J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE NO. 2011-0126: GEORGE MILLER VS. SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND GIOVAN BERNARDINO ( G.R. NO. 165412, 30 MAY 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J) SUBJECTS: PROBABLE CAUSE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. (BRIEF TITLE: MILLER VS. SEC. PEREZ)

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SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.  In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.  Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person.  Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.  Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial.

SUBJECT: DEFINITION OF PROBABALE CAUSE

The term “probable cause” does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.  It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.  Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

SUBJECT: WHEN DOJ SECRETARY RENDERS A RESOLUTION DISMISSING A COMPLAINT DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE HE COMMITS GRAVE ERROR. COURTS MUST SUBSTITUTE THEIR JUDGMENT.

While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority.  Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on record.

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THIRD DIVISION

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

          Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision dated June 14, 2004 and Resolution dated September 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72395.  The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent Secretary of Justice in issuing his Resolution dated March 21, 2002 which ordered the exclusion of respondent Giovan Bernardino (Bernardino) from the Information for attempted murder.

The facts as culled from the records:

Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) inMuntinlupaCity.  In November and December 1998, while serving as Acting Secretary General of the Inmates’ Crusade Against Drugs (ICAD) based at NBP, petitioner wrote two confidential lettersaddressed to then NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os. The letters contained a detailed report of the alleged irregularities and drug trading activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo), both inmates at the Medium Security Compound and ICAD Treasurer and Chairman, respectively.  Petitioner also recommended the transfer of Bernardino and Bernardo to the Maximum Security Compound.

          On January 6, 1999, at around 2:30 p.m., while proceeding towards the volleyball court at the Medium Security Compound, petitioner felt a crushing blow at the back of his head.  As blood oozed from his head, petitioner ran to the Infirmary for first aid treatment.  Later, petitioner was transferred to the NBP hospital.  On January 17, 1999, Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez, Medical Specialist at the NBP hospital, issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings:

–          lacerated wound, one (1), about 8 to 9 cms. long,

1 cm. deep, on parietal area of the head.

–          Barring unforseen (sic) circumstances, healing period is

from 7 to 10 days.

Investigation of the incident was immediately ordered by Supt. Agalo-os.   PGIII Cecilio M. Lopez conducted the investigation and submitted to the NBP Director his Reportdated January 5, 1999.  Based on the sworn statement of petitioner and the verbal admissions made by inmates Constantino Quirante, Jr. (Quirante)  and Roberto Ceballos (Ceballos), it was found that a few days before the incident, Bernardo and Bernardino confronted petitioner regarding the letters he wrote reporting the alleged illegal drug activities of Ace Aprid (Aprid), Bernardo and Bernardino at ICAD.  Bernardo and Bernardino were furious when petitioner admitted having authored the letters, threatening him with the words “Mamamatay ka,” which petitioner fully understood: he is going to die.  Petitioner discovered that another inmate (Valeroso) to whom he confided the matter, had divulged the existence of the letters to Bernardo and Bernardino.   At the time he was hit at the back of his head, petitioner was able to turn around and saw his assailant, later identified as Quirante, who ran away through the gate leading to the “talipapa” where petitioner lost sight of him.  Petitioner then saw two persons standing near the entrance of the “talipapa” and shouted at one of them asking for the identity of his assailant and if he saw the incident.  However, the man just kept mum.  As petitioner realized that blood was oozing from his head, he immediately went to the Infirmary.

The day after the incident, Bernardo and Bernardino along with fellow inmates Aprid, Virgilio Adrales, Rogelio Aguilar, Amable Bendoy, Arnel Modrigo, Alfred Magno and Vergel Bustamante, were brought to the investigation section.

In the course of the investigation, Quirante and Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on petitioner and the information they provided was summarized by the investigating officer as follows:

x x x x

While the investigation was in progress, inmates Roberto Ceballos and Constantino Quirante voluntarily surfaced admitting their participation in the clubbing of Miller.  After having been informed of their constitutional rights, the two during interrogation and without second thought, narrated in detail how and why they attempted to kill Miller in the following manner:

At around 10:30 A.M. of January 6, 1999, in whiling the time under the shade of a tree in a basketball court of the Medium Security Camp, Quirante and Ceballos were approached by Aprid and Bernardino to engage their services and offered an amount of P1,500.00 to kill Miller.  Being in dire need of money at the very moment, Quirante and Ceballos accepted the offer.  Quirante admitted treacherously hitting Miller at the back of his head with a piece of wood but for failing to get him with one blow, he had to flee.  On the other hand, Ceballos admitted as the lookout and was asked by Miller the identity of his assailant right after he was clubbed.  Accordingly, what motivated them to reveal everything is the fact that only P100.00 was paid in advance to them by Bernardino and Aprid and the balance of P1,400.00 as promised to be paid sooner was never fulfilled.  The duo even signified their intention to reduce their participation in writing to authenticate the admission of their guilt.  However, in the absence of a lawyer to assist them and to safeguard their constitutional rights, the officer on case opted not to do so.

To ascertain the veracity of Ceballos and Quirante’s confession, a confrontation was made at the Director’s Office.  Several inmates were lined-up with Ceballos and Quirante.  Miller when asked to identify his assailant, he spontaneously pointed to Quirante as the one who clubbed him on the head and likewise pointed to Ceballos as the man whom he had shouted at asking for the identity of his assailant.

x x x x

On the basis of the foregoing, PGIII Lopez recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further investigation “pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid.”   On February 10, 1999, the case was endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor submitting to the said office the following documents: (1) Investigation Report of PGIII Lopez; (2) Sworn Statement of petitioner; (3) Medical Certificate; (4) Routing Slip of Supt. Agalo-os; and (5) petitioner’s letters dated November 21, 1998 and December 27, 1998 addressed to the NBP Superintendent.  The case was docketed as I.S. No. 99-B-01314.

On March 30, 1999, Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla issued his resolutionfinding the evidence sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence, thus:

Anent the charge against Giovan Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo, we noticed that the same is merely anchored on suspicion and conjecture.  Except the bare allegations of the complainant, nothing would link them to the assault against the complainant.  In fact, their names were not even mentioned in the referral letter, dated February 10, 1999, of the Bureau of Corrections addressed to our Office.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the attached Information be filed in court.  Further, it is recommended that the charge against Ceballos be dismissed on ground of insufficiency of evidence.  As to the charge against Bernardino and Bernardo the same is likewise recommended dismissed on ground of insufficiency of evidence without prejudice to the refilling of same in the event that evidence against them may be unearthed by concerned authorities. (Italics supplied.)

Thereafter, an information for attempted murder was filed against Quirante only in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMuntinlupaCity(Branch 256), docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-452.

On or about April 14, 1999, Quirante and Ceballos executed a joint affidavit in Tagalog (“Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay”) which was sworn to before Prosecutor Padilla.   They declared that at noontime of January 6, 1999, their services were engaged through their “Bosyo” or Commander, Rodrigo Toledo (Toledo), who told them that if they hit (“paluin”) petitioner they will be paid P1,500 by Bernardino and Bernardo. Hence, they carried out the clubbing of petitioner by 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day infront of the volleyball court of the Medium Security Compound while petitioner was walking from the “talipapa.”   Quirante struck at petitioner from behind using a piece of wood and then ran away towards the “talipapa.”  Petitioner turned around and saw Ceballos whom he asked for the identity of his assailant. In pain and with bleeding wound on his head, petitioner momentarily sat down and then brought himself to the infirmary.   Ceballos thought that petitioner did not recognize him since his face was then covered with shirt cloth. A day later, Toledo handed them P100 as initial payment, the balance to be paid by Bernardo and Bernardino also through Toledo.  However, three days passed without the P1,400 being paid to them, until they were called to appear before the Director’s office.  When questioned during the investigation, they readily owned up to the assault on petitioner because Bernardino and Bernardo did not pay the agreed amount.

The sworn statement of Quirante and Ceballos was corroborated by Toledowho likewise executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” on even date stating that as early as December 1998, Bernardo and Bernardino have been talking to him about their plan to have petitioner killed.  Toledo being the leader of their group (BC 45) at the Medium Security Compound, Bernardo and Bernardino promised that they will pay whoever among his (Toledo) men can do it.   Toledo claimed that he initially declined but due to the daily conversations with Bernardo and Bernardino who also gave him food, he finally called on two of his men, Quirante and Ceballos, to carry out the plan to kill petitioner.  He was confident that everything will be alright since Bernardo and Bernardino committed to pay P1,500 for the job.  A day after the clubbing of petitioner, he gave Quirante and Ceballos P100 as initial payment by Bernardo and Bernardino for their services.  Three days later, he learned that Quirante and Ceballos were summoned before the Director’s Office in connection with the incident.  He affirmed the truth of the admissions made by Quirante and Ceballos because Bernardo and Bernardino failed to comply with their undertaking.

On December 2, 1999, Quirante, Ceballos andToledoexecuted new affidavitsin English, which were sworn to before Bureau of Corrections Assistant Director Joselito A. Fajardo and Prosecutor Leopoldo B. Macinas.  These new affidavits gave a more detailed narration of the incident and pointed to Bernardo and Bernardino as the “masterminds” with Aprid being an accomplice.  Bernardo and Aprid allegedly planned the killing of petitioner together with Toledo, the BC 45 Gang Commander, wherein Quirante agreed to be the one to kill petitioner while another gang member, Ceballos, would act as his lookout.  The affidavits also mentioned what transpired during the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla and the earlier April 1999 Tagalog affidavits they executed before Prosecutor Padilla. These documents were submitted during the reinvestigation conducted by Prosecutor Macinas.

Bernardo and Bernardino submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavitdated January 19, 2000, stating that it was the second time they were being implicated in the case and pointing out that both investigations by the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Corrections and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Muntinlupa City showed that they have no participation in the commission of the offense.  They asserted that the charges against them have no basis and the fruit of the wrong and malicious imputations of the witnesses. They denied having committed any violation of the rules and regulations of ICAD, of which Bernardo is Chairman while Bernardino is the Treasurer.  They claimed that in the three years they have been serving the ICAD, the organization has more than progressed and benefitted their fellow inmates at the NBP.  As to the statements given by Quirante, Ceballos andToledo, and other witnesses, these are conflicting and muddled, showing so much evidence of them having been tutored.

Bernardo and Bernardino likewise presented a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” executed by their witnesses, co-inmates Arnel Modrigo, Virgilio Adrales and Rogelio Aguilar.    Said affiants declared that when petitioner approached them and asked if Aprid and Bernardo had anything to do with the incident, they plainly answered in the negative and told petitioner he should ask those persons instead. Everyday, petitioner goes to them asking them to pinpoint Aprid, Bernardo and Bernardino as the masterminds in order to strengthen the case against them.   Petitioner even asked them to sign a handwritten letter prepared by petitioner himself, addressed to Supt. Agalo-os and which, while requesting for their transfer to the Medium Security dormitories, also affirmed the culpability of Aprid, Bernardo and Bernardino for the attempt on the life of petitioner. However, they refused to do so as they know there was no truth to the contents of said letter.

On March 20, 2000, Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued his Memorandumaddressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against Quirante, Ceballos andToledoin conspiracy with Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo, for the crime of attempted murder.  Prosecutor Macinas was convinced that the detailed account given by Quirante, Ceballos andToledowere executed freely and voluntarily, and found no reason why they would incriminate their co-inmates other than the truth of the statements in their affidavits.  On the other hand, the defenses proffered by Bernardo and Bernardino are evidentiary matters which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents Giovan Bernardino, Rod[o]lfo Bernardo, Rodrigo Toledo, Ace Aprid and Roberto Ceballos be all indicted by way of the herein attached amended information as co-conspirators of accused Constantino Quirante in attempting to kill George Miller, prima facie case having been established.

Consequently, an Amended Information was filed with the RTC which included the names of Bernardino, Aprid, Bernardo,Toledoand Ceballos as co-conspirators in the crime of attempted murder.

Bernardino filed a petition for reviewwith the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to support a claim of conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a language foreign to the affiants.  He noted that the English affidavits pointed to three people as the masterminds when originally only two have been implicated by the perpetrators (Quirante and Ceballos).

Petitioner filed his opposition,alleging that contrary to the claim of Bernardino, the Bureau’s investigation was far from complete as the Report of PGIII Lopez itself stated that the case is recommended for further investigation “pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid”.  As to the Tagalog affidavits, petitioner pointed out that these could not have been produced during the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla since the documents were executed only on April 14, 1999, two weeks after Prosecutor Padilla rendered his resolution.  Further investigation by the Bureau led to the execution of two affidavits in Tagalog (Quirante, Ceballos andToledo) without the knowledge of petitioner. However, said Tagalog affidavits “disappeared” and petitioner was not allowed access to the Investigation Section’s file despite his complaints to Director Sistoza, the Bureau and DOJ.  Prior to the November 25, 1999 hearing on reinvestigation, petitioner had new affidavits in English prepared with the assistance of a former Supreme Court interpreter (inmate Chua) and these were subsequently signed  by Toledo, Quirante and Ceballos and sworn to before Prosecutor Macinas.  Hence, the said documentary evidence was already considered in the March 20, 2000 Resolution of Prosecutor Macinas.  Petitioner further alleged that Bernardo and Bernardino received thru registered mail copy of the March 20, 2000 Resolution on June 16, 2000 but the petition for review before the DOJ was actually filed only on July 27, 2000 but conveniently dated July 14, 2000.

On March 21, 2002, public respondent, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez, issued his Resolutionfinding merit in the petition.   According to Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos andToledoare not credible considering “the length of time they were executed since the commission of the crime” and also because said documents cannot be considered newly discovered evidence.  He further noted that the affidavits were executed by the same persons investigated by the Bureau of Corrections and who all participated in the preliminary investigation of the case.  At most, said affidavits can only be considered as “afterthought or made upon the prodding or influence of other persons.”  Public respondent thus ordered:

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is MODIFIED.  The City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City is directed to amend the information to exclude accused Giovan Bernardino therefrom, and to report action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

On March 25, 2002, a Motion to Admit Second Amended Information, which dropped the name of respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed in court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under Resolutiondated August 1, 2002.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.  Petitioner argued that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in disregarding all material evidence presented which clearly showed that the affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos andToledo had not been submitted during the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla.  Contrary to the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice, the absence of said affidavits could not be construed as an irregularity in the conduct of preliminary investigation.  This must be so since the March 30, 1999 resolution of Prosecutor Padilla explicitly stated that if and when evidence be unearthed by the concerned authorities, the case may still be re-filed against the other suspects, including Bernardo and Bernardino, for conspiracy in the attempted murder of petitioner. Petitioner also faulted the public respondent in granting the petition for review despite the same having been filed out of time, more than one month after receipt of the DOJ resolution.

On June 14, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned resolutions. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

Petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that –

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW, AND AS SUCH THE INSTANT PETITION SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHEN, IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE WITNESSES DATED APRIL 14, 1999 AND DECEMBER 2, 1999, IT RELIED HEAVILY ON A MERE INFERENCE BASED NOT ON ESTABLISHED FACTS BUT ON ANOTHER INFERENCE.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW, AND AS SUCH THE INSTANT PETITION SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHEN, IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE REVERSING THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR’S FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT DEPARTED FROM THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, AND IN THE PROCESS, FAILED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT AND THOROUGH DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in concluding that the decision of the Secretary of Justice was supported with factual basis notwithstanding that its conclusion that the new affidavits were executed upon the influence of persons who merely wanted to indict respondent Bernardino, was based merely on another inference – that there was considerable length of time before the said affidavits were executed.  He assails the CA which, like the Secretary of Justice, closed its eyes on the clear indications of culpability appearing on the faces of the affidavits presented during the reinvestigation. The CA disregarded these pieces of evidence despite the same having established prima facie that respondent Bernardino is probably guilty of the charge, for the reason alone that since the Secretary of Justice himself “doubts the veracity of the affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo, it would be embarrassing to compel [him] to prosecute the case.”

On the other hand, respondent Bernardino in his Comment argued that the “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” of petitioner from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice should have been the trial court’s resolution of the “Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Information” which had been set for hearing, and not the petition for certiorari he filed before the CA.  He also insists that only one copy of the March 20, 2000 Memorandum of Prosecutor Macinas was sent to the NBP which was addressed to petitioner.  It was only on July 4, 2000 that his family was able to secure a copy from the Office of the City Prosecutor.  As to the resolution of public respondent Secretary, respondent Bernardino maintains that the Secretary of Justice was correct in disregarding the new English affidavits as they were subscribed by unlettered affiants who can hardly speak Filipino and know only the Visayan dialect.

On its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition as the Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion in modifying the ruling of Prosecutor Macinas by ordering the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the Information.   Considering that the affidavits indicting respondent Bernardino were executed after the initial preliminary investigation and after an information was already filed in court, the Secretary of Justice was justified in giving less credence to the said evidence.

We find the petition meritorious.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.  To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.  Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.  It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.

It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice.The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.

The Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.  Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s findings, courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or by the law.

In this case, Secretary Perez disregarded the new (English) affidavits executed by Quirante, Ceballos andToledo, saying it was an afterthought or made simply upon the prodding or influence of other persons.  He also stated that Quirante, Ceballos andToledoall participated in the investigations of the Bureau of Corrections.  No mention, however, was made of the fact that said new affidavits firmly reiterated what Quirante, Ceballos andToledodeclared in their earlier Tagalog affidavits and their verbal admissions during the investigation proceedings conducted by PGIII Lopez.  These Tagalog affidavits in turn, although executed two weeks after the initial preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla, were properly admitted and considered by the investigating officer, Prosecutor Macinas who took over during the reinvestigation of the case.  The recommendation of Prosecutor Padilla which initially found probable cause only against Quirante, explicitly reserved the inclusion of Bernardo and Bernardino whose complicity may eventually be established, by qualifying the dismissal of the case as against them for insufficiency of evidence, with the words “without prejudice to the refiling of the same in the event that evidence against them may be unearthed by concerned authorities.”  The reservation made by Prosecutor Padilla for the inclusion of other persons who may have had complicity in the commission of the crime was grounded on reasonable belief that there were other conspirators or masterminds, on the basis of the findings of PGIII Lopez during the investigation by the Bureau, the verbal admissions of Quirante and Ceballos as to their culpability and the alleged masterminds they identified. Hence, the English affidavits submitted during the reinvestigation cannot be considered an afterthought and executed merely upon the influence of certain persons, and Prosecutor Macinas properly admitted those in evidence.

Indeed, the English affidavits contained a reiteration and more detailed account of the clubbing incident earlier given by Quirante, Ceballos andToledoin the Tagalog affidavits. In these affidavits executed on December 2, 1999, as well as in the Tagalog affidavits dated April 14, 1999, they were consistent in pointing to Bernardo and Bernardino as the masterminds with Aprid as accomplice, in the crime charged.  Further, the English affidavits fully explained the circumstances as to why they were not able to give sworn statements during the Bureau investigation and initial preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla, before whom they subscribed their Tagalog affidavits, and the reason for the execution of new affidavits in English which were subscribed before Prosecutor Macinas.  Thus, the pertinent portions of their individual affidavits in English read:

            Affidavit of Roberto Ceballos

x x x x

On January 9^th 1999 at around 10:00 a.m. inmate Constantino Quirante was arrested by theICA (Inmates Custodial Aide) who took him to the Overseer’s Office for interrogation. I was arrested shortly afterwards by theICA and taken to their office also for investigation.  Inmate Constantino Quirante and I were then confined to the Bartolina (disciplinary cell) where we remained for two months and twenty one days (2 mos. 21 days) before being transferred to the Maximum Security Compound.

Shortly after being confined in the disciplinary cell at the Medium Security Compound, inmate Quirante and I were summoned to the Maximum Security Compound for interrogation. We first went to the office of Superintendent Agalo-os and made a joint statement which we did not sign as we were nervous and a lawyer (Ace Aprid’s counsel I think) was present.  We were then taken to the ante-room of the Director’s office where inmate Dr. George Miller was with an Inspector Lopez from the Bureau’s Investigation Section and an [illegible] Inspector Lopez’s questions in Tagalog and Dr. Miller asked why those people from ICAD wished to have him killed. We told him it was because he had informed on them with a report to the Superintendent.  While confined in the Medium Security Compound’s Bartolina we were visited by Giovan Bernardino who told us to keep quiet about what had happened and gave us hamburgers.  He also promised us money but this never materialized.

Later in the beginning of March we were escorted to the Muntinlupa City Prosecutor’s Office for a preliminary hearing.  We were surprised nobody from ICAD was there but Miller said he would not prefer charges against us provided we turned State’s witnesses and deposed to a counter-affidavit exposing the “masterminds”, those in fact who had commissioned the crime. Quirante and I requested the Asst. Prosecutor Padilla for a few days within which to think about submitting a counter-affidavit.  The Asst. Prosecutor Padilla arranged a second preliminary hearing which was on the 11^th March 1999 when we informed him we were still thinking it over.  Afterwards when we were transferred to the Maximum Security Compound we discovered the Bureau of Corrections’ Investigation Section had commenced an inquiry into the management of ICAD.  We were summoned to the Penal Superintendent’s office with inmate Rudy Toledo, when Quirante and I gave a joint affidavit withToledo giving another of his own account. All three of us were then escorted to Assistant Prosecutor Padilla’s office inMuntinlupaCity when we swore in our respective affidavits.  I understand from Dr. Miller these affidavits have been “misplaced” and he is unable to access copies from the Bureau of Corrections.  I therefore agreed to execute another deposition which differs from the joint affidavit sworn earlier in that this is more thorough.

Affidavit of Constantino Quirante

x x x x

On January 9^th, I was urinating in front of building 5 when I was called to the office of Inspector Del Prado.  I changed into my issue uniform at the brigada and proceeded to Inspector Del Prado’s office where I was arrested.  I admitted to the “hit” on Miller and that I was acting on orders received from Boy Bernardo and Giovan Bernardino of ICAD given to the BC 45 gang commander, Rudy Toledo.  I was then confined at the Medium Security Compound’s disciplinary cell.  Roberto Ceballos, who had been arrested and interrogated by theICA joined me in the bartolina.  Giovan Bernardino later visited us in the bartolina bringing hamburgers but no money.  Upon his request I promised to keep quiet about the involvement of inmate Boy Bernardo and himself. He assured me not to worry and that everything would be taken care of.

Round about Jan. 29^th, Roberto Ceballos and I were escorted to the office of Superintendent Agalo-os at the Maximum Security Compound.  We gave Superintendent Agalo-os a statement but did not sign it.  I believe the attorney of Ace Aprid was present so Ceballos and I were nervous of signing.  We were then taken to the ante room of the Director’s office where inmate Miller was present with Inspector Lopez of the Investigation Section and an interpreter.  We were asked a number of questions in Tagalog by Inspector Lopez and Dr. Miller asked why Bernardino and Bernardo wished him to be killed  [illegible]    myself provided we completed a counter-affidavit naming Bernardo and Bernardino as the “masterminds”.  Asst. City Prosecutor Padilla said he would give us some time to consider and he arranged a second preliminary hearing for March 11^th 1999.  At the second meeting we refused to give a counter-affidavit as we had not yet decided and also we were worried.

Thereafter we were transferred to the Maximum Security Compound on the 30^th of March. Approximately one month later we were called to the office of Superintendent Agalo-os with inmate Rudy Toledo.  Ceballos and I prepared a joint affidavit for the Bureau’s Investigation section and Rudy Toledo completed a sep[a]rate affidavit.  These handwritten affidavits were photocopied in Super[intendent] Agalo-os’s office by the Investigation Section Officer and at approximately 4:00 p.m. we were escorted into Assistant City Prosecutor Padilla’s office w[h]ere the affidavits were sworn.

This further affidavit is made at the request of Dr. Miller, as I understand the prior affidavits sworn in front of Attorney Padilla have disappeared and he has not been allowed access to the Bureau of Correction[s’] file copies with the Investigation Section.  This affidavit is more comprehensive and better than our first joint affidavit which was hurriedly completed in manuscript.

Toledo’s affidavit not only dovetailed with the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the execution of the two sets of affidavits, but also positively identified Bernardo, Bernardino and Aprid as the masterminds and detailed how the crime was planned and carried out on January 6, 1999.  Thus:

x x x x

On or about December 15^th, 1998 I had a meeting with inmate Giovan Bernardino at the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs restaurant in the Medium Security Compound of Camp Sampaguita.  The meeting was arranged by Giovan Bernardino when he spoke to me in my capacity as commander of the BC 45 Gang (Medium Security Compound) requesting that I arrange for some of my members to kill Dr. George Miller of the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs.  He offered the sum of one thousand five hundred pesos (PHP 1,500.00) to be paid after the task was accomplished.  Initially, I refused to accept this mission.  Thereafter, we met several times in ICAD’s premises mainly, at the billiard table.  At each meeting, he endeavoured to persuade me of that which he required earlier, namely to have some of my gang members kill inmate George Miller.  Everytime I refused inmate Bernardino said there was no need to worry he was able to take care of everything afterwards.  In January he contacted me again when I was invited to ICAD’s offices where I remember seeing a computer.  Inmate Rodolfo “Boy” Bernardo, the Chairman of the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs was present with another ICAD member inmate, Ace Aprid, who was the Sigue Sigue Sputnik commander of the Medium Security Compound.  Inmates Bernardo and Aprid were the colleagues of inmate Bernardino and all of them wanted Miller killed as they stated he had submitted a report concerning their activities in ICAD to Superintendent Agalo-os and was responsible for ICAD’s premises being subjected to a search by sniffer dogs at the Superintendent’s direction.  Later I arranged for two of my gang members, inmates Constantino Quirante and Roberto Ceballos, who agreed to do as ICAD’s Bernardo, Bernardino and Aprid had requested.  This was the morning of the 6^th of January and it was agreed that Quirante would be the assassin while Ceballos was to be the “lookout.”  At the meeting it was planned that I would arrange for a distraction to take place simultaneously when Quirante and Ceballos where [sic] killing Miller.  Inmate Miller’s movements to the High School and elsewhere that day were closely monitored and in the afternoon he went to the store of inmate Boy Sabater at the talipapa.  I organized Sinulog Dancing for the BC 45 Gang anniversary at Camp Sampaguita’s Plaza Compound with gang members to divert attention from Quirante’s and C[e]ballo’s assassination of  Miller. When the dancing was finished one of my men informed me that Miller was still alive and had been sent to theNBPHospital from the Camp Sampaguita Infirmary.  Quirante had struck Miller on the head from behind when he left the talipapa but failed to kill him.  Afterwards inmates Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid gave Quirante and Ceballos the sum of one hundred pesos (PHP100.00).  They were not paid the promised one thousand five hundred pesos (PHP1,500.00) as their “mission was not completed” in that they failed to kill Miller.

In February I was transferred to the Maximum Security Compound where I met Dr. Miller and informed him that I was prepared to testify regarding the foregoing.  Inmates Quirante and C[e]ballos had been transferred earlier to the Maximum Security Compound after confessing their involvement.  Later the Bureau of Corrections carried out an investigation regarding the affairs of ICAD when Quirante, C[e]ballos and myself where [sic] summoned to the Penal Superintendent Agalo-os’s office.  The Bureau’s Investigation Section then took an affidavit from me and a joint affidavit was completed by Quirante and C[e]ballos.  Thereafter we were escorted to the City Prosecutor[’s] Office inMuntinlupaCity where the affidavits were sworn in before the Assistant Prosecutor Padilla.  Copies were taken for the Investigation Section’s file. I was informed by Dr. Miller that the affidavits in the City Prosecutor[’s] Office have “disappeared” and he had been prevented to date from accessing the Bureau of Correction’s file, hence this further affidavit.

Confronted with these evidence clearly showing prima facie that respondent Bernardino was among those involved in the crime committed against petitioner, Prosecutor Macinas was correct in finding probable cause, upon reinvestigation, to include respondent Bernardino along with Bernardo, Aprid, Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo as those who will be formally charged with attempted murder and recommending the filing of an amended information for this purpose.  In modifying the said amended information by dropping the name of respondent Bernardino, Secretary Perez gravely abused his discretion, his conclusion that the new affidavits were mere afterthought being contrary to the facts on record.  Besides, the Secretary’s act of  absolving respondent Bernardino arbitrarily ignored the consistent and categorical declarations of Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo that respondent Bernardino together with Bernardo and Aprid instigated, planned and ordered the attack on petitioner, harping solely on their belated execution of affidavits even if such delay have been satisfactorily explained.

We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.  In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.  Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person.  Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.  Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial.

The term “probable cause” does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.  It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.  Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal.The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.   The Decision dated June 14, 2004 and Resolution dated September 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72395 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Secretary of Justice is hereby DIRECTED to REINSTATE or RE-FILE with deliberate dispatch the Amended Information which included Giovan Bernardino as accused in Criminal Case No. 99-452 of the National Capital Judicial Region,RegionalTrialCourtofMuntinlupaCity, Branch 256.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Rollo, pp. 20-25.  Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now deceased), with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.

Id.at 27.

CA rollo, pp. 22-23.

Rollo, pp. 66-77.

Id.at 64.

Id.at 58-61.

Id.at  60.

Id.at 60-61.

Id.at 57.

CA rollo, pp. 35-36.

Id.at 36.

Id.at 25-26.

Id.at 27.

Id.at 193-199; DOJ records, pp. 98-102.

DOJ records, pp. 34-41.

Id.at 32-33.

Id.at 30-31.

CA rollo, pp. 37-38.

Id.at 38.

DOJ records, pp. 81-95.

Id.at 111-119.

Supra note 3.

Id.at 23.

DOJ records, pp. 123-126.

Id.at 162.

CA rollo, pp. 12-16.

Rollo, p. 8.

Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 459, cited in Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318, 335.

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 641, citing Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 539, 553.

Id., citing Gonzalez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 164904, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 255, 269.

Insular Life Assurance Company, Limited v. Serrano, G.R. No. 163255, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 400, 405-406, citing  Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003) and First Women’s Credit Corporation v. Perez, G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774, 777.

Tan v. Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 229, 252, citing Sec. 4, last paragraph, Rule 112, Rules of Court.

Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc. G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 536.

Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009, 604 SCRA 618, 627, citing Alawiya v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 164170, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 267, 281.

Id.at 627-628.

Social Security System v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 158131, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 426, 442, citing Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 232.

DOJ records, pp. 98-99; CA rollo, pp. 195-196.

Id.at 100-101; id. at 193-194.

Id.at 102; id. at 197.

Manebo v. Acosta, supra note 34 at 633, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales, G.R No. 180165, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 642.

Tan v. Ballena, supra note 32 at 253-254, citing People v. CA, 361 Phil. 492 (1999), Ledesma v. CA, 344 Phil. 207, 226 (1997) and Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 429, 439.

United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 322, 336-337, citing Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323, 330-331 (1997).

Sy v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 166315, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 92, 99, citing Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 470.

Id.

CASE 2011-0125: AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (G.R. NO. 168382, 06 JUNE 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: ILLEGAL STRIKE; NEW MATTERS RAISED CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED WHEN JUDGMENT IS ALREADY FINAL. (BRIEF TITLE: ALPAP VS. PAL).

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DOCTRINE: IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A PROCEEDING MAY NOT BE REOPENED UPON GROUNDS ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES DURING THE PENDENCY OF SUCH PROCEEDINGS; OTHERWISE, IT MAY GIVE WAY TO VICIOUS AND VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS.^[1][44]

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PARTIAL DIGEST:

FACTS AND ISSUE

DOLE SECRETARY DECLARED THE ALPAP OFFICERS AND MEMBERS TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS BASED ON EITHER OF TWO GROUNDS, VIZ: THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILLEGAL STRIKE ON JUNE 5, 1998 OR THEIR DEFIANCE OF THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE DOLE SECRETARY.  ALPAP ARGUES THAT SUCH DECISION OF DOLE IS INEQUITABLE BECAUSE SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS WERE ON LEAVE OR WERE ABROAD AT THE TIME OF THE STRIKE. SOME WERE EVEN MERELY BARRED FROM RETURNING TO THEIR WORK WHICH EXCUSED THEM FOR NOT COMPLYING IMMEDIATELY WITH THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER. IS THEIR ARGUMENT VALID?

RULING:

THESE ALLEGATIONS WERE RAISED LATE, THAT IS, AFTER THE JUDGMENT (THAT THE RETURNING PILOTS’ TERMINATION WAS LEGAL) BECAME FINAL. THESE DEFENSES WERE NOT RAISED WHEN THE CASE WAS STILL PENDING BEFORE THE DOLE SECRETARY, THE CA OR EVEN BEFORE THIS COURT. IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A PROCEEDING MAY NOT BE REOPENED UPON GROUNDS ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES DURING THE PENDENCY OF SUCH PROCEEDINGS; OTHERWISE, IT MAY GIVE WAY TO VICIOUS AND VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS.^[2][44]  ALPAP WAS GIVEN ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS. IT CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN THAT IT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A judgment that has attained finality is immutable and could thus no longer be modified.

By this Petition for Review on Certiorari,^[3][1] petitioner Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) assails the Decision^[4][2] dated December 22, 2004 and Resolution^[5][3] dated May 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79686, which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Sto. Tomas) and Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson (Imson) in issuing their respective letters dated July 30, 2003^[6][4] and July 4, 2003,^[7][5] in connection with ALPAP’s motions^[8][6] filed in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97.

Factual Antecedents

            The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL.  Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed on December 9, 1997, a notice of strike^[9][7] against respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97.  Upon PAL’s petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute per Order^[10][8] dated December 23, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Philippine Airlines, Inc. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

                Accordingly, all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited. The parties are also enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

                The parties are further directed to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

                SO ORDERED.^[11][9]

            In a subsequent Order dated May 25, 1998,^[12][10] the DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the December 23, 1997 Order.  Despite such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998.  This constrained the DOLE, through then Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order^[13][11] on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown in a logbook^[14][12] signed by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order.

            On June 29, 1998, ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout^[15][13] against PAL, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-05253-98. ALPAP contended that its counsel received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their non-compliance therewith until June 26, 1998.  It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.

            On PAL’s motion, the Labor Arbiter consolidated the illegal lockout case with NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97 (strike case) pending before the DOLE Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an offshoot of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and because the factual allegations in both cases are interrelated.^[16][14] In a Resolution dated January 18, 1999,^[17][15] the NLRC sustained the consolidation of the illegal lockout case with the strike case, opining that the DOLE Secretary has the authority to resolve all incidents attendant to his return-to-work order.

            Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution^[18][16]  dated June 1, 1999 was rendered in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:

                WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby:

a.               x  x   x;

b.              DECLARES the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and thereafter as illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order of June 7, 1998 and, consequently, the strikers are deemed to have lost their employment status; and

c.               DISMISSES the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[19][17]

            In a Resolution^[20][18] dated July 23, 1999, ALPAP’s motion for reconsideration was denied.  Thus, ALPAP filed a Petition for Certiorari^[21][19] with the CA assailing both the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE Resolutions. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54880.

            Meanwhile, several ALPAP members filed separate individual complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against PAL with the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC, questioning their termination as a result of the strike staged by other ALPAP members on June 5, 1998.^[22][20]  While these cases were pending, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, affirmed and upheld the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE Resolutions in its Decision^[23][21] dated August 22, 2001.  ALPAP then sought a review of the CA Decision, thereby elevating the matter to this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152306.  On April 10, 2002, this Court dismissed ALPAP’s petition for failure to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error.^[24][22]  This Court’s Resolution attained finality on August 29, 2002.^[25][23]

Proceedings before the DOLE Secretary

            On  January  13,  2003,  ALPAP  filed  before  the   Office   of   the   DOLE  Secretary a Motion^[26][24] in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, requesting the said office to conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in the strike conducted in June 1998.  ALPAP contended that there is a need to conduct a proceeding in order to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAP’s officers and members, even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike.  It also alleged that there were some who joined the strike and returned to work but were asked to sign new contracts of employment, which abrogated their earned seniority. Also, there were those who initially defied the return-to-work order but immediately complied with the same after proper receipt thereof by ALPAP’s counsel. However, PAL still refused to allow them to enter its premises. According to ALPAP, such measure, as to meet the requirements of due process, is essential because it must be first established that a union officer or member has participated in the strike or has committed illegal acts before they could be dismissed from employment. In other words, a fair determination of who must suffer the consequences of the illegal strike is indispensable since a significant number of ALPAP members did not at all participate in the strike. The motion also made reference to the favorable recommendation rendered by the Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in ILO Case No. 2195 which requested the Philippine Government “to initiate discussions in order to consider the possible reinstatement in their previous employment of all ALPAP’s workers who were dismissed following the strike staged in June 1998.”^[27][25] A Supplemental Motion^[28][26] was afterwards filed by ALPAP on January 28, 2003, this time asking the DOLE Secretary to resolve all issues relating to the entitlement to employment benefits by the officers and members of ALPAP, whether terminated or not.

            In its Comment^[29][27] to ALPAP’s motions, PAL argued that the motions cannot legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary has no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to  NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97; that the requested proceeding is no longer necessary as the CA or this Court did not order the remand of the case to the DOLE Secretary for such determination; that the NLRC rather than the DOLE Secretary has jurisdiction over the motions as said motions partake of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims; and that all money claims are deemed suspended in view of the fact that PAL is under receivership.

            On January 24, 2003, the DOLE called the parties to a hearing to discuss and clarify the issues raised in ALPAP’s motions.^[30][28] In a letter dated July 4, 2003^[31][29] addressed to ALPAP President, Capt. Ismael C. Lapus, Jr., then Acting DOLE Secretary, Imson, resolved ALPAP’s motions in the following manner:

            x x x x

                After a careful consideration of the factual antecedents, applicable legal principles and the arguments of the parties, this Office concludes that NCMB-NCR-NS-12-514-97 has indeed been resolved with finality by the highest tribunal of the land, the Supreme Court. Being final and executory, this Office is bereft of authority to reopen an issue that has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

                It is important to note that in pages 18 to 19 of ALPAP’s Memorandum, it admitted that individual complaints for illegal dismissal have been filed by the affected pilots before the NLRC. It is therefore an implied recognition on the part of the pilots that the remedy to their present dilemma could be found in the NLRC.

                x x x x

                Thus, to avoid multiplicity of suits, splitting causes of action and forum-shopping which are all obnoxious to an orderly administration of justice, it is but proper to respect the final and executory order of the Supreme Court in this case as well as the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the illegal dismissal cases. Since ALPAP and the pilots have opted to seek relief from the NLRC, this Office should respect the authority of that Commission to resolve the dispute in the normal course of law. This Office will no longer entertain any further initiatives to split the jurisdiction or to shop for a forum that shall only foment multiplicity of labor disputes. Parties should not jump from one forum to another. This Office will make sure of that.

                By reason of the final ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court, the erring pilots have lost their employment status and second, because these pilots have filed cases to contest such loss before another forum, the Motion and Supplemental Motion of ALPAP as well as the arguments raised therein are merely NOTED by this Office.

            ALPAP filed its motion for reconsideration^[32][30] arguing that the issues raised in its motions have remained unresolved hence, it is the duty of DOLE to resolve the same it having assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. ALPAP also denied having engaged in forum shopping as the individual complainants who filed the cases before the NLRC are separate and distinct from ALPAP and that the causes of action therein are different. According to ALPAP, there was clear abdication of duty when then Acting Secretary Imson refused to properly act on the motions. In a letter dated July 30, 2003,^[33][31] Secretary Sto. Tomas likewise merely noted ALPAP’s motion for reconsideration, reiterating the DOLE’s stand to abide by the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

            ALPAP filed a petition for certiorari^[34][32] with the CA, insisting that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003, which merely noted its motions, were issued in grave abuse of discretion.

            In their Comment,^[35][33] Sto. Tomas and Imson argued that the matter of who among ALPAP’s members and officers participated in the strike was already raised and resolved by the CA and this Court.  By filing the motions, ALPAP, in effect, initiated a termination case which is properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. And since several ALPAP members have already filed complaints for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and benefits with the Labor Arbiter, ALPAP is thus engaging in forum-shopping when it filed the subject motions.

            PAL, on the other hand, also claimed in its Comment^[36][34] that ALPAP violated the principles governing forum shopping, res judicata and multiplicity of suits.  It opined that when ALPAP questioned the loss of employment status of “all its officers and members and asked for their reinstatement” in its appeal to reverse the Decision of the DOLE Secretary in the consolidated strike and illegal lockout cases, the matter of who should be meted out the penalty of dismissal was already resolved with finality by this Court and could not anymore be modified.

            The CA, in its Decision dated December 22, 2004,^[37][35] dismissed the petition.  It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in refusing to conduct the necessary proceedings to determine issues relating to ALPAP members’ employment status and entitlement to employment benefits. The CA held that both these issues were among the issues taken up and resolved in the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution which was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880 and subsequently determined with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 152306.  Therefore, said issues could no longer be reviewed.  The CA added that Sto. Tomas and Imson merely acted in deference to the NLRC’s jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal cases filed by individual ALPAP members.

           ALPAP moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in CA Resolution^[38][36]  dated May 30, 2005.

            Hence, this petition.

Issues

I.

                WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ACT ON ALPAP’S MOTIONS AND MERELY NOTED THE SAME.

II.

                WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN DECLARING THAT THE 01 JUNE 1999 RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT HAS ALREADY TAKEN UP AND RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF WHO AMONG THE ALPAP MEMBERS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS.^[39][37]

            ALPAP contends that it was erroneous for Sto. Tomas and Imson to merely take note of the motions when the issues raised therein sprang from the DOLE Secretary’s exercise of authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute which have nevertheless remained unresolved.  ALPAP prays that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003 be declared null and void. It likewise seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike of June 1998 and consequently who, from its vast membership, should be deemed to have lost employment status.

Our Ruling

            We deny the petition.

There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in merely noting ALPAP’s twin motions in due deference to a final and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court.

            From the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, which declared the strike of June 5, 1998 as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein to have lost their employment status, an appeal was taken by ALPAP.  This was dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, which ruling was affirmed by this Court and which became final and executory on August 29, 2002.

In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such determination.  However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court.  Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect.^[40][38]  Subject to certain recognized exceptions,^[41][39] the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as “nothing further can be done except to execute it.”^[42][40]

True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent an effective execution of the decision.  As was held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,^[43][41] any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case.   In any case,  especially when there is an ambiguity,  “a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly.”^[44][42]

There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity can be cured by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed.

            A review of the records reveals that in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary.  The records of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots.  The logbook^[45][43] with the heading “Return To Work Compliance/ Returnees” bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE.  From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them.  In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.

            ALPAP harps on the inequity of PAL’s termination of its officers and members considering that some of them were on leave or were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred from returning to their work which excused them for not complying immediately with the return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a very late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning pilots’ termination was legal. Interestingly, these defenses were not raised and discussed when the case was still pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA or even before this Court.  We agree with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from the time the return-to-work order was issued until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAP’s petition, no ALPAP member has claimed that he was unable to comply with the return-to-work directive because he was either on leave, abroad or unable to report for some reason.  These defenses were raised in ALPAP’s twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306 reached finality in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling.  It has been held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.^[46][44]  ALPAP was given all the opportunities to present its evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain that it was denied due process

            Relevant to mention at this point is that when NCMB NCRNS12-514-97 (strike/illegal lockout case) was still pending, several complaints for illegal dismissal were filed before the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC by individual members of ALPAP, questioning their termination following the strike staged in June 1998. PAL likewise manifests that there is a pending case involving a complaint^[47][45] for the recovery of accrued and earned benefits belonging to ALPAP members.  Nonetheless, the pendency of the foregoing cases should not and could not affect the character of our disposition over the instant case.  Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner consistent and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement and execution of a final judgment.

            WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 2004 and Resolution dated May 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79686 are AFFIRMED.

            SO ORDERED. 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice