Archive for 2011


  SPOUSES GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN VS. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.,(G.R. NOS. 190677-78); GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN, VS. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK (G.R. NOS. 190699-700); BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., VS. GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN (G.R. NO. 188792,  10 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.: )

 

 

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RESOLUTION

 

NACHURA, J.:

         

These consolidated petitions assail the Court of Appeals (CA) September 18, 2009 Decision[1][1] and December 16, 2009 Resolution[2][2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 98307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 101421; and its March 12, 2009 Decision[3][3] and July 15, 2009 Resolution[4][4] in CA-G.R. SP No. 102799.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 98307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 101421, the appellate court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. Q-07-59545, restraining the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted by Spouses George R. Tan and Susan L. Tan (hereafter referred to as Spouses Tan) in favor of Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO). The CA concluded that the issuance of the writ was unfounded and unsubstantiated.  In CA-G.R. SP No. 102799, the CA found that the bond set by the RTC was grossly insufficient to cover all the damages which BDO might sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that Spouses Tan were not entitled to the writ. It thus remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the proper injunction bond which should not be less than P32 Million.

After the filing of the Reply to BDO’s Comment in G.R. No. 188792 and while awaiting BDO’s Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 190677-78 and Spouses Tan’s Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 190699-700, BDO moved for extension of time to file the appropriate pleading in view of the settlement of the consolidated cases.[5][5] 

On December 16, 2010, Spouses Tan and BDO filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss,[6][6] alleging that they have come to an agreement for the amicable resolution of their respective claims to avoid the inconvenience of litigation. Attached to the motion are the Compromise Agreement executed by the parties and a copy of the RTC decision approving the agreement. The Compromise Agreement reads:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

This Agreement, which shall supplement Memorandum of Agreement dated 27 May 2010, is made and executed this _____ day of _______ 2010, by and between:

SPOUSES GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN, Filipinos, of legal age, residing at 42 Ifugao St., La Vista Subd., Brgy. Pansol, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as “Spouses Tan”;

– and –

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., a banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with office address at 10/F BDO Corporate  Center South Tower, Makati Avenue corner H.V. Dela Costa St., Makati City, represented herein by its Senior Vice President, Melanie S. Belen, and Vice President, Emily D. Samoy, as evidenced by the Special Power of Attorney indicating their authority, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex “A,” hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”;

(herein after referred to singly as a “Party,” and collectively as “Parties”).

WITNESSETH: That

Spouses Tan obtained various loans and other credit accommodations from the Bank in the total principal amount of Fifty Nine Million Nine Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Four and 19/100 Pesos (P59,984,624.19). As security for the loans and other credit accommodations, Spouses Tan executed a Real Estate Mortgage and Amended Real Estate Mortgage on 15 January 2004 and 02 February 2004, respectively, covering a parcel of land located at 42 Ifugao Street, La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (“TCT”) No. 13600, registered in the name of George Sin Gee Tan married to Susan  Lim Tan (the “Property”).

Sometime in 2006, Spouses Tan defaulted in the payment of their loan obligations. Hence, the Bank initiated  foreclosure proceedings on the foregoing Real Estate Mortgage. At the auction sale on 03 December 2009, the Bank emerged as highest bidder and was issued Certificate of Sale dated 04 December 2009.

Spouses Tan filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-07-59545 (the “Case”), pending before Branch 81 (the “Court”).

In order to put an end to the protracted litigation, the Bank has accepted the proposal of Spouses Tan and entered into and executed Memorandum of Agreement dated 27 May 2010 (the “MOA”).

Further to the MOA, and as a supplement thereto, and pursuant to the Court’s Order given in open court on 07 July 2010, the parties have agreed to execute this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereby agree to the following terms and conditions:

1.         The Bank shall allow Spouses Tan to redeem the Property for a total redemption price of SIXTY MILLION PESOS (P60,000,000.00), subject to the following terms:

a.                           THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P30,000,000.00), payable in five (5) years beginning June 2010, or until June 2015 (the “Term”). Spouses Tan shall pay Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) a month, for sixty (60) months, with a balloon payment in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) at the end of the Term.

b.                           For and in consideration of the amount of THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P30,000,000.00), Spouses Tan shall cede, transfer and convey to and in favor of the Bank, all its rights, possession, title and interests in a parcel of land in Roxas City covered by TCT No. T-16024, registered in the name of Spouses Tan (the “Roxas Property”).

2.         On December 2010, or upon expiration of the redemption period, Spouses Tan shall allow the Bank to consolidate title over the Property.

3.         Upon consolidation of title in the Bank’s name, the Bank and Spouses Tan shall execute a Contract to Sell covering the Property in accordance with the terms under Section 1.

4.         Upon full payment of the amount under Section 1 (a), and the cession, transfer and conveyance to the Bank of the Roxas Property pursuant to Section 1 (b), the parties agree that Spouses Tan’s personal loan obligations with the Bank, including Spouses Tan’s personal loan obligations with then Equitable PCI Bank, shall be deemed fully settled.

5.         After execution and signing, the parties shall file this Agreement with the Court for approval.

The parties hereby agree to move for the approval of this Agreement before the Court. However, the obligations under this Agreement shall be immediately enforceable even prior to the approval of this Agreement.

6.         Parties agree to move for the dismissal of the Case, within fifteen (15) days from execution of all documents necessary to implement this Agreement.

7.         All expenses, fees, and taxes in connection with: (a) the cession, transfer and conveyance to the Bank of the Roxas Property; and (b) the consolidation of title of the Property in the Bank’s name, shall be for the account of the Bank.

8.         Upon failure of Spouses Tan to comply with any of the terms and conditions under this Agreement, the Bank shall be entitled, without necessity of any demand or notice:

a.       To take immediate possession of the Property. Spouses Tan agree to peacefully surrender and immediately vacate the Property.

b.      To file the necessary motion or pleading with the Court to implement this Agreement, and/or enforce its rights under law and equity.

9.         Parties hereby mutually and irrevocably waive all claims, counterclaims, demands, and causes of action, which they raised, or could have raised, against each other, including future claims of whatever kind, in connection with the Case and the Property.

10.       The parties confirm that the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement have been mutually agreed upon, without any act of force, fraud or undue intimidation. The parties further confirm that they have consulted their respective legal counsel, and that they understand the legal consequences of this Agreement. Accordingly, the parties hereby agree to abide by the terms and conditions hereof, which have the force and effect of a lawful right and a demandable obligation.

11.       In the event that any one or more of the provisions of this Agreement be later declared invalid, illegal or unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions shall in no way be impaired or affected thereby.

12.       The parties hereto intend for this Agreement to supplement the MOA. All terms and conditions of the MOA shall remain in full force and effect and remain unmodified except as specifically set forth in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first above-written.

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.

By:

            Sgd.                                                                         Sgd.

MELANIE S. BELEN                                          GEORGE R. TAN

            Sgd.                                                                         Sgd.

EMILY D. SAMOY                                              SUSAN L. TAN[7][7]

In a decision[8][8] dated September 15, 2010, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Having been sealed with court approval, the compromise agreement shall govern the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of the consolidated petitions is in order.

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The cases are considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

     


SO ORDERED.

 

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

                                         Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                       ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                                                      Associate Justice

                                                        Acting Chairperson, Second Division

 

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                              Chief Justice



*               In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Raffle dated October 13, 2010.

**             In lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated October 13, 2010.

***            In lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Raffle dated March 8, 2010.

[9][1]           Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 56-87. 

[10][2]          Id. at 89-94.

[11][3]          Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 188792), pp. 29-45.

[12][4]          Id. at 83-85.

[13][5]          Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 757-759.

[14][6]          Id. at 771-773.

[15][7]          Id. at 760-762.

[16][8]          Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190677-78), pp. 150-153.


[1][1]           Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 56-87. 

[2][2]           Id. at 89-94.

[3][3]           Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 188792), pp. 29-45.

[4][4]           Id. at 83-85.

[5][5]           Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 757-759.

[6][6]           Id. at 771-773.

[7][7]           Id. at 760-762.

[8][8]           Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190677-78), pp. 150-153.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ELENITA C. FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 190889, 10 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.) 

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DECISION

 

NACHURA, J.: 

                            

 

 

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.


The facts:

         Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:

                             That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[3][3]

          When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[4][4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:

1.     The search warrant subject of this case exists;

2.     Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;

3.     Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;

4.     Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

5.     The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and

6.     The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[5][5]

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,[6][6] these are the chain of events that led to the filing of the information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.

Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.

          To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioner’s house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized.

At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioner’s house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.

The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioner’s house.  The team found and was able to confiscate the following:

1.     Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;

2.     Thirty five (35) pieces  of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and

3.     Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.

For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:

That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7][7]

They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.

Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8][8]


Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence.  The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities and defects.

In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained: 

Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.

It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.

x x x x                         

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

                        x x x x

x x x.   [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

x x x x

To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).

The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their possession during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9][9]  

 Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

 Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following observations:

[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored.[10][10]

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioner’s residence were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11][11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.[12][12] Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:

Sec. 13.  Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

            A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13][13] Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.[14][14]

On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states: 

 

Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.[15][15]

This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:

Section 1.  Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.  (Emphasis ours.)

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and   state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,[16][16] because different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the information.[17][17] This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.

          Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the CA’s Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.

 

The Issues

Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.

Our Ruling

            We find merit in the petition.

          First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers.  We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible.

 

          No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:

Sec.  2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article –

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

          There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule.  Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18][18]

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[19][19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20][20]

           Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.

          Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

 The pertinent portions of SPO2 Nava’s testimony are elucidating:

            Q         When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         What were they doing?

            A         They were cordoning the house.

Q         You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he tell you?

            A         Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.

Q         And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers were surrounding?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Now, how  long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?

A         I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 o’clock up to 12:00 o’clock the following day.

Q         At about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were you?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Where were you?

            A         I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.

Q         While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?

            A         Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.

            Q         And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?

            A         Yes, sir.

            x x x x

Q         Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside the house?

            A         It was Zaldy Valerio.

            COURT:          (to witness)

            Q         Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Why do you know him?

A         Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

            x x x x

            PROS. PERALTA:

Q         When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?

            A         I shouted to seek cover.

            x x x x

Q         So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, “take cover?”

A         I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the place where something was thrown.

            Q         What did you see if any?

            A         I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

            x x x x

Q         Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 o’clock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall another unusual incident?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         And can you tell us what was that incident?

A        I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the roof of another house.

Q         And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Did you recognize him?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         Who was that person?

            A         Zaldy Valerio again.

            x x x x

Q         Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?

            A         I was on the road in front of the house.

Q         Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?

            A         He was on top of the house.

            x x x x

            Q         Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?

            A         Yes, sir.

            Q         What was that?

            A         Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

            x x x x

            Q         And what did he tell you?

            A         It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.

            x x x x

Q         What did you do if any?

            A         We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.

            x x x x

            Q         Who opened the fence for you?

            A         It was a lady who is the owner of the house.

Q         When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?

            A         We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21][21]  

The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

            Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

          The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm.

 

  In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22][22] are instructive:

                        The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

            But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law,  in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

            In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.  Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23][23]

          Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder thereof:

(1)             possesses a firearm or a part thereof

(2)             lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24][24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.

          At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner’s participation, knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

          Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25][25] The quantum of proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned. 

The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioner’s waistband was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers.  Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioner’s house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

    In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[26][26] 

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites:

(a)              the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b)             the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to which the seized part/component corresponds.

 In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the

elements of the crime. The subject receivers – one with the markings “United States Property” and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 – were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1, respectively.  They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.[27][27] His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28][28]

    Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of firearms.[29][29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification[30][30] to that effect and identified the same in court.[31][31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32][32]

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

 

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                      Chief Justice


 


[1][1]        Penned by Executive Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Florito S. Macalino, concurring; rollo, pp. 71-84.

[2][2]           Id. at 32-69.

[3][3]           Information; CA rollo, pp. 6-7.  (Emphasis supplied.)

[4][4]           Supra note 2, at 33.

[5][5]           Id.

[6][6]           Supra notes 1 and 2.

[7][7]           CA rollo, pp. 60-90; see also Exhibits 2 & 2a, records, Vol. I, p. 37.

[8][8]           Supra note 2, at 49-63.

[9][9]           Id. at 64-68.

[10][10]         Supra note 1, at 78-79.

[11][11]         Rollo, pp. 85-90.

[12][12]         Id. at 92-93.

[13][13]         Approved on June 6, 1997.

[14][14]         Emphasis supplied.

[15][15]         Emphasis supplied.

[16][16]         In fact, the signing prosecutor did not even cite Section 1; see Information, supra note 3.

[17][17]         The purpose of the rule against duplicity of offense, embodied in Sec. 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. (F. Regalado,  Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II [8th ed., 2000], citing People v. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234, 270 [1957]).

[18][18]         People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 926 (2003), citing People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704-705.

[19][19]         People v. Go, supra, at 928, citing People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 610 (1993) and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).

[20][20]         People v. Doria, supra note 18, at 711.

[21][21]         TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 5-14.

[22][22]         G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 716.

[23][23]         Id. at 725-727.  (Citations omitted.)

[24][24]         See People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 84857, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 158, 167, citing People v. Caling, G.R. No. 94784, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 827.

[25][25]         People v. Dela Rosa,  id. at 172.

[26][26]         See Teofilo Evangelista v. The People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010; People v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 724, 738; Advincula v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 641, 649 (2000).

[27][27]         Q             Now, when you saw this lower receiver of the cal. 45, what did you do if   any?

      A             I called some uniformed men and asked them to guard the place.

      Q             You did not right away pick it up?

      A             No, sir, because we waited for some media persons for them to see what was thrown.

      Q             Were (sic) the media people eventually arrived?

      A             Yes, sir.

      Q             Were they able to see this lower receiver of cal. 45?

      A             Yes, sir.

      x x x x

      Q             Were you the one who actually picked up this lower receiver of the cal. 45?

      A             Yes, sir, I picked it with the help of a wire.

      Q             If that lower receiver of cal. 45 including the wire in picking it up is shown to you, will you be able to identify them?

      A             Yes, sir.

      Q             I am showing to you a receiver of the cal. 45 already marked as Exhibit E, please go over the same and tell if this is the same lower receiver of cal. 45 including the wire?

                A             Yes, sir.

                x x x x

                Q             You said that Zaldy Valerio threw something out of the house towards the direction of another house. Can you remember having said so?

                A             Yes, sir.

                x x x x

                Q             And you cannot enter this if the owner of the house will not open the gate for you?

                A             Yes, sir.

                Q             And so, were you able to enter this house?

                A             They let us in because they opened the fence.

                x x x x

                Q             When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?

                A             We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal.

                Q             If that lower receiver of cal. 45 will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?

                A             Yes, sir.

Q             I am showing to you this lower receiver of the cal. 45 already marked as Exhibit E-1, is that the same lower receiver of cal. 45 which you saw in the early morning of August 28, 2002?

                A             Yes, sir.

                Q             What did you do with that lower receiver?

                A             I picked it up and when I have picked it up, turned it over to our investigator.

                Q             Can you tell us how did you pick up that lower receiver?

                A             Through the use of a wire.

Q             Was there any media people present when you picked up this lower receiver of the cal. 45?

                A             Many. (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 8-14)         

[28][28]         TSN, August 18, 2004, pp. 21-30.

[29][29]         TSN, August 4, 2004, pp. 16-17.

[30][30]         Exhibit G; records, Volume I, p. 8.

[31][31]         TSN, August 4, 2004, p. 16.

[32][32]         Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 450, 468-469.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, AND RAYMOND S. TAN (G.R. NO. 180452, 10 JANUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECT: DANGEROUS DRUGS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. NG YIK BUN ET AL.)

x————————————————————————————–x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

 

The Case

 

          This is an appeal from the January 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan, which affirmed the April 1, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The Facts

          An Information indicted accused-appellants of the following:

That on or about the 24th day of August 2000, at Barangay Bignay II, Municipality of Sariaya, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver and distribute, without authority of law, on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van, bearing Plate No. UBU 827, and have in their possession, custody, and control, without the corresponding license or prescription, twenty-five (25) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, each containing: 2.954 grams, 2.901 grams, 2.926 grams, 2.820 grams, 2.977 grams, 2.568 grams, 2.870 grams, 2.941 grams, 2.903 grams, 2.991 grams, 2.924 grams, 2.872 grams, 2.958 grams, 2.972 grams, 2.837 grams, 2.908 grams, 2.929 grams, 2.932 grams, 2.899 grams, 2.933 grams, 2.938 grams, 2.943 grams, 2.955 grams, 2.938 grams and 2.918 grams, respectively, with a total weight of 72.707 kilos, and one hundred forty seven (147) self-sealing transparent plastic bags likewise containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), also a regulated drug, with a total weight of 291.350 kilos, or with a grand total weight of 364.057 kilos.

            That the above acts were committed by a syndicate with the use of two (2) motor vehicles, namely: L-300 Mitsubishi Van bearing Plate No. UBU 827 and a Nissan Sentra Exalta car without Plate Number.

            Contrary to law.[1][1]

          As summarized in the appealed CA decision, the facts are as follows:

          On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province.  Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.

The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters.   They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van.  Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van.  Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader.  A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.

          A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu.  

          On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.

          Accused-appellants all maintained their innocence and presented the following defenses:

(1)     Accused-appellant Hwan testified that he was planning to buy cheap goods at Villa Vicenta Resort on August 24, 2000, when he saw a van full of bihon at the resort and inquired if it was for sale.  He went to relieve himself 15 meters away from the van.  A group of police officers arrested him upon his return.

(2)     Accused-appellant Tan testified that he was a businessman collecting a debt in Lucena City on August 24, 2000.  He was at a restaurant with his driver when three persons identified themselves as police officers and forcibly brought him inside a car.  He was handcuffed, blindfolded, and badly beaten.  He was later brought to a beach and was ordered to hold some bags while being photographed with five Chinese-looking men he saw for the first time.  A tricycle driver, Ricky Pineda, corroborated his story by testifying that he saw Tan being forced into a white Nissan car on August 24, 2000.

(3)     Accused-appellant Ng Yik Bun (Bun) testified that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on August 22, 2000.  On August 24, 2000, he was at a beach with some companions when four armed men arrested them.  He was made to pose next to some plastic bags along with other accused-appellants, whom he did not personally know.  He was then charged with illegal possession of drugs at the police station. A friend of his, accused-appellant Kwok Wai Cheng (Cheng), corroborated his story.

(4)     Accused-appellant Kan Shun Min (Min) testified that he arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 2000 for business and pleasure.  On August 24, 2000, he checked into a beach resort.  While walking there, he was suddenly accosted by four or five men who poked guns at him.  He was brought to a cottage where he saw some unfamiliar Chinese-looking individuals.  He likewise testified that he was made to take out white packages from a van while being photographed.  His friend, accused-appellant Chang Chaun Shi (Shi), corroborated his story.

The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

          ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the six (6) accused namely Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan (some also known by other names), GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) each.

            The shabu involved in this case and their accompanying paraphernalia are ordered disposed of in accordance with law, now RA 9165. The two (2) vehicles are forfeited in favor of the government.

            SO ORDERED.[2][2] 

 

In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan raised the lone issue of:  whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the absence of a warrant. 

On the other hand, accused-appellant Hwan sought an acquittal on the basis of the following submissions:

I

The trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest as held in the case of People vs. [Cuizon].

II

The trial court violated Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when it heard the case at bench on June 26, 2001 at the chemistry division of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City without the presence of both the herein accused-appellant and his counsel de parte.

III

The trial court erred when it issued and dictated in open hearing a verbal order denying accused’s formal “Motion to Suppress Illegally Procured Evidence” upon a [ratiocination] that is manifestly contrary to law [and] jurisprudence set in the Cuizon case, supra.

IV

The trial court erred when with lack of the desired circumspection, it sweepingly ruled the admission in evidence the 731 exhibits listed in the prosecution’s 43-page formal offer of evidence over the itemized written objections of the defense in a terse verbal order (bereft of reason for the denial of the raised objections) dictated in open hearing which reads: “All the exhibits of the prosecution are hereby admitted. The court believes that as far as the evidence submitted goes, these exhibits of the prosecution consisting of several plastic bags of shabu were not yet shown to be the fruit of a poisonous plant.” x x x

V

The trial court also erred in admitting the prosecution’s photographs (Exhibit “K” and “M,” inclusive of their sub-markings), the photographer who took the shots not having taken the witness stand to declare, as required by the rules, the circumstances under which the photographs were taken.

VI

The trial court erred when it tried and applied the provisions of R.A. 9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the instant case even though [the] crime charged took place on 24 August 2000.

VII

The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.[3][3]

The appellate court found accused-appellants’ contentions unmeritorious as it consequently affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

The CA ruled that, contrary to accused-appellants’ assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of the contraband was made.  The CA held that accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified their arrests and the seizure of the contraband.  The CA agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of the situation meant that the buy-bust team had no time to secure a search warrant.  Moreover, the CA also found that the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained under the plain view doctrine.

The CA debunked accused-appellant Hwan’s arguments in seriatimFirst, the CA ruled that People v. Cuizon[4][4] was not applicable to the instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers immediately acted on the information they had received about an ongoing shipment of drugs. 

Second, the CA also noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively waived his right to be present during the inspection of exhibits and hearing, for the manifestation made by the prosecution that accused-appellant Hwan waived his right to be present was never raised in issue before the trial court.

And third, the CA found accused-appellant Hwan’s other arguments untenable.  It held that the trial court correctly admitted Exhibits “K” and “M” even if the photographer was not presented as a witness.  The CA based its ruling on Sison v. People,[5][5] which held that photographs can be identified either by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.  It agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court under RA 6425 and not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the RTC Decision.  The CA likewise dismissed the argument that conspiracy was not proved by the prosecution, noting that the evidence presented established that accused-appellants were performing “their respective task[s] with the objective of loading the plastic bags of shabu into an L-300 van.”[6][6]

          The CA disposed of the appeal as follows:

                        WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

                        SO ORDERED.[7][7]

            On February 18, 2008, the Court, acting on the appeal of accused-appellants, required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.

          On March 27, 2008, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan filed their Supplemental Brief on the sole issue that:

THERE WAS NO VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE OF A WARRANT

 On June 4, 2008, accused-appellant Hwan filed his Supplemental Brief, raising the following errors, allegedly committed by the trial court:

I

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS RULE 115 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN IT CONDUCTED A HEARING ON JUNE 26, 2001 AT THE CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY IN CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF BOTH THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL IN SUCH VITAL [PROCEEDINGS].

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS VALID THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-CONCURRENCE OF THE REQUISITE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS ARREST.

          Essentially, accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense was being committed.  Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal.  They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. 

          Accused-appellant Hwan additionally claims that he was deliberately excluded when the trial court conducted a hearing on June 26, 2001 to identify 172 bags of shabu for trial purposes.  He asserts that no formal notice of the hearing was sent to him or his counsel, to his prejudice.

The Court’s Ruling

          On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2.  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant.  Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.[8][8]  In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.  Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants:       (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.  The following exchange between Capt. Ibon and the prosecutor sheds light on the participation of all six accused-appellants:

Q:        Upon arriving at Villa Vicenta Resort in Brgy. Bignay II, [in] what specific area [did] you position yourselves?

A:         Initially we [were] about three hundred meters away from Villa Vicenta Resort, then we walked [stealthily] so as not to [be] [spotted] until we were about fifty meters sir.

Q:        So you [positioned] yourself about fifty meters away from the point of Villa Vicenta Resort?

A:         From the actual location we saw about six personnel walking together loading contraband.

Q:        You said you [were] about fifty meters away from these six persons who were loading contraband, is that what you mean?

A:         Yes sir.

Q:        In that place where you [positioned] yourself, could you tell us, what was the lighting condition in the place where you positioned yourselves?

A:         It was totally dark in our place sir.

Q:        How about the position of the six persons who were loading contraband?

A:         They were well-lighted sir.

Q:        Why do you say that they are well-lighted?

A:         There were several [fluorescent] lamps sir.

Q:        Where?

A:         One search light placed near where they were loading the shipment sir.

Q:        How about the other?

A:         About two fluorescent lamps at the house near the six persons your honor.

COURT:           Are these portable lamps:

A:         Fixed lamps your honor.

Q:        Where else?

A:         Another at the right corner[.] There was also somewhat a multi-purpose house and it [was] well-lighted your honor.

Q:        This is a resort and that multi-purpose house that you are referring to are the cottages of the resort?

A:         Yes your honor.

FISCAL:           You said you saw six persons who were loading goods[.] In what vehicle [were they] transferring those things?

A:         Into [an] L-300 van sir.

Q:        What is the color of the van?

A:         White sir.

Q:        What did you see that these six persons [were] loading?

A:         We saw [them] holding white plastic with white substance your honor.

Q:        What container [were they] loading?

A:         Actually there were several checkered bags and other plastic [bags] sir.

Q:        How [were] they loading these bags?

A:         [Manually] your honor.

Q:        Will you please describe how they [were] loading it, Mr. Witness?

A:         Actually the plastic bags [some were] repacked [into] checkered [bags] while others [were] loading inside the checkered bag sir.

Q:        Did they put that on their shoulder or what?

A:         Holding and holding [sic] sir.

Q:        Nobody carrying [it] on their back?

A:         Nobody sir.

x x x x 

Q:        You said you saw these six persons, will you please look around this courtroom and tell us if these six persons that you are referring to are present?

COURT:           Considering that there are many persons inside this courtroom, will you please stand up and please [tap] the shoulder of these six persons?

x x x x             

INTERPRETER:           Witness tapped the [shoulders] of six male persons inside the courtroom.

x x x x

FISCAL:          May we manifest your honor that when these  six persons stood up when their names [were] called on the basis [of] what [was] written [on] the information [were] once tapped on their shoulder by this witness.

The last question I have [is] how long you stayed in this position watching these six persons loading those [products] in the L-300 van?

A:         Ten to fifteen minutes sir.

Q:        Within that period could you tell us what transpired?

A:         I called Major Tabo to inform [him of] what I saw, I called Major Tabo through the hand-held radio sir.

Q:        What was the reply of major Tabo with respect to your information?

A:         He directed me to get closer to these six persons and find out if really the contraband is shabu that was first reported sir.

Q:        So did you in fact go closer?

A:         Yes sir.

Q:        How [close] were you [to] the six persons at the time?

A:         When we were closing [in] somebody noticed us and they were surprised, I immediately shouted “Freeze, don’t move, we are Filipino soldiers,” we further identified [ourselves] sir.

Q:        What was the reaction of the six persons when you shouted those words?

A:         They [froze] sir.

             x x x x 

Q:        When you went closer and they [froze], what happened?

A:         I asked them who among them are English-speaking?

Q:        What was the reply given to you?

A:         Somebody replied “tagalog lang.”

Q:        Who was that person who replied “tagalog lang?”

A:         Chua Shilou Hwan sir.

Q:        Will you please [identify] for us who answered that in [T]agalog?

COURT:          Please [tap] his shoulder.

A:         This man sir.

COURT:          Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who identified himself as Chua Shilou Hwan.

CHUA SHILOU HWAN:        Opo.

FISCAL:          After answering you [with] “tagalog lang,” what happened?

A:         I further asked them “Ano ang dala ninyo?”

Q:        What was the reply?

A:         Chua Shilou Hwan said shabu.

Q:        So [what] did you do next?

A:         I asked them who is their leader, sir.

Q:        What was the reply?

A:         He told me it was Raymond Tan, sir.

Q:        Is he inside this courtroom now?

A:         Yes sir.

COURT:          Please tap [his] shoulder.

 WITNESS:      This man sir.

COURT:          Ikaw ba Raymond Tan?

  INTERPRETER:  A man stood and [nodded] his head.

x x x x 

FISCAL:          Now after they [froze], what did you do?

A:         I inspected the contraband and I found these bags and I immediately called Major Tabo and informed [him of] the matter sir.

Q:        How many bags were you able to confiscate in the scene?

A:         All in all 172 your honor.

Q:        That 172, one of them is the bag in front of you [which] you identified earlier?

A:         Yes sir.

Q:        When you saw that bag could you tell us what particular [contents] attracted you upon seeing these bags?

A:         It was marked by the members (interrupted).

Q:        No what attracted you?

A:         Something crystalline white sir.

Q:        Are you referring to all the bags?
            

A:         All the bags sir.[9][9] x x x

Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader.  Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended­­––is valid.

In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.[10][10]  In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them.  As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers.  And to write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.[11][11]

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs:  (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.[12][12]  Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs.  They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them.  Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellants.[13][13]  There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.

 Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.  They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta Resort.  Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested inside a restaurant.  But as the trial court found, the persons who could have corroborated their version of events were not presented in court.  The only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated Tan’s alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible. 

As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecution’s witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the trial court’s finding that the police officers’ testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit.  Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.[14][14]  We find no reason to deviate from this rule in the instant case.

          On the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for accused-appellant Hwan to claim a violation of his right to examine the witnesses against him.  The records show the following exchange on June 26, 2001:

FISCAL LUGTO:

I would like to manifes[t] that Atty. Agoot, counsel of accused Chua Shilou Hwan, waived his right to be present for today’s trial for purposes of identification of the alleged shabu.

 

ATTY SAVELLANO:

[Are] we made to understand that this hearing is for identification of shabu only?

FISCAL LUGTO:

Yes despite the testimony of the Forensic Chemist, this is for continuation with the direct testimony for purposes of identification which was confiscated or seized by the joint operation of the Military and the PNP at Sariaya, Quezon.

For the record, this [is] for the continuation of the direct testimony of Forensic Chemist Mary Jean Geronimo.[15][15]

          As the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel were not present when the forensic chemist testified.  The prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accused-appellant Hwan waived his right to be present at that hearing.  Yet Hwan did not question this before the trial court.  No evidence of deliberate exclusion was shown.  If no notice of hearing were made upon him and his counsel, they should have brought this in issue at the trial, not at the late stage on appeal.

          All told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must be affirmed.  The trial court’s determination as to the credibility of witnesses and its findings of fact should be accorded great weight and respect more so when affirmed by the appellate court.  To reiterate, a look at the records shows no facts of substance and value that have been overlooked, which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the instant appeal.  Deference to the trial court’s findings must be made as it was in the position to easily detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.[16][16]

         

Penalty Imposed

         

          Accused-appellants were each sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of PhP 5,000,000.  This is within the range provided by RA 6425, as amended.[17][17]  We, therefore, affirm the penalty imposed on accused-appellants.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accused-appellants Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and Raymond S. Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.

 

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                                                RENATO C. CORONA

       Chief Justice

       Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO     MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice


 


[1][1] Rollo, p. 5.

[2][2] CA rollo, p. 46.  Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar.

[3][3] Id. at 124-125.

[4][4] G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996, 256 SCRA 325.

[5][5] G.R. Nos. 108280-83 & 114931-33, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 58, 75-76.

[6][6] Rollo, p. 25.

[7][7] Id. at 26.  Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court).

[8][8] People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA 135, 146; citing People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.

[9][9] TSN, July 24, 2001, pp. 22-34.

[10][10] Supra note 8, at 147; citing People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388.

[11][11] People v. Tidula, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998, 292 SCRA 596, 611; People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 703; People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 199, 210; People v. Mahusay, G.R. No. 91483, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 80, 87; People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 87187, June 29, 1995, 245 SCRA 421, 430; and People v. Lopez, Jr., G.R. No. 104662, June 16, 1995, 245 SCRA 95, 105.

[12][12] People v. Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 594, 604-605; citing Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 400, 418.

[13][13] People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010.

[14][14] People v. Gregorio, Jr., G.R. No. 174474, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 216, 227; citing People v. Abaño, G.R. No. 142728, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 431.

[15][15] TSN, June 26, 2001, p. 1.

[16][16] People v. Macabare, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 119, 132; citing People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 375, 394.

[17][17] Secs. 16 and 17 of RA 6425, as amended, provide:

Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.––The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos [PhP 500,000] to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.––The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

x x x x

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.