Archive for 2011


CASE 2011-0152: IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES, RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES. (G.R. NO. 182645, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: INTERVENTION (BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES).

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 1 Comment
July 13, 2011

CASE 2011-0152: IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES, RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES. (G.R. NO. 182645, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: INTERVENTION (BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES).

====================

 

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

 

PETITIONER WAS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE AT RTC AND CA. CAN BE FILE THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?

 

NO. HE MUST BE A PARTY AGRIEVED BY A DECISION. AN AGRIEVED PARTY UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 65 [OF THE RULES OF COURT] IS ONE WHO WAS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.  X X X. A PERSON NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN THE CA CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT TO HAVE THE JUDGMENT REVIEWED.

           

 

First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.[1][8]

 

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.[2][9]

 

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.[3][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.[4][11]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

BUT PETITIONER ONLY ACQUIRED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN JANUARY 2005 AND HE FILED THE PETITION ONLY AFTER LEARNING OF THE RTC AND CA DECISION. HE COULD NOT HAVE INTERVENED EARLIER. . IS HIS ARGUMENT RIGHT.

 

NO. HIS SITUATION IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION. TO DO SO WOULD PUT INTO THE HANDS OF THE LITIGANTS IN A CASE THE POWER TO RESURRECT OR TO INTRODUCE ANEW, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF INTERVENORS, ISSUES TO A LITIGATION WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN LONG SETTLED ON APPEAL.

 

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

 

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

 

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,[5][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.[6][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

 

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.[7][14]

 

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

 

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,[8][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

 

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x[9][16]

 

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

====================

 

 

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

                         

                                                                        SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

 

In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, Antonio Rodriguez, Macario J. Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates,

 

RENE B. PASCUAL,

                                         Petitioner,                                    

 

– versus –

 

 

 

JAIME M. ROBLES,                         

                                         Respondent.

 G.R. No. 182645

 

 

Present:

 

 

   CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

   VELASCO, JR.,

   PERALTA,

  MENDOZA, and

   PEREZ,* JJ.

 

 

 

Promulgated:

 

     June 22, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

                                                 

 

DECISION

 

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

 

          On December 15, 2010, this Court promulgated a Resolution[10][1] which set aside its Decision[11][2] earlier issued on December 4, 2009 on the ground that herein petitioner, Rene B. Pascual failed to implead herein respondent Jaime M. Robles, who is an indispensable party to the present case.

 

          After receiving respondent’s Comment and Opposition,[12][3] as well as petitioner’s Reply[13][4] thereto, the Court will now proceed to determine the merits of the instant petition for certiorari.

 

          Again, the Court finds it apropros to restate the pertinent antecedent facts and proceedings as set forth in the December 4, 2009 Decision as well as in the December 15, 2010 Resolution, to wit:

                        On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the [Regional Trial Court] RTC [ofIrigaCity]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.

 

                        Henry, Certeza and Rosalina’s claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.

 

                        At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of thePhilippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.

 

                        Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.

 

                        Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.

 

                        Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:

 

                        (1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;

                        (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;

                        (3) Jaime Robles;

                        (4) Florencia Rodriguez;

                        (5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

                        (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez

 

                        Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.

 

                        In his opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan,Pasig, Rizal.

 

                        After hearing on Jamie Robles’ application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.

 

                        On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.

 

                        On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.[14][5]           

 

 

                   Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a notice of appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles’ failure to file a record on appeal.

 

                        Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

 

                        In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance.

 

                        On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.

 

                        Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004.  Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

 

                        On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory.

 

                        On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.[15][6]

 

          Petitioner posits the following reasons relied upon for the allowance of his petition:

 

            I

                        THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED APRIL 16, 2002 WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

 

 

II

                        THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, BASED ON THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

                       

 

 

III

                        THE AFOREMENTIONED COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, WERE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AS THEY CONTRAVENED, INCONSISTENT WITH AND CONTRADICTORY TO THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULE THAT ALL COURTS SHOULD TAKE THEIR BEARINGS FROM THE SUPREME COURT.[16][7]

 

          The Court finds that there are compelling reasons to dismiss the present petition, as discussed below.

 

          First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.[17][8]

 

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.[18][9]

 

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.[19][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.[20][11]

 

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

 

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

 

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,[21][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.[22][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

 

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.[23][14]

 

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

 

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,[24][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

 

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x[25][16]

 

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

 

          Considering the foregoing, the Court no longer finds it necessary to address the issues raised by petitioner.

 

          WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                             Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

       PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                    JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA   

            Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice 

 

 

 

 

 

[1][8]           The complete text of Section 1, Rule 65 reads as follows:

                Section 1. Petition for certiorari.– When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

                The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

[2][9]           Concepcion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 420, 434-435, citing Tang v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)

[3][10]          Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  183905 and 184275, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 679, 697; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p.  724, citing Ramos v. Lampa, 63 Phil. 215 (1936).

[4][11]          Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 36.

[5][12]          G.R. No.  134269, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 258.

[6][13]               Id. at 280.

[7][14]          Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 293.

[8][15]          G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362.

[9][16]               Id. at 372-373.

*               Designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 1008 dated June 10, 2011.

[10][1]          Rollo, pp. 422-431.

[11][2]          Id. at 193-213.

[12][3]          Id. at 656-701.

[13][4]          Id. at 705-711.

[14][5]          Id. at 228-231.

[15][6]          Id. at 425-426.

[16][7]          Id. at 12-13.

[17][8]          The complete text of Section 1, Rule 65 reads as follows:

                Section 1. Petition for certiorari.– When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

                The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

[18][9]          Concepcion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 420, 434-435, citing Tang v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)

[19][10]         Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  183905 and 184275, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 679, 697; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p.  724, citing Ramos v. Lampa, 63 Phil. 215 (1936).

[20][11]         Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 36.

[21][12]         G.R. No.  134269, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 258.

[22][13]             Id. at 280.

[23][14]         Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 293.

[24][15]         G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362.

[25][16]             Id. at 372-373.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0088: WHICH MOTIONS REQUIRE HEARING AND WHICH MOTIONS NEED NOT BE HEARD?

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LEGAL NOTE 0088: WHICH MOTIONS REQUIRE HEARING AND WHICH MOTIONS NEED NOT BE HEARD?

 

SOURCE: ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA VS. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA (A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2044, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN)

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CAN DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER BE GRANTED WITHOUT HEARING?

YES. IT IS ONE OF THOSE WHICH A COURT CAN ACT UPON WITHOUT PREJUDICING THE RIGHTS OF THE OTHER PARTY.

Nonetheless, we cannot hold Judge Causapin administratively liable for granting defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer without hearing and on the same day said motions were filed. 

Atty. Bautista questions defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer, which did not contain notices of hearing as required by the following provisions under Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

SEC. 4.  Hearing of motion.  – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. 

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

As prescribed by the aforequoted provisions, a movant shall set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party. 

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WHAT IS THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE ON HEARING RE MOTIONS?

 . . . . . The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.[1][31]   

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WHAT IS THE REASON FOR REQUIRING A HEARING?

DUE PROCESS.

The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose.  The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant.  In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded.[2][32]

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IS THE RULE REQUIRING NOTICE OF HEARING APPLICABLE TO ALL MOTIONS?

NO. THERE ARE MOTIONS WHICH MAY HE HEARD EX PARTE AND THEY ARE NON-CONTENTIOUS AND DO NOT AS A RULE INVOLVE THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE OTHER PARTIES IN THE SUIT.

 Yet the rule requiring notice of hearing is not unqualifiedly applicable to all motions, and there are motions which may be heard ex parte, as Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court also clearly acknowledges.  Among the latter class of motions are precisely those seeking extension of time to plead, and the reason these are not strictly held to the requirement of notice is that they are non-contentious and do not as a rule involve the substantial rights of the other parties in the suit. [3][33]  In Amante v. Suñga,[4][34] the Court declared that:

 

The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion “made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.”  As “a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard…”

It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objection of the motion.”[5][35]

 

Considering that a motion for extension of time may be acted upon by the court ex parte or without hearing, then it need not contain a notice of hearing.  It is equally unnecessary for the court to wait until motion day, under Rule 15, Section 7[6][36] of the 1997 Rules of Court, to act on a motion for extension of time.  Therefore, contrary to the finding of the OCA, Judge Causapin did not commit abuse of discretion in granting defendants’ motions for extension of time on the same day said motions were filed and even when the same motions did not contain a notice of hearing.

[1][31]          Basco v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 671, 685 (2000); Marcos v. Ruiz, G.R. Nos. 70746-47, September 1, 1992, 213 SCRA 177, 192; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA 520, 539; Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, December 6, 1991, 204 SCRA 654, 667; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses, Corp., G.R. No. 89125, July 2, 1991, 198 SCRA 689, 698; Cui v. Madayag, 314 Phil. 846, 858  (1995).

[2][32]          Atty. Neri v. Judge De la Peña, 497 Phil. 73, 81 (2005).

[3][33]          Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256, 266 (1987).

[4][34]          159-A Phil. 474 (1975).

[5][35]         Id. at 476-477.

[6][36]          SECTION 7. Motion day. – Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day.

 

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LEGAL NOTE 0087: RE NON-FORUM SHOPPING BASED ON CAUSAPIN CASE, JUNE 2011

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LEGAL NOTE 0087: RE  NON-FORUM SHOPPING BASED ON CAUSAPIN CASE, JUNE 2011

 

SOURCE: ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA VS. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA (A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2044, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING. (BRIEF TITLE: BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN)

 

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WHAT IS THE PROVISION IN THE RULES ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

 

RULE 7, SECTION 5 OF THE RULES OF COURT

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court – which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91,[1][19] as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94[2][20] – requires the plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.   

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court prescribes:

 

SEC. 5.  Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

 

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.  The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.  If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

 

WHAT ARE THE EARLIER RULINGS ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

 

 

No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and constitutes a defect in the petition.  The attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition.[3][21]

 

It is true that in Loquias, the Court required strict compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

 

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case.  We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.  Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.  Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.  There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification.  It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending.  We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.  The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.  Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.  Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[4][22]

 

WAS THERE SUBSEQUENLTY A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING?

 

YES, IN CAVILE CASE.

 

Nevertheless, in Cavile,[5][23] the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing substantial compliance with the rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping:

 

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient.  However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.  This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.  It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

 

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.  All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon.  They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents.  Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.  There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.  Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as “special circumstance” for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.[6][24]

 

[1][19]          Effective January 1, 1992.

[2][20]          Effective April 1, 1994.

[3][21]          Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 47 (2005).

[4][22]          Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 4 at 603-604.

[5][23]          Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, supra note 6.

[6][24]         Id. at 311-312.

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