J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0242: BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS, INC., HEREIN REPRESENTED BY RICARDO JULIAN VS. THE HEIRS OF JOSE RAMOS AND THE HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO AND VICTORINA NEPA; AND THE           HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 188381, 14 DECEMBER 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECT: REQUIREMENT IN A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE SUBMISSION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT OR ORDER;  LACHES AS A BAR TO A PROPERTY OWNER’S ACTION TO ANNUL A RECONSTITUTED VERSION OF HIS TITLE REGISTERED IN ANOTHER PERSON’S NAME. (BRIEF TITLE: BAGUIO TRINITY VS. HEIRS OF RAMON).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and sets aside the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated May 8, 2008 and November 7, 2008 and directs such court to hear and decide the merits of the petition for annulment of judgment.

        SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/ DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

A PIECE OF LAND WAS TITLED TO TWO OWNERS.  BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS INC. WAS ONE OF THEM. IT FILED A CASE AT MTC TO ANNUL AN RTC DECISION RECONSTITUTING THE TITLE TO THE OTHER OWNER. MTC DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT IT CANNOT ANNUL AN ORDER OF AN RTC, A HIGHER COURT. BAGUIO TRINITY FILED A CASE AT RTC WHICH DISMISSED ALSO THE CASE BECAUSE IT CANNOT ANNUL AN ORDER OF A CO-EQUAL COURT. IT FILED A CASE AT CA BUT CA DISMISSED IT BECAUSE BAGUIO TRINITY DID NOT ATTACH TO ITS PETITION AN ORIGINAL COPY OF THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED AND BECAUSE OF LACHES. IS CA DECISION CORRECT?

NO. THE 1990 EARTHQUAKE RESULTED IN THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF THE RTC RECORDS OF THE CASE.  THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CANNOT STOP TO GRIND BECAUSE OF SUCH LOSS AND NO ONE SHOULD SUFFER OR BENEFIT FROM IT.

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WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 4, RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH PROVIDES THAT “A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION SHALL BE ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE PETITION INTENDED FOR THE COURT AND INDICATED AS SUCH BY THE PETITIONER,”

TO ENSURE THAT THE COURT IS SHOWN A GENUINE COPY OF THE CHALLENGED JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER BEFORE IT ACTS ON THE PETITION.

        Evidently, when Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided that “a certified copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner,” it wanted to ensure that the Court is shown a genuine copy of the challenged judgment or final order before it acts on the petition.

        The Court is aware of the necessity of mandating strict compliance with procedural rules. Here, however, the 1990 earthquake resulted in the loss or destruction of the RTC records of the case.  The administration of justice cannot stop to grind because of such loss and no one should suffer or benefit from it.

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WHO CAN ISSUE A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE LOST ORDERS?

THE PUBLIC OFFICER IN CUSTODY OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. IN THIS CASE THE CLERK OF COURT.

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THE CLERK OF COURT ISSUED A CERTIFICATION THAT THE RELEVANT RECORDS ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE HAVING BEEN LOST TO AN EARTHQUAKE. SINCE A CERTIFIED COPY CANNOT BE ISSUED, IS THERE A REMEDY?

YES. THAT THE RECORD CUSTODIAN COULD NO LONGER ISSUE A CERTIFIED COPY SHOULD NOT OF COURSE PREVENT AN AGGRIEVED PARTY FROM PURSUING HIS PETITION.  THE RULES ALLOW SUCH PARTY TO SUBMIT APPROPRIATE SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

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DID BAGUIO TRINITY SUBMIT SECONDARY EVIDENCE?

YES. IT SUBMITTED  FAITHFUL COPIES OF THE  CHALLENGED RECONSTITUTION ORDERS, AUTHENTICATED BY A VERIFIED STATEMENT THAT THESE ARE COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL ORDERS. 

        And who can issue a certified copy of the lost orders?  The answer is that it can be issued by the public officer in custody of the original of the document.^[1][4]  Here, it is the clerk of court of the RTC that issued the challenged reconstitution orders.  But the clerk of court issued a certification, conformably with Section 28 of Rule 132, that the relevant records are no longer available having been lost to an earthquake.  That the record custodian could no longer issue a certified copy should not of course prevent an aggrieved party from pursuing his petition.  The rules allow such party to submit appropriate secondary evidence.

        Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that when the original document has been lost and its unavailability has been established, a party “may prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.”  Copies of the challenged reconstitution orders from the LRA or the Register of Deeds are of course available to petitioner Baguio Trinity.  But it could just as validly submit faithful copies of its challenged reconstitution orders, authenticated by a verified statement that these are copies of the original orders.  The Baguio Trinity did.  Consequently, the CA had no valid reason denying its petition for failure to attach a copy of the assailed reconstitution orders. 

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CA REQUIRED ALSO COPIES OF DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS FILED DURING THE RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS. ARE THESE NECESSARY?

NOT AT THIS STAGE. THEY COULD BE VERY WELL ADDUCED DURING THE HEARING SINCE THEIR RELEVANCE COULD HARDLY BE DISCERNED UNTIL THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN JOINED.

        As for copies of documents and pleadings filed during the reconstitution proceedings, the notices of hearing, and the titles issued to petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, which the CA wanted petitioner Baguio Trinity to submit, these could very well be adduced during the hearing since their relevance could hardly be discerned until the issues have been joined.

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THE CA ALSO DISMISSED THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF LACHES. IT WAS FILED ONLY 12 YEARS FROM 1995 WHEN IT LEARNED OF THE RECONSTITUTION ORDERS. IS CA CORRECT?

NO. IT IS NOT RIGHT FOR THE CA TO DISMISS SUCH ACTION BY REASON OF LACHES SIMPLY BECAUSE NO INACTION IS EVIDENT ON BAGUIO TRINITY’S PART.  IN FACT, IT HAD BEEN AN UNINTENTIONAL OBJECT OF RELAY BETWEEN THE LOWER COURTS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELAY IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 

ALSO, THERE IS  CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF TITLES. IT MUST BE RESOVED.  THE PRESENT STANDOFF CANNOT REMAIN INDEFINITELY UNDER A TITLING SYSTEM THAT ASSURES THE EXISTENCE OF ONLY ONE VALID TITLE FOR EVERY PIECE OF REGISTERED LAND.  EVIDENTLY, LACHES CANNOT BAR AN ACTION SOUGHT TO RELIEVE SUCH INTOLERABLE STANDOFF. 

        Two.  The CA also dismissed petitioner’s action for annulment of final orders on the further ground that such action is already barred by laches.  The CA pointed out that petitioner Baguio Trinity learned of the reconstitution orders as early as 1995.  Still, the action for the annulment of those orders was filed only 12 years later on December 21, 2007. 

The RTC of Agoo ordered the reconstitution of the Grabiles title when, if Baguio Trinity’s allegations were to be believed, the original of such title actually existed and had since been replaced through subsequent sales, terminating their ownership of the property.  As things now stand, two sets of titles covering the same property, one based on transactions emanating from the original and another based on the reconstituted titles exist.  One has to give way to the other.

Petitioner Baguio Trinity initially brought an action to annul the reconstituted versions of the Grabiles’ title before the MTC of Rosario, La Union, on September 14, 1995 but that court dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction and opined that it should be filed with the RTC.

  Baguio Trinity filed a second action on December 3, 1997 for recovery of property, declaration of nullity of the titles, and damages before the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32, against the Ramos and Nepa heirs who held the reconstituted titles.  But the RTC dismissed the action on May 31, 2004 saying that it cannot annul the orders issued by a co-equal court. This, the CA Sixth Division affirmed and held that Baguio Trinity should have availed itself of a petition for annulment under Rule 47.

 Baguio Trinity finally filed before the CA an action for annulment of the reconstitution orders on the ground that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue them.  It is not right for the CA to dismiss such action by reason of laches simply because no inaction is evident on Baguio Trinity’s part.  In fact, it had been an unintentional object of relay between the lower courts which contributed to the delay in the proceedings. 

The petition for annulment alleged serious charges which if true can invalidate respondents’ title. Such title had been subjected to two reconstitution proceedings that could have divested the true owner of title over his property. The conflict between the two sets of titles has to be resolved.  The present standoff cannot remain indefinitely under a titling system that assures the existence of only one valid title for every piece of registered land.  Evidently, laches cannot bar an action sought to relieve such intolerable standoff. 

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THIRD DIVISION

BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS,  G.R. No. 188381

INC., herein represented by

RICARDO JULIAN,

                        Petitioner,                        Present:

                                                  VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

        – versus –                                   PERALTA,

  ABAD,

  SERENO,^* and

  PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

THE HEIRS OF JOSE RAMOS

and THE HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO

and VICTORINA NEPA; and the             Promulgated:

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

                        Respondents.              December 14, 2011

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DECISION

ABAD, J.:

The case is about a) the requirement in a petition for annulment of judgment of the submission of a certified true copy of the assailed judgment or order and b) laches as a bar to a property owner’s action to annul a reconstituted version of his title registered in another person’s name.

The Facts and the Case

        Spouses Meliton Grabiles and Leona Calderon (the Grabiles) were the original registered owners of a 2,933-square-meter lot in Rosario, La Union.^[2][1]  After a number of successive transfers the lot was eventually sold to petitioner Baguio Trinity Developers, Inc. on January 3, 1994, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title T-38340 in its name.

        It appears, however, that in 1985 Anastacio Laroco and Leona Javier filed a reconstitution proceeding before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, covering the Grabiles’ original title.  But for some reasons, the RTC’s order of October 20, 1986 directed the reconstitution of the title in the name of one Maria Bernal.  This order was annotated on the Grabiles’ Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 1082 issued by the Register of Deeds of La Union. 

In 1986, Melicia Silva filed a second petition purportedly on behalf of the Grabiles for the reconstitution of their original title also before Branch 31 of the RTC of Agoo.  In its order of October 28, 1986, the RTC ordered the reconstitution of the title in the name of the Grabiles as OCT RO-4717.  Entry 89953 of this reconstituted original title stated that the property had been sold in 1939 to a certain Jose Ramos.  So, too, in 1944, the southern portion of the lot, covering 1,372 square meters, was sold to Quirini Parrocha who in turn sold it in 1955 to the spouses Leopoldo and Victorina Nepa (the Nepas).  Respondents in this case are the heirs of these two buyers, Jose Ramos and the Nepas (the Ramos and Nepa heirs).

        On September 14, 1995 petitioner Baguio Trinity filed a complaint for recovery and declaration of nullity of title and damages before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rosario, La Union, against the Ramos and Nepa heirs who held reconstituted titles over the property.  Since Baguio Trinity presented the issue on the validity of the reconstituted titles issued by the RTC, a superior court, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

        On December 3, 1997 petitioner Baguio Trinity filed a second complaint for recovery of property, declaration of nullity of title, and damages before the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32. But, by Order of May 31, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after finding that the assessed value of the subject property was below P20,000.00.  Moreover, the court said that it could not annul an order issued by a co-equal court. The RTC also denied Baguio Trinity’s motion for reconsideration, prompting it to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) on October 13, 2004.  On September 13, 2007^[3][2] the CA dismissed the petition, stating that Baguio Trinity’s remedy should have been a petition to annul judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Three years later from the time the RTC dismissed the complaint or on December 20, 2007 petitioner Baguio Trinity filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the reconstitution orders that the RTC of Agoo, Branch 31, issued on October 20, 1986 and October 28, 1986, impleading the Ramos and Nepa heirs. Baguio Trinity claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order reconstitution for the Grabiles’ title since this was not lost. Further, the Grabiles could not have authorized anyone to institute the proceedings on their behalf since they had been long dead. Thus, the orders should be annulled for lack of jurisdiction.

        On May 8, 2008 the CA^[4][3] dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to attach a) a certified copy of the RTC Order dated October 20, 1986, and b) copies of the affidavits of witnesses and the documents, and the pleadings filed during the reconstitution proceedings, the notices of hearing, and the titles issued to petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest in support of petitioner’s cause of action. Further, petitioner paid insufficient docket fees.

        Petitioner Baguio Trinity filed a motion for reconsideration and attached a copy of the affidavit of Cresencio Aspiras, their immediate predecessor, together with copies of reconstituted titles issued to previous owners to show the chain of ownership before Baguio Trinity acquired title to the property.  It also paid the deficiency in the docket fees and explained that a certified true copy of the assailed Order cannot be obtained because the records were destroyed during the July 16, 1990 earthquake per RTC Certification of November 14, 2007.

        But the CA denied petitioner’s motion of November 7, 2008, citing Section 4, par. 2 of Rule 47 which provides that a “certified copy of the judgment or final order shall be attached to the original copy of the petition.”   The mandatory tenor of the requirement, said the CA, precluded Baguio Trinity’s submission of some other copy of such judgment or final order. 

        In any event, the CA held that the petition was barred by laches since Baguio Trinity had notice of the reconstitution orders as early as 1995 when it filed an action (the first that it filed) for declaration of nullity of titles and damages before the MTC, a wrong court.  Baguio Trinity filed its action to annul the orders of reconstitution with the CA only on December 21, 2007 or 12 years after that court affirmed the RTC order dismissing the complaint (the second action filed) before the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32. 

        Because the CA denied petitioner Baguio Trinity’s motion for reconsideration of its ruling in its resolution of April 24, 2009, petitioner has taken recourse to this Court.

The Issue

        The only issue before this Court is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner Baguio Trinity’s action for annulment of judgment a) by reason of its failure to comply with the requirement of submission of certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders; and b) on ground of laches.

The Court’s Rulings

One.  In denying the petition before it, one of the grounds the CA gave was that petitioner Baguio Trinity failed to attach to its petition for annulment of judgment a “certified copy of the judgment or final order,” which requirement is mandatory.  Without it, the court “would have no bases to form a decision.”  Besides, said the CA, petitioner could have obtained a certified copy of the same from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) which is usually furnished a copy, just as petitioner was able to secure a copy of the October 28, 1986 Order from the LRA.  The Register of Deeds is also usually furnished a copy of such order.

        Evidently, when Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided that “a certified copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner,” it wanted to ensure that the Court is shown a genuine copy of the challenged judgment or final order before it acts on the petition.

        The Court is aware of the necessity of mandating strict compliance with procedural rules. Here, however, the 1990 earthquake resulted in the loss or destruction of the RTC records of the case.  The administration of justice cannot stop to grind because of such loss and no one should suffer or benefit from it.

        And who can issue a certified copy of the lost orders?  The answer is that it can be issued by the public officer in custody of the original of the document.^[5][4]  Here, it is the clerk of court of the RTC that issued the challenged reconstitution orders.  But the clerk of court issued a certification, conformably with Section 28 of Rule 132, that the relevant records are no longer available having been lost to an earthquake.  That the record custodian could no longer issue a certified copy should not of course prevent an aggrieved party from pursuing his petition.  The rules allow such party to submit appropriate secondary evidence.

        Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that when the original document has been lost and its unavailability has been established, a party “may prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.”  Copies of the challenged reconstitution orders from the LRA or the Register of Deeds are of course available to petitioner Baguio Trinity.  But it could just as validly submit faithful copies of its challenged reconstitution orders, authenticated by a verified statement that these are copies of the original orders.  The Baguio Trinity did.  Consequently, the CA had no valid reason denying its petition for failure to attach a copy of the assailed reconstitution orders. 

        Notably, the respondent Ramos and Nepa heirs have not questioned the authenticity of the submitted copies.  At any rate, the Court notes that petitioner Baguio Trinity attached certified machine copies of the assailed Orders supplied by the LRA as annexes to the present petition.

        As for copies of documents and pleadings filed during the reconstitution proceedings, the notices of hearing, and the titles issued to petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, which the CA wanted petitioner Baguio Trinity to submit, these could very well be adduced during the hearing since their relevance could hardly be discerned until the issues have been joined.

        Two.  The CA also dismissed petitioner’s action for annulment of final orders on the further ground that such action is already barred by laches.  The CA pointed out that petitioner Baguio Trinity learned of the reconstitution orders as early as 1995.  Still, the action for the annulment of those orders was filed only 12 years later on December 21, 2007. 

The RTC of Agoo ordered the reconstitution of the Grabiles title when, if Baguio Trinity’s allegations were to be believed, the original of such title actually existed and had since been replaced through subsequent sales, terminating their ownership of the property.  As things now stand, two sets of titles covering the same property, one based on transactions emanating from the original and another based on the reconstituted titles exist.  One has to give way to the other.

Petitioner Baguio Trinity initially brought an action to annul the reconstituted versions of the Grabiles’ title before the MTC of Rosario, La Union, on September 14, 1995 but that court dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction and opined that it should be filed with the RTC.

  Baguio Trinity filed a second action on December 3, 1997 for recovery of property, declaration of nullity of the titles, and damages before the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32, against the Ramos and Nepa heirs who held the reconstituted titles.  But the RTC dismissed the action on May 31, 2004 saying that it cannot annul the orders issued by a co-equal court. This, the CA Sixth Division affirmed and held that Baguio Trinity should have availed itself of a petition for annulment under Rule 47.

 Baguio Trinity finally filed before the CA an action for annulment of the reconstitution orders on the ground that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue them.  It is not right for the CA to dismiss such action by reason of laches simply because no inaction is evident on Baguio Trinity’s part.  In fact, it had been an unintentional object of relay between the lower courts which contributed to the delay in the proceedings. 

The petition for annulment alleged serious charges which if true can invalidate respondents’ title. Such title had been subjected to two reconstitution proceedings that could have divested the true owner of title over his property. The conflict between the two sets of titles has to be resolved.  The present standoff cannot remain indefinitely under a titling system that assures the existence of only one valid title for every piece of registered land.  Evidently, laches cannot bar an action sought to relieve such intolerable standoff. 

        WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and sets aside the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated May 8, 2008 and November 7, 2008 and directs such court to hear and decide the merits of the petition for annulment of judgment.

        SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                    Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

      DIOSDADO M. PERALTA       MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO

                Associate Justice                              Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                              PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                     Associate Justice

                                    Chairperson, Third Division               

CERTIFICATION

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                    Chief Justice

RETIRED EMPLOYEE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, SIBONGA, CEBU VS. MERLYN G. MANUBAG, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, SIBONGA, CEBU (A.M. NO. P-10-2833, 14 DECEMBER 2010, PER CURIAM.

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DIGEST:

MANUBAG FALSIFIED HER PDS DATED MAY 12, 2008 BY STATING THEREIN THAT SHE WAS A BSC GRADUATE OF COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE RECOLETOS IN 1984 WHEN IN FACT SHE WAS NOT. THE ENTRIES MADE BY MANUBAG WERE BELIED BY DEMETRIO L. QUIRANTE, UNIVERSITY REGISTRAR OF SAN JOSE RECOLETOS, IN A CERTIFICATION STATING THAT THEIR OFFICE DOES NOT HAVE THE ORIGINAL RECORD OF MANUBAG.

WHAT OFFENSE DID MANUBAG COMMIT. WHAT IS THE PENALTY?

MANUBAG COMMITTED DISHONESTY BY MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSIFICATION OF AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT. PENALTY IS DISMISSAL WITH FOREFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

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DOCTRINES:

MAKING INCORRECT ENTRIES IN PERSONAL DATA SHEET (PDS) BY LETTING IT APPEAR THAT ONE FINISHED A 4 YEAR COURSE WHEN IN FACT SHE FINISHED ONLY A TWO YEARS COURSE CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY BY MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENT. PENALTY: DISMISSAL WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

The OCA found that the incorrect entries made by Manubag in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constituted dishonesty by misrepresentation and falsification of an official document and, thus, recommended that she be dismissed from service, effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

WHAT IS DISHONESTY?

Dishonesty means “a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”^[1][4]

It need not be overstressed that the administrative function of clerks of court, like Manubag, is very important for the proper administration of justice. As such, clerks of court must be persons of integrity and honesty. The image of the court of justice is reflected in the conduct, whether official or personal, of its personnel, from the highest to the lowest official. As mentioned in the Court’s Resolution in the case of Bulalat v. Adil:^[2][5]

This Court has consistently underscored the heavy burden and responsibility that court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. No position demands greater moral uprightness from its occupant than a judicial office. Indeed, the responsibilities of a public officer as enshrined in the Constitution are not mere rhetoric to be taken as idealistic sentiments. These are working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds.  Because respondent has failed to live up to the stringent standards of his office, we have no other recourse but to sanction him for his despicable conduct.

DISHONESTY CARRIES EXTREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE

Indeed, being in the nature of a grave offense, dishonesty carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service.^[3][8]

          The Court has been explicit. In the case of Ramos v. Mayor:^[4][9]

Under Section 52 (A)(1) and (A)(6), Rule IV of the “Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service” (Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999), respondent’s act of making untruthful declarations in his PDS renders him administratively liable for falsification of public document and dishonesty which are classified as grave offenses and, thus, warrant the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service even if either of them is respondent’s first offense. Section 58 of Rule IV thereof states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.^[5][10]

          In Adm. Case for Dishonesty & Falsification Against Luna,^[6][11] this Court emphasized that “every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.  Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing.” Manubag indubitably failed to meet the strict standards set for a court employee, hence, she does not deserve to remain in the judiciary.  

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D E C I S I O N

Per Curiam:

At bench is an administrative complaint filed against respondent Merlyn G. Manubag (Manubag), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu (MTC).  

The case stemmed from the undated Letter-Complaint sent by an anonymous retired employee (complainant) charging her with: (1) Falsification of Public Documents; (2) Immorality; and (3) Gambling during Office Hours.^[7][1]

          For Falsification of Public Documents, the complainant alleged that Manubag submitted a fake diploma and falsified her school records to make it appear that she was a graduate of a four-year secretarial course when, in fact, she only finished a two-year course at a certain university in Cebu City. The complainant claimed that Manubag’s appointment was approved because the latter’s backer, a certain Francisca Kong, was the live-in partner of Judge Emilio T. Reyes, then presiding judge of the MTC of Sibonga, Cebu.

          For Immorality, the complainant alleged that while still legally married to a certain Sergio Manubag, who had been giving her monthly support for their minor son, respondent and a certain Boy Alicaya lived together as husband and wife.  They had a son who was registered and baptized with Boy Alicaya as the father.

          For Gambling During Office Hours, the complainant averred that Manubag played mahjong during office hours at the residence of Angelic Dadula-Ortiz in Poblacion, Sibonga, Cebu, every afternoon.  She even told the players that Sibonga MTC Judge Delfin H. Decierdo was not a capable judge.

          In her Comment dated October 24, 2007,^[8][2] Manubag denied the charges against her. To belie the allegation that she submitted a falsified diploma or school records to support her appointment, she pointed out that she qualified and passed the Career Service Professional Examination given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) held in Cebu City on July 31, 1998.  She explained that the CSC required the submission of all pertinent documents, including her school records, which were all scrutinized for authenticity.  Apparently, her requirements were in order, otherwise, she would not have been able to take the examination.

          As regards the charge of immorality, Manubag confirmed that her husband had been providing support for the subsistence of their minor son.  She claimed that the Boy Alicaya mentioned in the complaint was just a family friend, being a barkada of her younger brother, and that it was impossible to have a relationship with him as he had his own family.  She stressed that she has been living with her parents and an unmarried brother in the family compound.

          As to the allegation that she gambled during office hours, she averred that this would be physically impossible, considering that the presiding judge of her court was always in the office during working hours and he was the signatory in her daily time record.  She admitted, however, that after 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, before going home, she would sometimes pass by the residence of Angelic Dadula-Ortiz and there were occasions when the family members of the latter were playing mahjong.  She remarked that perhaps the complainant saw her within the vicinity of the residence of Angelic Dadula-Ortiz during these occasions and then presumed that she was there during the whole afternoon.

In this Court’s Resolution dated March 11, 2009,^[9][3] the administrative complaint was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu (RTC), for investigation, report and recommendation.

          Judge Maximo A. Perez (Judge Perez) of the RTC prepared a Report and recommended that Manubag be found GUILTY of Dishonesty, fined the sum of P10,000.00, reprimanded and warned that a commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.         

The Report submitted by Judge Perez was noted and the same was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice.

In its Memorandum dated February 22, 2010, the OCA made the following recommendations:

(1)       that the administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and

(2)       that respondent Merlyn G. Manubag, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and DISMISSED from the service, effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. 

The OCA made the following explanation:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee.  The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer, as in this case the Court, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position (Filoteo v. Calago, A.M. No. P-04-1815, October 18, 2007; Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court).

            Anent the issue of falsification of public documents, there is substantial evidence to hold the respondent guilty of dishonesty for falsifying an official document.

            Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, appointment or registration.  Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue and integrity.  It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bermejo, AM No.  P-2004, March 14, 2008).

            The Court does not tolerate dishonesty.  Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service.  As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical  standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law (De Guzman v. delos Santos, A.M. No. 2008-8-SC [18 December 2002]).

            In the instant complaint, the respondent denies having submitted a falsified diploma or school records to support his appointment as Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibonga, Cebu, but she does not deny possession of the falsified school records.  In fact, in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS), dated May 12, 2008, it is reflected that she is a BSC Graduate of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos in 1984, contrary to the certification of Mr. Demetrio L. Quirante, University Registrar of San Jose Recoletos, that their office does not have the original record of the respondent.  Furthermore, the said registrar certified that the machine copy of the transcript of record of the respondent has the following deficiencies and observations and the same are quoted, as follows: ‘a.  Our exact date of graduation for summer 1984 is May 12 (not May 24) 1984; b,.  We do not have the course Bachelor of Science in Commerce major in Commerce; c.  It seems that the course appearing in the copy of the TOR should have been Bachelor of Science in Commerce major in Accounting.’

            The importance of accomplishing a PDS with utmost honesty cannot be stressed enough (Re:  Anonymous Complaint Against Mr. Rodel M. Gabriel, A.M. No.  2005-18-SC [19 April 2006]).  Its accomplishment is required under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and since it is a requirement in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein is intimately connected with such employment (Administrative Case For Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document Against Noel V. Luna SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, AM No.  2003-7-SC [15 December 2003]).

            Indeed, respondent’s act of stating in her PDS that she was a college graduate when the truth is otherwise amounts to dishonesty by misrepresentation and falsification of an official document.

            Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292, the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of public document are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed even for the first offense.  Section 9 of said Rule likewise provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification from re-employment in the government service.  This penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent (Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. P-03-1696 [30 April 2003]).

            Anent the charges of immorality and gambling during office hours, the evidence on records failed to provide the needed quantum of proof to hold the respondent liable of the said charges.  The record shows bare allegations which are not substantiated by testimonial or documentary evidence.  It is ruled that within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded (Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.  175201, April 23, 2008). [Underscoring and emphasis supplied]

THE COURT’S RULING

          The OCA found that the incorrect entries made by Manubag in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constituted dishonesty by misrepresentation and falsification of an official document and, thus, recommended that she be dismissed from service, effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Dishonesty means “a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”^[10][4]

It need not be overstressed that the administrative function of clerks of court, like Manubag, is very important for the proper administration of justice. As such, clerks of court must be persons of integrity and honesty. The image of the court of justice is reflected in the conduct, whether official or personal, of its personnel, from the highest to the lowest official. As mentioned in the Court’s Resolution in the case of Bulalat v. Adil:^[11][5]

This Court has consistently underscored the heavy burden and responsibility that court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. No position demands greater moral uprightness from its occupant than a judicial office. Indeed, the responsibilities of a public officer as enshrined in the Constitution are not mere rhetoric to be taken as idealistic sentiments. These are working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds.  Because respondent has failed to live up to the stringent standards of his office, we have no other recourse but to sanction him for his despicable conduct.

In this case, Manubag falsified her PDS dated May 12, 2008 by stating therein that she was a BSC Graduate of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos in 1984 when in fact she was not. The entries made by Manubag were belied by Demetrio L. Quirante, University Registrar of San Jose Recoletos, in a certification stating that their office does not have the original record of Manubag.  He further certified that the machine copy of the transcript of record of Manubag has the following deficiencies as observed and the same are quoted, as follows:

a.     Our exact date of graduation for Summer 1984 is May 12 (not May 24), 1984;

b.  We do not have the course Bachelor of Science in Commerce major in Commerce;

c.    It seems that the course appearing in the copy of the TOR should have been Bachelor of Science in Commerce major in Accounting.^[12][6]

It cannot be denied that Manubag, through falsifying an official document, gained undue advantage over qualified applicants to the same position. This Court simply cannot tolerate this as she has deprived a deserving individual. All things being equal, another employee who possesses similar qualifications should have been appointed had it not been for the misrepresentations of Manubag.   

The significance of accomplishing PDS with utmost honesty cannot be overemphasized. It is a requirement under Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with one’s employment in the government.  Thus, the making of false statements in completing the PDS is intimately connected with such employment. Making erroneous entries to accomplish the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses for which the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service of employees found guilty of such offenses is prescribed even for the first offense.^[13][7]

Indeed, being in the nature of a grave offense, dishonesty carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service.^[14][8]

          The Court has been explicit. In the case of Ramos v. Mayor:^[15][9]

Under Section 52 (A)(1) and (A)(6), Rule IV of the “Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service” (Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999), respondent’s act of making untruthful declarations in his PDS renders him administratively liable for falsification of public document and dishonesty which are classified as grave offenses and, thus, warrant the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service even if either of them is respondent’s first offense. Section 58 of Rule IV thereof states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.^[16][10]

          In Adm. Case for Dishonesty & Falsification Against Luna,^[17][11] this Court emphasized that “every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.  Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing.” Manubag indubitably failed to meet the strict standards set for a court employee, hence, she does not deserve to remain in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, respondent Merlyn G. Manubag is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.

          SO ORDERED. 

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                   Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO                     CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

             Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

                     (On leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

                                                                                      (On leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                           Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                             LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                        ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

                                                                                           (No part)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.                JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                 Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA             MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

              Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIPE NACHOR y OMAYAN (G.R. NO. 177779, 14 DECEMBER 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: RAPE; LACK OF RESISTANCE IS IMMATERIAL. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. NACHOR)

x –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

DOCTRINES

THREE PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN DETERMINING THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF ACCUSED IN RAPE CASES

“[In determining] the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent,  to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.”^[1][11]

ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, THE TRIAL COURT’S ASSESSMENT  DESERVES GREAT WEIGHT

“[On the issue of credibility of witnesses,] the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x x.  Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.”^[2][14]

IN RAPE CASE LACK OF RESISTANCE  IS NOT ESSENTIAL AS LONG AS FORCE OR INTIMIDATION IS PRESENT.

Even if it were true that “AAA” did not seriously resist the appellant’s sexual offense, her failure is inconsequential and cannot affect the credibility of her testimony.  “It must be stressed that the resistance of the victim is not an element of the crime [of rape],” and the law does not impose on the prosecution the burden of establishing the same.^[3][18]  “As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.”^[4][19]

DENIAL AND ALIBI ARE INHERENTLY WEAK DEFENSES

The appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi were properly rejected.  Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.  “Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant,] the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”^[5][25]

x –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“[W]hen the offended parties are young and immature girls [aged 12 to16], courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by the trial if the matter about which they testified is not true.”^[6][1]

The Charge

For review is the Decision^[7][2] dated June 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02040 which affirmed with modifications the Decision^[8][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case Nos. IR-6033 and IR-6034, convicting appellant Felipe Nachor y Omayan of the crime of rape against “AAA.”^[9][4]  The Information^[10][5] in Criminal Case No. IR-6033 contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about May 9, 2001, at x x x, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [lay with] and [succeeded] in having carnal knowledge [of] ‘AAA’, 14-year old minor, daughter of the culprit, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as shall be proven in Court.  The act is with qualifying aggravating circumstance of the fact that the victim is below 18 years old and the offender is a parent. (Art. 266-B, Par. 6, subpar. 1, R.A. 8353)

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

            The Information^[11][6] in Criminal Case No. IR-6034 is identically worded except for the date of the commission of the crime.  In this case, the appellant was accused of raping “AAA” on or about 11:30 in the morning of the first week of June 2001.        

The appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.  After the termination of the pre-trial conference, joint trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

            “AAA” was born on September 11, 1986, and lived with her parents and four siblings.  She was 14 years old when in the morning of May 9, 2001, she was left alone with her father, the appellant.  While she was cooking at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, the appellant suddenly poked a bolo at her neck, pulled her wrist and dragged her towards the room which she shared with her brother and sisters. Gripped with fear, she struggled and attempted to escape but the appellant’s strength was too much for her.  Her shouts for help were futile since the house of their nearest neighbor was about a hundred meters away and separated by trees and hilly terrain from their house.

            While inside the room, the appellant, with a bolo still in his hand, forced “AAA” to lie down on the bed.  When she obeyed, the appellant removed her shorts and panty.  Thereafter, he took off his shorts and underwear and started kissing her neck and breasts.  He proceeded to mount “AAA,” inserted his penis inside her vagina and executed a pumping motion.  During this ordeal, “AAA” continued to struggle, but her attempt to resist the appellant’s lewd desires was unsuccessful.  She instead experienced intense pain and cried.

            After the appellant satisfied his lust, he again poked his bolo at “AAA” and threatened to kill her, her mother and siblings if she would report the incident to anyone.  The appellant then stood up, put on his clothes and departed.  “AAA” kept the incident to herself out of fear.

            “AAA” was again raped by the appellant in the first week of June, 2001 when her mother and siblings were not around.  At around 11:30 in the morning, “AAA” was studying in their house when the appellant came out of his room armed with his bolo.  “AAA” rushed outside for fear of another sexual abuse, but was overtaken by the appellant who poked his bolo at her neck and dragged her towards her room.  Once inside, the appellant removed the pants and panty of “AAA,” and threatened to kill her, her mother and siblings if she would relate the incident to another person.  As in the previous incident of rape, the appellant forced “AAA” to lie down, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made coital movements.  Despite her struggle and resistance, she was unable to resist his bestial acts.  After satiating himself, the appellant reiterated his warning to “AAA” not to tell anyone of her ordeal or else he would kill them all.

            A few months later, the abdomen of “AAA” started to bulge.  Having been threatened by the appellant, she refused to divulge any information.  The mother of “AAA” therefore sought the assistance of one of her wedding sponsors to whom “AAA” finally revealed the sexual abuse she experienced in the hands of her father.  After this revelation was relayed to her mother, “AAA” was immediately taken to the Regional Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development where she declared in an interview that her father sired the child she was carrying.  She was then taken to the National Bureau of Investigation for a medico-legal examination.  The results confirmed that “AAA” was pregnant.  On December 27, 2001, “AAA” gave birth to a baby boy she named “BBB.”

The Version of the Appellant

            The appellant denied raping “AAA.”  He averred that on May 9, 2001, he left his house at 7:00 o’clock in the morning to go to his sister in Antipolo, Buhi, Camarines Sur.  Moreover, “AAA” no longer stayed in their house from April 2001 to October 2001.  During this period, she worked as a housemaid without his permission.  It was only in October 2001 that he saw “AAA” and noticed that she was already pregnant.  He asked his wife if she knew anything of the delicate condition of “AAA” but he did not receive a reply.  He instructed his wife to go to her brothers and sisters to have a conference with “AAA.”  His wife complied but excluded him from the meetings without any explanation.  His wife could not also explain why they kept the pregnancy of “AAA” a secret from him.

The appellant asserted that it was his son, Randy, who impregnated “AAA.”  He confronted Randy on the pregnancy of “AAA” but the latter refused to reply and cried instead.  The appellant also claimed that his wife assisted “AAA” in filing the cases to get rid of him so that she could continue having an affair with the man often seen in her company.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

            On January 27, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding accused, Felipe Nachor y Omayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and further amended by RA 8353 in relation to RA 7610, in [C]riminal [C]ases No[s]. IR-6033 and IR-6034, respectively, he is sentenced to death, [to] pay an indemnity of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.^[12][7]

The Verdict of the Court of Appeals

            With the imposition of capital punishment on the appellant, the case was elevated to us for mandatory review and docketed as G.R. Nos. 157931-32.  Pursuant to People v. Mateo,^[13][8] however, we referred the case to the CA, which affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision.  Thus:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appealed Decision dated January 27, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Cases Nos. IR-6033 and IR-6034 finding the accused-appellant FELIPE NACHOR Y OMAYAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentencing him in each case to suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that for each count of rape, the accused-appellant is also CONDEMNED to pay private complainant “AAA,” the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Should no motion for reconsideration be filed in this case by the accused-appellant within the allowable reglementary period, or after the lapse thereof, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for appropriate action thereon.

SO ORDERED.^[14][9]

Assignment of Errors

            Hence, this appeal where the appellant raises the following assignment of errors contained in his Brief before the CA:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.^[15][10] 

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

“[In determining] the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent,  to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.”^[16][11]

Guided by these legal precepts, we find the testimony of “AAA,” who was 14 years old when the two incidents of rape occurred, credible and untainted by any hint of falsehood or prevarication.  She testified on her ordeal committed on May 9, 2001 as follows:

PROS. (BERNARD) BELTRAN:

Q:            Do you know the accused in these cases?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            If he is in this courtroom, will you [point] to him?

INTERPRETER:

The witness points to a person who when asked x x x his name answered [‘Felipe Nachor’]the accused in these cases.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Why do you know him?

A:            He is my father.

Q:            Sometime on May 9, 2001, where were you?

A:            I was at home.

Q:            Where is that house of yours situated?

A:            At  x x x, Camarines Sur.

Q:            With whom were you in your house during that day?

A:            My father.

Q:            While you were in your house at x x x, Camarines Sur on May 9, 2001 with your father, what unusual incident happened if any?

A:            My father poked a bolo [at] my neck.

Q:            How long was that bolo?

A:            The length of the bolo (witness demonstrating with her hand, 1 ½ feet).

Q:            Now, what happened next?

A:            He undressed me.

Q:            What was undressed from you?

A:            My shorts and panties.

Q:            What about your upper clothing?

A:            It was not.

Q:            After the accused undressed you, what did the accused do next?

A:            He also undressed, sir.

Q:            What was undressed from him?

A:            His shorts and briefs.

Q:            After the accused undressed himself, what did he do next?

A:            He lay on top of me.

Q:            What did he do next?

COURT:

Before that, what was your position?

A:            I was lying on my back.

Q:            Who made you lie on your back?

A:            My father.

Q:           Now, when you were lying on your back and your father was on top, what did your father do next?

A:           His penis was inserted in my vagina.

Q:            Prior to the insertion of his penis [into] your vagina, what did he do to you if any?

A:            He kissed me.

Q:            x x x what part of your body was kissed by him?

A:            On my neck.

Q:            Where else?

A:            On my breast.

x x x x

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Now while the penis of the accused was inside your vagina, what was he doing?

A:            He again poked the bolo [at] my neck.

Q:            What did he do next?

A:            He said that [if] I [report] the matter he will kill us all.

Q:            What happened next?

A:            He put on his shorts.

Q:            What else happened?

A:            And then he left.    

Q:            What about you?

A:            I put on my shorts also.

Q:            What about your panties?

A:            I put it [on] also.

Q:            Did you tell anybody what happened to you?

A:            No[,] sir.

Q:            Why?

A:            We might be killed.

Q:            By whom?

A:            My father.

x x x x

COURT:

Q:            You said the accused Felipe Nachor poked a bolo [at] you.  What part of your body did he poke his bolo?

A:            [At] my neck.

Q:            While poking the bolo [at] your neck, what did he say if any?

A:            That if I reported the matter, he will kill us all.

Q:            When you said the word ‘us’, who [were] you referring to?

A:            Myself, my mother, my sisters and brothers.

Q:           While he had sexual intercourse with you, what did you feel?

A:           I felt anger.

Q:           What about your vagina?

A:           I felt pain in my vagina.

Q:           What did you do while he was having sexual intercourse with you?

A:           I was crying.

Q:            Aside from that, what did you do if any?

A:            I was trying to escape, to run away.

Q:            Were you able to run away?

A:            No, your Honor.

Q:            Why?

A:            Because he held my hands.^[17][12]

x x x x

On the rape committed in the first week of June, 2001, she testified as follows:

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Sometime in the first week of June, 2001 in the morning was there any unusual incident that happened between you and your father if any?

COURT:

Where? In what place?

PROS. BELTRAN:

At  x x x, Camarines Sur.

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What was that?

A:            I was again poked with a bolo [by] my father on my neck.

Q:            When you said your father, you are referring to the accused in these cases Felipe Nachor y Omayan the one that you [pointed to] a while ago in court?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:           Now, what was [that] unusual incident that happened [in] the first week of June 2001, at x x x, Camarines Sur sometime at around 11:30 in the morning?

A:           I was again poked with a bolo on my neck and he undressed me.

Q:           What was undressed from you?

A:           My panties and shorts.

Q:           After he undressed you, what did the accused do next?

A:           He also undressed himself.

Q:           What was undressed by him?

A:           Brief and shorts.

Q:           After he undressed himself, what did he do next?

A:           He laid on top of me.

Q:            What was your position when your father laid on top of you?

A:            I was lying on my back.

Q:            Who made you lie on our back?

A:            My father.

Q:           Now when your father was on top of you, what did your father do next?

A:           His penis was inserted inside my vagina.

Q:            Immediately?

A:            Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q:           When your father inserted his penis inside your vagina, what did he do next?

A:           He made a push and pull motion.

Q:            So you want to impress us that while the penis of the accused was inside your vagina he was doing a push and pull motion on you, is that what you mean?

x x x x

WITNESS:

A:            Yes, sir.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What happened next?

A:            And then he put on his shorts.

Q:            What about his briefs?

A:            He put on his briefs also.

Q:            What about you?

A:            I also put on my panties and shorts.

x x x x

Q:            When your father was already dressing himself, what did he tell you if any?

A:            That if I reported the matter he will kill us.

Q:            Prior to the insertion of the penis of your father [in] your vagina, did he tell you anything?

A:            That if I tell the incident to somebody he will kill us.

Q:            When you said that he will kill us, [whom] do you think x x x your father [was] referring [to]?

A:            My mother, my sisters and brothers.

Q:            Now, how did these incidents come into the open?

A:            Because my mother brought me to the ‘hilot’.

COURT:

Q:            Why, why did your mother bring you to the ‘hilot’?

A:            Because according to one of the wedding sponsors of my mother, why is my [abdomen] becoming bigger.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What happened to the ‘hilot’?

A:            According to the ‘hilot’ my [abdomen] was already six (6) months big.

Q:            Do you know the reason why your [abdomen] was then about six (6) months big?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            Why?

A:            Because of what my father did to me that he raped me.

Q:            Why was it that your [abdomen] was big?

A:            Because his penis was inserted in my vagina.

Q:            Do you know a certain child by the name of “BBB?”

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            Why do you know the child?

A:            That’s my child.

Q:            Do you know the father of your child?

A:            Yes, sir[.]

Q:           Who is the father of your child?

A:           Felipe Nachor.

Q:           So you want to impress [on]us that your father Felipe Nachor is also the father of your child “BBB?”

A:           Yes, sir.”^[18][13]  (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the observations of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, that the testimony of “AAA” on both occasions of her rape is worthy of credence.  Her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for having carnal knowledge of her by means of force and intimidation on May 9, 2001 and the first week of June, 2001.  “AAA” positively identified the appellant as her abuser.  She never wavered in her testimony and maintained even on cross-examination that the appellant was her rapist.

“[On the issue of credibility of witnesses,] the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x x.  Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.”^[19][14]

In this case, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA.  The evaluation of the testimony of “AAA” has been appreciated properly and the evidence is overwhelming to convict the appellant of the crime charged. 

The appellant attempts to discredit “AAA” by assailing instances in her testimony that were improbable and inconsistent with human behavior.   Particularly, he argues that there was no resolute resistance by “AAA” on the assault on her honor.  He maintains that the testimony of “AAA” is incredible since he “cannot remove her shorts and panties or easily insert his penis into her vagina without first putting aside the bolo which he was allegedly holding with his left hand.”^[20][15]  He further claims that there was failure on the part of “AAA” to immediately file a complaint or report the rape incidents to her mother or to the police authorities despite the absence of threats.  Lastly, he contends that “AAA” acted normally, as if nothing happened, and did not even leave their home after she was supposedly raped on different dates.

The appellant’s contentions fail to impress.  There is no factual basis for the appellant’s assertion that “AAA” did not exert a tenacious effort to defy his sexual aggression.  On the contrary, “AAA” was unwavering in her testimony that she struggled with the appellant in both occasions of rape.  “AAA” even punched and kicked him in the thigh during the first occasion of her rape.^[21][16]  During the first rape incident, she tried to flee from her horrible fate, but the appellant was too strong and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.  She even shouted for help, but nobody heard her as the house of the nearest neighbor was more or less 100 meters away and separated from their house by trees and hilly terrain.

The appellant’s assault on the credibility of “AAA” by asserting that he could not remove her shorts and panties or easily insert his penis into her vagina without first putting aside the bolo held in his left hand while his right hand was holding both her hands^[22][17] has also no  basis in fact.  As borne by the record, the appellant had already been undressed of her shorts and panties before she was forced to lie down.  It is thus not impossible for him to consummate the rape using his right hand to bind the hands of “AAA” while holding a bolo to her neck with his left hand.

Even if it were true that “AAA” did not seriously resist the appellant’s sexual offense, her failure is inconsequential and cannot affect the credibility of her testimony.  “It must be stressed that the resistance of the victim is not an element of the crime [of rape],” and the law does not impose on the prosecution the burden of establishing the same.^[23][18]  “As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.”^[24][19]

Here, “AAA” testified that on both occasions of rape, the appellant poked a bolo at her neck, dragged her to a room in the house and succeeded in making her submit to his will.  The use of a bladed weapon to ensure the commission of the rape “speaks loudly of appellant’s use of violence, or force and intimidation.”^[25][20]  

Worth noting, too, is the filial relationship between the appellant and “AAA.”  He is the father of the 14 year-old victim.  In incestuous rape, the father’s “moral ascendancy and influence over [his daughter] sufficiently substitutes for force and intimidation.”^[26][21]  He “takes advantage of his blood relationship, [proximity,] ascendancy, and [moral] influence over his victim both to commit the [rape] and to intimidate the victim into silence.”^[27][22]

The appellant further claims that the conduct of “AAA” after being raped, i.e., not reporting the incident to anyone despite the absence of threats from him and acting like nothing happened, was incredible and contrary to human experience.  This contention is misleading as a review of the record reveals that he cowed “AAA” into not telling anyone of her harrowing ordeal by threatening to kill her, as well as her mother and siblings if she would do so.  Considering that “AAA” was a young girl at the time she was raped, the appellant’s threat was sufficient to produce fear in her mind.  Moreover, the fact that the appellant was her biological father and exercised moral ascendancy over her explains why she “behaved as though no wrong had been done to her.”^[28][23]  “[D]elay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and [her] testimony nor destroy their probative value.”^[29][24]

The appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi were properly rejected.  Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.  “Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant,] the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”^[30][25]

We are not convinced by the appellant’s postulations that it was his son, Randy, who raped “AAA” and that he was accused of raping her due to the instigation of his wife who wanted to get rid of him so she could continue her illicit affair with another man.  A young girl, ‘innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.  Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.” ^[31][26]

The Proper Penalty

The appellant committed incestuous rape and must consequently suffer the penalty provided by law.  The trial court correctly imposed upon him the penalty of death since a rape committed while the victim was still under 18 years of age by an offender who is her parent merits no less than the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.^[32][27]  It is clear from the birth certificate of “AAA” that she was only 14 years old when she was ravished by the appellant, her biological father. 

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,^[33][28] which prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should be imposed.^[34][29]  Thus, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count of rape.

The Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence,^[35][30] the amounts of civil  indemnity  and

damages awarded to “AAA” also require a modification.  For each of the two counts of rape, she is entitled to an award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another  P75,000.00 as moral damages and  P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02040, which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, finding appellant Felipe Nachor y Omayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED with modifications that appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape; and the awards of moral damages and exemplary damages are increased to P75,000,00, and P30,000.00 respectively, for each count of rape.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice