any kind of notice.

Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice of hearing as a mere scrap of paper.^[39]  In the classic formulation of Manakil v. Revilla,^[40] such a motion was condemned as:

x x x [n]othing but a piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no question which the court could decide. The court had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance with Rule 10 [now Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15].  It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the court. It did not become a motion until x x x the petitioners herein fixed a time for hearing of said alleged motion.  (Emphasis supplied).

          An important aspect of the above judicial pronouncement is the absence of any duty on the part of the court to take action on a motion wanting a valid notice of hearing.  After all, the Rules of Court places upon the movant, and not with the court, the obligations both to secure a particular date and time for the hearing of his motion^[41] and to give a proper notice thereof on the other party.^[42]  It is precisely the failure of the movant to comply with these obligations, which reduces an otherwise actionable motion to a “mere scrap of paper” not deserving of any judicial acknowledgment.

Accordingly, a judge may not be held administratively accountable for not acting upon a “mere scrap of paper.”  To impose upon judges a positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with defective notices of hearing would encourage litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but necessary rule of a fair judicial proceeding.  In Hon. Cledera v. Hon. Sarmiento,^[43] this Court aptly observed:

The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing “shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion” (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory principle x x x would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rules and when their requirements may be ignored.  We had to draw a line somewhere and WE did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of Court, wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.^[44] (Emphasis supplied)

          Verily, We find the respondent free from any administrative liability in not taking action on Emelita’s motion for execution pending appeal.  The motion itself is not entitled to judicial cognizance—the reason for which is imputable to the fault of the movant herself and not to an apparent breach of the respondent of her duties as a member of the bench.  Notably, the respondent did act on the matter of the execution of the MeTC judgment pending appeal when the issue was properly scheduled for hearing in the 8 February 2006 Urgent Motion.

WHEREFORE, the complaint dated 8 May 2006 against the respondent, as then presiding judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 87 of Quezon City, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice 

Chairperson 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.       TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

 Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

^[1]               Rollo, p. 7.

^[2]               Id.

^[3]               Id at 7-8.

^[4]               Id. at 8.

^[5]               Id.

^[6]               Id.

^[7]               Id.

^[8]               Id.

^[9]               Id. at 15.

^[10]             Id.

^[11]             Id. at 8.

^[12]             Id. at 8-9.

^[13]             Id. at 9.

^[14]             Id.

^[15]             In Edaño v. Gonzales-Asdala (A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974, 26 July 2007, 528 SCRA 212), the respondent was dismissed from service due to gross insubordination and gross misconduct.

^[16]             Rollo, pp. 38-40.

^[17]             Id.

^[18]             Id. at 38-39.

^[19]             Id. at 36.

^[20]             Id.

^[21]             Id. at 41-45.

^[22]             Id. at 10.

^[23]             Id. at 19.

^[24]             Id.

^[25]             Id. at 21.

^[26]             Id. at 20-21.

^[27]             Id. at 36-37.

^[28]             Id.

^[29]             Id. at 28-31.

^[30]             G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993, 221 SCRA 464.

^[31]             413 Phil. 717 (2001). 

^[32]             Rollo, pp. 7-11.

^[33]             Id. at 1-5.

^[34]             Id.

^[35]             Id. at 39-40.

^[36]             Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

^[37]             Id.

^[38]             Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

^[39]             Sebastian v. Cabal, 143 Phil. 364, 366 (1970); Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Batu Construction Company, 121 Phil. 1221, 1224 (1965); Philippine National Bank v. Donasco, 117 Phil. 429, 433 (1963); Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117, 121 (1923); The Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. The Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866, 871 (1920).

^[40]             42 Phil. 81, 82 (1921).

^[41]             Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

^[42]             Id.  See also Magno v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-22670, 31 January 1969, 26 SCRA 692, 695; Fulton Insurance Company v. Manila Railroad Co., 129 Phil. 195, 203-204 (1967).

^[43]             148-A Phil. 468 (1971).

^[44]             Id. at 491.

CASE NO. 2011-0062 RE:  REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT – BRANCH 56, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU (A.M. NO. 09-7-284-RTC, 16 FEBRUARY 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECTS: DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF CASES.  

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

               SECOND DIVISION

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

               DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

            This administrative matter stemmed from the Report dated July 6, 2009 on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted by the Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in March 2007 in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, Cebu, in anticipation of the compulsory retirement of Judge Augustine A. Vestil (Judge Vestil), then presiding judge of the same court.

          The report disclosed that during the audit, the trial court has: (1) a total caseload of 1,431 cases consisting of 555 civil cases and 876 criminal cases; (2) 15 cases submitted for decision, but were already beyond the reglementary period;^[1] (3) two cases with pending incidents awaiting resolution, which were beyond the reglementary period;^[2] and (4) 247 cases, which had remained dormant for a considerable length of time.

          It was further reported that Branch 56 did not observe an organized record management.  No system was being followed to facilitate the monitoring of the status of cases.  The court records were found to be in disarray as: (1) court records of terminated and archived cases were mixed with active cases; (2) copies of orders, pleadings and other documents were not chronologically attached to the case folders; (3) copies of the minutes of the hearings/proceedings were left unattached to the case folders and were merely kept in a separate file; and (4) loose copies of orders, pleadings and other documents were found merely inserted in the case folders.

          Thus, on April 23, 2007, then Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño issued a Memorandum, directing Judge Vestil to: (1) submit an explanation of his failure to: [a] decide 15 cases submitted for decision within the reglementary period, [b] resolve the incidents for resolution in two cases within the reglementary period, and [c] take further action on the 247 cases despite the lapse of a considerable length of time; (2) decide the 15 cases submitted for decision and resolve the incidents in two cases; and (3) take appropriate action on the 247 dormant cases within 45 days from notice.

          Likewise, in the same Memorandum, Atty. Emeline Bullever-Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug), Clerk of Court of the same court, was directed to devise and adopt a records management system that will ensure the immediate and orderly filing of court records, and effectively facilitate the monitoring of the status of cases and supervise her staff members to ensure prompt delivery of their respective assignments.

          On June 20, 2007, in compliance with the Court’s directives, Judge Vestil, without explaining the reason for the delay, reported the subsequent actions taken in the cases referred to in the Memorandum dated April 23, 2007, to wit:

           As to directive no. 2:

1.           Civil Case No. MAN-2910 – submitted for decision in May 2007 as the defendant’s Formal Offer of Exhibits was filed on February 12, 2007 and the exhibits were admitted on March 19, 2007;

2.           Civil Case No. MAN-3084 – still pending trial and hearing was reset to June 28, 2007;

3.           Civil Case No. MAN-4009 – decided on February 20, 2007, or 17 days before the lapse of the reglementary period. But due to the absence of the typist-in-charge, the typing of the decision was left unfinished;

4.           LRC No. 638 – decided on March 8, 2007;

5.           LRC (Fe Cortes Dabon, petitioner) – decided on December 7, 2006;

6.           Criminal Case No. DU-3316 – decided on September 4, 2006 and was promulgated on June 6, 2007;

7.           Criminal Case No. DU-5308 – decided on September 21, 2004. Promulgated set on December 5, 2006. Reset to May 28, 2007. Reset to April 26, 2007 and reset to May 21, 2007. Pre-trial of other accused was still set on May 21, 2007;

8.           Criminal Case No. DU-7047 – decided on April 13, 2007; promulgated on March 26, 2007;

9.           Criminal Case No. DU-7518 – decided on April 7, 2006; promulgated on April 3, 2007;

10.      Criminal Case No. DU-7649 – decided on February 9, 2007; promulgated on May 28, 2007;

11.      Criminal Case No. DU-9207 – decided on August 1, 2006 and promulgated on April 18, 2007;

12.      Criminal Case No. DU-9650 – submitted for decision on March 1, 2007;

13.       Criminal Case No. DU-11862 – decided per judgment dated October 16, 2006; set for promulgation on March 1. 2007;

14.       Criminal Case No. DU-12508 – originally set to be promulgated on December 6, 2006 but due to lack of judges, it was eventually promulgated only on May 11, 2007;

15.       Criminal Case No. DU-13453 – promulgated on April 2007;

16.       Civil Case No. MAN-3762 (Motion to Dismiss) – counsels were required to submit their respective memoranda with regard to the motion to dismiss only up to June 11, 2007, thus, not yet submitted for decision;

17.      Criminal Case No. DU-10480 (Demurrer to Evidence)- per order dated May 25, 2007, demurrer to evidence was denied. Reception of Accused evidence was set to August 28, 2007.

          With regard to the alleged dormant cases, Judge Vestil acted, although belatedly, on the two hundred forty-seven (247) cases before he retired on August 8, 2007.  Some of the cases were ordered dismissed or archived; others were set for pre-marking of exhibits, deposition-taking, arraignment, pre-trial or hearing; and, some were ordered submitted for decision. Judge Vestil, however, offered no explanation why there was delay in the court’s action in these cases.

          For her part, Atty. Cabahug reported that:

(1)         they have already conducted an inventory of court records in the storage room to properly give space for cases which are archived, disposed or decided cases;

(2)             they made a list in separate logbooks – of the cases: (a) forwarded to the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals; (b) those placed in the bodega; (c) transmitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court; (d) newly filed and transferred from other courts; and (e) already disposed of, decided or archived;

(3)             they already gave instructions to the court clerks to note in the Semi Annual Inventory Report the last action of the court in all the cases assigned to them;

(4)             issued a memorandum to her staff members to seek permission and enter in the logbook the time whenever they go out of the office during office hours;

(5)             and suggested to have a staff meeting every Monday of the month to monitor the concerns of their staff.

          In a Resolution dated March 26, 2008, the Court granted the request of Judge Vestil for the release of his retirement benefits, “provided the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be retained/withheld therefrom to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may impose on him in relation to the instant case.

          The audit team maintained, however, that except for Civil Case No. MAN-3084 and Criminal Cases Nos. DU-9650 and DU-11862 which were inadvertently included as submitted for decision but were in fact already decided or still pending trial, all other cases reported in the audit report suffered undue delay in its disposition. While, Judge Vestil claimed that certain cases were decided within the reglementary period, he, however, also admitted that while he was able to prepare the decisions, the same remained unpromulgated within the reglementary period. With regard to the 247 dormant cases, while he immediately acted upon its resolution, he however, offered no explanation for the delay in the resolution thereof.

          On August 8, 2007, Judge Vestil compulsorily retired from service.

          Later, on July 6, 2009, the OCA, in its Report, found Judge Vestil guilty of undue delay in deciding cases and recommended that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be deducted from the one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) previously withheld from his retirement benefits. However, in so far as Atty. Cabahug is concerned, the instant matter was recommended to be considered as closed and terminated.

          On August 19, 2009, the Court resolved to consider the instant complaint CLOSED and TERMINATED in so far as Atty. Cabahug is concerned.

          On October 12, 2009, Judge Vestil manifested that since his retirement in 2007, he had already undergone several medical examinations and presently his continuous medication costs at least P500.00 daily.  Judge Vestil, thus, prays for the resolution of the instant complaint against him and the subsequent release of the P100,000.00 which was previously withheld from his retirement benefits upon his retirement.

 We sustain the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

A review of the records would show the undisputed delay in the disposition of numerous cases assigned to Branch 56 which was then presided by Judge Vestil.  There were at least 80 civil cases, some were filed as early as 1997, which are still pending as of March 2007.  Furthermore, at least 100 criminal cases are still pending beyond the 90-day reglementary period.

In his defense, Judge Vestil sought refuge from the fact that Branch 56 was saddled with a heavy caseload.  We are, however, unconvinced. The Court knew the heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial judge.  But such cannot excuse him from doing his mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch.  Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with their judicial duty. This, Judge Vestil failed to do. Corollarily, a heavy caseload may excuse a judge’s failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time.^[3]  Hence, all that respondent judge needs to do is request for an extension of time over which the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the OCA, it is not enough that he pens his decision; it is imperative to promulgate the same within the mandated period.  The lack of staff that will prepare and type the decision is equally inexcusable to justify the delay in the promulgation of the cases.

We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt resolution of disputes.  Justice delayed is justice denied.  Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Section 16,^[4] Article III of the Constitution.

The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved.  Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved.  There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.^[5] 

Furthermore, the proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.^[6]  What we emphasized before bears repeating: “It is the duty of a judge to take note of the cases submitted for his decision or resolution and to see to it that the same are decided within the 90-day period fixed by law, and failure to resolve a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency.” “A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution and is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly.”  “The public trust character of his office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility and efficiency.”^[7]Accordingly, it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court, so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.

Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05,^[8] Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which then makes Judge Vestil liable administratively.  Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11 (B) of the same Rule.

          Here, considering that Judge Vestil had been previously administratively sanctioned for dereliction of duty,^[9] the imposition of fine amounting to P40,000.00 is, thus, proper.

          WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judge Augustine A. Vestil is adjudged administratively liable for failure to decide cases within the reglementary period and is hereby FINED in the amount of P40,000.00, to be deducted from theP100,000.00 previously retained from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office is DIRECTED to immediately release the balance of Judge Vestil’s retirement benefits after such fine has been deducted therefrom.

^[1]               Civil Cases Nos. MAN-2910, MAN-3084, MAN-4009, Land Registration Cases Nos. LRC-638, LRC (Fe Cortes Dabon, Petitioner), and Criminal Cases Nos. DU-3316, DU-5308, DU-7047, DU-7518, DU-7649, DU-9207, DU-9650, DU-11862, DU-12508 and DU-13453.

^[2]               Civil Case No. 3762 (Motion to Dismiss) and Criminal Case no. 10480 (Demurrer to Evidence)

^[3]              Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 2 and 31, Tagum City, A.M. No. 04-1-56-RTC, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 605, 610.

^[4]               Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

^[5]               Petallar v. Pullos, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 434, 438.

^[6]               Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Reinato G. Quilala and Branch Clerk of Court Zenaida D. Reyes-Macabeo, MeTC, Branch 26, Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1341, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 597, 604

^[7]               Id.

^[8]               CANON 3-A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE

                x x x x

                Rule 3.05 – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

^[9]                 Suspended for one (1) year and fined in the amount of P50,000.00 for dereliction of duty.