Archive for 2011


CASE 2011-0146: FELICISIMA R. DIAZ VS. JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA, CEBU (A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1786, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: DIAZ VS. JUDGE GESTOPA).

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

DIGEST:

 

THIS CASE INVOLVES UNLAWFUL DETAINER. DURING PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE THE JUDGE ORDERED THE CASE REFERRED TO BARANGAY RECONCILIATION. COUNSEL OF COMPLAINANT INFORMED THE COURT THAT IT WAS ALREADY REFERRED TO BARANGAY RECONCILIATION AND THERE WAS ALREADY A CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION. WAS THE ACTION OF THE JUDGE PROPER?

 

NO. IT WILL JUST DELAY THE CASE. UNLAWFUL DETAINER FALLS UNDER SUMMARY PROCEDURE. SPEEDY RESOLUTION IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY.

 

Indeed, in Farrales v. Camarista,[1][4] the Court explained that while the last paragraph of the afore-cited provision apparently gives the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said subject civil case to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure.  The reason is because the Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving “an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.”  The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat the very essence of the creation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

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SUBJECT: WHAT IS THE LIABILITY OF THE JUDGE?

 

THE JUDGE WAS HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND FINED P21,000.00. THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME HE WAS PENALIZED.

 

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) dismissal; (b) suspension from office; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. In this case, considering respondent judge’s two previous administrative infractions, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P21,000.00.

 

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SUBJECT: THE JUDGE ALLEGED THAT HE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH. IS THIS A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE?

 

NO BECAUSE THE RULES VIOLATED WERE BASIC PROCEDURAL RULES.

 

Time and again, we have reiterated that the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation.  We have held in numerous cases that the failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, because as previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural rules.  All that was needed for respondent to do was to apply them.

 

 

 

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

 

FELICISIMA R. DIAZ,                                                Complainant,

 

 

 

                        –  versus  –

 

 

 

 

JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR., Municipal Trial Court, Naga, Cebu,

                    Respondent.                                   

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786

 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-2262-MTJ]

 

Present:

 

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

 

     June 22, 2011

 

 

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

PERALTA, J.:

          Before us is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Felicisima R. Diaz against Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr., Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Naga, Cebu, for incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, neglect of duty, and conduct unbecoming of a judge relative to Civil Case No. R-595 entitled Felicisima Rivera-Diaz v. Spouses Ruel & Diana Betito and Isidro Pungkol.

 

          The antecedent facts are as follows:

 

Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2009, she filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC of Naga, Cebu, entitled Felicisima Rivera-Diaz v. Spouses Ruel & Diana Betito and Isidro Pungkol, docketed as Case No. R-595.  On July 8, 2009, the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference.  Since complainant cannot attend the conference because of her heart ailment, she instead sent her nephew, Elmer Llanes, to appear in her behalf.

 

          During the conference, Judge Gestopa recommended the case for barangay conciliation, pursuant to Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code.[2][1]  Complainant’s counsel objected and moved for mediation instead. However, respondent judge insisted that he has the authority to refer it back to barangay for conciliation.

 

          Judge Gestopa concluded that since the subject property is in Naga, and that complainant has always been a resident of Naga, it is therefore proper to refer the case for barangay conciliation.  Complainant, on the other hand, claimed that she is no longer a resident of Naga.

 

          Complainant moved for reconsideration.  She argued that the referral of the case to the lupon is a violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. She stressed that she is no longer a resident of Naga and is now actually residing in Dumlog, Talisay City, Cebu.  Complainant further pointed out that the case had already been previously referred to the lupon.  In fact, a Certification to File Action in court had been issued on May 20, 2008.  She further admitted that she did not attach the certificate to the complaint since she believed that the same was not required anymore, considering that the parties are not residents of the same barangay or municipality.

 

          On July 20, 2009, Judge Gestopa denied the motion for reconsideration.

 

          Dissatisfied, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Gestopa.  Complainant alleged that respondent judge exhibited gross ignorance of the law in referring the case back to barangay conciliation when clearly she is not a resident of Naga.  She accused respondent judge of unduly delaying for months the resolution of the case.  She further claimed that respondent judge appeared to be biased, thus, she requested that the case be transferred to another court.

 

          On May 5, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Gestopa to submit his Comment on the complaint against him.

 

          In his Comment dated August 2, 2010, Judge Gestopa argued that the referral of the case to the barangay for conciliation was made in good faith, to give way for the possible amicable settlement of the parties.  He insisted that complainant was just trying to circumvent the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.  Respondent judge pointed out that while complainant denied that she is a resident of Naga, she however actually sought barangay conciliation, as evidenced by the Certification to File Action dated May 20, 2008, which was issued by BarangayNorth Poblacion and attached to the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.

 

          Respondent judge, however, admitted that on November 16, 2009, the members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay North Poblacion declared that barangay conciliation between the parties failed to reach a settlement.  Thus, an Order was issued directing the parties to appear before the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for mediation.  On February 17, 2010, the PMC submitted the Mediator’s Report of “Unsuccessful Mediation.”

          In a Memorandum dated January 12, 2011, the OCA found Judge Gestopa guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).  The instant administrative case was, likewise, recommended to be redocketed as a regular administrative matter against Judge Gestopa.

 

                                                RULING

 

          The findings of the OCA are well taken.

 

          There is no doubt that Civil Case No. R-595 was a case of unlawful detainer covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

 

          The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the period within which judgment should be rendered.  Section 10 thereof provides:

 

SEC. 10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

 

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order.  Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

 

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.

 

-s

          It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgments in cases falling under summary procedure is 30 days.  This is in keeping with the spirit of the rule which aims to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases falling thereunder.[3][2]

          Respondent judge argued that such referral to the barangay is justified by Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code.[4][3]  We are unconvinced.

 

          Indeed, in Farrales v. Camarista,[5][4] the Court explained that while the last paragraph of the afore-cited provision apparently gives the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said subject civil case to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure.  The reason is because the Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving “an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.”  The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat the very essence of the creation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

 

          To further strengthen and emphasize the objective of expediting the adjudication  of cases  falling under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,  Sections 7 and 8 mandated preliminary conference which is precisely for   the purpose of giving room for a possible amicable settlement, to wit:

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

 

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

Section 8 of said Rule reads in full:

 

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:

 

a)…..Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;

b)…..The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

c)…..Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

d)…..A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

e)…..Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

 

 

          Thus, there was no reason anymore to refer the case back to the barangay for the sole purpose of amicable settlement, because the abovementioned Sections 7 and 8  provided already for such action.

 

          Furthermore, considering that complainant had already manifested in court, albeit belatedly, the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in court due to unsuccessful conciliation, respondent’s act of referring the case to barangay conciliation rendered its purpose moot and academic.

 

          We cannot accept the justifications made by respondent judge, considering that this is not the first time that he seemed to be at loss as to how to correctly interpret the Rules on Summary Procedure.  We note that he had been previously penalized in two other administrative cases due to his failure to decide the cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure within the reglementary period, to wit: in In Re: A.M. No. MTJ-99-1181, Renato M. Casia v. Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr., August 11, 1999, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P1,000.00 for his failure to decide a case within the required period; likewise, in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1303, Vidala Saceda v. Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr., December 13, 2001, for a similar offense, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P10,000.00.

 

          Time and again, we have reiterated that the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation.  We have held in numerous cases that the failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, because as previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural rules.  All that was needed for respondent to do was to apply them.

 

          Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) dismissal; (b) suspension from office; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. In this case, considering respondent judge’s two previous administrative infractions, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P21,000.00.

 

          WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Naga, Cebu, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                         Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

  TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO           ROBERTO A. ABAD

                    Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice       

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

                                                ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                  Associate Justice

                                                Second Division, Chairperson

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

                                                               RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                        Chief Justice 

 

 


 


[1][4]           Supra note 2.

*               Acting member per  Special Order No. 1006.

[2][1]           Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code provides that “the court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu propio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.”

[3][2]           Ferrales v. Camarista, 383 Phil. 832, 841 (2000).

[4][3]           Supra note 1.

[5][4]           Supra note 2.

WHO IS ROSARIO URIARTE?

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Rosario Uriarte ties go a long way back to DTI days

Philippine Daily Inquirer

4:24 am | Friday, July 8th, 2011

 5share84 75

 

TIES THAT BIND AND BIND Former President Arroyo places the Presidential medal of merit on then PCSO Vice Chair and General Manager Rosario Uriarte in this photo taken during the 75th PCSO anniversary celebration on Sept. 8, 2009. EDWIN BACASMAS

Rosario Uriarte’s ties with former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, now a Pampanga lawmaker, go a long way back.

It came as no surprise then to some senators that Uriarte was appointed general manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) under Arroyo’s watch.

“She was very familiar with the President. Therefore, she had the confidence and trust of the President. That’s why she was placed there,” Sen. Franklin Drilon told reporters after the blue ribbon committee hearing on the alleged misuse of PCSO funds.

During close to two hours of grilling, it was Drilon who asked Uriarte about her professional background, giving the public a glimpse of her association with the former leader.

It turned out Uriarte was closer to Arroyo than the public had expected or imagined, working for her from the time the latter entered government service at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) until she assumed the presidency.

Uriarte confirmed working with then Assistant Trade Secretary Arroyo while she was still a member of the Garment and Textile Exports Board in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

She next served as her consultant when Arroyo was elected senator and vice president years later, and as part of her appointments staff when she became the President.

In an admission that surprised Cagayan-born Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, Uriarte said she briefly worked at the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (Ceza) in 2002 before she was appointed to the PCSO.

Uriarte served as general manager of the PCSO from Jan. 17, 2003, to July 30, 2010, and became concurrent chair of the agency from April 19, 2004, to Aug. 29, 2004.

Uriarte earned her economics degree from the University of the Philippines before working at the DTI, Bureau of Industrial Development and Ceza.

She then ventured into free-lance consultancy on local government process and training, master plan development and infrastructure before assuming her post at the PCSO.

In his privilege speech in October 2003, Sen. Panfilo Lacson alleged that Uriarte’s chief of staff, Raul Ancheta, facilitated the use of PCSO funds to finance a private group urging then President Arroyo to run in the 2004 presidential election.

Arroyo had served the unexpired term of President Joseph Estrada starting in 2001.

Ancheta denied the allegations and said that all PCSO books were open for review.

In 2008, Uriarte was on the roster of Gusi Peace Prize awardees, under the social welfare category. The award is referred to by its promoter as the Asian equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize. Reports from TJ Burgonio and Inquirer Research

 

TRIAL NOTE 0012 – THREE IMPORTANT DATES IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE; LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES.

 

SOURCE: WILLIAM ENDELISEO BARROGA VS.  DATA CENTER COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND  IFRED BACTAD (G.R. NO. 174158, 27 JUNE 2011,  DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL; TRANSFER; DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS; LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES. (BRIEF TITLE: BARROGA VS. DATA CENTER COLLEGE)

 

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SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE THREE MATERIAL DATES WHICH SHOULD BE STATED IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65?

THE  DATES WHEN THE NOTICE  OF THE JUDGMENT WAS RECEIVED, WHEN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED AND WHEN THE NOTICE OF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS RECEIVED.[1][26]  THESE DATES SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE PETITION TO ENABLE THE REVIEWING COURT TO DETERMINE IF THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.

The three material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of the judgment was received, when a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was received.[2][26]  These dates should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time.[3][27]  Indeed, petitioner’s petition before the CA stated only the date of his receipt of the NLRC’s Resolution denying his motion for partial reconsideration.  It failed to state when petitioner received the assailed NLRC Decision and when he filed his partial motion for reconsideration.  However, this omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached as Annex “N” of the petition.  In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,[4][28] we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case.  It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.

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SUBJECT:  SUPPOSE YOU FAIL TO ATTACH AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE, WHAT SHOUD YOU DO?

SUBMIT IT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE C.A. DISMISSES YOUR PETITION. 

Next, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service.  However, records show that petitioner timely rectified this omission by submitting the required affidavit of service even before the CA dismissed his petition.

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SUBJECT: WHAT IS THE RULE ON WHAT DOCUMENTS TO ATTACH TO A CERTIORARI PETITION UNDER RULE 65?

THE RULES DO NOT SPECIFY THE DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE APPENDED TO THE PETITION EXCEPT THAT THEY SHOULD BE RELEVANT TO THE JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION BEING ASSAILED.

Thirdly, petitioner’s failure to attach respondent’s motion for reconsideration to the assailed NLRC decision is not sufficient ground for the CA to outrightly dismiss his petition.  The issue that was raised in respondents’ motion for reconsideration is the propriety of the NLRC’s grant of overload honorarium in favor of petitioner.  This particular issue was not at all raised in petitioner’s petition for certiorari with the CA, therefore, there is no need for petitioner to append a copy of this motion to his petition.  Besides, as already mentioned, the denial of respondents’ motion for reconsideration has been assailed by respondents before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94205.  At any rate, the Rules do not specify the documents which should be appended  to the petition except that they should be relevant to the judgment, final order or resolution being assailed.  Petitioner is thus justified in attaching the documents which he believed are sufficient to make out a prima facie case.[5][29]

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SUBJECT: STATE THE JURISPRUDENCE  ON THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE?

The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice.[6][30]  These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided.[7][31]  The CA thus should not have outrightly dismissed petitioner’s petition based on these procedural lapses.

 

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[1][26] Batugan v. Balindong, G.R. No. 181384,March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 473, 482.

[2][26] Batugan v. Balindong, G.R. No. 181384,March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 473, 482.

[3][27] Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 112, 127.

[4][28] G.R. No. 176995,July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 624, 636.

[5][29] Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 412, 424-425 (2004).

[6][30] Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 623, 629 (2000).

[7][31] Van Melle Phils., Inc. v. Endaya, 458 Phil. 420, 430 (2003).