Archive for 2011


CASE 2011-0043: SOLEDAD DALTON VS. FGR REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FELIX NG, NENITA NG, AND FLORA R. DAYRIT OR FLORA REGNER (G.R. NO. 172577, 19 JANUARY 2011, CARPIO, J) SUBJECTS: CONSIGNATION; FINDINGS OF COURT BINDING ON SC. (BRIEF TITLE: DALTON VS. FGR REALTY)

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February 12, 2011

CASE NO. 2011-0043: SOLEDAD DALTON VS. FGR REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FELIX NG, NENITA NG, AND FLORA R. DAYRIT OR FLORA REGNER (G.R. NO. 172577, 19 JANUARY 2011, CARPIO, J) SUBJECTS: CONSIGNATION; FINDINGS OF COURT BINDING ON SC. (BRIEF TITLE: DALTON VS. FGR REALTY)

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 9 November 2005 Decision2 and 10 April 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 26 February 2002 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 7, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB 4218.

The Facts

Flora R. Dayrit (Dayrit) owned a 1,811-square meter parcel of land located at the corner of Rama Avenue and Velez Street in Cebu City. Petitioner Soledad Dalton (Dalton), Clemente Sasam, Romulo Villalonga, Miguela Villarente, Aniceta Fuentes, Perla Pormento, Bonifacio Cabajar, Carmencita Yuson, Angel Ponce, Pedro Regudo, Pedro Quebedo, Mary Cabanlit, Marciana Encabo and Dolores Lim (Sasam, et al.) leased portions of the property.

In June 1985, Dayrit sold the property to respondent FGR Realty and Development Corporation (FGR). In August 1985, Dayrit and FGR stopped accepting rental payments because they wanted to terminate the lease agreements with Dalton and Sasam, et al.

In a complaint5 dated 11 September 1985, Dalton and Sasam, et al. consigned the rental payments with the RTC. They failed to notify Dayrit and FGR about the consignation. In motions dated 27 March 1987,6 10 November 1987,7 8 July 1988,8 and 28 November 1994,9 Dayrit and FGR withdrew the rental payments. In their motions, Dayrit and FGR reserved the right to question the validity of the consignation.

Dayrit, FGR and Sasam, et al. entered into compromise agreements dated 25 March 199710 and 20 June 1997.11 In the compromise agreements, they agreed to abandon all claims against each other. Dalton did not enter into a compromise agreement with Dayrit and FGR.

The RTC’s Ruling

In its 26 February 2002 Decision, the RTC dismissed the 11 September 1985 complaint and ordered Dalton to vacate the property. The RTC held that:

Soledad Dalton built a house which she initially used as a dwelling and store space. She vacated the premises when her children got married. She transferred her residence near F. Ramos Public Market, Cebu City.

She constructed the 20 feet by 20 feet floor area house sometime in 1973. The last monthly rental was P69.00. When defendants refused to accept rental and demanded vacation of the premises, she consignated [sic] her monthly rentals in court.

x x x x

It is very clear from the facts that there was no valid consignation made.

The requisites of consignation are as follows:

1.      The existence of a valid debt.

2.      Valid prior tender, unless tender is excuse [sic];

3.      Prior notice of consignation (before deposit)

4.      Actual consignation (deposit);

5.      Subsequent notice of consignation;

Requisite Nos. 3 and 5 are absent or were not complied with. It is very clear that there were no prior notices of consignation (before deposit) and subsequent notices of consignation (after deposit)

Besides, the last deposit was made on December 21, 1988. At the time Dalton testified on December 22, 1999, she did not present evidence of payment in 1999. She had not, therefore, religiously paid her monthly obligation.

By clear preponderance of evidence, defendants have established that plaintiff was no longer residing at Eskina Banawa at the time she testified in court. She vacated her house and converted it into a store or business establishment. This is buttressed by the testimony of Rogelio Capacio, the court’s appointed commissioner, who submitted a report, the full text of which reads as follows:

REPORT AND/OR OBSERVATION

“The store and/or dwelling subject to ocular inspection is stuated [sic] on the left portion of the road which is about fifty-five (55) meters from the corner of Banawa-Guadalupe Streets, when turning right heading towards the direction of Guadalupe Church, if travelling from the Capitol Building.

I observed that when we arrived at the ocular inspection site, Mrs. Soledad Dalton with the use of a key opened the lock of a closed door. She claimed that it was a part of the dwelling which she occupies and was utilized as a store. There were few saleable items inside said space.”

Soledad Dalton did not take exception to the said report.

Two witnesses who were former sub-lessees testified and clearly established that Mrs. Dalton use the house for business purposes and not for dwelling.12

Dalton appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In its 9 November 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s 26 February 2002 Decision. The Court of Appeals held that:

After a careful review of the facts and evidence in this case, we find no basis for overturning the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint, as we find that no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant.

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and generally requires a prior tender of payment. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof. Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.

Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. It had been consistently held that compliance with these requisites is mandatory.

No error, therefore, can be attributed to the lower court when it held that the consignation made by the plaintiff-appellant was invalid for failure to meet requisites 3 and 5 of a valid consignation (i.e., previous notice of the consignation given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation and, after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified thereof).

Plaintiff-appellant failed to notify defendants-appellees of her intention to consign the amount due to them as rentals. She, however, justifies such failure by claiming that there had been substantial compliance with the said requirement of notice upon the service of the complaint on the defendants-appellees together with the summons.

We do not agree with such contention.

The prevailing rule is that substantial compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is not enough. In Licuanan vs. Diaz, reiterating the ruling in Soco vs. Militante, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule thus:

“In addition, it must be stated that in the case of Soco v. Militante (123 SCRA 160, 166-167 [1983]), this Court ruled that the codal provisions of the Civil Code dealing with consignation (Articles 1252-1261) should be accorded mandatory construction —

We do not agree with the questioned decision. We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law. Articles 1256-1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only directory construction of the law. The use of the words “shall” and “must [sic] which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicated that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual…”

Clearly then, no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant for she did not give notice to the defendants-appellees of her intention to so consign her rental payments. Without any announcement of the intention to resort to consignation first having been made to persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation, the consignation as a means of payment is void.

As to the other issues raised by the plaintiff-appellant in her second and third assigned errors, we hold that the ruling of the lower court on such issues is supported by the evidence adduced in this case.

That plaintiff-appellant is not residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa and that she is using the same for business purposes, not as dwelling place, is amply supported by the testimony of two of plaintiff-appellant’s sub-lessees. The Commissioner’s Report submitted by Rogelio Capacio, who was commissioned by the lower court to conduct an ocular inspection of the leased premises, further lends support to the lower court’s findings. On the other hand, plaintiff-appellant only has her self-serving claims that she is residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa to prove her continued use of the leased premises as dwelling place.

There is thus no merit to plaintiff-appellant’s fourth assigned error. The lower court acted within its authority in ordering the plaintiff-appellant to vacate the leased premises. The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellant had failed to continuously pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees. It was therefore within the powers of the lower court to grant such other relief and remedies equitable under the circumstances.

In sum, there having been no valid consignation and with the plaintiff-appellant having failed to pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees, no error can be attributed to the lower court in rendering its assailed decision.13

Hence, the present petition. Dalton raises as issues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that (1) the consignation was void, and (2) Dalton failed to pay rent.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Dalton claims that, “the issue as to whether the consignation made by the petitioner is valid or not for lack of notice has already been rendered moot and academic with the withdrawal by the private respondents of the amounts consigned and deposited by the petitioner as rental of the subject premises.”14

The Court is not impressed. First, in withdrawing the amounts consigned, Dayrit and FGR expressly reserved the right to question the validity of the consignation. In Riesenbeck v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court held that:

A sensu contrario, when the creditor’s acceptance of the money consigned is conditional and with reservations, he is not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. Thus, when the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. IV, 1973 Ed., p. 317, citing 3 Llerena 263). The same factual milieu obtains here because the respondent creditor accepted with reservation the amount consigned in court by the petitioner-debtor. Therefore, the creditor is not barred from raising his other claims, as he did in his answer with special defenses and counterclaim against petitioner-debtor.

As respondent-creditor’s acceptance of the amount consigned was with reservations, it did not completely extinguish the entire indebtedness of the petitioner-debtor. It is apposite to note here that consignation is completed at the time the creditor accepts the same without objections, or, if he objects, at the time the court declares that it has been validly made in accordance with law.16 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is mandatory. Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will render the consignation void. Substantial compliance is not enough.

In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Toyota Bel-Air, Inc.,17 the Court enumerated the requisites of a valid consignation: (1) a debt due; (2) the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused without just cause to accept the payment, or the creditor was absent, unknown or incapacitated, or several persons claimed the same right to collect, or the title of the obligation was lost; (3) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice before consignation was made; (4) the amount was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice after the consignation was made.

Articles 1257 and 1258 of the Civil Code state, respectively:

Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation.

The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment.

Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.

The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The giving of notice to the persons interested in the performance of the obligation is mandatory. Failure to notify the persons interested in the performance of the obligation will render the consignation void. In Ramos v. Sarao,18 the Court held that, “All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with [this requisite] is mandatory.”19 In Valdellon v. Tengco,20 the Court held that:

Under Art. 1257 of our Civil Code, in order that consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment. In said Article 1258, it is further stated that the consignation having been made, the interested party shall also be notified thereof.21 (Emphasis supplied)

In Soco v. Militante, et al.,22 the Court held that:

We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law, Articles 1256 to 1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only a directory construction to the law. The use of the words “shall” and “must” which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicate that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Dalton claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she failed to pay rent. The Court is not impressed. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.” In Pagsibigan v. People,24 the Court held that:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.25

Whether Dalton failed to pay rent is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.26 Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 9 November 2005 Decision and 10 April 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1 Rollo, pp. 11-22.

2 Id. at 24-31. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring.

3 Id. at 39-40.

4 CA rollo, pp. 23-30. Penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes.

5 Records, pp. 1-5.

6 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

7 Id. at 49-50.

8 Id. at 51-52.

9 Id. at 53-54.

10 Id. at 57-58.

11 Id. at 59-60.

12 CA rollo, pp. 28-30.

13 Rollo, pp. 27-30.

14 Id. at 18.

15 G.R. No. 90359, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 656.

16 Id. at 659.

17 G.R. No. 137884, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 70, 89.

18 491 Phil. 288 (2005).

19 Id. at 305.

20 225 Phil. 279 (1986).

21 Id. at 327.

22 208 Phil. 151 (1983).

23 Id. at 153-154.

24 G.R. No. 163868, 4 June 2009, 588 SCRA 249.

25 Id. at 256.

26 Id. at 257.

Comment

CASE 2011-0042: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. VICTORIO A. DION (A.M. NO. P-10-2799, 18 JANUARY 2011, EN BANC) SUBJECT: UNREMITTED COLLECTIONS OF CLERK OF COURT; DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. DION)

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CASE NO. 2011-0042: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR  VS. VICTORIO A. DION (A.M. NO. P-10-2799, 18 JANUARY 2011, EN BANC) SUBJECT: UNREMITTED COLLECTIONS OF CLERK OF COURT; DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. DION)

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RESOLUTION

 

PER CURIAM:

 

          This administrative case arose from a financial audit that the Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD) of the Court Management Office (CMO) under the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted on the books of account of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan.  The audit team discovered unreported and unremitted collections that respondent Victorio A. Dion (Dion), its former Clerk of Court, made in connection with his duties.

The record shows that on February 22, 1996 plaintiff in Civil Case 832 (SJ-96), Rhey Osborn P. Columbres v. Gerardo R. Abarcar, deposited P30,000.00 with Dion as required by the court and for which he issued a mere temporary receipt.  Dion explained that the plaintiff pleaded with him not to deposit the money with the court’s fiduciary fund anymore since the parties were going to settle the case and he wanted to get his money back immediately.

Three years later or on January 8, 1999 the plaintiff in Civil Cases 913 and 922, Letecia N. Herrera v. Perfecto Cerezo, also deposited P30,000.00 with Dion as required by the court but Dion did not report the collection nor did he deposit the money with the court’s fiduciary fund account.  Nine months later on October 8, 1999 Judge Madronio ordered the release of the P30,000.00 to plaintiff Herrera.  Dion paid her on October 11, 1999 by withdrawing the amount from the fiduciary fund account. 

When it was discovered in a subsequent in-office audit that Dion withdrew the P30,000.00 from the court’s fiduciary fund without previously depositing an equivalent amount, the auditor required him to explain.  

Dion presented a certification that he inadvertently placed the P30,000.00 he got from Herrera into the court’s safe but was later on unable to open it.  He said that he was able to have the safe opened only on September 18, 2001 and get the P30,000.00 out because he had been preoccupied with preparing for his transfer to Branch 3 of the MTCC of Dagupan City.  On the following day, September 19, 2001, he claimed to have dutifully issued SC Official Receipt 11477855 in Herrera’s name to rectify the unreported P30,000.00 collection and to account for the money that he withdrew from the court’s fiduciary fund.  Dion apparently got away with this explanation.

But later, instead of canceling and discarding the official receipt he issued in Herrera’s name, the matter having been already taken up in the previous audit, Dion erased Herrera’s name on it, including the case title and number.  He then replaced these with details from Civil Case 832 (SJ-96), the case of Rhey Osborn P. Columbres and Gerardo R. Abarcar, to cover up for the P30,000.00 that he received on February 22, 1996 from the plaintiff in that case and remedy another deficiency in the court’s fiduciary fund.  The new entries made it appear, however, that he officially reported the collection on September 19, 2001 when he had by then long moved to his new assignment as Clerk of Court of the MTCC Dagupan City.

On July 30, 2007 the audit team leader had a dialogue with Dion.  He tried to refute the evidence presented against him, but in the end he admitted the misdeed. Later, he settled his accountability.

          The OCA recommended Dion’s dismissal for dishonesty and grave misconduct and forfeiture of all benefits that may be due him, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in the government service including government-owned and controlled corporations.

          The Court is inclined to adopt the findings of the audit team and the recommendation of the OCA.  He violated OCA Circular 50-95, which states that “all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Landbank of the Philippines.”  Likewise, he violated OCA Circular 26-97, which directed judges and clerks of court to compel collecting officials to strictly comply with the provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 which required collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for all money received by them.

          It is evident that Dion willfully betrayed the trust placed by the Court in him as Clerk of Court of the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan.  Following the rulings in OCA v. Nacuray and in Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted in the MTC of Bucay, Abra, the Court has no alternative but to impose the penalty of dismissal on him.

          WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Victorio A. Dion guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and DISMISSES him from the service effective immediately.  All benefits except accrued leave credits that may ordinarily be due him are ORDERED forfeited with prejudice to re-employment in the government service including government-owned and controlled corporations.

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

 

      ANTONIO T. CARPIO              CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES    

  Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.     ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

               Associate Justice                                   Associate Justice

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                     Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 

                        

       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                    LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                 Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice       

 

   MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                   ROBERTO A. ABAD

                Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

    MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.          JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                 Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA                  MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

            Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

Composed of Nathaniel M. Sevilla, Eduardo G. Tesea, Dennis B. Cantano, and Allan B. Carreon; See Annex “A,” Report on the Financial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian/San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

  OCA Report, p. 2.

  Id.; see also Annex “A,” Report of the Audit Team dated May 19, 2008, p. 6.

  Id.

  Id.

  Id.

  OCA Report, p. 3; see also Annex “A,” Report of the Audit Team dated May 19, 2008, p. 6.

  Id. at 4; id. at 6-7.

  Id. at 4-5; id.

  Id. at 5; id. at 7.

  Id. at 5-6.

  OCA Circular 50-95 took effect on November 1, 1995.

  OCA Circular 26-97 took effect on May 5, 1997.

  A.M. No. P-03-1739, April 7, 2006, 486 SCRA 532.

  A.M. No. P-06-2236, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 437.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0027: HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS AN IN-TRACORPORATE CONTROVERSY?

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SOURCE: RENATO REAL VS. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. AND/ OR KIICHI ABE (G.R. NO.  168757, 19 JANUARY 2011,  DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT WHETHER A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY. (BRIEF TITLE: REAL VS. SANGU PHILIPPINES ET AL.)

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHETHER A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL  IS AN  IN-TRACORPORATE  CONTROVERSY? IF INTRACORPORATE, RTC HAS JUDICDICTION. IF NOT, NLRC HAS JURISDICTION.

 

YOU CONSIDER THE STATUS OR RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES AND  THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION UNDER CONTROVERSY.

 

THIS IS CALLED THE TWO-TIER TEST: THE RELATIONSHIP TEST AND THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY TEST.

 

SAID THE COURT:

 

The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy.  This two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

 

‘To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are not stockholders, members or associates, between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns the individual franchises.  The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation.  If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.’ [Citations omitted.]

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP TEST?

 

UNDER THIS TEST YOU CONSIDER THE  INTRA-CORPORATE RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN OR AMONG THE PARTIES.  THE TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS EMBRACED UNDER SECTION 5(B) X X X WERE AS FOLLOWS:

 

A)               BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION AND THE PUBLIC;

B)               BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION AND ITS STOCKHOLDERS, PARTNERS, MEMBERS OR OFFICERS;

C)                BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION AND THE STATE AS FAR AS ITS FRANCHISE, PERMIT OR LICENSE TO OPERATE IS CONCERNED; AND

D)               AMONG THE STOCKHOLDERS, PARTNERS OR ASSOCIATES THEMSELVES.

 

THIS WAS THE TEST EARLIER FOLLOWED. THE COURT DESCRIBED THIS AS FOLLOWS:

A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate controversy.  Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing between or among the parties.  The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b) x x x were as follows:

a)               between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;

b)               between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers;

c)                between the corporation, partnership or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and

d)               among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC (now the RTC), regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.  This came to be known as the relationship test.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION  UNDER CONTROVERSY TEST?

 

THE COURT DEFINES IT IN A 1984 CASE OF DMRC (BELOW) AS: UNDER THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY TEST, THE INCIDENTS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER THE CONTROVERSY ITSELF IS INTRA-CORPORATE.  THE CONTROVERSY MUST NOT ONLY BE ROOTED IN THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE RELATIONSHIP, BUT MUST AS WELL PERTAIN TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PARTIES’ CORRELATIVE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CORPORATION CODE AND THE INTERNAL AND INTRA-CORPORATE REGULATORY RULES OF THE CORPORATION.  IF THE RELATIONSHIP AND ITS INCIDENTS ARE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE CONTROVERSY OR IF THERE WILL STILL BE CONFLICT EVEN IF THE RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT EXIST, THEN NO INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY EXISTS.

 

NOTE IN THE SPEED DISTRIBUTION INC. CASE (BELOW) THE COURT COMBINED THE TWO TESTS AND CALLED IT THE TWO-TIER TEST.

 

THE DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-TIER TEST  ITS APPLICATION ON THE 2011 CASE STATED ABOVE (REAL VS. SANGU PHILIPPINES ET AL) IS AS FOLLOWS:

Our Ruling

Two-tier test in determining the existence of intra-corporate controversy

 

 

                Respondents strongly rely on this Court’s pronouncement in the 1997 case of Tabang v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:

[A]n intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation.  There is no distinction, qualification nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.[1][16]

                In view of this, respondents contend that even if petitioner challenges his being a corporate officer, the present case still constitutes an intra-corporate controversy as petitioner is undisputedly a stockholder and a director of respondent corporation.

            It is worthy to note, however, that before the promulgation of the Tabang case, the Court provided in Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla[2][17] a “better policy” in determining which between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over termination disputes,[3][18] or similarly, whether they are intra-corporate or not, viz:

The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court[4][19]).  The better policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy.  In the absence of any one of these factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction.  Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that every conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would involve such corporate matters as only SEC (now the Regional Trial Court[5][20]) can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.  (Emphasis ours)

            And, while Tabang was promulgated later than Mainland Construction Co., Inc., the “better policy” enunciated in the latter appears to have developed into a standard approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate controversy.  This is explained lengthily in Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142,[6][21] to wit:

Intra-Corporate Controversy

 

            A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate controversy.  Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing between or among the parties.  The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b) x x x were as follows:

a)               between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;

b)               between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers;

c)                between the corporation, partnership or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and

d)               among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC (now the RTC), regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.  This came to be known as the relationship test.

However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., the Court introduced the nature of the controversy test.  We declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or stockholders.  We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute.

Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate.  The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.  If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.

The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy.  This two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

 

‘To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are not stockholders, members or associates, between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns the individual franchises.  The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation.  If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.’ [Citations omitted.]

                Guided by this recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents’ contention that the fact alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of respondent corporation automatically classifies this case as an intra-corporate controversy.  To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate.  There are other factors to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to consider them as intra-corporate controversies.

What then is the nature of petitioner’s Complaint for Illegal Dismissal? Is it intra-corporate and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter?  We shall answer this question by using the standards set forth in the Reyes case. 

No intra-corporate relationship between the parties

 

 

As earlier stated, petitioner’s status as a stockholder and director of respondent corporation is not disputed.  What the parties disagree on is the finding of the NLRC and the CA that petitioner is a corporate officer.  An examination of the complaint for illegal dismissal, however, reveals that the root of the controversy is petitioner’s dismissal as Manager of respondent corporation, a position which respondents claim to be a corporate office.   Hence, petitioner is involved in this case not in his capacity as a stockholder or director, but as an alleged corporate officer.  In applying the relationship test, therefore, it is necessary to determine if petitioner is a corporate officer of respondent corporation so as to establish the intra-corporate relationship between the parties.  And albeit respondents claim that the determination of whether petitioner is a corporate officer is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon in this petition for review on certiorari, we shall nonetheless proceed to consider the same because such question is not the main issue to be resolved in this case but is merely collateral to the core issue earlier mentioned.

Petitioner negates his status as a corporate officer by pointing out that although he was removed as Manager through a board resolution, he was never elected to said position nor was he appointed thereto by the Board of Directors. While the By-Laws of respondent corporation provides that the Board may from time to time appoint such officers as it may deem necessary or proper, he avers that respondents failed to present any board resolution that he was appointed pursuant to said By-Laws.  He instead alleges that he was hired as Manager of respondent corporation solely by respondent Abe.  For these reasons, petitioner claims to be a mere employee of respondent corporation rather than as a corporate officer.

We find merit in petitioner’s contention.

“‘Corporate officers’ in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those officers of the corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.  There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation Code.  These are the president, secretary and the treasurer.  The number of officers is not limited to these three.  A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager.  The number of corporate officers is thus limited by law and by the corporation’s by-laws.”[7][22]

            Respondents claim that petitioner was appointed Manager by virtue of Section 1, Article IV of respondent corporation’s By-Laws which provides:

ARTICLE IV

OFFICER

                Section 1.  Election/Appointment – Immediately after their election, the Board of Directors shall formally organize by electing the President, Vice-President, the Secretary at said meeting.

                The Board, may from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be necessary or proper.  Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act as President and Treasurer or Secretary at the same time. 

x x x x[8][23] (Emphasis ours)

We have however examined the records of this case and we find nothing to prove that petitioner’s appointment was made pursuant to the above-quoted provision of respondent corporation’s By-Laws.  No copy of board resolution appointing petitioner as Manager or any other document showing that he was appointed to said position by action of the board was submitted by respondents. What we found instead were mere allegations of respondents in their various pleadings[9][24] that petitioner was appointed as Manager of respondent corporation and nothing more.  “The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence.”[10][25]

It also does not escape our attention that respondents made the following conflicting allegations in their Memorandum on Appeal[11][26] filed before the NLRC which cast doubt on petitioner’s status as a corporate officer, to wit:

x x x x

24.  Complainant-appellee Renato Real was appointed as the manager of respondent-appellant Sangu on November 6, 1998.  Priorly [sic], he was working at Atlas Ltd. Co. at Mito-shi, Ibaraki-ken Japan.  He was staying in Japan as an illegal alien for the past eleven (11) years.  He had a problem with his family here in the Philippines which prompted him to surrender himself to Japan’s Bureau of Immigration and was deported back to the Philippines.  His former employer, Mr. Tsutomo Nogami requested Mr. Masahiko Shibata, one of respondent-appellant Sangu’s Board of Directors, if complainant-appellee Renato Real could work as one of its employees here in the Philippines because he had been blacklisted at Japan’s Immigration Office and could no longer go back to Japan.  And so it was arranged that he would serve as respondent-appellant Sangu’s manager, receiving a salary of P25,000.00.  As such, he was tasked to oversee the operations of the company. x x x  (Emphasis ours)

x x x x

As earlier stated, complainant-appellee Renato Real was hired as the manager of respondent-appellant Sangu.  As such, his position was reposed with full trust and confidence. x x x

            While respondents repeatedly claim that petitioner was appointed as Manager pursuant to the corporation’s By-Laws, the above-quoted inconsistencies in their allegations as to how petitioner was placed in said position, coupled by the fact that they failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove that petitioner was appointed thereto by action or with approval of the board, only leads this Court to believe otherwise.  It has been consistently held that “[a]n ‘office’ is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected (or appointed) by the directors or stockholders.”[12][27]  Clearly here, respondents failed to prove that petitioner was appointed by the board of directors.  Thus, we cannot subscribe to their claim that petitioner is a corporate officer.  Having said this, we find that there is no intra-corporate relationship between the parties insofar as petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal is concerned and that same does not satisfy the relationship test.

Present controversy does not relate to intra-corporate dispute       

 

 

            We now go to the nature of controversy test. As earlier stated, respondents terminated the services of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) his continuous absences at his post at Ogino Philippines, Inc; (2) respondents’ loss of trust and confidence on petitioner; and, (3) to cut down operational expenses to reduce further losses being experienced by the corporation.  Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and sought reinstatement, backwages, moral damages and attorney’s fees.  From these, it is not difficult to see that the reasons given by respondents for dismissing petitioner have something to do with his being a Manager of respondent corporation and nothing with his being a director or stockholder. For one, petitioner’s continuous absences in his post in Ogino relates to his performance as Manager.  Second, respondents’ loss of trust and confidence in petitioner stemmed from his alleged acts  of establishing a company engaged in the same line of business as respondent corporation’s and submitting proposals to the latter’s clients while he was still serving as its Manager.  While we note that respondents also claim these acts as constituting acts of disloyalty of petitioner as director and stockholder, we, however, think that same is a mere afterthought on their part to make it appear that the present case involves an element of intra-corporate controversy.  This is because before the Labor Arbiter, respondents did not see such acts to be disloyal acts of a director and stockholder but rather, as constituting willful breach of the trust reposed upon petitioner as Manager.[13][28]  It was only after respondents invoked the Labor Arbiter’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint in the Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal[14][29] filed before the NLRC that respondents started considering said acts as such. Third, in saying that they were dismissing petitioner to cut operational expenses, respondents actually want to save on the salaries and other remunerations being given to petitioner as its Manager.  Thus, when petitioner sought for reinstatement, he wanted to recover his position as Manager, a position which we have, however, earlier declared to be not a corporate position.  He is not trying to recover a seat in the board of directors or to any appointive or elective corporate position which has been declared vacant by the board.  Certainly, what we have here is a case of termination of employment which is a labor controversy and not an intra-corporate dispute.  In sum, we hold that petitioner’s complaint likewise does not satisfy the nature of controversy test. 

            With the elements of intra-corporate controversy being absent in this case, we thus hold that petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not intra-corporate. Rather, it is a termination dispute and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Section 217[15][30] of the Labor Code.

            We take note of the cases cited by respondents and find them inapplicable to the case at bar.  Fortune Cement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[16][31] involves a member of the board of directors and at the same time a corporate officer who claims he was illegally dismissed after he was stripped of his corporate position of Executive Vice-President because of loss of trust and confidence.  On the other hand, Philippine School of Business Administration v. Leano[17][32] and Pearson & George v. National Labor Relations Commission[18][33] both concern a complaint for illegal dismissal by corporate officers who were not re-elected to their respective corporate positions.  The Court declared all these cases as involving intra-corporate controversies and thus affirmed the jurisdiction of the SEC (now the RTC)[19][34] over them precisely because they all relate to corporate officers and their removal or non-reelection to their respective corporate positions.  Said cases are by no means similar to the present case because as discussed earlier, petitioner here is not a corporate officer.

            With the foregoing, it is clear that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  In cases such as this, the Court normally remands the case to the NLRC and directs it to properly dispose of the case on the merits.  “However, when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner’s case may be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case.”[20][35]  “It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of litigation.  If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.”[21][36]  We have gone over the records before us and we are convinced that we can now altogether resolve the issue of the validity of petitioner’s dismissal and hence, we shall proceed to do so.

Petitioner’s dismissal not in accordance with law

 

 

            “In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that [the] dismissal of an employee is for a valid cause.”[22][37]  Here, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, respondents failed to produce any convincing proof to support the grounds for which they terminated petitioner.  Respondents contend that petitioner has been absent for several months, yet they failed to present any proof that petitioner was indeed absent for such a long time.  Also, the fact that petitioner was still able to collect his salaries after his alleged absences casts doubts on the truthfulness of such charge.  Respondents likewise allege that petitioner engaged in a heated argument with the employees of Epson, one of respondents’ clients. But just like in the charge of absenteeism, there is no showing that an investigation on the matter was done and that disciplinary action was imposed upon petitioner.  At any rate, we have reviewed the records of this case and we agree with the Labor Arbiter that under the circumstances, said charges are not sufficient bases for petitioner’s termination. As to the charge of breach of trust allegedly committed by petitioner when he established a new company engaged in the same line of business as respondent corporation’s and submitted proposals to two of the latter’s clients while he was still a Manager, we again observe that these are mere allegations without sufficient proof.  To reiterate, allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence.[23][38]  

            Moreover, petitioner’s dismissal was effected without due process of law.  “The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.  The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.  This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the dismissal with illegality.”[24][39]  Since in this case, petitioner’s dismissal was effected through a board resolution and all that petitioner received was a letter informing him of the board’s decision to terminate him, the abovementioned procedure was clearly not complied with.  All told, we agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner has been illegally dismissed.  And, as an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the two reliefs of backwages and reinstatement,[25][40] we affirm the Labor Arbiter’s judgment ordering petitioner’s reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and awarding backwages from the time of his dismissal until actually reinstated.  Considering that petitioner has to secure the services of counsel to protect his interest and necessarily has to incur expenses, we likewise affirm the award of attorney’s fees which is equivalent to 10% of the total backwages that respondents must pay petitioner in accordance with this Decision.

            WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The assailed June 28, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The June 5, 2003 Decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to petitioner Renato Real is AFFIRMED and this case is ordered REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of petitioner’s backwages and attorney’s fees in accordance with this Decision.

            SO ORDERED.

[1][16] Supra note 9 at 430.

[2][17] 320 Phil. 353, 359-360 (1995).

[3][18] See C.A. Azucena Jr.’s The Labor Code With Comments and Cases, Volume II, 6th Edition (2007) pp. 46-49.

[4][19] Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code.

[5][20] Id.

[6][21] G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 593, 609-612.

[7][22] Garcia v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 173115 and 173163-164, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 450, 468.

[8][23] CA rollo, pp. 266-273.

[9][24] Respondents’ Position Paper filed with the Labor Arbiter, id. at 94-113; Memorandum on Appeal and Rejoinder filed with the NLRC, id. at 182-220 and 285-294; Comment filed with the CA, id. at 302-319; Comment/Opposition (To The Petition for Review)  and Memorandum filed before this Court, rollo, pp. 89-100 and 169-187.

[10][25]         General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010 citing Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, 507 Phil. 631, 648-649 (2005).

[11][26]         CA rollo, pp. 122-220 at 191 and 212.

[12][27]         Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. v. King, G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 102, 110.

[13][28]         Respondents’ Position Paper, CA rollo, pp. 94-113 at 109-110.

[14][29]         Id. at 221-236.

[15][30]         ART. 217.  Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1.       Unfair labor practice cases;

2.       Termination disputes;

3.       If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4.       Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

5.       Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs; and

6.       Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and Maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement

x x x x

[16][31]         Supra note 13.

[17][32]         Supra note 12.

[18][33]         Supra note 11 at 173-174.

[19][34]         Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code.

[20][35]         Leandro M. Alcantara v. The Philippine Commercial and International Bank, G.R. No. 151349, October 20, 2010 citing Somoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78050, October 23, 1989, 178 SCRA 654, 663; Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Offices, G.R. No. 160334, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 419, 426.

[21][36]         Id. citing Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 537, 555.

[22][37]         Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 165968, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 245, 252.

[23][38]         Supra note 25.

[24][39]         Supra note 27 at 113-114.

[25][40]         Golden Ace Builders v. Jose Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.

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