J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0202: ERNESTO Z. ORBE VS. JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG, PAIRING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IMUS, CAVITE (A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1792, 26 SEPTEMBER 2011) SUBJECTS: SMALL CLAIM CASES;  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. (BRIEF TITLE: ORDE VS. JUDGE GUMARANG).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision and Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST

SMALL CLAIM CASE FILED BY POBRE WAS ASSIGNED TO JUDGE GUMARANG ON FEB 9, 2010. IT WAS RESET TO MARCH 4 THEN RESET TO MARCH 11 THEN TO MARCH 25 AND THEN TO APRIL 15. DID JUDGE GUMARANG VIOLATE THE SMALL CLAIMS RULE?

YES. HE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE CASE WITHIN 5 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT WAS ASSIGNED TO HIM.

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JUDGE GUMARANG ARGUED THAT THE 5 DAYS REFER TO FIVE CALENDAR DATES WHEN THE CASE WAS SET FOR HEARING AND NOT FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. IS HIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

NO. THE RULE SAYS 5 DAYS. THERE IS NO ROOM FOR FURTHER INTERPRETATION; IT DOES NOT REQUIRE RESPONDENT’S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.  HE IS DUTY-BOUND TO ADHERE TO THE RULES AND DECIDE SMALL CLAIMS CASES WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.

Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, which is within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear.  The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy.  There is no room for further interpretation; it does not require respondent’s exercise of discretion.  He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.

………………………..

Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it. 

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WHAT IS HIS PENALTY?

UNDER THE RULES HIS ACT CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELAY IN RENDITION OF JUDGMENT. THE PENALTY IS, INTER ALIA, A FINE OF MORE THAN P10,000.00. BUT SINCE THE SMALL CLAIMS CASE RULE IS NEW, SC DEEMED IT PROPER TO IMPOSE FINE OF P5,000.00.

Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge, which is punishable by suspension from office, without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  Considering that the Rule on small claims is a new rule, and that this is respondent judge’s first violation of the rule, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

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WHAT IS THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN PROVIDING A 5 DAY DEADLINE IN RESOLVING SMALL CLAIMS CASES?

THE EXIGENCY OF PROMPT RENDITION OF JUDGMENT IN SMALL CLAIMS CASES IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY.

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WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND ESSENCE OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES?

TO ENHANCE  ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY BY THOSE WHO CANNOT AFFORD THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIGATION PARTICULARLY  IN CASES OF RELATIVELY SMALL VALUE AND TO IMPROVE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE.

Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation of the Rule is rather misplaced.  It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what the Court sought to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to wit:

x x x Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court, under the present Constitution, can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small claims cases and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before them pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure without the need for legal representation and extensive judicial intervention. This system will enhance access to justice, especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value.  It is envisioned that by facilitating the traffic of cases through simple and expeditious rules and means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in this country, thus, giving citizens a renewed “stake” in preserving peace in the land. x x x^[1][6]

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WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE RULE?

THE TIME AND EXPENSE REQUIRED BY ORDINARY LEGISLATION IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE AMOUNT INVOLVED. THUS IT DISCOURAGE JUST RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE.

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WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THE RULE?

THERE ARE NO LAWYERS, NO FORMAL PLEADINGS AND NO STRICT LEGAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

        The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute.  The small claims process is designed to function quickly and informally.  There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.^[2][7]

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IS POSTPONEMENT ALLOWED?

ONLY ONE AND ONLY UPON PROOF OF PHYSICAL INABILITY OF THE PARTY TO APPEAR.

        The need for prompt resolution of small claims cases is further emphasized by Section 19 of the Rule, which provides that:

SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed. — A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

          In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not attributed to any of the parties to the case.  The numerous postponements, which in some instances were upon respondent’s initiative, were uncalled for and unjustified, considering that it was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were futile.  Thus, the postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very essence of the Rule.

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CAN JUDGE GUMARANG INVOKE AS DEFENSE GOOD FAITH OR LACK OF MALICE?

NO BECAUSE THE RULES VIOLATED WERE BASIC PROCEDURAL RULES.

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IF A JUDGE FAILS TO APPLY ELEMENTARY RULES OF PROCEDURE WHAT IS HIS LIABILITY?

HE IS LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURE.

         Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it.  Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  In the instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic procedural rules.

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WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT CASES BE DECIDED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

TO PREVENT DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BECAUSE JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED.

        We cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize  if not totally eradicate  the problem of congestion long plaguing our courts.  The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice.  For obviously, justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.^[3][8]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

                                                        THIRD DIVISION

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DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

          Before us is an administrative complaint^[4][1] filed by complainant Ernesto Z. Orbe (Orbe) against Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang (respondent), Pairing Judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Imus,Cavite for Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

          The antecedent facts are as follows:

          Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims case docketed as Civil Case No. ICSCC 09-65 entitled E.Z. Orbe Tax Accounting Services, thru, Ernesto Z. Orbe v. L.G.M. Silver Star Credit Corporation, represented by Librado Montano, filed before the MTC of Imus,Cavite, presided by Judge Emily A. Geluz.

          During the hearing of the case onFebruary 9, 2010, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.  On the same day, the case was assigned to respondent Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Assisting Judge of the MTC of Imus,Cavite, for the continuation of the trial.

          Complainant alleged that the case was scheduled for hearing onMarch 4, 2010, but was postponed by respondent toMarch 11, 2010because of power interruption.  OnMarch 11, 2010, again the hearing was reset by respondent Judge Gumarang toMarch 25, 2010as he was due for medical check-up.  OnMarch 25, 2010, respondent conducted another Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), and again reset the hearing toApril 15, 2010when the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement.

          Complainant argued that Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases for failure to decide the civil case within five (5) days from receipt of the order of reassignment.

          On August 2, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Gumarang to submit his comment on the complaint against him.^[5][2]

          In his Comment^[6][3] datedSeptember 13, 2010, Judge Gumarang explained that as Assisting Judge in the MTC of Bacoor,Cavite, he tried small claims cases only on Thursdays.  He admitted that he failed to decide the case within five (5) working days from receipt of the order, as mandated by the Rule.  However, he pointed out that the Rule needed clarification since, as in his case, the five (5) working days should be construed to refer to five (5) calendared trial dates falling on Thursdays only, considering that he allotted only one day, that is Thursday, to hear and try small claims cases.

          On May 10, 2011, the OCA, in its Memorandum,^[7][4] recommended that the instant matter be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It likewise found Judge Gumarang guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, but recommended that he be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) only for  violating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.

          We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

          Indeed, Section 22 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases clearly provided for the period within which judgment should be rendered, to wit:

Section 22. Failure of Settlement – If efforts at settlement fail, the hearing shall proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be terminated within one (1) day. Either party may move in writing to have another judge hear and decide the case. The reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance with existing issuances.

            The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be made within the same day the motion is filed and granted, and by the Executive Judge to the designated judge within the same day of the referral. The new judge shall hear and decide the case within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of reassignment.^[8][5]

          In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than two (2) months for respondent to render a decision on the subject case as he himself admitted the series of postponements which occurred during the pendency of the case. His lone argument was that he hears small claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that, in his case, the period of five (5) working days being referred to by Section 22 of the Rule should pertain only to Thursdays.

          We are unconvinced.

          Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation of the Rule is rather misplaced.  It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what the Court sought to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to wit:

x x x Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court, under the present Constitution, can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small claims cases and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before them pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure without the need for legal representation and extensive judicial intervention. This system will enhance access to justice, especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value.  It is envisioned that by facilitating the traffic of cases through simple and expeditious rules and means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in this country, thus, giving citizens a renewed “stake” in preserving peace in the land. x x x^[9][6]

          The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute.  The small claims process is designed to function quickly and informally.  There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.^[10][7]

          Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, which is within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear.  The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy.  There is no room for further interpretation; it does not require respondent’s exercise of discretion.  He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.

          The need for prompt resolution of small claims cases is further emphasized by Section 19 of the Rule, which provides that:

SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed. — A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

            In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not attributed to any of the parties to the case.  The numerous postponements, which in some instances were upon respondent’s initiative, were uncalled for and unjustified, considering that it was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were futile.  Thus, the postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very essence of the Rule.

           Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it.  Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  In the instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic procedural rules.

          We cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize  if not totally eradicate  the problem of congestion long plaguing our courts.  The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice.  For obviously, justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.^[11][8]

          Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge, which is punishable by suspension from office, without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  Considering that the Rule on small claims is a new rule, and that this is respondent judge’s first violation of the rule, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

          WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision and Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                                                Associate Justice

   JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                          JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 

             Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

CASE 2011-0201: PEDRO ANGELES , REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT VS. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL AND EDWIN PASCUAL (G.R. NO. 157150, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, BERSAMIN J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. (BRIEF TITLE: ANGELES VS. PASCUAL)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61600. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

          SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

I

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.^[1][11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.  There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.^[2][12]

          Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;  whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;  whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.  Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.^[3][13]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^[4][14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

          The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC.  Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’sLot4 was proved by preponderant evidence.

          It is noteworthy to point out, too, that the argument of Angeles based on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens titles pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) is inapplicable considering that the ownership of Lot 4 andLot 5 was not the issue. Nor were the metes and bounds of the lots as indicated in the respective TCTs being assailed, for the only issue concerned the exact and actual location of Lot 4 andLot 5.

II

Angeles was a builder in good faith

          To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

           Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

         Article 448.  The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.  However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.  In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.  The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 

          The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another.  The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith.  We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.^[5][15]

          With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.  Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder  to pay the value of the land.  Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION                                                            

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R E S O L U T I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

          Under appeal is the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 in CA- G.R. CV No. 61600,^[6][1] which involved a dispute about the true location of the respective lots of the parties, with the respondents claiming that the petitioner had encroached on their lot but the latter denying the encroachment.

Antecedents

          Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in CabanatuanCity.  Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2 (Lot4) of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-951, a portion of the consolidation of Lots 1419-B-2B-3, 1419-B-2-B-4 and 1419-B-2-B-5, Psd- 9016, LGC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 94 covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-43707 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija;^[7][2] Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-subdivision plan covered by TCT No. T-9459 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.^[8][3] Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual’s house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

          In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his ownLot4 and discovered that Angeles’ house also encroached on his lot.  Of the 318 square meters comprisingLot4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area ofLot4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles’ house. Angeles refused the demand.  Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inCabanatuanCity.

          In the course of the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Lot4.^[9][4]  Fajardo testified that Angeles’ house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand, Angeles presented Juan Fernandez, the geodetic engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his claim that there had been no encroachment.^[10][5] However, Fernandez explained that he had performed only a “table work,” that is, he did not actually go to the site but based the sketch plan on the descriptions and bearings appearing on the TCTs of Lot 4, Lot 5 and Lot 6; and recommended the conduct of a relocation survey.^[11][6]

          In its decision of November 3, 1998,^[12][7] the RTC held that there was no dispute that Pascual and Angeles were the respective registered owners of Lot 4 and Lot 5; that what was disputed between them was the location of their respective lots; that Pascual proved Angeles’ encroachment on Lot 4 by preponderant evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief.  The RTC thus disposed:

         WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

1)      ordering the defendant or persons claiming right through him to cause the removal of his house insofar as the same occupies the portion ofLot4, Block 2 (TCT No. T-43707), of an area of 252 square meters, as particularly indicated in the Sketch Plan (Exhibit C-1);  and

2)      and without pronouncement to damages in both the complainant and counterclaim.

With Costs.

SO ORDERED.^[13][8]

          Angeles appealed to the CA.

          On January 31, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC,^[14][9] and held that as between the findings of the geodetic engineer (Fajardo) who had actually gone to the site and those of the other (Fernandez) who had based his findings on the TCTs of the owners of the three lots, those of the former should prevail.  However, the CA, modifying the RTC’s ruling, applied Article 448 of the Civil Code (which defined the rights of a builder, sower and planter in good faith).  The decision decreed thus:^[15][10]

         WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED.  Plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision their option to either buy the portion of defendant-appellant’s house on theirLot. No. 4, or to sell to defendant-appellant the portion of their land on which his house stands. If plaintiffs-appellees elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render the defendant-appellant’s house useless, then plaintiffs-appellees should sell the encroached portion of their land to defendant-appellant. If plaintiffs-appellees choose to sell the land but defendant-appellant is unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time plaintiffs-appellees made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises.  But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then defendant-appellant may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease.  Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease. From the moment plaintiffs-appellees shall have exercised their option, defendant-appellant shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms. This is without prejudice to any future compromise which may be agreed upon by the parties.

         SO ORDERED.

          Angeles expectedly sought reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on February 13, 2003. 

Issues

          Hence, Angeles appeals, assailing: (a) the credence the CA accorded to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo as opposed to the survey plan prepared by Fernandez; and (b) the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of Angeles’ house or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary to its finding of good faith.

Ruling

          The petition lacks merit.

I

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.^[16][11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.  There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.^[17][12]

          Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;  whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;  whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.  Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.^[18][13]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^[19][14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

          The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC.  Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’sLot4 was proved by preponderant evidence.

          It is noteworthy to point out, too, that the argument of Angeles based on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens titles pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) is inapplicable considering that the ownership of Lot 4 andLot 5 was not the issue. Nor were the metes and bounds of the lots as indicated in the respective TCTs being assailed, for the only issue concerned the exact and actual location of Lot 4 andLot 5.

II

Angeles was a builder in good faith

          To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

           Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

         Article 448.  The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.  However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.  In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.  The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 

          The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another.  The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith.  We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.^[20][15]

          With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.  Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder  to pay the value of the land.  Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

          WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61600. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

          SO ORDERED.

                                                          LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                                                               Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

 Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

     Associate Justice                                            Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice