Archive for 2011


LEGAL NOTE 0068: WHEN WILL AN EMPLOYER BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF ITS EMPLOYEE WHO DIED DUE TO AILMENT WHILE AT WORK?

 

SOURCE: OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP. AND/OR DENNIS HAO VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND ANICIA CUBACUB (G.R. NO. 150898, 13 APRIL 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECTS: DAMAGE BASED ON TORT; WHETHER EMPLOYER IS LIABLE FOR DEATH OF EMPLOYEE. (BRIEF TITLE: OCEAN BUILDERS VS. SPOUSES CUBACUB).

 

DIGEST:

 

BLADIMIR BECAME SICK. HE REQUESTED THAT HE BE BROUGHT TO TARLAC. INSTEAD HIS EMPLOYER  BROUGHT HIM TO A COMMUNITY HOSPITAL. THERE HE DIED. HIS PARENTS FILED CASE FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE EMPLOYER OCEAN BUILDER.. RTC DISMISSED CASE. CA REVERSED ON THE GROUND THAT OCEAN BUILDERS HAS NO FULL TIME NURSE, VIOLATIVE OF THE LABOR CODE AND SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT HIM TO A BETTER HOSPITAL.

 

 

IS OCEAN BUILDERS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE?

 

 

NO. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HOW MANY EMPLOYEES IT HAS. IF PETITIONER’S MANAGER’S TESTIMONY IS TRUE,  IT HAD ONLY SEVEN REGULAR EMPLOYEES AND 20 CONTRACTUAL    EMPLOYEES ─ STILL SHORT OF THE MINIMUM 50 WORKERS THAT AN ESTABLISHMENT MUST HAVE FOR IT TO BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A FULL-TIME REGISTERED NURSE. 

 

ALSO,  THE EMPLOYER HAS  GIVEN ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE WHEN ITS MANAGER ADVISED THE EMPLOYEE TO  TAKE A 3-DAY REST AND LATER BROUGHT HIM TO THE NEAREST HOSPITAL.

 

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS CASE?

 

IT IS A CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON TORTS, THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BEING MERELY INCIDENTAL.

At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. 

 

SINCE THIS IS A CASE BASED ON TORTS WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE PRESENT.

 

THERE ARE THREE:  (1) DUTY; (2) BREACH; AND (3) INJURY AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION.

To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz:  (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.  

 

 

IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING A SICK OR INJURED EMPLOYEE, WHAT IS THE DUTY OF EMPLOYER?

 

UNDER ART. 161 OF THE LABOR CODE, THE EMPLOYER MUST PROVIDE ALL THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE MEDICAL AND DENTAL ATTENDANCE  AND TREATMENT.

The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.

        Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:

                  ART. 161.  Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHAT MEDICAL SERVICES MUST THE EMPLOYER PROVIDE?

ART. 157 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES:

                  Article 157.  Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a)          The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b)         The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and

 

(c)          The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous.  Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the company has.  If Hao’s testimony[1][4] would be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual    employees ─ still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse. 

Chicken pox is self-limiting.  Hao does not appear to have a medical background.  He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the CaybigaHospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.

 

ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IN TORTS IS THAT NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE. WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

 

PROXIMATE CAUSE IS THAT WHICH, IN NATURAL AND CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE, UNBROKEN BY AN EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, PRODUCES INJURY, AND WITHOUT WHICH, THE RESULT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.[2][5]  AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR FAILURE TO ACT, WHENEVER IT APPEARS FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE THAT THE ACT OR OMISSION PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL PART IN BRINGING ABOUT OR ACTUALLY CAUSING THE INJURY OR DAMAGE, AND THAT THE INJURY OR DAMAGE WAS EITHER A DIRECT RESULT OR A REASONABLY PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION.[3][6] 

 

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir.  Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.[4][5]  An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.[5][6] 

        Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature.  The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate court’s findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well.  This finding is not, however, borne by the records.  Nowhere in the appellate court’s or even the trial court’s decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker.  At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened.[6][7]

On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his “last illness,” holds that the certificate which he issued ─ citing chicken pox as antecedent cause ─ deserves more credence. 

There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate cause of Bladimir’s death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications ─ from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias’.  In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in both certificates were the same.[7][8] 

Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimir’s attending physician, he having merely ordered Bladimir’s transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the CaybigaHospital.  He thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 o’clock the following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir.  As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.[8][9] 

 

THERE ARE TWO DEATH CERTIFICATES. ONE IS DULY REGISTERED AND THE OTHER IS NOT. WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE?

 

THE REGISTERED ONE BECAUSE IT IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND THE ENTRIES THEREIN ARE PRESUMED CORRECT.

It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise.[9][10]  The QCGH death certificate was received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995.   Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate.  Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he was not around at the time of death.   


[1][4]   Vide TSN, Hearing on January 7, 1997, p. 8.

[2][5]   Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, Dec. 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 439.

[3][6]   Ibid.

[4][5]   Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, Dec. 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 439.

[5][6]   Ibid.

[6][7]   Vide TSN, Hearing on January 7, 1997, p. 25.

[7][8]   Vide TSN, Hearing on June 25, 1996, Direct Examination of Dr. Frias, records, p. 30.

[8][9]   Vide, TSN, Hearing on June 25, 1996, id. at 35.

[9][10] Philamlife v. CA, 398 Phil. 599 (2000).

LEGAL NOTE 0070: CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI?

 

SOURCE: SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS. LBC BANK (G.R. NO. 183575, 11 APRIL 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: WHETHER  C.A. CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MARCELO VS. LBC BANK).

 

CASE DIGEST:

 

SPOUSES MARCELO OBTAINED LOAN FROM LBC BANK AND MORTGAGED THEIR PROPERTY. THEY FAILED TO PAY THE LOAN. LBC BANK FILED EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. LATER LBC BANK MANAGER MILAN EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION AND FILED IT WITH THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. MARCELO’S TITLE WAS CANCELLED AND A NEW TITLE WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF LBC BANK. THE LATTER FILED PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION. MARCELO SPOUSES OPPOSED ON GROUND THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MILAN WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION. RTC ISSUED WRIT OF POSSESSION. MARCELO SPOUSED FILED WITH C.A. A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIOARI.  C.A. REVERSED RTC DECISION. LBC MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION ATTACHING THERETO A SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE SHOWING THAT MILAN HAS AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION. C.A. RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION AND AFFIRMED RTC DECISION.

 

ISSUE: CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR CERIORARI?

 

YES.

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, AS AMENDED, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND PERFORM ANY AND ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN CASES FALLING WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

 

In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank,14 where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate court’s admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the Court held that “[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues.” The Court explained further:

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, “The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.”15

Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court held:

[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Bank’s express ratification ofMilan’s consolidation of the title over the subject property. Further, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Bank’s motion for reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will certainly defeat the ends of substantial justice.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña, III and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring.

3 Id. at 44-46.

4 Docketed as P-525-2004.

5 Records, p. 55. Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.

6Id. at 56.

7 Id. at 154-164.

8 Id. at 163-164.

9Id. at 165-175.

10Id. at 195.

11Id. at 196. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

12Id. at 197-198. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

13 Id. at 41-42.

14 G.R. No. 163788, 24 August 2009, 596 SCRA 662.

15Id. at 682.

16 G.R. No. 153144, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 348-350, cited in Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, supra.

CASE  2011-0115: SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS. LBC BANK (G.R. NO. 183575, 11 APRIL 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: WHETHER  C.A. CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MARCELO VS. LBC BANK).

SECOND DIVISION

 

 

SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO                                G.R. No. 183575

and MILAGROS MARCELO,

Petitioners,                                                                    Present:

 

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

-versus-                                                                           PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

 

 

LBC BANK,                                                                   Promulgated:

Respondent.                                                                    April 11, 2011

x—————————————————————————————–x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

CARPIO, J.:

 

 

The Case

 

 

This petition for review1 assails the 26 March 2008 Amended Decision2 and 27 June 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90166. In the 26 March 2008 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals modified its original decision of 16 June 2006 and affirmed the trial court’s decision of 1 December 2004 directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent LBC Bank (LBC Bank). In the 27 June 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.

The Facts

 

 

On 16 April 1997, petitioners Spouses Rogelio and Milagros Marcelo (Spouses Marcelo) obtained a P3 million loan from LBC Bank. On 27 May 1998, Spouses Marcelo obtained another loan from LBC Bank in the amount of P2.3 million. The two loans were secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Baliuag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-64135 in the name of Spouses Marcelo.

 

Spouses Marcelo defaulted in the payment of their loans. Consequently, LBC Bank sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on 15 October 1998.

 

On 21 October 1998, the Office of the Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan, issued a Notice of Sheriff’sSale. After the posting and publication of the Notice of Sale, the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction on 25 November 1998. LBC Bank, being the highest bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was eventually registered with the Bulacan Registry of Deeds.

 

Spouses Marcelo failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period. As a result, on 5 December 2000, LBC Bank’s Mecauayan Branch Manager, Ricardo B. Milan, Jr. (Milan), executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Title, which was filed with the Bulacan Registry of Deeds. On 1 February 2001, Spouses Marcelo’s title to the subject property was cancelled and TCT No. T-145323 was issued in LBC Bank’s name.

 

 

 

 

On 12 October 2004, LBC Bank filed with the Regional trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 11, a petition4 for the issuance of a writ of possession over the foreclosed property.

 

 

The Trial Court’s Ruling

 

 

On 1 December 2004, the trial court rendered a decision, granting the petition and directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of LBC Bank, to wit:

 

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and the allegations therein to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.

 

Let writ of possession in favor of LBC Bank be issued accordingly.

 

SO ORDERED.5

 

 

Spouses Marcelo moved for reconsideration, contending that LBC Bank’s consolidation of title was invalid since the affidavit of consolidation was executed byMilanwho was allegedly unauthorized to do so. Spouses Marcelo further argued that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was insufficient in form for being verified by one Rosario B. Aotriz who lacked authority to perform such act.

 

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 17 May 2005.6

 

Spouses Marcelo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Spouses Marcelo claimed that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of LBC Bank. Spouses Marcelo alleged that there was no evidence thatMilanwas the authorized representative of LBC Bank to consolidate ownership over the foreclosed property. Absent such evidence,Milanwas allegedly unauthorized, and thus, there was no proper consolidation of title in favor of LBC Bank. Therefore, LBC Bank was not entitled to a writ of possession.

 

 

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

 

On 16 June 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,7 initially granting Spouses Marcelo’ certiorari petition and disposing of the case as follows:

 

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 1, 2004 and the Order dated May 17, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 11 in P-525-2004 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

 

SO ORDERED.8

 

 

LBC Bank filed a motion for reconsideration,9 attaching thereto the (1) Affidavit of Ma. Tara O. Aznar,10 Chief Finance Officer of LBC Bank, attesting to the practice and policy of LBC Bank that Branch Managers are responsible for all accounts within their branch’s jurisdiction with full authority to foreclose secured accounts and consolidate ownership as may be warranted; (2) Secretary’s Certificate,11 dated 27 June 2006, expressly confirming and ratifying the “implied and apparent authority” of Milan to consolidate ownership over the subject property; and (3) Secretary’s Certificate,12 dated 1 July 2005, authorizing Ma. Tara O. Aznar, among others, to “act as authorized signatory in x x x Affidavit/s of Witness/es and other pleadings relevant to the cases of the Bank.”

 

 

On 26 March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision granting the motion for reconsideration “in the interest of substantial justice.” The Court of Appeals considered the documents submitted by LBC Bank, namely, the Affidavit of its Chief Finance Officer and the Secretary’s Certificate, “showing that LBC Bank ratified the questioned consolidation of the subject property.” The dispositive portion of the Amended Decision reads:

 

WHEREFORE, the June 16, 2006 Decision is hereby AMENDED. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 1, 2004 and the Order dated May 17, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 11 in P-525-2004 are AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.13

 

 

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 27 June 2008.

 

The Issue

 

 

The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals can admit new evidence in a special civil action for certiorari.

 

The Ruling of the Court

 

The petition lacks merit.

 

In their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, Spouses Marcelo insisted thatMilanhad no authority to consolidate the title over the foreclosed property on behalf of LBC Bank.

 

On the other hand, LBC Bank claimed that Milan had such authority as indicated in the Secretary’s Certificate dated 9 March 2000, which pertinently states that “the Board hereby confirms and ratifies the authority of [Milan] x x x to file and prosecute to its conclusion, criminal and civil cases for and in behalf of LBC Development Bank and to enter into compromise agreement or execute an affidavit of desistance upon final settlement of criminal/civil complaints/cases, as fully to all intents and purposes as might or could be lawfully done by this Bank;” x x x.

 

As stated, the Court of Appeals initially ruled in favor of Spouses Marcelo. However, upon submission by LBC Bank of documents expressly and unequivocally confirming and ratifyingMilan’s authority to consolidate the title over the foreclosed property, the Court of Appeals amended its original decision.

 

Spouses Marcelo fault the Court of Appeals for admitting and considering the Affidavit of Ma. Tara O. Aznar, dated 10 July 2006, and the Secretary’s Certificates dated 27 June 2006 and 1 July 2005 in resolving LBC Bank’s motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ 16 June 2006 Decision. Spouses Marcelo contend that in a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals cannot admit new evidence. Spouses Marcelo further submit that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, and thus, the Court of Appeals erred in admitting the “additional evidence.”

 

The Court is not convinced.

 

 

In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank,14 where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate court’s admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the Court held that “[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues.” The Court explained further:

 

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, “The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.”15

 

 

Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court held:

 

[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x.

 

Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Bank’s express ratification ofMilan’s consolidation of the title over the subject property. Further, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Bank’s motion for reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will certainly defeat the ends of substantial justice.

 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the 26 March 2008 Amended Decision and 27 June 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90166.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña, III and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring.

3 Id. at 44-46.

4 Docketed as P-525-2004.

5 Records, p. 55. Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.

6Id. at 56.

7 Id. at 154-164.

8 Id. at 163-164.

9Id. at 165-175.

10Id. at 195.

11Id. at 196. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

12Id. at 197-198. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

13 Id. at 41-42.

14 G.R. No. 163788, 24 August 2009, 596 SCRA 662.

15Id. at 682.

16 G.R. No. 153144, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 348-350, cited in Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, supra.