Archive for 2011


WHAT IS AQUINOMICS?

WHAT IS AQUINOMICS?

TRACKING INVESTMENTS

AQUINOMICS: HOPES UP, INFRA DOWN

No Free Lunch

‘Aquinomics’: What difference has it made?

By: Cielito F. Habito
Philippine Daily Inquirer

5:33 am | Tuesday, June 21st, 2011

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In a recent Inquirer Briefing attended by business leaders and other movers and shakers, I was asked to speak on the state of the Philippine economy one year into the Aquino administration. I titled it “A Year Under ‘Aquinomics’,” prompting someone to ask me if there was something to “Aquinomics” beyond playing on the President’s name. Not that I can claim to be a spokesman for the President’s economic team; I am not, and am not aspiring to be one, nor seeking to be part of his government. (It was “the other yellow candidate” whom I supported in the last two presidential elections, after all.)

Addressing the question, “Aquinomics” cannot be likened to, say, “Reaganomics” of the 1980s, which was defined by a distinct economic philosophy known at the time as “supply side economics.” This had challenged traditional demand-side or “Keynesian” economics, which until then was the mainstream thinking in macroeconomics. More recently, we heard of “Thaksinomics” espoused by the former leader ofThailand, which appeared to be defined by his business-friendly yet pro-poor approach to running the Thai economy.

What defines “Aquinomics,” then? One description that comes to mind is “economics of business confidence,” as that has been the driver of the economy under Aquino’s leadership so far. Over the past four quarters, growth in private domestic investment has been consistently surging, based on the quarterly National Income Accounts. This investment surge comes after many years of relative stagnation. Cross-country data from the Asian Development Bank reveal that in 2002-2007, our annual growth in total investment—that is, putting public and private, and foreign and domestic investments together—averaged zero percent. In contrast, our neighbors posted positive investment growth ranging from 3 to 19 percent per year. For most of the past decade, then, our neighbors were leaving us behind in building even greater productive capacity in their respective economies.

What is remarkable about the investment growth we are seeing lately is that it comes in the face of a significant drop in foreign direct investments (FDI). Latest Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas data report that actual net FDI inflows so far this year are 17 percent lower than in the same period last year, a steep drop by any standard. Similarly, latest data on foreign investment approvals by the different investment bodies taken together (namely the Board of Investments, Philippine Economic Zone Authority, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Clark Development Corporation) report a 53 percent drop from last year. And yet, overall investment has jumped 37 percent, implying that domestic investments must have jumped by much more, far overcoming the foreign investment decline.

What makes it even more remarkable is that the public component of domestic investment (government construction) also suffered a deep decline of 37.3 percent. Again, private domestic investments must have zoomed so much that not even this steep fall prevented total investment from surging the way it did.

At face value, the drop in government spending appears to be a downside to the Aquino government’s performance. Data from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) indicate that disbursements in the first four months of the year were P60.5 billion or 11.6 percent lower than in the same period last year. Some observers now fault the new administration for “underspending,” for indeed, not only has it spent less than it did last year, it has also spent even farther less than what had been programmed to be spent by this time. But before casting this government as inept and lacking absorptive capacity, one must remember that this year’s budget was still drawn up by the previous administration. And if the current government has been more prudent about spending the money, it could well be because they have found that they don’t have to spend as much as the former government would have, to accomplish as much.

And it seems they have. The Department of Public Works and Highways is one of the biggest “culprits” in the underspending. It turns out that the agency has made dramatic changes in the way public works projects are costed out, leading to substantial savings. For one thing, Public Works Secretary Rogelio Singson has significantly reduced allowable “indirect costs,” including contractors’ profit margins (and quite likely the so-called “bukol”), in public works projects. Coupled with a strict policy on transparent public bidding, the agency boasts of more than P2 billion in savings from 2,797 projects over the past year.

Another reason for the underspending is that much of the large lump sums allocated by the previous government to various departments remain unspent. These are substantial amounts that the previous leadership gave department secretaries the discretion to allocate and spend—and it’s not hard to imagine how much of it must have gone to less than responsible uses. If the current department secretaries are slow in spending such sums, it could be because their predecessors had over-provided them in the first place. The new administration intends to cut these “lump sums” to a bare minimum in the 2012 budget, the first budget they truly own.

Aquinomics, then, might also stand for economics of fiscal responsibility—and the government now has a rare budget surplus to show for it. And while their underspending normally would have dragged the entire economy down, fortunately for them (and for us), the tremendous boost in private domestic investments that Aquinomics also brought about more than made up for the gap.

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AQUINOMICS, A SEQUEL

No Free Lunch

Tracking investments

By: Cielito F. Habito
Philippine Daily Inquirer

6:13 am | Tuesday, June 28th, 2011

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If responses to last week’s piece on “Aquinomics” are any reflection of the President’s approval rating, recent polls showing that those who are satisfied with his leadership still far outnumber those who are dissatisfied are confirmed by our readers. But there will always be a few who, because of innate pessimism or blind affinity to the previous leadership, still chose to focus on the negatives, and on that basis end up condemning the present state of events.

There were essentially two negative points that I mentioned last week: the decline in government construction spending (by 37.3 percent), and the decline in foreign direct investments (FDI, by 17 percent). I had made the observation that in spite of these, aggregate investment was still recorded to have jumped 37 percent. One need not be a math wizard to infer from this that the remaining component—domestic investments from the private sector—must have grown by far more than that, to have led to such a high growth rate when all three are combined. And because I had offered possible explanations for the first negative point, it was the drop in foreign direct investments that the doubters took me to task for. Hence I felt it useful to look more closely at what happened to investment spending in the past year under “Aquinomics.”

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the drop in foreign direct investments cannot be taken as any indictment of the current government. Two facts are relevant here: one,Japanwas the top source of foreign direct investments last year; and two, the three-way disaster that hitJapanin the first quarter must have dramatically reduced FDI flows therefrom. Having accounted for 28.7 percent of net FDI inflows in the country last year,Japancould very well have accounted for the bulk if not all of the 17 percent drop in FDI recorded by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). But aside fromJapan’s woes, the rich economies, especially theUnited States(the next biggest source of our FDI), have not quite bounced back from where they were before the recent global recession hit them. In short, the drop in FDI over the past year is not President Aquino’s black eye. If it were, we would not have received the unprecedented series of recent credit rating upgrades from Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s Investors Service, concrete manifestation of heightened confidence in the management of the economy under the new leadership.

But a reader was not satisfied. He wrote: “If you can say with certainty that neighboring countries also experienced a similar decline in FDI, and that the decrease in our FDI was not primary caused by discouraging words or acts of this administration, then I shall have no conflict with you.” Well, I can. I was moved to Google my way to the latest Thai FDI data from the Bank of Thailand (their counterpart to our BSP), and found that—guess what—Thailand’s cumulative net FDI inflows in the first quarter of this year fell a steep 95 percent (against our 17 percent drop), i.e., from $1.536 billion to only $69.5 million! IfThailand, long the darling of foreign investors who come to our neighborhood (also dominated by the Japanese, by the way), is seeing such drastic decline, I am willing to bet that our other Asean neighbors have suffered a similar fate. And so I decided to stop Googling for now.

I used to joke, every time our foreign investment trends moved the other way from those of private domestic investments, that “either the foreigners know something our own investor’s don’t—or it’s the other way around.” While I always felt that there is an element of truth to this half-joking observation, my little research tells me this is not what is happening this time. This suggests to me that the moment investment appetite in Japan, the US and other sources of our FDI returns to normal, we will see these ratings upgrades translate into actual inflows of FDI—lots of them. And if we can sustain the momentum of private domestic investment we are seeing right now, and then, with improved government finances, also reverse the decline in public sector investments, I am excited to imagine what our economy can achieve.

What have the private domestic investors been investing in? Indicative data are available on this from the same National Income Accounts that gave the GDP growth figures. The data reveal that the 16.7 percent rise in durable equipment investments went to things like pulp and paper machineries, farm machineries, textile machineries, metal working machineries, air conditioners and refrigeration equipment, mining and construction machineries, pumps and compressors, railway transport equipment, road vehicles, and other industrial equipment—all of which rose by double- up to triple-digit growth rates. In other words, real investments were growing almost all across the board. New factories are being built, or existing factories are being expanded. Even farms are seeing a surge in new investments at a rate not seen for many years. Some may not trust these aggregate data from government statistical bodies, but one doesn’t even need to rely on them entirely. We only need to note how publicly listed companies are announcing, one after another, substantial capital expansion programs within the year and in the years ahead.

To me, there’s no question that there is overwhelming confidence in “Aquinomics” at this time. This makes the challenge all the more daunting for President Aquino: he needs to get his act together and shun the many missteps he has made, lest he himself dissipate this confidence surge before we begin to see Filipinos’ lives get better irreversibly.

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Aquinomics: Hopes up, infra down

By Riza T. Olchondra
Philippine Daily Inquirer

2:55 am | Friday, July 1st, 2011

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One year into the Aquino administration, much improvement is needed to support investor confidence like speeding up public-private partnership (PPP) projects and achieve government targets, economists said.

The Aquino administration inspired business confidence, resulting in increased private investment, according to five economists interviewed separately by the Inquirer.

But the economists said public spending and timely interventions must support business confidence or it would not translate into widespread economic gains.

Cielito F. Habito, a former socioeconomic planning secretary, said on the sidelines of a recent Inquirer forum that “Aquinomics” seemed good enough in the first three months of 2011 using an annualized quarter-on-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth as yardstick.

GDP rose 1.9 percent in the first three months of the year from 0.5 percent and 0.3 percent in the two preceding quarters.

An annualized quarter-on-quarter comparison takes away the so-called base effect from the first quarter of 2010, which Habito said was “warped” by election spending.

Using a year-on-year comparison, the first quarter GDP growth, however, slowed to 4.9 percent from 8.4 percent in the first quarter of 2010.

Habito attributed the good quarter-on-quarter GDP performance to aggressive private investment, which he said was fueled by investor confidence in Mr. Aquino and his administration’s drive for corruption-free and inclusive growth.

Slow-moving PPP

Yet, despite the gains, one particularly sticky issue is that PPP projects, a cornerstone of the administration’s strategy, are perceived to be moving slowly, Habito said.

For investor interest to be sustained, he said, the government must also invest in infrastructure even as it continues to push further reforms to curb red tape and corruption.

Gilbert M. Llanto, an economist with the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, a government think-tank, said the administration “needs a lot of improvement in performing the task of market coordination.”

Concrete interventions

The challenge lies in translating good ideas in the Philippine Development Plan into concrete interventions and measurable outputs, such as tax policy and industrial policy, Llanto said.

Cid Terosa, an economist from the University of Asia and the Pacific, said it was too early to tell if the country was better off than a year ago.

Terosa said the economy and economic management had been “good” so far, but from a scale of 1 to 10, he gave the Aquino administration a score of 7.

“A big letdown would be the seeming lack of authoritative actions on government officials who have not performed up to par. Also the slow realization of PPP projects is a letdown,” Terosa said. “Yes, I am optimistic but governance has to be stronger and more decisive.”

Arsenio M. Balisacan, dean of the University of the Philippines School of Economics (UPSE), said the economy was not doing too badly despite major challenges.

Balisacan said the administration sometimes seemed “distracted” with trying to clean up controversial deals and projects that came about in the previous administration.

However, this cannot be helped as the Aquino administration wants to drive home its anticorruption crusade, he said.

As for the seemingly slow pace of PPPs, Balisacan said it was understandable for the Aquino administration to be careful.

Sin taxes

Balisacan said Mr. Aquino should seriously consider raising taxes or focus on revenue measures like sin taxes that do not really hurt the poor.

The revenue raised should be promptly spent on infrastructure, rural health and education.

The UPSE dean said incentives for companies must be rationalized so that growth areas such asMindanao, where political and security risks need balancing, would benefit instead of established growth areas like Metro Manila.

“Incentives are not serving their purpose if we’re giving them to companies that would otherwise invest or expand, anyway, such as BPO (business process outsourcing) firms. We should give incentives in industries that are just starting out, or as growth boosters in areas with high risk, such asMindanao,” Balisacan said.

He said companies like La Frutera Inc. of Senen Bacani, which invested in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, must be encouraged because they improve the livelihood and confidence of residents in the region.

“We don’t need to give incentives for companies putting up more high-rise buildings in Metro Manila under the label of ‘economic zones,’” Balisacan said.

Joblessness serious

The appropriate rating for the Aquino administration at this time is “NI (needs improvement),” said Benjamin E. Diokno, an economist with the University of thePhilippines, in an e-mail.

“After a year in office, the economy is slowing, joblessness remains serious, and poverty continues to deepen. Of course, it is unfair to expect him to solve these decade-long problems within a year. But after a year in office, Mr. Aquino has yet to unveil his vision and concrete road map of how he will solve these problems,” Diokno said.

He said that while the budget was approved on time, the administration failed to spend efficiently and speedily to perk up the economy.

Diokno said he was not optimistic that Mr. Aquino would meet the target of an average 7 to 8 percent economic growth during his entire term.

The economist noted that the expansion of the pork barrel system was inconsistent with the Aquino administration’s anticorruption crusade.

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 CASE 2011-0123: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE VS. HON. RONALDO PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ALTER-EGO OF PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AND ANYONE ACTING IN HIS STEAD AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS OPERATING IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM), AND PHILIPPINE        NATIONAL POLICE, OR ANY OF THEIR        UNITS OPERATING IN ARMM (G.R. NO. 190259, 07 JUNE 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECT: VALIDITY OF PROCLAMATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY. (BRIEF TITLE: AMPATUAN VS. PUNO)

X ======================================= X

 

SUBJECT: COURT WILL RESPECT PRESIDENT’S JUDGMENT UNLESS THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

 

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,[1][18] it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter.  As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,[2][19] it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.  Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.

 

. . . . . . . . .

 

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.

 

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[1][18]  Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001).

[2][19]  392 Phil. 618, 635 (2000).

EN BANC

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN,             G.R. No. 190259

ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE

SAHALI-GENERALE

Petitioners,                      Present:

                                                                     CORONA, C.J., 

                                                                     CARPIO,

                                                                     CARPIO MORALES,

                                                            VELASCO, JR.,

  NACHURA,

                                                            LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

– versus –                                              BRION,

  PERALTA,

  BERSAMIN,

 DELCASTILLO,

  ABAD,

  VILLARAMA, JR.,

  PEREZ,

  MENDOZA, and

  SERENO, JJ.

HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity

as Secretary of the Department of Interior

and Local Government and alter-ego of

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

and anyone acting in his stead and on

behalf of the President of the Philippines,

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

(AFP), or any of their units operating in

the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE   

NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their      Promulgated:

units operating in ARMM,                       

                             Respondents.                    June 7, 2011                   

x —————————————————————————————- x

 

 

DECISION

 

ABAD, J.:

 

          On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,[1][1] placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City ofCotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.

Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)[2][2] “transferring” supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).  But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the former, by “delegating” instead of “transferring” supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.[3][3]

          Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials,[4][4] filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[5][5] 

          Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Provinceof Sultan Kudaratand the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers.[6][6]  Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.

In its comment for the respondents,[7][7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.[8][8]  She issued the proclamation pursuant to her “calling out” power[9][9] as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.  The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.[10][10]  She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads.

On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way.  These orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM.  They did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11][11] The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.[12][12] Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.[13][13] 

          Although normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this petition, it might be relevant to rule on the issues raised in this petition since some acts done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A could impact on the administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed against those believed affected by such proclamation and orders.

The Issues Presented

 

The issues presented in this case are:

1.       Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;

2.       Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and

3.       Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.   

The Rulings of the Court

         

We dismiss the petition.

One.  The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.

But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.  After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12,[14][14] of RA 9054.  In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.[15][15]  In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

Two.  Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.[16][16]  But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.  And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.  The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.  She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Three.  The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18,Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.[17][17]

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,[18][18] it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter.  As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,[19][19] it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.  Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.  Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

 

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.[20][20] 

          Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and CotabatoCity, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.[21][21]

But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:

The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.

 

Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.

 

x x x x

 

The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with about two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been accounted for. x x x

 

As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred (200) firearms. x x x

 

Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.

 

What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).

 

One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the Ampatuan family.

 

x x x x

 

On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to reckon with because the group is well capable of launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the people and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x

 

In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372) firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms and was reported to be moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.[22][22]

          In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23][23]  Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

          Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946.  It has been reported[24][24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

          SO ORDERED.          

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 


 

 

 

 

      ANTONIO T. CARPIO              CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES    

  Associate Justice                                               Associate Justice

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.     ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

               Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                     Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice

 

 

                      

       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                     LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                 Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice        

 

 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO             MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

              Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

   JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                            JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

             Associate Justice                                                 Associate Justice

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

          Chief Justice

 

 



[1][1]  Rollo, p. 34.

[2][2] Id. at 36.

[3][3] Id. at 80.

[4][4] Ampatuan, Adiong and Sahali-Generale were, respectively, the Governor, Vice-Governor and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the ARMM at that time.

[5][5]  Rollo, pp. 14-17.

[6][6] Id. at 20-22.

[7][7] Id. at 63.

[8][8] Id. at 85, 87, 95.

[9][9] Id. at 98.

[10][10] Id. at 76.

[11][11] Id. at 95.

[12][12] Id. at 78.

[13][13] Id. at 110.

[14][14] SEC. 12. Succession to Regional Governorship in Cases of Temporary Incapacity. – In case of temporary incapacity of the regional Governor to perform his duties on account of physical or legal causes, or when he is on official leave of absence or on travel outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Vice-Governor, or if there be none or in case of his permanent or temporary incapacity or refusal to assume office, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly shall exercise the powers, duties and functions of the Regional Governor as prescribed by law enacted by the Regional Assembly or in the absence thereof, by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. 

[16][16]  Rollo, p. 22.

[17][17]  See SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 509-510 (2004).

[18][18]  Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001).

[19][19]  392 Phil. 618, 635 (2000).

[20][20] Id. at 643-644.

[21][21]  Rollo, pp. 20-21.

[22][22] Id. at 101-105.

[23][23] Id. at 105.

LEGAL NOTE 0071: WHAT ARE MORAL DAMAGES? HOW ARE MORAL DAMAGES PROVEN? WHAT ARE NOMINAL DAMAGES?

 

SOURCE: RODOLFO N. REGALA VS. FEDERICO P. CARIN (G.R. NO. 188715, 6 APRIL 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: QUASI DELICT; MORAL DAMAGES; NOMINAL DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: REGALA VS. CARIN)


WHAT IS THE RULE ON RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES?

 

RECOVERY IS MORE AN EXCEPTION THAT THE RULE.

 

In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule.

 

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MORAL DAMAGES?

 

TO COMPENSATE AND ALLEVIATE THE PHYSICAL SUFFERING, MENTAL ANGUISH, FRIGHT, SERIOUS ANXIETY, BESMIRCHED REPUTATION, WOUNDED FEELINGS, MORAL SHOCK, SOCIAL HUMILIATION, AND SIMILAR HARM UNJUSTLY CAUSED TO A PERSON.

 

Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.

 

HOW DO YOU PROVE MORAL DAMAGES?

 

To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219[19] and 2220[20] of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.  The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

 

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[21]

 

IS MALICE OR BAD FAITH CRUCIAL IN CLAIM FOR MORAL DAMAGES? WHAT IS MALICE?

 

YES.

 

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[27] While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

 

SUPPOSE THERE IS NO MORAL DAMAGES BUT NEVERTHELESS THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON (E.G. RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ENJOYMENT OF HIS PROPERTY) IS VIOLATED? WHAT DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO HIM.

 

NOMINAL DAMAGES THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO RECOGNIZE OR VINDICATE THE VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS.

 

Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. Respondent and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner’s construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same.  Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[29]

 

THE ABOVE POINTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING SOURCE CASE:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

 

RODOLFO N. REGALA,                                 Petitioner,

– versus –

FEDERICO P. CARIN,

Respondent.

 

G.R. No. 188715    Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

                Chairperson,

BRION,

BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

SERENO, JJ.

 

Promulgated:

 

April 6, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

 

          Assailed via this petition for review of petitioner Rodolfo N. Regala is the May 26, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the May 29, 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Br. 255 in Civil Case No. LP-99-0058, ordering petitioner to pay respondent Federico P. Carin moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City.  When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent sometime in May 1998 for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work.

As earlier indicated, petitioner’s real intention was to build a second floor, in fact with a terrace atop the dividing wall.  In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell on their property.  As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondent’s satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-complaint[3] with the Office of the City Engineer and Building Official of Las Piñas City on June 9, 1998.

In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the lack of a building permit for the construction of a second floor, petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the debris falling therefrom, allowed his laborers to come in and out of his (respondent’s) property without permission by simply jumping over the wall, and trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner persisted in proceeding with the construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall.

Several “sumbongs[4] (complaints) were soon lodged by respondent before the Office of Barangay Talon Dos against petitioner for encroachment, rampant invasion of privacy and damages arising from the construction, and for illegal construction of scaffoldings inside his (respondent’s) property.

As no satisfactory agreement was reached at the last barangay conciliation proceedings in December 1998, and petitioner having continued the construction work despite issuance of several stop-work notices from the City Engineer’s Office for lack of building permit, respondent filed on March 1999 a complaint[5] for damages against petitioner before the RTC of Las Piñas City.

In his complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace;  and that debris and dust piled up on respondent’s property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut some of the windows of his house.  Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioner, denying respondent’s allegations, claimed in his Answer[6] that he was the sole and exclusive owner of  the wall referred to as a perimeter wall, the same having been built within the confines of his property and being part and parcel of the house and lot package he purchased from the developer, BF Homes, Inc., in 1981;  that the issue of its ownership has never been raised by respondent or his predecessor;  and that securing the consent of respondent and his neighbors was a mere formality in compliance with the requirements of the Building Official to facilitate the issuance of a building permit, hence, it should not be taken to mean that he (petitioner) acknowledges respondent to be a co-owner of the wall. He added that he eventually secured the requisite building permit[7] in March 1999 and had duly paid the administrative fine.[8]

Further, petitioner, denying that a demolition of the whole length of the wall took place, claimed that he and his contractor’s laborers had been diligently cleaning respondent’s area after every day’s work until respondent arrogantly demanded the dismantling of the scaffoldings, and barred the workforce from, and threatening to shoot anyone entering the premises;  and that the complaint was instituted by respondent as leverage to force him to withdraw the criminal case for slander and light threats[9] which he had earlier filed against respondent for uttering threats and obscenities against him in connection with the construction work.

At the trial, after respondent and his wife confirmed the material allegations of the complaint, petitioner took the witness stand and presented his witnesses.

Architect Antonio Punzalan III[10] testified that he installed GI sheets to prevent debris from falling onto respondent’s property and had instructed his workers to clean the affected area after every work day at 5:00 p.m., but they were later barred by respondent from entering his property.

Engineer Crisostomo Chan[11] from the Office of the Building Official of Las Piñas City testified, among other things, on the circumstances surrounding the complaint for illegal construction filed by respondent and that a building permit was eventually issued to petitioner on March 15, 1999.

Engineer Sonia Haduca[12] declared that upon a joint survey conducted on the properties of both petitioner and respondent in December 1998 to determine their exact boundaries, she found an encroachment by petitioner of six centimeters at the lower portion of the existing wall negligible, since the Land Survey Law permits an encroachment of up to ten centimeters.

By Decision of May 29, 2006, Branch 255 of the Las Piñas City RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent whom it awarded moral damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary damages of P100,000 and attorney’s fees of P50,000 plus costs of suit.[13]

In finding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the renovation of his house without the requisite building permit from the City Engineer’s Office, he misrepresented to respondent his true intent of introducing renovations.  For, it found that instead of just boring a hole in the perimeter wall as originally proposed, petitioner divided the wall into several sections to serve as a foundation for his firewall (which ended up higher than the perimeter wall) and the second storey of his house.

The trial court further declared that respondent and his family had thus to contend with the noise, dust and debris occasioned by the construction, which petitioner and his work crew failed to address despite respondent’s protestations, by refusing to clean the mess or install the necessary safety devices.

Applying Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, the trial court ruled that petitioner was at fault and negligent for failing to undertake sufficient safety measures to prevent inconvenience and damage to respondent to thus entitle respondent to moral and exemplary damages.

On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification by reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.  The appellate court anchored its affirmance on Article 19 of the New Civil Code which directs every person to, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, and observe honesty and good faith.

By Resolution[14] of July 10, 2009, the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as well as respondent’s prayer in his Comment that the original awards made by the trial court be restored.

Hence, petitioner’s present petition faulting the appellate court in

Affirming with modification the decision of the trial court….considering the absence of any competent proof to warrant the grant of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.[15]  (underscoring supplied)

Petitioner maintains that since moral and exemplary damages are compensatory in nature, being meant neither to punish nor enrich, the claimant must establish that not only did he sustain injury but also that the other party had acted in bad faith or was motivated by ill will.  To petitioner, respondents failed to discharge this burden.  He adds that the trial court did not delve into whether petitioner’s renovations were the primary cause of respondent’s claimed injuries, viz violation of privacy, sleepless nights and mental anguish, among other things, as it instead focused on the lack of a building permit as basis for the awards.

Rebutting the testimony of respondent’s wife as to the alleged unauthorized intrusion of petitioner’s workers into respondent’s property in order to erect scaffoldings, petitioner points out that such an undertaking would take a considerable length of time and could not have gone unnoticed had consent not been given by respondent.

Moreover, petitioner posits, if consent had truly been withheld, there was nothing to prevent respondent from dismantling or immediately removing the offending structures – a course of action he did not even attempt.

In his Comment[16] to the petition, respondent quotes heavily from the appellate and trial court’s findings that fault and negligence attended petitioner’s renovation, thus justifying the award of damages. He goes on to reiterate his plea that the awards given by the trial court in its decision of May 29, 2006 should be reinstated.

The petition is partly impressed with merit.

The trial court’s award of moral and exemplary damages, as affirmed by the appellate court, was premised on the damage and suffering sustained by respondent arising from quasi-delict under Article 2176[17] of the Civil Code.  Thus the trial court explained:

Indeed, there was fault or negligence on the part of the defendant when he did not provide sufficient safety measures to prevent causing a lot of inconvenience and disturbance to the plaintiff and his family. The evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding the dirt or debris, as well as the absence of devices or safety measures to prevent the same from falling inside plaintiff’s property, were duly established. It did not help the cause of the defendant that he made a lot of misrepresentations regarding the renovations on his house and he did not initially have a building permit for the same. In fact, it was only after the construction works were completed that the said permit was issued and upon payment of an administrative fine by the defendant.[18]

In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule.  Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.  To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219[19] and 2220[20] of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.  The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[21]

In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner’s act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.

It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.

The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifically Architect Punzalan, demonstrates that they had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least, minimize the damage to respondent’s property occasioned by the construction work. Architect Punzalan details how upon reaching an agreement with petitioner for the construction of the second floor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioner’s property based on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and Tax Declarations[22] and found that the perimeter wall was within the confines of petitioner’s property; that he, together with petitioner, secured the consent of the neighbors (including respondent) prior to the start of the renovation as reflected in a Neighbor’s Consent[23] dated June 12, 1998; before the construction began, he undertook measures to prevent debris from falling into respondent’s property such as the installation of GI sheet strainers, the construction of scaffoldings[24] on respondent’s property, the instructions to his workers to clean the area before leaving at 5:00 p.m;[25]  and that the workers conducted daily clean-up of respondent’s property with his consent, until animosity developed between the parties.[26]

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[27] While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages.[28]

Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. Respondent and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner’s construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same.  Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[29]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is VACATED.  The Court orders petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P25,000 as nominal damages.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                         Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

                                  CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                      Associate Justice

                                   Chairperson

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA                                                                                                 Chief Justice


[1]       Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with the concurrence of Associate Justices       Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., CA rollo, pp. 157-164.

[2]       Records, pp. 579-602.

[3]       Exhibit “B,” records, pp. 281-282.

[4]      Id. at 9 and 284.

[5]       Docketed as Civil Case No. LP-99-0058, id. at 2-6.

[6]       Id. at 21-28.

[7]      Exhibit “21,” id. at 427.

[8]      Vide Exhibit “22,” id. at 428.

[9]       Criminal Case Nos. 43519-20 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Br. 79.

[10]     TSN, August 4, 16, 2004.

[11]    TSN, September 27, 2004.

[12]    TSN, October 13, 2004

[13]     Records, p. 602.

[14]    CA rollo, p. 187.

[15]    Rollo, p. 32.

[16]     Id. at 350-356.

[17]     Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

[18]     Records, p. 600.

[19]     Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1)     A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2)     Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3)     Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;

(4)     Adultery or concubinage;

(5)     Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6)     Illegal search;

(7)     Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8)     Malicious prosecution;

(9)     Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

[20]    Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently and in bad faith.

[21]     B. F. Metal (Corporation) v. Lomoton, G. R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 618, 628-629 citing Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 139268, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 270, 276.

[22]     Exhibit “11,” records, p. 413.

[23]     Exhibit “7,” id. at 288.

[24]    Exhibits “5” to “6,” id. at. 278.

[25]    TSN, August 4, 2004, pp. 18-34.

[26]    Id. at 35-38.

[27]    Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108164, 241 SCRA 671, 675.

[28]     Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 139268, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 270, 277.

[29]    Id. at 279.