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TIP-0008: THE CASE OF CA ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS – MINDANAO STATION.

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July 16, 2011

TIP-0008: THE CASE OF CA ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS – MINDANAO STATION.

RE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS, CA – MINDANAO STATION (A.M. OCA IPI NO. 08-127-CA-J, 11 JANUARY  2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JUDGES. BRIEF TITLE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF CAYETUNA.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

 

 WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CASE AGAINST JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS?

 DISMISSED FOR BEING UNSUBSTANTIATED.

 After an assiduous study of the parties’ allegations and counter-allegations, with due consideration of the documents they submitted to bolster their respective positions, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant case for being unsubstantiated.

 

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 WHY WAS THE CASE DISMISSED, INTER ALIA?

 BECAUSE THE LETTER-COMPLAINTS AS WELL AS THE OMNIBUS REPLY AND MANIFESTATION OF COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT UNDER OATH.

 Both the letter-complaints of April 30, 2008 and June 18, 2008 are unverified, while the June 3, 2010 Omnibus Reply and Manifestation of complainants is not under oath.  It must be noted that most of the complainants are lawyers, and are presumed and ought to know the formal requirement of verification for administrative complaints as stated under Section 1, Rule 140:

 

SECTION 1.  How instituted.¾Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate their allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.  The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

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WHAT ARE THE THREE WAYS IN INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JUDGES?

 BY: (1) MOTU PROPRIO BY THE SUPREME COURT;

 (2) UPON VERIFIED COMPLAINT WITH AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS ALLEGED THEREIN OR BY DOCUMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSTANTIATE SAID ALLEGATIONS; OR

 (3) UPON AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC RECORDS OF INDUBITABLE INTEGRITY.[1][21]

 

 The above rule provides three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.[2][21]

 

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 COMPLAINANTS ARGUE THAT THEIR COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO THE CASE OF SINSUAT VS. HIDALGO. IS THEIR ARGMENT CORRECT?

 NO. IN SINSUAT VS. HIDAGLO, THERE WAS ADMISSION ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT JUDGE AND THE COMPLAINT WAS SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC RECORDS OF INDUBITABLE INTEGRITY.

 Indeed, complainants not only failed to execute a verified complaint but also never submitted their affidavits showing personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in their letter-complaints.  To cover this procedural deficiency, they assert that the Court properly recognized their letter-complaints as an anonymous complaint, relying on Sinsuat v. Hidalgo.[3][22]  

 

In Sinsuat, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and subsequent letters of complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator as an anonymous complaint, since therein respondent Judge Hidalgo admitted complainants’ material allegations and “the motion and letters sufficiently averred the specific acts upon which respondent’s alleged administrative liability was anchored.  And the averments are verifiable from the records of the trial court and the CA’s Decision.”[4][23]  In short, the unverified complaint was properly considered as an anonymous complaint, since the material allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the trial court, as aptly found by the CA.

 

This is not the case in this instant.  Complainants’ reliance on Sinsuat is misplaced.  For one, even a passing perusal of the Comment and Supplemental Comment does not show respondent Justice Elbinias admitting the allegations in the letter-complaints. For another, the averments and material allegations of complainants are neither verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity nor supported or substantiated by other competent evidence submitted by complainants. 

 

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GIVE ANOTHER PRECEDENT CASE ON THE RULE REGARDING ANONYMOUS COMPLAINTS?

ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST PERSHING T. YARED.

In Anonymous Complaint against Pershing T. Yared, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Canlaon City, this Court reiterated the rule pertaining to anonymous complaints, thus:

 

At the outset, the Court stresses that an anonymous complaints is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author.  However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.[5][27]  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

In the instant case, the charges of Gross Inefficiency; Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority are neither supported by public records nor substantiated by competent evidence.

 

Public records do not support any of the allegations.  The incident involving Engr. Rowell T. Magalang, Administrative Officer, Maintenance and Utility Unit of the CA Mindanao – Station merely shows a misunderstanding between respondent and the engineer concerned.[6][28]  As regards those of complainants Roxas and Abugho relative to their unauthorized absence on March 19, 2008, it is embodied in the letter[7][29] of even date by Justice Elbinias to the Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao – Station, Ruby Jane B. Rivera, which evidently shows what it is.  Complainants allege the nastiness of respondent in marking absent Abugho and Roxas that day even if they were present, only on account of their going out of the office for a few minutes to buy food.  Respondent counters that both were absent and not around when he looked for them on March 19, 2008, as he would not have informed the CA Personnel Officer if it were not so.  Since the utility worker and the driver are expected to be at the office during office hours, then it is logical that if they were not around, then they could not be present.

 

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WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS?

THE COMPLAINANT.

It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.[8][30]  In the instant case, complainants have not shown, much less submitted, substantial evidence supporting their allegations.

 

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JUSTICE ELBINIAS DISMISSED HIS CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE ATTY. CAYETUNA. WAS HIS ACTION CORRECT?

 YES. CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES WORK AT THE PLEASURE OF THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY.

 It must be borne in mind that complainants, as primarily confidential employees, need the trust of their immediate superior, Justice Elbinias.  In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara,[9][32] this Court reiterated the principle behind and the element of trust in the employment to a primarily confidential position.  We cited De los Santos vs. Mallare, thus:

 

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential.  The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.[10][33]

 

Moreover, it has been said that confidential employees work at the pleasure of the appointing authority.  Thus, there is no quibble that when the relation between respondent CA Associate Justice Elbinias and his lawyers has deteriorated to the extent that there is no longer intimacy between them that insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state, then the confidential employment is no longer tenable.  The right of respondent to change the confidential employees in his office cannot be disputed.

 

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WHAT IS THE LESSON RESERVED FOR JUSTICE ELBINIAS AND JUDGES/JUSTICES SIMILARLY SITUATED?

 TO BETTER AND IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF HIS EMPLOYEES.

 Even if the allegations have not been substantially proved, still it is incumbent for Justice Elbinias to reflect on how the conflict between him and his staff came about.  While we take notice of the letter of support from other employees in the CA Mindanao – Station, and the Resolutions from the YMCA and the City Council of Cagayan de Oro City commending him, we hope that Justice Elbinias learns from this experience to better and improve the management and supervision of his staff.

 

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R E S O L U T I O N

 

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

 

Complainants Attys. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, Cathy D. Cardino, Cynthia Y. Jamero, Grace L. Yulo, Ken Rinehart V. Sur, Roderick Roxas (driver), and Alfonso Abugho (utility worker) were confidential employees assigned in the Office of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, Court of Appeals (CA) – Mindanao Station in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental.  They filed with this Court an unverified letter-complaint[11][1] dated April 30, 2008 charging Justice Elbinias with Gross Inefficiency; Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority. 

 

Complainants prayed for (1) the dismissal from service of Justice Elbinias; (2) his preventive suspension pending investigation of the instant administrative complaint; (3) the provision of “security” to them from his retaliation and reprisal on account of this complaint; and (4) the acceptance by the Court of their enclosed resignation letters[12][2] without the prior approval of Justice Elbinias for fear that they would be peremptorily terminated by him instead.

 

Moreover, Atty. Cayetuna wrote then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno a confidential letter[13][3] dated April 30, 2008, narrating how he was instantly terminated by Justice Elbinias on April 24, 2008 due to his refusal to sign a letter-reply to a litigant, and asking for help in order to receive his salary for the second half of April 2008 and Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) for April 2008 which were not given to him when these emoluments were released to the CA employees in the CA – Mindanao Station on April 25, 2008 ostensibly because of his having been terminated the day before.  Likewise, on April 28, 2008, he was informed by the CA Cashier that he would no longer receive the Emergency Economic Assistance (EEA) and the midyear bonus on account of his termination. 

 

The Facts

 

The instant case precipitated from a letter-complaint, dated February 6, 2008, filed by a litigant (petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 01580, entitled Algabre v. RTC, Branch 15, Davao City, which was raffled to Justice Elbinias as ponente) before the Presidential Action Center (PAC) of the Office of the President requesting assistance for the resolution of the case which has been pending before the CA – Mindanao Station for almost a year since its filing on March 6, 2007.  The letter-complaint was referred by the PAC to Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. Dela Cruz, in-charge for Regions IX-XII, for appropriate action.

 

Consequently, on April 8, 2008, then DCA Jose P. Perez[14][4] indorsed the letter-complaint to the CA – Mindanao Station for appropriate action.  OnApril 21, 2008, Justice Elbinias received a copy of said letter-complaint thru an Indorsement datedApril 18, 2008 from CA Executive Justice Romulo V. Borja.

 

Justice Elbinias assigned Atty. Cayetuna to draft the letter-reply explaining what transpired with the case which had already been decided on February 28, 2008.  Justice Elbinias, however, asked Atty. Cayetuna to sign the letter-reply and he would simply note it.  This was not palatable to Atty. Cayetuna who balked at signing the letter-reply.  On April 24, 2008, he wrote[15][5] Justice Elbinias explaining why he could not, in conscience, sign it.  This earned the ire of Justice Elbinias who peremptorily terminated Atty. Cayetuna’s employment with the CA through a letter[16][6] dated April 24, 2008 to Ruby Jane B. Rivera, Personnel Officer of the CA – Mindanao Station. 

 

The very next day, or on April 25, 2008, when the RATA for the lawyers and the salaries of the CA employees in the CA – Mindanao Station were released, Atty. Cayetuna did not receive his salary for the second half of April 2008 and RATA for that month on account of his termination.  Likewise, he was informed on April 28, 2008 that he would no longer receive his EEA and midyear bonus.  These are the subjects of Atty. Cayetuna’s April 30, 2008 letter to then Chief Justice Puno.

 

The other complainants, in solidarity with Atty. Cayetuna, filed the instant unverified letter-complaint.

 

In the meantime, acting on the requested acceptance of their resignation letters, then CA Presiding Justice Conrado A. Vasquez, Jr. issued a recommendation[17][7] on May 6, 2008 for the approval of the resignations of complainants to then Chief Justice Puno.  The resignations were duly approved on May 7, 2008.  The approved resignations, however, inadvertently excluded that of Atty. Cynthia Y. Jamero.  Thus, on May 8, 2008, CA Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. likewise recommended[18][8] for approval Atty. Jamero’s resignation, which was approved on May 9, 2008.

On July 3, 2008, complainants sent another unverified letter-complaint[19][9] dated June 18, 2008 thanking the Court for the speedy acceptance of their resignation letters.  Therein, they additionally alleged Justice Elbinias’ belligerent attitude when¾upon receipt on May 8, 2008 of the Court’s approval and acceptance of complainants’ resignation letters, which inadvertently excluded Atty. Jamero’s¾Justice Elbinias wrote a letter to the Personnel Officer of the CA – Mindanao Station terminating Atty. Jamero’s employment but antedating it May 7, 2008.  Moreover, complainants raised another grievance against Justice Elbinias who, allegedly under flimsy reasons, refused to sign their clearances.  Finally, they imputed malevolent intent on Justice Elbinias who allegedly—although not confirmed—gave a list of their names to then newly appointed CA Associate Justice Ayson in connection with the applications of some of them.  In fine, they reiterated their plea for the preventive suspension of Justice Elbinias pending resolution of the instant case to prevent him from using his position to further harass them.

 

In his Comment[20][10] datedJuly 13, 2008, Justice Elbinias vehemently denied the charges.  While admitting telling complainants that he would fire them, he said this was on account of the poor, inefficient and sloppy draft work of the complainants-lawyers, and the unsatisfactory performance of complainants driver and utility worker.  He attributed the concerted efforts of complainants to preempt their dismissal by filing the instant complaint as also an attempt to put him in a bad light.  On the issue of the firing of Atty. Cayetuna allegedly on his refusal to sign the letter-reply to Mr. Algabre, Justice Elbinias asserted that the mention of CA Associate Justice Lim therein was factual as shown in Atty. Cayetuna’s drafts and did not put Justice Lim in a bad light.  Moreover, he maintained that he never forced Atty. Cayetuna to sign the letter-reply, but the latter “set him up” by raising such an issue and writing an “insincere” written objection about it.  And having lost confidence in Atty. Cayetuna, he had no option but to fire him.

Additionally, on September 15, 2008, after getting a copy of complainants’ June 18, 2008 letter-complaint, Justice Elbinias filed his Supplemental Comment.[21][11]  Therein, he asserted the need to do an inventory of records and cases before he would sign their clearances, since complainants’ sudden abandonment of his office left it in disarray with records difficult to locate.  He maintained that he was reorganizing his office and the inventory was still not finished on June 18, 2008 when complainants wrote their additional letter-complaint.  He also accused complainants of collective theft for the loss of some documents from his chamber.

 

Meanwhile, on July 24, 2009, all the current employees assigned in the Office of Justice Elbinias in the CA – Mindanao Station sent the Court a letter[22][12] of support for Justice Elbinias datedJuly 13, 2009.

 

Also, on account of Justice Elbinias’ transfer to the CA in Manila, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) of Misamis Oriental, Inc. issued Board Resolution No. 133-S-2009[23][13] on August 7, 2009, expressing appreciation for Justice Elbinias’ integrity and dedication as a CA Associate Justice.  Similarly, the City Council of Cagayan de Oro City issued Resolution No. 9776-2009[24][14] on August 18, 2009, commending Justice Elbinias for his integrity and dedication in serving the citizenry as Associate Justice of the CA.

 

On March 2, 2010, through a Resolution[25][15] of even date, we required the parties to manifest whether they would submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.

 

On March 22, 2010, Justice Elbinias filed his Manifestation[26][16] to submit the instant case for resolution based on the basis of the pleadings.  Complainants, however, filed on April 15, 2010 a letter[27][17] requesting for copies of the pleadings filed by Justice Elbinias, which was duly granted.[28][18]

 

On June 4, 2010, complainants filed their Omnibus Reply and Manifestation,[29][19] dated June 3, 2010, to Justice Elbinias’ comments and duly submitted the instant case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.  They argued that their unverified complaints were properly treated by the Court as anonymous complaints, since respondent justice admitted the material allegations therein relative to the DTR of Leofer Andoy, failure to timely act on cases with Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the “undertakings” they submitted as per respondent’s instructions, non-signing of their clearances and deterring Justice Ayson from hiring some of them.  Moreover, they asserted that Atty. Cayetuna’s drafts could not have been stolen by the author thereof, and that they did not violate Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 in divulging confidential information to unauthorized persons as then Chief Justice Puno could not be considered an unauthorized person. 

 

Besides, complainants stressed, no liability under Articles 363 (planting of evidence), 364 (blemish reputation of another), 353 (public and malicious imputation of a crime, etc.) and 183 (perjury) of the Revised Penal Code can be attributed to them, since their letter-complaints were filed with utmost circumspection and confidentiality.  To debunk their alleged inefficiency and assert the contrary of respondent’s allegation that they preempted their inevitable termination by filing the instant complaints, they submitted their respective but similar performance ratings of “Very Satisfactory,” together with the comparative Judicial Data Statistics from the Information and Statistical Data Division of the CA, which tended to show that the output data on case disposition of Justice Elbinias did not substantially change before and after they resigned from his office.  They contended that all these prove that their alleged inefficiency had no factual basis.  Finally, they maintained that they had already contemplated resigning way before the incidents involving Atty. Cayetuna and Abugho happened because of, they reiterate, his demeaning and terrorizing actuations against them.

 

On July 16, 2010, Justice Elbinias filed his Rejoinder.[30][20]  He assailed complainants’ Omnibus Reply and Manifestation for again being conveniently not under oath, concluding their allegations to be insincere and untruthful.  He countered and debunked the assertions and allegations of complainants.  He strongly posited that complainants misled or mischaracterized facts by falsely asserting his alleged admission of their allegations in his Comment and Supplemental Comment.

 

Our Ruling

 

After an assiduous study of the parties’ allegations and counter-allegations, with due consideration of the documents they submitted to bolster their respective positions, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant case for being unsubstantiated.

 

Both the letter-complaints of April 30, 2008 and June 18, 2008 are unverified, while the June 3, 2010 Omnibus Reply and Manifestation of complainants is not under oath.  It must be noted that most of the complainants are lawyers, and are presumed and ought to know the formal requirement of verification for administrative complaints as stated under Section 1, Rule 140:

 

SECTION 1.  How instituted.¾Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate their allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.  The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

The above rule provides three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.[31][21]

 

Indeed, complainants not only failed to execute a verified complaint but also never submitted their affidavits showing personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in their letter-complaints.  To cover this procedural deficiency, they assert that the Court properly recognized their letter-complaints as an anonymous complaint, relying on Sinsuat v. Hidalgo.[32][22]  

 

In Sinsuat, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and subsequent letters of complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator as an anonymous complaint, since therein respondent Judge Hidalgo admitted complainants’ material allegations and “the motion and letters sufficiently averred the specific acts upon which respondent’s alleged administrative liability was anchored.  And the averments are verifiable from the records of the trial court and the CA’s Decision.”[33][23]  In short, the unverified complaint was properly considered as an anonymous complaint, since the material allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the trial court, as aptly found by the CA.

 

This is not the case in this instant.  Complainants’ reliance on Sinsuat is misplaced.  For one, even a passing perusal of the Comment and Supplemental Comment does not show respondent Justice Elbinias admitting the allegations in the letter-complaints. For another, the averments and material allegations of complainants are neither verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity nor supported or substantiated by other competent evidence submitted by complainants. 

 

The formal faux pas of complainants could have been remedied by the submission under oath of their subsequent pleadings, particularly the Omnibus Reply, where they traversed the points and defenses raised by respondent vis-à-vis their allegations.  And they could have appended thereto their respective affidavits attesting to their personal knowledge of the facts of their material allegations.  But, as it is, complainants chose not to place their Omnibus Reply under oath, much less submitted their affidavits.  Verily, after receiving copies of respondent’s Comment and Supplemental Comment, they had ample opportunity but chose not to correct the deficiencies of their complaints while submitting the instant case for resolution based on the pleadings filed sans their affidavits.

 

Complainants assert that Justice Elbinias admitted the material allegations in their letter-complaints, to wit:  (1) that, aware of Andoy’s absences in February 2008 which were not reflected in his (Andoy’s) Daily Time Record (DTR), Justice Elbinias nonetheless signed said DTR; (2) that respondent did not deny failing to timely act on the application for TRO in the cited cases in their complaint; (3) that respondent’s lawyers (complainants) submitted their “undertakings” as per his instructions; and (4) that he did not sign complainants’ clearances on account of office inventory of records and for lack of follow- up by complainants.

 

These assertions are belied by respondent’s comment and supplemental comment. 

 

Justice Elbinias denies being fully aware of Andoy’s absences when he signed the latter’s DTRs.  He points out that he was not aware whether Andoy filed leaves for his absences in December 2007, and whether Andoy declared or not his absences in February 2008, since he signs all the DTRs of his office staff which are submitted together.  Thus, he maintains that if Andoy did not mark as absent the days he was absent or whether he filed leaves for his absences, respondent charges it to inadvertence on his part for having signed Andoy’s DTRs which was done in good faith.  Indeed, without copies of the subject DTRs of Andoy as duly signed by respondent and the logbook of their office reflecting the time of the employees’ arrival and departure, we cannot ascribe any liability on respondent.

 

On his alleged failure to timely act on an application for a TRO, it bears stressing that Justice Elbinias, in his Comment, asserts what he calls an “undue interest and irregular involvement.”[34][24]  While respondent does not deny the fact that no TRO was issued, such is not equivalent to an admission of wrongdoing.  Verily, the issuance of any provisional remedy, such as a TRO in the alleged case, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon certain conditions as provided by law that are amply shown by the applicant.  Consequently, undue delay or inaction on an application of a provisional remedy, like a TRO, cannot be imputed to the judge or court where there is no showing that the grant thereof is proper and well nigh dictated by an indubitable right of a party-applicant that needs protection.  Anent the allegation of undue delay in the resolution of motions for reconsideration, we agree with respondent that said allegation is general and lacks specificity.  Complainants merely made a general allegation of undue delay without particulars as to specific cases, the motions for reconsideration of which have been set for resolution after the adverse parties have filed their comments thereto and have not been resolved beyond the 90-day period.  On the alleged inaction on cases with TRO, complainants failed to show that the issuance of a TRO in a particular case is paramount to the provisional protection of a party’s right in esse.

The “undertakings” embodied in the application letters[35][25] of complainant-Attys. Jamero, Sur, Cardino and Yulo submitted by Justice Elbinias in his Comment duly show the nature of confidential employees.  Complainants contend that these were accomplished and submitted by them upon the instructions of respondent.  We find it incredulous that the “undertakings” were made by complainant-lawyers at the behest of respondent.  It stands to reason that an applicant, among others, submits an application letter.  The application letters submitted by complainants to Justice Elbinias could not have been under the latter’s instruction and control.  Consequently, the application letters, without more, were certainly from complainants and could not have been under the direction of respondent.

 

The fact that Justice Elbinias did not sign the clearances of complainants is sufficiently explained in his Supplemental Comment that he was reorganizing his office and doing an inventory of the rollos of the cases assigned to him.  Besides, as aptly pointed out by respondent, complainants were not unduly prejudiced by his delay in signing their clearances for they were able to receive their benefits and were even rehired in the CA Mindanao – Station despite the lack of clearances, for such were not needed for their reemployment as shown by the letter[36][26] of CA Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to respondent dated September 5, 2008.

 

Even granting arguendo and considering the letter-complaints as anonymous complaints, still these cannot prosper as stated earlier because the averments and material allegations of complainants are neither verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity nor supported or substantiated by other competent evidence submitted by complainants. 

 

In Anonymous Complaint against Pershing T. Yared, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Canlaon City, this Court reiterated the rule pertaining to anonymous complaints, thus:

 

At the outset, the Court stresses that an anonymous complaints is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author.  However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.[37][27]  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

In the instant case, the charges of Gross Inefficiency; Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority are neither supported by public records nor substantiated by competent evidence.

 

Public records do not support any of the allegations.  The incident involving Engr. Rowell T. Magalang, Administrative Officer, Maintenance and Utility Unit of the CA Mindanao – Station merely shows a misunderstanding between respondent and the engineer concerned.[38][28]  As regards those of complainants Roxas and Abugho relative to their unauthorized absence on March 19, 2008, it is embodied in the letter[39][29] of even date by Justice Elbinias to the Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao – Station, Ruby Jane B. Rivera, which evidently shows what it is.  Complainants allege the nastiness of respondent in marking absent Abugho and Roxas that day even if they were present, only on account of their going out of the office for a few minutes to buy food.  Respondent counters that both were absent and not around when he looked for them on March 19, 2008, as he would not have informed the CA Personnel Officer if it were not so.  Since the utility worker and the driver are expected to be at the office during office hours, then it is logical that if they were not around, then they could not be present.

 

It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.[40][30]  In the instant case, complainants have not shown, much less submitted, substantial evidence supporting their allegations.

 

Anent the untimely and peremptory termination of complainant Atty. Cayetuna, we find it to be a misunderstanding between respondent and his most senior lawyer which has been blown out of proportion. 

 

A cursory perusal of the drafts[41][31] prepared by Atty. Cayetuna of the letter-reply to Algabre would readily show that the explanation is factual in nature and in no way pejorative to CA Associate Justice Lim.  Thus, there is really no basis for Atty. Cayetuna’s misgiving about signing said letter-reply.  And it is uncalled for Atty. Cayetuna to write a formal letter to respondent about his refusal to do so. 

 

It must be borne in mind that complainants, as primarily confidential employees, need the trust of their immediate superior, Justice Elbinias.  In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara,[42][32] this Court reiterated the principle behind and the element of trust in the employment to a primarily confidential position.  We cited De los Santos vs. Mallare, thus:

 

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential.  The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.[43][33]

Moreover, it has been said that confidential employees work at the pleasure of the appointing authority.  Thus, there is no quibble that when the relation between respondent CA Associate Justice Elbinias and his lawyers has deteriorated to the extent that there is no longer intimacy between them that insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state, then the confidential employment is no longer tenable.  The right of respondent to change the confidential employees in his office cannot be disputed.

 

Even if the allegations have not been substantially proved, still it is incumbent for Justice Elbinias to reflect on how the conflict between him and his staff came about.  While we take notice of the letter of support from other employees in the CA Mindanao – Station, and the Resolutions from the YMCA and the City Council of Cagayan de Oro City commending him, we hope that Justice Elbinias learns from this experience to better and improve the management and supervision of his staff.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

 

SO ORDERED.                    

 

 

 

 

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                        Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

   ANTONIO T. CARPIO                    CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES                             

          Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA    TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

         Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

                    ARTURO D. BRION                               DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                         Associate Justice                                             Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

                LUCAS P. BERSAMIN                    MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

          Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

     ROBERTO A. ABAD                         MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

          Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

       JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                        JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

          Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

[1][21] Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133,August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 38, 46.

[2][21] Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133,August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 38, 46.

[3][22]Id.

[4][23]Id. at 47.

[5][27] A.M. No. P-05-2015, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 347. 354-355; citing Anonymous v. Geverola, A.M. No. P-97-1254,September 18, 1997, 279 SCRA 279.

[6][28] Rollo, pp. 17-24.

[7][29]Id. at 16.

[8][30] Rivera v. Mendoza, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2013 [OCA-IPI No. 06-2509-RTJ], August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 608, 613, citing Barcena v. Gingoyon, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1794, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 65, 74.

[9][32] G.R. No. 142937,November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 41.

[10][33] 87 Phil. 289, 298 (1950).

[11][1] Rollo, pp. 1-15.

[12][2]Id. at 35-40, all datedApril 30, 2008.

[13][3]Id. at 41-44.

[14][4] Now a member of this Court.

[15][5] Rollo, p. 32.  Atty. Cayetuna’s letter reads in full, thus:

 

April 24, 2008

 

HON. JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS

Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station

Cagayan de Oro City

 

Dear Justice,

 

I am writing you this letter in connection with the letter datedFebruary 6, 2008of petitioner Rolando Algabre in CA G.R. No. SP 01580 asking for assistance from the Presidential Action Center (OP), which letter was in turn, endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court of the Philippines, to intervene and make the appropriate/urgent action on their Petition which is still pending with your office despite the lapse of eleven (11) months from its filing on March 6, 2007.

 

Your action, is to write a reply to petitioner and furnish the OCA with a copy thereof.  Per instruction, you made me write an explanation to petitioner the circumstances which caused the delay in the deliberation of the Report/draft Decision and securing the signature of Justice Lim for concurrence.  I explained with you my reluctance to affix my signature as the writer of the letter reply, which in a way put the good Justice Lim in bad light, but still you insisted to put my name on the said letter.

 

Now that the letter is made, edited and polished (by your Honor), with its entire tenor substantially different from my draft letter, it is of my conscience and moral call that I cannot make, write nor sign a letter that tends to discredit, malign and put anybody, a co-office worker, or a Justice at that, in bad light.  It is against my conscience, my moral and legal principles I have learned as a lawyer and, as a Roman Catholic Christian.

 

I respect you and acknowledge your ascendancy over me.  Despite my utmost loyalty as your subordinate, however, I cannot intelligently write such letter in my own free will and sign it for you which I honestly belief that will subject me to disciplinary, if not criminal liability.

 

I deal this as a serious matter and I hope you will understand my predicament.

 

Thank you very much,

 

Respectfully yours,

 

(SGD) Atty. Samson Ariel C. Cayetuna

Court Attorney V-CT

 

[16][6]Id. at 53.

[17][7]Id. at 308.

[18][8]Id. at 310.

[19][9]Id. at 74-75.

[20][10]Id. at 80-109.

[21][11]Id. at 142-147.

[22][12]Id. at 228-229.

[23][13]Id. at 179-181.

[24][14]Id. at 187-188.

[25][15]Id. at 232.

[26][16]Id. at 234-236.

[27][17]Id. at 243.

[28][18]Id. at 244-245, Resolution datedApril 27, 2010.

[29][19]Id. at 252-276, Omnibus Reply [To Respondent Justice Michael P. Elbinias’ Comment dated 13 July 2008, 10 September 2008, and to his Manifestation dated March 2010] and Manifestation [In Compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated 27 April 2010, received on 25 May 2010], dated June 3, 2010.

[30][20]Id. at 484-506, dated July 13, 2010.

[31][21] Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133,August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 38, 46.

[32][22]Id.

[33][23]Id. at 47.

[34][24] Rollo, p. 96.

[35][25]Id. at 123-125, dated April 18/19, 2007.

[36][26]Id. at 294-295.

[37][27] A.M. No. P-05-2015, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 347. 354-355; citing Anonymous v. Geverola, A.M. No. P-97-1254,September 18, 1997, 279 SCRA 279.

[38][28] Rollo, pp. 17-24.

[39][29]Id. at 16.

[40][30] Rivera v. Mendoza, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2013 [OCA-IPI No. 06-2509-RTJ], August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 608, 613, citing Barcena v. Gingoyon, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1794, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 65, 74.

[41][31] Rollo, pp. 25-31.

[42][32] G.R. No. 142937,November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 41.

[43][33] 87 Phil. 289, 298 (1950).

Comment

TIP 0007: THE CASE OF JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR. OF RTC BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA.

Filed under: TIPS FOR JUDGES — Leave a comment
July 14, 2011

TIP 0007: THE CASE OF JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR. OF RTC BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA.

 

ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA VS. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA (A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2044, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN)

 

=============================

 

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

  

FINDING OF THE COURT:

 

The Court finds that Judge Causapin is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

. . . . . .

 

In conclusion, the Court finds Judge Causapin guilty of (1) gross ignorance of the law for dismissing, without hearing, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G on the ground of non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court on execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping; and (2) gross misconduct for having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G and requesting Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

 

THE JUDGE ALREADY RETIRED. WHAT IS HIS PENALTY?

  FINE OF P20,000.00 TO BE TAKEN FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFIT OR TO BE PAID BY HIM.

 The Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty imposable upon Judge Causapin for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. 

 

Rule 140, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court characterizes both gross ignorance of the law and procedure and gross misconduct as grave offenses.  The penalties prescribed for such offense are:  (1) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 

 

          Since Judge Causapin already retired compulsorily on November 24, 2006, the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible.  Hence, the Court imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

WHAT IS THE RULE ON GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 WHERE THE LAW INVOLVED IS SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY, LACK OF CONVERSANCE THEREWITH CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

 Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.  They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.  Judicial competence requires no less.  The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.[1][26]  The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.

 

In Pesayco v. Layague,[2][27] the Court stressed that:

 

A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law x x x.  Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[3][28]

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

THE JUDGE  DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF A PROPER CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WITHOUT HEARING.

IS HEARING REQUIRED BEFORE A COMPLAINT CAN BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A PROPER CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

YES.

Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are required.

 

SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provided that:

 

2.         Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum-shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

The same requirement was subsequently carried over to Rule 7, Section 5, second paragraph of the 1997 Rules of Court.

 

………………………….

 

Morever, defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G did not file a proper motion to dismiss.  According to Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint[.]”  Defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G incorporated their motion to dismiss into their answer with counterclaim.  They actually raised the defect in plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping as a special and affirmative defense.  This calls for the application of Rule 16, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

 

SEC. 6.  Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

 

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

 

Going by the foregoing rule, Judge Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No. 1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary hearing specifically on the defect in the plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping; or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case and tackling the issue in the course thereof.  In both instances, parties are given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint.  Judge Causapin neither conducted such a preliminary hearing or trial on the merits prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

THE JUDGE HAD BEEN HAVING DRINKING SPREES WITH THE DEFENDANTS. IS THIS GROSS MISCONDUCT?

YES. THESE RENDER SUSPECT HIS IMPARTIALITY.  A JUDGE SHOULD SO BEHAVE AT ALL TIMES AS TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY.  THE CONDUCT OF A JUDGE MUST BE FREE FROM ANY WHIFF OF IMPROPRIETY NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES BUT ALSO TO HIS BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE HIS SALA AND EVEN AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL.[4][30]

 

Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautista’s allegations; and the Court deems Judge Causapin’s silence as admission of the same.  Judge Causapin could have easily denied the allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent, notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.[5][29] 

 

Judge Causapin’s drinking sprees with the defendants and request for Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default are evidently improper.  These render suspect his impartiality.  A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private individual.[6][30] 

 

 

=============================

 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

 

FIRST DIVISION

 

 

ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA,  

                     Complainant,                                                                                                                                     

 

 

 

– versus –

 

 

 

jUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Guimba, Nueva Ecija,

                       Respondent.

   A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044      

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2553-RTJ)

 

Present:

 

CORONA, C.J.,

      Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,* and

MENDOZA,** JJ.

 

Promulgated:

 

June 22, 2011

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

 

D e c i s I O N

 

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

 

          Before the Court is an administrative Complaint[7][1] filed by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista (Atty. Bautista) against Judge Blas O. Causapin, Jr. (Judge Causapin), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

 

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

 

On December 15, 2005, the heirs of Baudelio T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista; the heirs of Aurora T. Bautista, represented by Reynaldo B. Mesina; Elmer B. Polangco; Nancy B. Polangco; and Gabriel Bautista (plaintiffs), through counsel, Atty. Bautista, filed a Complaint for Partition before the RTC against Jose Bautista and Domingo T. Bautista (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 1387-G.  Civil Case No. 1387-G was raffled to Judge Causapin’s branch.

 

Defendants had until January 26, 2006 to file their answer, but on January 24, 2006, they filed a motion for an extension of 15 days within which to file the said pleading.  Judge Causapin granted defendants’ motion in an Order dated January 25, 2006.

 

Defendants filed on February 6, 2006 a second motion for extension to file answer.  In an Order of even date, Judge Causapin granted defendants an “inextendible” extension of 15 days. 

 

Defendants filed on February 20, 2006 a final motion for extension of 10 days within which to file their answer, which was again granted by Judge Causapin in an Order issued on the same day.

 

On February 25, 2006, Atty. Bautista filed a comment[8][2] on defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer.  He pointed out that all three motions did not contain a notice of the time and place of hearing, thus, these should be considered mere scraps of paper.

 

Finally, on March 20, 2006, defendants filed their joint Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss.

 

Plaintiffs countered by filing onMarch 27, 2006a motion to declare defendants in default.  Judge Causapin set the plaintiffs’ motion for hearing onApril 28, 2006.

 

Plaintiffs and Atty. Bautista appeared for the hearing set onApril 28, 2006, but defendants failed to appear.  Judge Causapin reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to May 19, 2006.

 

Plaintiffs and defendants with their respective counsels appeared during the hearing onMay 19, 2006.  Defendants’ counsel, however, moved for time within which to file pleading, which was granted by Judge Causapin.  The hearing was reset toJune 20, 2006.

 

Only plaintiffs and their counsel, Atty. Bautista, appeared for the hearing on June 20, 2006, thus, Judge Causapin again reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to July 11, 2006.

 

Atty. Bautista failed to appear for the hearing onJuly 11, 2006.  Judge Causapin once more reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to August 28, 2006.

 

At the hearing onAugust 28, 2006, the parties and their counsels were present.  Judge Causapin finally submitted for resolution plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default.

 

In the Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default[9][3]  dated September 18, 2006, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and Nancy Polangco did not sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the complaint, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.  He cited the ruling in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[10][4] that “[w]here there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition signed by only one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by his co-parties to represent them and to sign the certification.”[11][5]  Judge Causapin observed further that compulsory parties – plaintiffs heirs of Baudelio T. Bautista and Aurora T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista and Reynaldo Mesina, respectively – were not properly named in the complaint, in violation of Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Rules of Court.  Hence, Judge Causapin held in the end that defendants could not be declared in default for not answering a defective complaint, which in law does not exist.

 

Consequently, Atty. Bautista filed the present administrative Complaint against Judge Causapin for Gross Ignorance of the Law, for issuing (1) the Orders dated January 25, 2006, February 6, 2006, and February 20, 2006, which granted defendants’ motions for extension of time to file their answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, without notice of hearing; and (2) the Resolution dated September 18, 2006, which summarily dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G without ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default. 

 

Atty. Bautista averred that Judge Causapin, in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and utter lack of professional competence.  Atty. Bautista disputed the application of Loquias to Civil Case No. 1387-G, and insisted that Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile[12][6] was the more appropriate jurisprudence.  In Cavile, the Supreme Court recognized the execution of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of the petitioners, on behalf of all other petitioners therein, as substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.  In addition, Judge Causapin cannot motu proprio dismiss a case without complying with Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that the dismissal of a case without prejudice shall be upon motion and hearing.  Atty. Bautista denied that there were other compulsory heirs who were not impleaded in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and even if there were, the non-inclusion of compulsory parties was not a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint.  

 

Atty. Bautista also questioned Judge Causapin’s impartiality considering that (1) Judge Causapin was seen having a drinking spree with Jose T. Bautista, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, as attested to by Delia Ronquillo in an Affidavit dated October 16, 2006;[13][7] and (2) Judge Causapin and Jose Bautista, the other defendant in Civil Case No. 1387-G, are both active members of the Masonic Organization and drink together regularly.[14][8]

Lastly, Atty. Bautista charged Judge Causapin with gross misconduct.  Atty. Bautista alleged that he was categorically requested by Judge Causapin to withdraw the motion to declare defendants in default since, as assured by said Judge, the plaintiffs’ civil case for partition was already strong and there was no chance of plaintiffs losing the case.  Likewise constituting gross misconduct was the granting by Judge Causapin of defendants’ many motions for extension of time to file answer on the very same day said motions were filed.  A written motion without a Notice of Hearing was a mere scrap of paper.  

 

In the 1st Indorsement[15][9] datedNovember 9, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, required Judge Causapin to comment on Atty. Bautista’s complaint within 10 days from receipt.

 

On November 22, 2006, while the OCA was still awaiting Judge Causapin’s comment to Atty. Baustista’s complaint, said judge issued in Civil Case No. 1387-G a Resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated September 18, 2006,[16][10] wherein he clarified his reasons for dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G: 

 

The unsigning of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is the reason for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.

 

The Court considered also the fact that the Court cannot make a decision with finality in this case for partition since the names of the heirs of Baudelio Bautista were not on record as well as the heirs of Aurora T. Bautista represented by Reynaldo Mesina and since the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping was not signed by two of the plaintiffs.  The Court further considered the provisions of the Rules of Court in Rule 7, Section 5, paragraph 2 which provides “failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be caused for the dismissal of the case without prejudice unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.” x x x

 

The Court under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar was of the opinion that dismissing the case without prejudice would make it easier and simpler for the plaintiffs to rectify the errors observed by the Court by refiling a new complaint.

 

x x x x

 

The claim of the plaintiffs that there was no hearing held to hear is in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is without merit. 

 

The defendants in their Answer pointed to the fact that the plaintiffs’ verification of their complaint was defective.

 

The case was scheduled for Pre-trial on June 20, 2006 but the parties did not finish the Pre-trial scheduled for several times.  Both parties filed on June 20, 2006, separate motions submitting the issues for resolution of the court, hence, the questioned resolution of the court finding the defendants not in default and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice.

 

The order dismissing the complaint without prejudice was made so that the plaintiffs will be afforded time to correct whatever deficiencies very much apparent in their complaint as to parties to the case and as to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which according to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court cannot be cured by amendment.[17][11]

 

 

As regards the question of the appropriate jurisprudence, Judge Causapin held in his Resolution of November 22, 2006:

 

This Court cannot find any difference in the rule of Non-Forum shopping in the cases of Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman earlier cited and the case of Cavile et al. vs. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et al., also herein before cited.

 

x x x x

 

The only difference between the two above-cited cases is that “the Supreme Court in the case of Cavile found an exception to the general rule and allowed an exception to the general rule because it found the signature of one of the petitioners Thomas George Cavile, Sr. as the signature of the other petitioners who were all named as petitioners in the case to be having a common interest as against all the defendants calling the situation as a “special circumstance” to allow substantial compliance with the mandatory requirement of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

 

The circumstance of parties to the case present in the case of Cavile do not obtain in this case which by no stretch of imagination and of facts cannot apply to the case at bar because there is no indication that all the parties-plaintiffs have a common interest against the defendants because not all the plaintiffs were named in the complaint.[18][12]

 

 

In the same Resolution, Judge Causapin defended his Orders granting defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer to the complaint, thus:

 

While it is true that all defendants[’] Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer were furnished the plaintiffs, it is also true that all the motions of the defendants did not contain a setting of the motions for hearing. 

 

The Court considered the motions for extension of time to file answer “motions” which the Court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court x x x.

 

The Court therefore Granted all the motions of extension of time filed by the defendants favorably.[19][13]

 

 

On December 6, 2006, Judge Causapin filed his Comment[20][14] to Atty. Bautista’s complaint against him, essentially reiterating the ratiocinations in his Resolution dated November 22, 2006 in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

The OCA submitted on February 20, 2007 its Report[21][15] with the following recommendations:

 

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation that (a) the instant case be RE-DOCKETTED as an administrative matter; and (b) respondent judge be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00, which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits; in case such accrued leave credits be found insufficient to answer for the said fine, the respondent Judge shall pay the balance thereof to the Court.[22][16]

 

 

          The Court re-docketed Atty. Bautista’s Complaint as a regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they are willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[23][17]  Even though both parties duly received notices, only Judge Causapin submitted such a Manifestation[24][18] on June 11, 2007.  The Court finally deemed the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

          The Court finds that Judge Causapin is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court – which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91,[25][19] as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94[26][20] – requires the plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.   

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court prescribes:

 

SEC. 5.  Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

 

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.  The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.  If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

 

 

No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and constitutes a defect in the petition.  The attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition.[27][21]

 

It is true that in Loquias, the Court required strict compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

 

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case.  We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.  Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.  Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.  There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification.  It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending.  We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.  The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.  Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.  Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[28][22]

 

 

Nevertheless, in Cavile,[29][23] the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing substantial compliance with the rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping:

 

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient.  However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.  This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.  It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

 

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.  All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon.  They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents.  Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.  There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.  Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as “special circumstance” for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.[30][24]

 

 

Atty. Bautista argues that:

 

[T]he Cavile Case is more relevant to the case before [Judge Causapin] – the Loquias Case being an Election Contest; whereas, the Cavile Case was an action for Partition under Rule 69.  Expectedly, the parties in an Election case may have different causes of action or defences; whereas, in a simple action for Partition, the plaintiffs normally have a common interest in the subject of the case, and therefore, a common cause of action against the defendants.  Precisely, the matter of “common cause of action” was the rationale in allowing the signature of only one plaintiff in the Cavile case as substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 7 Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The conclusion of respondent-Judge is this respect displays his ignorance of the law and lack of competence.[31][25]

 

 

Judge Causapin concluded that Cavile does not apply to Civil Case No. 1387-G because the plaintiffs in the latter case do not have a common interest.  Without notice and hearing, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint in the said civil case because of the purported defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping.  Thus, plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to explain, justify, and prove that the circumstances in Cavile are also present in Civil Case No. 1387-G. 

 

Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are required.

 

SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provided that:

 

2.         Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum-shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

The same requirement was subsequently carried over to Rule 7, Section 5, second paragraph of the 1997 Rules of Court.

 

Morever, defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G did not file a proper motion to dismiss.  According to Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint[.]”  Defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G incorporated their motion to dismiss into their answer with counterclaim.  They actually raised the defect in plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping as a special and affirmative defense.  This calls for the application of Rule 16, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

 

SEC. 6.  Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

 

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

 

 

Going by the foregoing rule, Judge Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No. 1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary hearing specifically on the defect in the plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping; or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case and tackling the issue in the course thereof.  In both instances, parties are given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint.  Judge Causapin neither conducted such a preliminary hearing or trial on the merits prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.  They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.  Judicial competence requires no less.  The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.[32][26]  The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.

 

In Pesayco v. Layague,[33][27] the Court stressed that:

 

A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law x x x.  Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[34][28]

 

 

Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautista’s allegations; and the Court deems Judge Causapin’s silence as admission of the same.  Judge Causapin could have easily denied the allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent, notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.[35][29] 

 

Judge Causapin’s drinking sprees with the defendants and request for Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default are evidently improper.  These render suspect his impartiality.  A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private individual.[36][30] 

 

Nonetheless, we cannot hold Judge Causapin administratively liable for granting defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer without hearing and on the same day said motions were filed. 

 

Atty. Bautista questions defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer, which did not contain notices of hearing as required by the following provisions under Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

 

SEC. 4.  Hearing of motion.  – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

 

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. 

 

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

 

 

As prescribed by the aforequoted provisions, a movant shall set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party.  The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.[37][31]   

 

The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose.  The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant.  In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded.[38][32]

 

Yet the rule requiring notice of hearing is not unqualifiedly applicable to all motions, and there are motions which may be heard ex parte, as Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court also clearly acknowledges.  Among the latter class of motions are precisely those seeking extension of time to plead, and the reason these are not strictly held to the requirement of notice is that they are non-contentious and do not as a rule involve the substantial rights of the other parties in the suit. [39][33]  In Amante v. Suñga,[40][34] the Court declared that:

 

The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion “made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.”  As “a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard…”

 

It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objection of the motion.”[41][35]

 

 

Considering that a motion for extension of time may be acted upon by the court ex parte or without hearing, then it need not contain a notice of hearing.  It is equally unnecessary for the court to wait until motion day, under Rule 15, Section 7[42][36] of the 1997 Rules of Court, to act on a motion for extension of time.  Therefore, contrary to the finding of the OCA, Judge Causapin did not commit abuse of discretion in granting defendants’ motions for extension of time on the same day said motions were filed and even when the same motions did not contain a notice of hearing.

 

In conclusion, the Court finds Judge Causapin guilty of (1) gross ignorance of the law for dismissing, without hearing, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G on the ground of non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court on execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping; and (2) gross misconduct for having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G and requesting Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

The Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty imposable upon Judge Causapin for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. 

 

Rule 140, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court characterizes both gross ignorance of the law and procedure and gross misconduct as grave offenses.  The penalties prescribed for such offense are:  (1) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 

 

          Since Judge Causapin already retired compulsorily on November 24, 2006, the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible.  Hence, the Court imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. 

 

WHEREFORE, Judge Blas O. Causapin, Jr. is found GUILTY of both gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct and is accordingly FINED the amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits or accrued leave credits; and if such amount is insufficient to answer for the said fine, Judge Causapin shall pay the balance thereof.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice
   
   
   
   
   
   

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

[1][26]          Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 20, 32.              

[2][27]          A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.

[3][28]         Id. at 459.

[4][30]          Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

[5][29]          See Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-936, November 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 665, 670-671.

[6][30]          Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

*               Per Raffle dated June 13, 2011.

**             Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.

[7][1]           Rollo, pp. 8-19.

[8][2]          Id. at 34-36.

[9][3]          Id. at 58-59.

[10][4]          392 Phil. 596 (2000).

[11][5]          Rollo, p. 59.

[12][6]          448 Phil. 302 (2003).

[13][7]          Rollo, pp. 60-61.

[14][8]         Id. at 62-63.

[15][9]         Id. at 64.

[16][10]        Id. at 68-77.

[17][11]        Id. at 71-77.

[18][12]        Id. at 76.

[19][13]        Id. at 72.

[20][14]        Id. at 65-67.

[21][15]         Id. at 1-5.

[22][16]        Id. at 5.

[23][17]         Id. at 79.

[24][18]         Id. at 84.

[25][19]         Effective January 1, 1992.

[26][20]         Effective April 1, 1994.

[27][21]         Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 47 (2005).

[28][22]         Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 4 at 603-604.

[29][23]         Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, supra note 6.

[30][24]        Id. at 311-312.

[31][25]         Rollo, p. 88.

[32][26]         Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 20, 32.              

[33][27]         A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.

[34][28]        Id. at 459.

[35][29]         See Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-936, November 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 665, 670-671.

[36][30]         Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

[37][31]         Basco v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 671, 685 (2000); Marcos v. Ruiz, G.R. Nos. 70746-47, September 1, 1992, 213 SCRA 177, 192; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA 520, 539; Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, December 6, 1991, 204 SCRA 654, 667; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses, Corp., G.R. No. 89125, July 2, 1991, 198 SCRA 689, 698; Cui v. Madayag, 314 Phil. 846, 858  (1995).

[38][32]         Atty. Neri v. Judge De la Peña, 497 Phil. 73, 81 (2005).

[39][33]         Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256, 266 (1987).

[40][34]         159-A Phil. 474 (1975).

[41][35]        Id. at 476-477.

[42][36]         SECTION 7. Motion day. – Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day.

 

Comment

CASE 2011-0153: RUEL AMPATUAN “ALIAS RUEL” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 183676, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; BUY BUST OPERATION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE (AMPATUAN VS. PEOPLE

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)CASE 2011-0153: RUEL AMPATUAN “ALIAS RUEL” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 183676, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; BUY BUST OPERATION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE (AMPATUAN VS. PEOPLE)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

 

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS TO PROVE IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?

 

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN: (1) THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE TOOK PLACE; (2) THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OR THE ILLICIT DRUG WAS PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE; AND (3) THAT THE BUYER AND SELLER WERE IDENTIFIED.

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WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESENT TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED?

 THE PRESENTATION  IN COURT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI — THE BODY OR SUBSTANCE OF THE CRIME – ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT A CRIME HAS ACTUALLY BEEN COMMITTED.

 In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[1][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.[2][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.[3][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.[4][22]

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WHAT IS A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

 

A BUY-BUST  OPERATION IS A FORM OF ENTRAPMENT WHEREBY WAYS AND MEANS ARE RESORTED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRAPPING AND CAPTURING THE LAWBREAKERS IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR CRIMINAL PLAN.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

IS BUY-BUS OPERATION LEGAL?

 YES PROVIDED THAT DUE REGARD TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SAFEGUARDS IS UNDERTAKEN.

           A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[5][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[6][25]

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HOW MUCH WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO TESTIMONIES OF POLICE OFFICERS?

 

MUCH CREDENCE BE GIVEN TO THEM UNLESS THERE IS EVIDCENCE TO THE CONTRARY. THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A REGULAR MANNER.

 In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[7][26]

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HOW MUCH WEIGHT IS GIVEN TO TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS?

 ACCORDED RESPECT WHEN NO GLARING ERRORS, GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OR SPECULATIVE AND ARBITRARY CONCLUSIONS CAN BE GATHERED.

 Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[8][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[9][28]

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HOW DOES ONE   OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS?

 THERE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS EITHER DID NOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES OR THAT THEY WERE PROMPTED WITH ILL MOTIVE.

         Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.[10][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.[11][30]

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WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED DRUGS?

 As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)[12][31]

 

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WHAT ARE THE LINKS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

 FIRST: EIZURE OF DRUG BY APPREHENDING OFFICER, SECOND: URNOVER BY APPREHENDING  OFFICER TO INVESTIGATING OFFICER; THIRD: URNOVER BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO FORENSIC CHEMIST AND FOURTH: TURNOVER BY THE FORENSIC CHEMIST TO THE COURT.

 The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[13][32]

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEIZED DRUG?

 Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[14][36]

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PETITIONER DENIES KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRANSACTION AND HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COMPANIONS WERE JUST VISITORS IN THAT HOUSE. IS THIS VALID DEFENSE.

 NO.

 Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[15][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

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FIRST DIVISION

RUEL AMPATUAN “Alias RUEL,”                                                Petitioner, G.R. No. 183676
 

– versus –

 

 

 

 

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

                                             Respondent.

                               

 Present:CORONA, C. J.,     Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DELCASTILLO,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA,* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

 

         For review through this appeal[16][1] is the Decision[17][2] dated 25 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant RUEL AMPATUAN “Alias Ruel” under Section 4[18][3] of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” as amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”  The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 4, Panabo City, in Criminal Case No. 98-76, finding appellant Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659) [as further amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002] is hereby AFFIRMED.[19][4] 

The facts as presented by the prosecution before the appellate court, follows:

On 13 October 1997, at around 10:00 a.m., police operatives PO1 Arnel Micabalo (PO1 Micabalo) and PO2 Francisco S. Caslib (PO2 Caslib) together with around fifteen (15) to sixteen (16) police members belonging from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Compound in Tagum City and Panabo Police Station were given a briefing by their team leader, a certain SPO1 Derrayal, regarding a buy-bust operation they would later conduct that day against a certain suspected drug pusher by the name of Totong Ibrahim (Ibrahim) who lives near the Coca-Cola warehouse at Barangay Cagangohan, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.[20][5] 

The buy-bust operation was conducted at around 1:00 p.m. of the same day.  Police officers PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib, prepared marked money in the amount of P500.00[21][6] and went to the house of Ibrahim posing as buyers.  The rest of the team positioned themselves at the grassy area nearby awaiting for the pre-arranged signal from PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib.  The policemen saw the accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan (Mr. Ampatuan) and his wife Linda, at the gate of the fence.[22][7]  They talked to the couple and pretended to buy for a party, marijuana worth P500.00.[23][8]  The couple told them to wait outside the fence and then went inside the house. Several minutes later, the couple came out with another man identified as Maguid Lumna (Lumna).  Mr. Ampatuan asked for the payment.  The poseur-buyers handed the marked money to Mr. Ampatuan, who in turn handed it to his wife, Linda.  Mr. Ampatuan then showed the police officers the marijuana contained in one pack.  This was placed inside a black bag and given to the poseur-buyers.  The pre-arranged signal of talking aloud was made and the rest of the police officers proceeded to the scene.  The couple and Lumna were arrested and brought to the Panabo Police Station.[24][9] 

On 23 October 1997, the confiscated object was turned over by the Panabo Police Station to Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero (Austero) of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Davao City.[25][10]  Upon examination, the sample taken yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana.  The total weight of the confiscated specimen as testified by Austero was approximately 1.3 kilos.[26][11] 

The version of the defense is:

On 13 October 1997, Mr. Ampatuan, his wife Linda and bodyguard Lumna went to the house of one Arnulfo Morales (Morales) in TagumCityto inquire about reports that the town of Asuncionwas impassable because of flooding.  Mr. Ampatuan explained in his testimony that the alleged flooding was the reason given by his debtor Muker Ganda (Muker) to explain the belated payment of a loan.   Morales advised them that they should go directly to the house of Muker at PanaboCity, Davao del Norte to collect the amount due in his favor.[27][12] 

Upon boarding a bus going to PanaboCity, the three met Arlene, the wife of Ibrahim.  Arlene, Linda’s classmate in elementary, invited them for lunch at her house, which was near Muker’s residence.  When they reached Muker’s house, the latter was not able to pay for his loan, hence they just acceded to the invitation of Arlene.  While inside the house, they saw Ibrahim outside with two companions.  At that point, five police officers entered the premises where Ibrahim was and one of them fired his gun.  Ibrahim and his companions ran, were chased by the police but were not apprehended.  Failing to capture Ibrahim, the police officers then barged back to the house where the couple, Lumna, and Arlene were.  They accused Mr. Ampatuan to be the owner of the black bag containing marijuana samples carried by the police officers.  Mr. Ampatuan vehemently denied the ownership of the same and his participation in the sale and/or possession of illegal drugs.  He explained that he and his companions were merely visitors of Arlene.  Nevertheless, the police officers insisted that he owned the samples and the black bag and they were eventually brought to the police station.[28][13]

An Information was filed against Mr. Ruel Ampatuan, Linda Ampatuan and Maguid Lumna dated 17 March 1998 which reads:

The undersigned accuses RUEL AMPATUAN alias “Ruel,” LINDA AMPATUAN alias “LINDA” and MAGUID LUMNA of the crime of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about October 13, 1997, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deal and distribute two (2) packs of dried Marijuana leaves weighing one (1) kilo and three hundred fifty nine & 3/100 grams.[29][14]

Upon arraignment, the couple and Lumna entered a plea of not guilty.

On 31 January 2002, the trial court found Mr. Ampatuan guilty but acquitted Linda and Lumna of the offense charged.  The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00 pursuant to law.  Accused Linda Ampatuan alias “Linda” and accused Maguid Lumna are ACQUITTED for reasons of reasonable doubt.  The two packs of dried marijuana leaves weighing a total of 1.3 kilos are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be destroyed in accordance with law.  Costs de oficio.[30][15]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the judgment of the trial court.[31][16]  The appellate court ruled that the prosecution proved the requisites for illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, to wit: (1) that the accused sold and delivered the prohibited drugs to another, and (2) that the accused knew that what was sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.[32][17]  It noted that the prosecution presented as evidence in court the corpus delicti.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

In this petition, the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan raised two assignments of errors:

First, Whether or not there was a correct application of the law and jurisprudence by the lower courts on the matter; and,

Second, Whether or not the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leaning on the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt are correct.[33][18]

The accused-appellant questions the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers related to his apprehension.  He likewise invokes denial of any knowledge and ownership of the black bag which contained the marijuana samples and asserts that he was mauled by the police officers to admit the ownership thereof and of the purported illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

The Court’s Ruling

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[34][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.[35][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.[36][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.[37][22]

As per record of the case, this Court is convinced that there was complete compliance with all the requisites under the law.

The prosecution established that at 1 p.m. of 13 October 1997, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the members of the police force to entrap a drug pusher named Ibrahim.  However, despite his absence in the target area, the entrapment operation ensued within the same place between the police officers who acted as poseur-buyers and the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan.  This was shown in the direct testimony[38][23] of PO2 Caslib:

Q:  So what did you do with the money when they asked for it?

A:  I gave the money personally and then the other person gave to us the marijuana.

Q:  When you said the other person, is that male or female?

A:  He is male, sir.

Q: You said you handed the money, to whom did you hand the money?

A:  I handed it to Ruel.

Q:  Now tell us, if this Ruel and Linda that you mentioned are in court, will you able to identify them?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Please point to the court this Ruel Ampatuan.

A:  That man, sir.

            (Witness is pointing to a person wearing maong pants and maroon long sleeves and when asked, identified himself as Ruel Ampatuan.)

x x x x

Q:  After you handed the money to Ruel Ampatuan, what did you do next, if any?

A:  I handed the money to Ruel and then he gave it to his wife.

Q:  And after he gave the money to his wife, what happened next?

A:  He gave us the item.

Q:  Where did this item come from?

A:  It came from the black bag, from the house of Totong Ibrahim.

Q:  Why, where were you exactly talking with the two accused?

A:  We were in front of the house of Totong Ibrahim.

x x x x

Q:  You mentioned that he got this bag of marijuana, what did the accused do with it?  Where did he bring it?

A:  He brought it outside.

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A:  We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy-bust operation. 

Q:  What happened next?

A: We apprehended the two (2) and then our back-up companions also identified themselves.

            We find credit to the straight-forward testimony of PO2 Caslib.  Absence of any ill-will on the part of the prosecution witnesses who were the best witnesses in prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, we sustain the findings of the lower courts.

Further, the accused-appellant challenges the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers in the purported transaction of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.  He argues that the police officers forced him to admit the ownership of the marijuana samples due to their failure to apprehend their real target, Ibrahim. 

          A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[39][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[40][25]

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[41][26]

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[42][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[43][28]

        Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.[44][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.[45][30]

As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)[46][31]

 

 

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[47][32]

As testified by PO2 Caslib, the marijuana came from the black bag and was handed by Mr. Ampatuan to them.    The marijuana was eventually turned over to the police station.  It was positively identified by PO2 Caslib in open court. 

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A: We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy- bust operation.[48][33]

x x x x

Q:  I am showing to you a bag here which was earlier marked as Exhibit “F,” tell us what relation had this to the bag that you mentioned?

A:  That is the bag, sir.

Q:  How do you know that this is the one?

A:  Because it is somewhat an old bag.

Q:  Were you able to look at the contents of this bag on that day?

A:  Yes, during our arrival at the police station.

Q:  Do you mean to say that that was your first time to look at the contents of this bag?

A:  We saw the content of the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim and we removed everything at the police station.

Q:  Who opened the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim?

A:  It was Ruel Ampatuan.

Q:  When Ruel opened this, what was the content?

A:  Marijuana, sir.

Q: Can you tell us how they were arranged or how they were packed inside?

A:  They were arranged by files, sir.

Q:  How many files if you can remember?

A:  it is wrapped with cellophane.

Q:  I will open this bag and show its contents to you.  Tell us what relation has this marijuana to the marijuana which you purchased from the accused?

Q:  This is the one, sir.[49][34]

The corpus delicti of the crime which was the illicit drug was tested by Forensic Chemist Austero who later testified[50][35] and confirmed that the sales confiscated during the sale was marijuana.

Q: Now, you mentioned that you were the one who conducted the examination, tell us what kind of examination was this?

A: The examination was qualitative, Sir.  That is to determine the presence of the sought for substance.  So in this case, it is alleged to be marijuana.  It is the determination of the presence of marijuana on these specimens submitted.

Q:  Now, briefly, how is your examination done, can you describe it?

A: A sample is treated with a duquenois-levine reagent and if the purple color appears, it indicates the presence of marijuana plant. 

Q:  Now, by the way, how much was the quantity of the marijuana handed to the laboratory?

A:  The first which I marked as “A”, the weight is 774.5 grams and the one which I marked as ‘B,” weighed 584.8 grams.

Q:  Now, how much sample from “A” did you use for your examination?

A:  Sir, I did not weigh the samples that were taken from the specimens.

Q: Now, by the way, what was the result of this examination that you conducted?

A: Both specimens gave positive result to the test for the presence of marijuana, Sir.

Q:  Did you reduce your report into writing?

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Do you have a copy with you.

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Where in your report [indicates] that the result was positive?

A:  Under findings, Sir.

Q: How much, by the way, was the total weight of the entire specimens that were handed to your office?

A:  The total weight of the specimens Sir was 1, 359.3 grams.

Q:  In terms of kilos, how will you convert that?

A:  1.3 kilos.

Q: Now, in this report of yours, there is a signature over the typewritten name on the right side, whose signature is that?

A:  That is my signature, Sir.

Pros. dela Banda:

At this point, Your Honor, may we request that this Chemistry Report No. D-200-97 be marked as Exhibit “J” in accordance with the pre-trial, Your Honor.  This is the original also, Your Honor.

Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[51][36]

Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[52][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

          WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The 25 June 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 4, finding accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan guilty of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425[53][38], as amended by Section 13, Republic Act No. 7659, as further amended by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.  Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

                                                                                      JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                                                                                          Associate Justice 
               WE CONCUR:   

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                        RENATO C. CORONA

    Chief Justice

[1][19]       People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 757 citing People v. Bandang, G.R. No. 151314, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 579.

[2][20]       People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 552, 567.

[3][21]       People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 630, 636-637 citing People v. Orteza, supra note 16 at 758 citing further People v. Zeng Hua Dian, G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 34.

[4][22]       People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101 citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.

[5][24]          People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 118, 135; Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, 6 February 2009, 578 SCRA 147, 152.

[6][25]          People v. De Leon, id.; People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, 21 August 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439.

[7][26]       People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552

[8][27]          People v. Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 9 February 2010, 612 SCRA 91, 106; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 366 citing People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295-296 (2003).

[9][28]          People v. Villamin, id. at 106-107 citing People v. Macatingan, id. at 366 citing further People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 741, 752-753.

[10][29]      People v.  Roa, G.R. No. 186134, 6 May 2010, 620 SCRA 359, 367-368.

[11][30]      Id. at 368 citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116 (2002).

[12][31]      People v. Presas, G.R. No. 182525, 2 March 2011.

[13][32]      People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 441, 451 citing People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.

[14][36]      People v. Quiamanlon, G.R. No. 191198, 26 January 2011.

[15][37]        People v. De Leon, supra note 21 at 136; People v. Isnani, G.R. No. 133006, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 454 citing People v. Ganenas, 417 Phil. 53, 68 (2001) citing further People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 788 (2000).

*              Per Special Order No. 1022.

[16][1]          Via notice of appeal, pursuant to Section 2(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

[17][2]          Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring.  Rollo, pp. 34-45. 

[18][3]                          Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions. In case of a practitioner, the additional penalty of the revocation of his license to practice his profession shall be imposed. If the victim of the offense is a minor, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed.

Should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section, be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the pusher.

[19][4]          Court of Appeals Decision.  Rollo, p. 44.

[20][5]          Testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib. TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 5-8.

[21][6]          Broken down to five (5) P100.00 bill.

[22][7]          Testimony of Arnel Micabalo.  TSN, 10 March 1999, p. 6.

[23][8]          Decision of the Court of Appeals.  Rollo, p. 36.

[24][9]          Testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib. TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 9-13.

[25][10]         Testimony of Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero.  TSN, 19 January 2000, pp. 5-19.

[26][11]        Id. at 8-10.

[27][12]         Testimony of Ruel Ampatuan.  TSN, 15 August 2001, pp. 4-6.

[28][13]         Decision of the Court of Appeals.  Rollo, pp. 37-38.

[29][14]         Records, p. 1.

[30][15]        Id. at 114-115.       

[31][16]         Decision of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, p. 44.

[32][17]        Id. at 41.

[33][18]         Petition. Id. at 21.

[34][19]      People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 757 citing People v. Bandang, G.R. No. 151314, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 579.

[35][20]      People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 552, 567.

[36][21]      People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 630, 636-637 citing People v. Orteza, supra note 16 at 758 citing further People v. Zeng Hua Dian, G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 34.

[37][22]      People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101 citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.

[38][23]         Direct testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib.  TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 11-13.

[39][24]         People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 118, 135; Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, 6 February 2009, 578 SCRA 147, 152.

[40][25]         People v. De Leon, id.; People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, 21 August 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439.

[41][26]      People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552

[42][27]         People v. Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 9 February 2010, 612 SCRA 91, 106; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 366 citing People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295-296 (2003).

[43][28]         People v. Villamin, id. at 106-107 citing People v. Macatingan, id. at 366 citing further People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 741, 752-753.

[44][29]      People v.  Roa, G.R. No. 186134, 6 May 2010, 620 SCRA 359, 367-368.

[45][30]      Id. at 368 citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116 (2002).

[46][31]      People v. Presas, G.R. No. 182525, 2 March 2011.

[47][32]      People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 441, 451 citing People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.

[48][33]         Testimony of PO2 Arnel Micabalo.  TSN, 8 March 2000, p. 12.

[49][34]        Id. at 13-14.

[50][35]         Direct Testimony of Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero. TSN, 19 January 2000, pp. 8-9.

[51][36]      People v. Quiamanlon, G.R. No. 191198, 26 January 2011.

[52][37]        People v. De Leon, supra note 21 at 136; People v. Isnani, G.R. No. 133006, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 454 citing People v. Ganenas, 417 Phil. 53, 68 (2001) citing further People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 788 (2000).

[53][38]      Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the “THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972” provides in part: 

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, x x x, any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions. x x x.

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