J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0200: ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA AND LEGAL RESEARCHER DIANA G. RUIZ, ALL OF  REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18 TAGAYTAY CITY (G.R. NO. RTJ-11-2265, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECTS: FILING FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST COURT PERSONNEL; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION AS MINISTERIAL DUTY. (BRIEF TITLE: ATTY. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE LARIDA).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED. 

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SUBJECTS/ DOCTRINES/ DIGESTS:

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE MINISTERIAL CHARACTER OF THE JUDICIAL DUTY TO ISSUE WRITS OF POSSESSION?

AFTER ALL THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION, WHICH ARE: (1) CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MORTGAGOR’S NAME; AND (2) ISSUANCE TO MORTGAGOR OF A NEW TCT, SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY ESTABLISHED, THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ISSUE THE WRIT PRAYED FOR. IT CANNOT WITHHOLD, SUSPEND, OR OTHERWISE DENY THIS RELIEF FROM PETITIONER.

The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. ^[1][32] Thus:

A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person’s recovery of possession of real or personal property.  An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.  Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:

            Section 6.  Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

            Section 7.  Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the same was made without  violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.  Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by aTorrenstitle.  Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.

On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property.  Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed.  The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.  After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.  At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.  Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.

Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper.  We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment.  The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent’s right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners’ failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]

Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor’s name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.

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JUDGE LARIDA JR. DID NOT GRANT IMMEDIATELY COMPLAINANT’S URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION. HE RULED THAT COMPLAINANT HAD YET TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE WRIT. CAN HE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

NO. JUDGE LARIDA JR.’S FAITHFULLY ADHERED TO HIS JUDICIAL DUTY TO REVIEW THE CASES, SERVE DUE PROCESS TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND TO EVENTUALLY DECIDE THE PETITIONS BASED SOLELY ON LAW AND EVIDENCE.

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.^[2][33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

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WHEN CAN A JUDGE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

IF IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT HE COMMITTED AN ERROR SO GROSS AND PATENT AS TO PRODUCE AN INFERENCE OF BAD FAITH. IN ADDITION TO THIS, THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF MUST NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, BUT SHOULD ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY BAD FAITH, FRAUD, DISHONESTY, AND CORRUPTION.^[3][34]

It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.^[4][34]

The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect respondent Judge Larida Jr.’s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

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WHAT MUST BE DONE TO A LAWYER WHO FILES AN UNFOUNDED COMPLAINT?

HE MUST BE SANCTIONED. FILING OF BASELESS COMPLAINT IS CONTEMPTUOUS.

 “A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.”^[5][41]

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

x ————————————————————————————— x

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Doubtless, the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary. However, it will not hesitate to protect innocent court employees against any baseless accusation or administrative charge that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.^[6][1]

At bench is an administrative case against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. (Judge Larida, Jr.), Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma (Atty. Calma) and Legal Researcher Diana G. Cruz (LR Ruiz), all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18,TagaytayCity.

The Facts:

            In a Letter-Complaint dated August 26, 2008,^[7][2] complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo (complainant), counsel for Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (CRBC), charged Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz with ignorance of the law.

          The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the letter-complaint and its attachments as follows:

I.         Four (4) Petitions for issuance by the Clerk of Court of Certificates of Sale under Act 3135, as amended:

1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Freddie P. Magno, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

2.  Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Sixto & Norma Tolentino, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Jonathan & Yolanda Peñaranda, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 01 October 2001);

4.   Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Celia Bay, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

II.        Four (4) Ex-parte Joint Petitions for the issuance by the Honorable Trial Court of Writs of Possession under Act 3135, as amended:

1. TG-05-1103, 08 August 2005, Sps. Babestil & Sancha Pendatum, mortgagors;

2.   TG-05-1104, 24 November 2005, Josefina Villanueva, mortgagor;

3.   TG-05-1105, 08 August 2005, Sps. Josefa Desipeda & Roqueno Calderon, mortgagors;

1. TG-05-1141, 28 December 2005, Norma Malabanan, mortgagor;

Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo avers that the aforementioned Petitions have long been pending before the above-mentioned court saying that the ongoing hearings of said cases may be further extended by the respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.

Anent TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo argues that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed an error when he recognized the appearance and participation of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as lawyer for the oppositors to the said petitions in the hearings thereof, and thereafter gave due course to the two oppositions filed, both dated 15 November 2005.  Respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed another error when he failed to require the oppositors and Atty. Anarna the required guaranty bonds as mandated by Section 47 of Republic Act 8791.

Likewise, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo bewails the issuance by respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. of the Order dated 10 July 2008 in TG-05-1141 which denied complainant’s Ex Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession (in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141) by ruling that the petitioner has yet to present evidence besides marking of exhibits.  Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo considers the said Order as contrary to Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which mandates, among others, that the trial court shall issue the Writ of Possession regardless of opposition thereto.

In addition, complainant Emmanuel B. Andamo accuses respondent Diana Ruiz, as then Officer-in-Charge and Acting Clerk of Court, and Atty. Stanlee Calma, as the incumbent Clerk of Court, for not having “lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Court’s working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[’s] acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon….”

Furthermore, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo implicated Atty. Ireneo Anarna, charging the latter of ignorance on the provisions of Act 3135 and for obstruction of justice for filing misplaced oppositions to non-litigious ex-parte petitions for issuance of Writ of Possession and for not submitting the required oppositor’s bond.^[8][3]

          The Joint Comment of respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz dated October 3, 2007was also summarized by the OCA, viz:

Respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo mainly charges them for the non-issuance of certificates of sale in the abovementioned extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings which were filed by Pepito Abueg as Acting Manager of petitioner Cavite Rural Banking Corporation.  Respondents Calma and Ruiz declare that in all the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, were undated certificates of sale signed by then Deputy Sheriff Victor Hernandez, and Clerk of Court Analiza Luna. However, these certificates do not bear the signature of approval of then Assisting Judge (and eventually Deputy Court Administrator) Reuben P. Dela Cruz.

Likewise, respondents Calma and Ruiz stress that there is an Order in an undocketed case, entitled Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (then Cavite Development Bank), mortgagee v. Sps. Jonathan Peñaranda, Sps. Simon and Petronila Peji, Celia M. Bay, Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno, mortgagors.  This Order was issued by then Judge Reuben Dela Cruz on17 March 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda; Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino; and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, including the petition for issuance of certificates of sale, were properly brought before and deliberated by the court.  Hence, taking into consideration the issuance of the17 March 2004Order which they cannot alter or modify, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that any issuance of certificates of sale on the subject applications for foreclosure cannot be done.

Respondents Calma and Ruiz further explicate that in a copy of the 17 March 2004Order, there appears a signature over a handwritten name “Sibano J. Sibero” dated “3-17-04.” Thus suggesting that he received a copy of said Order in behalf of Cavite Rural Banking Corporation. Hence, respondents Calma and Ruiz chide complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo for not mentioning in his complaint the 17 March 2004 Order.  Furthermore, assuming ex gratia argumenti that complainant Emmanuel  R. Andamo is not aware of said Order, respondents Calma and Ruiz still blame complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo that it took him almost seven (7) years before he made a follow up on the petitions for issuance of certificates of sale. If only their attention were called, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that they would have searched for the records and inform complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo about the Order.

In addition, respondents Calma and Ruiz call as an unfair accusation complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo’s imputation that they were the reason for the issuance of the10 July 2008Order.  Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that said Order is a judicial action and an exercise of discretion by the court to which they, being merely the Clerk of Court and the Legal Researcher, respectively, do not have any control.  Moreover, they point out that the said Order was also given in the other petitions of complainant where there is no oppositor, thus, rendering complainants’ perception as unfounded.

Lastly, while complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo charges respondents Calma and Ruiz with gross ignorance of Act No. 3135, respondents Calma and Ruiz find it ironic that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo misses the entire point of the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which states complainant’s failure to show compliance with the same Act No. 3135.^[9][4]

          After perusing the records, the OCA found that the allegations in the complaint and the defenses raised by respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented conflicting factual issues that could not be categorically resolved merely on the basis of the records submitted. Judge Larida, Jr. even failed to submit his Comment on the matter. The OCA then pointed out the necessity for a formal investigation where the complainant and the respondents would be given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. Thus, it recommended that the administrative complaint against respondents be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case, and the same be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.

In the Resolution dated January 19, 2011,^[10][5] the Court resolved to: (1) note the letter-complaint of Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo against respondents Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz, for gross ignorance of the law relative to LRC Case Nos. 05-1105, 05-1104, 05-1103, and 05-1141 for the issuance of writs of possession under Act 3135, as amended, and the joint comment dated October 3, 2007 of respondents Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher; (2)  re-docket the instant administrative complaint; (3) refer this case to a Justice of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records, and direct the Presiding Justice of the CA to raffle the case among the incumbent Justices of the CA who shall conduct the investigation and submit the required report and recommendation; and (4) note the Report dated June 18, 2010 of the OCA.

          The case was eventually assigned to CA Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-Javier) who, as directed by the Court, conducted the corresponding investigation on the complaint.

          Notably, during the initial stage of the proceedings, Judge Larida, Jr. filed his Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Comment^[11][6] dated April 14, 2011.^[12][7] The same was granted in the interest of substantial justice.^[13][8] In         his Comment, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. denied that he delayed               the resolution of complainant’s petitions for issuance of writs of     possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. He claimed that he was unaware of unacted foreclosure proceedings pending before the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC-Br. 18, Tagaytay City; that he never talked to complainant about the cases in his chambers; that it was only out of prudence and propriety that he acknowledged the oppositions to complainant’s four (4) petitions as the said oppositions were necessarily part of the proceedings; and that he eventually set the petitions for hearing since there was a need for complainant to present evidence to support his entitlement to the four (4) writs prayed for.

          Judge Larida, Jr. also informed the Court that per Supreme Court Resolution dated November 18, 2008,^[14][9] he was detailed as Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

          During the hearing on April 14, 2011, the parties agreed to submit their affidavits with attachments to constitute their testimony subject to cross-examination.^[15][10]

          Complainant did not submit an affidavit and opted to adopt his Letter-Complaint as his direct testimony. He further submitted several documentary evidence.^[16][11]

          For his part, Judge Larida, Jr. submitted his Judicial Affidavit dated April 18, 2011. He essentially iterated therein his allegations in his Comment. He also offered various documentary evidence^[17][12] to refute the charges against him.

Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz likewise submitted their undated Joint Affidavit.

Atty. Calma emphasized that then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz had long denied complainant’s undocketed petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure in CRBC v. Magno, in his Order of March 17, 2004. The grounds for the said denial were: (1) non-payment of entry fees; (2) non-assignment of docket numbers; (3) absence of proofs of service to the sheriff and the parties; (4) non-attachment of photocopies of the official receipts to the cases; and (5) non-payment of sufficient amount of docket fees. Atty. Calma also disclosed that he was no longer connected with the judiciary as he had opted to engage in the private practice of law.

Aside from those previously submitted exhibits, Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented the following: (1) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Magno;^[18][13] (2) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Spouses Tolentino;^[19][14] (3) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;^[20][15]              (4) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in Celia M. Bay;^[21][16]       (5) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Freddie P. Magno;^[22][17]     (6) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^[23][18]            (7) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Sps. Tolentino;^[24][19]           (8) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^[25][20]             (9) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;^[26][21] (10) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^[27][22] (11) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Celia Bay;^[28][23] (12) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^[29][24] (13) Order of Judge Reuben Dela Cruz dated March 17, 2004;^[30][25] (14) Certification dated June 7, 2004 by Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^[31][26] (15) Comment dated October 3, 2007 filed before the OCA;^[32][27] and (16) Joint Affidavit of respondent Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz.^[33][28]

The Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, TagaytayCity, submitted a status report and certified copies of the pertinent documents in LRC Case Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141.^[34][29]

 After the formal offer of evidence and the admission of the exhibits, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda. Only respondent Judge Larida, Jr. complied.

Accordingly, in her Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2011, Justice Lazaro-Javier recommended that Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz be EXONERATED of the charges against them for ignorance of the law.  In sum, Justice Lazaro-Javier found that:

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.  Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle.  Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphasis supplied]

          Now, the Court resolves.

After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of Justice Lazaro-Javier.

          Notably, respondents are all charged with gross ignorance of the law for their alleged acts or omissions, as follows:

As to respondent

Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.

According to complainant, it was Judge Larida Jr.’s ministerial duty under Act 3135, specifically Sections 7^[35][30] and 8^[36][31] thereof, to issue the writs of possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. This being so, there was no need for him to still require applicant to present evidence as condition for granting them.  The fact that he did, nonetheless, was a clear defiance of his ministerial duty and rendered him guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant is mistaken.

The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. ^[37][32] Thus:

A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person’s recovery of possession of real or personal property.  An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.  Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:

            Section 6.  Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

            Section 7.  Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the same was made without  violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.  Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by aTorrenstitle.  Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.

On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property.  Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed.  The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.  After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.  At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.  Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.

Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper.  We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment.  The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent’s right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners’ failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]

Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor’s name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.^[38][33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.^[39][34]

The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect respondent Judge Larida Jr.’s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

At any rate, the filing of this administrative complainant is not the proper remedy for complainant.  Complainant should have sought relief from higher courts.  The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law; neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions. As regards this matter, the case of Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis^[40][35] is enlightening:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

Complainant also held against Judge Larida, Jr. his alleged failure to require oppositors to post guaranty bonds in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. Complainant invokes Section 47 of Republic Act (R.A) No. 8791.^[41][36]

Clearly, the provision cited by complainant refers to restraint of foreclosure proceedings which requires posting of bond by one who seeks it.  It does not apply to the present case wherein the subject properties had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.  Thus, petitioner’s insistence for imposition of guaranty bonds on the oppositors in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 is misplaced.  On this score too, Judge Larida, Jr. cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the law for not imposing these bonds in the cases mentioned.

As to respondents

Atty. Calma and

LR Ruiz

Records bear out that as early as March 17, 2004, then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz of RTC Branch 18, TagaytayCity, under Order^[42][37] of even date, had already denied CRBC’s petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda, thus:

Hence, it is very evident, therefore, that there is no payment of the entry fees; there are no docket numbers assigned and stamped on the cases; there are no proofs of service of the notices of the Sheriff to the parties, particularly the mortgagors; there are no xerox copies of the official receipts attached to the cases, except Spouses Peñaranda; and that official receipts issued do not cover the correct amounts and entries for each pertinent book of accounts, in violation of RA 3135, as amended and the issuances of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda, Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji;CeliaM.Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

SO ORDERED. [Italics supplied]

It is worth noting, too, that there were no pending motions for reconsideration filed or other incidents initiated by complainant in the subject cases to warrant their entry in the court calendar.  As a matter of fact, complainant does not deny that the assailed Order dated March 17, 2004had long attained finality.  For Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to put them back in the court calendar, for no cogent reason at all, is obviously improper.

Finally, the trial court, through then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz, had already spoken when it denied the petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda. As stated, it was beyond Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to order the trial court what to do next with these cases. At that time, complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to him under the rules.  He could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from the Order of denial datedMarch 17, 2004 but he did not. What complainant failed to do as a judicial remedy, he cannot revive through an administrative complaint against these court employees. It bears pointing out that it was only onAugust 26, 2008 or more than four years since the Order ofMarch 17, 2004 was issued when the complainant unfairly turned his ire on these innocent and helpless respondents by wrongly accusing them in this administrative case.

          Clearly, this is a frivolous and baseless complaint. The respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. At this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice Lazaro-Javier, to wit:

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated.  The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.  Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle.  Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphases supplied]

A repeat of this cannot be tolerated.

This administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judge, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. “As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice.”^[43][38] “Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”^[44][39] 

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.”^[45][40]

 “A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.”^[46][41]

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED. 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                      ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                  Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice     

CASE 2011-0199: FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON (DECEASED), JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY (G.R. NO. 170404, 28 SEPTEMBER 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT (BRIEF TITLE: CRUZ VS. GINGOYON)

====================================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.  The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00.  In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court.  Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/ DIGEST:

WHY WAS ATTY. CRUZ CITED FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT?

BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGATION IN HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH READS:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.^[1][9]  (Emphasis supplied.)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WAS COUNSEL’S PLEADING CONTEMPTUOUS? WHY?

YES. BECAUSE THE ALLEGATION WAS UNSUBSTANTIATED AND BEREFT OF FACTUAL BASIS. IT BRINGS THE COURT INTO DISREPUTE.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis.  In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his “fair observation or conclusion.”^[2][29]

………………………………….

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality.  It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice. 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SUPPOSE THE ALLEGATION OF THE PETITIONER IS JUSTIFIED. WOULD HIS PLEADING STILL BE CONTEMPTUOUS?

YES. BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE USED WAS ABUSIVE OR INSULTING. RESPECT FOR THE COURT SHOULD ALWAYS BE OBSERVED.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt.  “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense.  Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.”^[3][32]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.

By this Petition for Certiorari,^[4][1] petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order^[5][2] dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which states:

                WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

                Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

                SO ORDERED.^[6][3]

Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix the amount of bond.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint^[7][4] filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance.  In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the “basketball goal” which was permanently attached to the second floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right of way.

Mina was declared in default^[8][5] hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte. 

After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision^[9][6] dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked “locus standi.”  Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.

                Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who display their wares in their choice spots in the alley and their customers that mill around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the residents of the places of this kind, they still find order in this madness and get out of this kind of life unscathed. It’s because they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the residents of the area have become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at play throw every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they cannot be faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon their neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the people in their place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better still move to an upscale residential area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.^[10][7]     

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration,^[11][8] he took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:

The 12^th and 13^th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are off-tangent and even spouses illegality;

Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking food?  In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;

The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of property is all right and justified when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that “residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;”

For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way or alley has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place to be;

Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. For the information of the court, plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to consider thePasayCityresidence of the plaintiffs as a blighted human settlement. Apparently the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his litany of eye sore descriptions;

Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving way to illegality in the name of live and let live principle?

Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located and the specific activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.^[12][9]  (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005.^[13][10]

In an Order^[14][11] dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,^[15][12] and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.^[16][13]  Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present.  Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his serious charge that he “has been communicating with the defendant off the record, given that the latter has already been declared in default”.  He is therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not be punished for contempt of court for committing improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.^[17][14]

On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear.  Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order^[18][15] in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause.  The Order reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this court today, Friday, November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded to his wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.

When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who might represent himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff.  Instead it was the defendant and his counsel who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

                x x x x

In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in today’s hearing, the court considers the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be cited for contempt. x x x^[19][16]

In his Compliance^[20][17] to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the circumstances of the instant case.  He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: “…where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated October 21, 2005.”^[21][18]

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order^[22][19] finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court.  The Order reads:

Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge that the Judge “has been communicating with the defendant off the record”. But instead of presenting proof of facts or stating facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: “Where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court…“ By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has been communicating with the defendant off the record.

                The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge [to] know the blight in his place inPasayCityis for the Judge to communicate with the defendant. It is only by communicating with the defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such blight.

Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed inPasayCityin 1991 and that he has been a judge inPasayCitysince 1997. The nuisance that Cruz complained of, or the blight of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is replicated in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but a microcosm of what is prevalent not only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in many other highly urbanized areas in the country. Judges are no hermits that they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to make this allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.

                Cruz’s open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the defendant is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or offends its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De Leon, L-10236, January 31, 1958).  x x x By alleging that the judge communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).

                WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

                Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

                SO ORDERED.^[23][20]

An Order of Arrest^[24][21]  was issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)^[25][22] with the respondent court.  In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred that:

x x x x

2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;

x x x x

The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order^[26][23] dated December 1, 2005 based on petitioner’s failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.  The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005.  In a Resolution^[27][24] dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition “inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their personal capacities.”^[28][25]  

Issues

            Petitioner raises the following issues:

A.

WHETHER x x x PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

B.

WHETHERRESPONDENT COURTHAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR CITING PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.

C.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURTABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO FIX BOND.^[29][26]

The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

            Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the respondent court of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case.  Petitioner avers that no other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence during trial.  Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

            Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.

Our Ruling

            We find the petition unmeritorious.

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.  

“[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt.”^[30][27] “[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to ‘misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same’ within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt.”^[31][28]

Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis.  In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his “fair observation or conclusion.”^[32][29]

Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance to the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005which he filed with the respondent court. The allegation was repeated despite Judge Gingoyon’s outright denial of communicating with the defendant and explanation in the Order^[33][30] dated November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon was familiar with the area as he was detailed inPasayCity since 1991 as State Prosecutor, and thereafter, as judge since 1997.

Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation.  Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis.  Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.

On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what normally happens in places such as Edang Street, to wit:  “x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or [do] their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in x x x.  Ambulant vendors who display their wares in the alley and their customers that mill around them; x x x children chasing  each  other,  dodging   and   [ducking]  from  awnings  or  canopies;  x  x  x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys x x x.”^[34][31]

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality.  It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice. 

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt.  “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense.  Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.”^[35][32]

Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioner’s act amounts to direct contempt of court.^[36][33] 

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion.  Petitioner insists that the respondent court should have granted his Ex-Parte Motion since he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.  He further avers that respondent court violated his right to due process by fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.

The respondent court was  well  within  the  bounds  of its authority when it denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court^[37][34] without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.^[38][35] 

Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari.  Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.^[39][36] and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court.  However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M.^[40][37]  Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court.  Significantly, the records show that respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005.^[41][38]  It is therefore clear that at the time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari.  In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.  This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.^[42][39]  Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.  To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the remedy prayed for.  Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct contempt.  However, as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of P2,000.00 commensurate with the acts committed. 

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts.  “A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA).  A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.”^[43][40]  For the guidance of the petitioner, “[t]his Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive.”^[44][41]  Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases.^[45][42]  “However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice.  This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.”^[46][43]  Unwarranted demands upon this Court’s attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, “[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.”^[47][44]  In consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel^[48][45] within 15 days from notice.  Petitioner failed to comply hence we directed him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated September 6, 2010.^[49][46]  Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he was fined P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 2011^[50][47] which was increased to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29, 2011.  Consequently, petitioner is hereby directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.  The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00.  In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court.  Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0198: BPI EMPLOYEES UNION – METRO MANILA AND ZENAIDA UY VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (G.R. NO. 178699); BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION (G.R. NO. 178735) (21 SEPTEMBER 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: BPI EMPLOYEES VS. BPI)

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DISPOSITIVE:

          WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 178699 and 178735 are both PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The Amended Decision dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92631 is hereby AFFIRMED with  MODIFICATIONS.  The back wages of Zenaida Uy should be computed as follows:

1.           Basic Monthly Salary, Cost of Living Allowance, Financial Assistance and Quarterly Bonus, with P10,895.00 as the base figure which is her salary rate at the time of her dismissal, computed from the time of her dismissal on December 14, 1995 up to her reinstatement on August 1, 2006;

2.           Teller’s Functional Allowance, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

3.           Holiday Pay, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

4.           Attorney’s Fees, which is 10% of the total amount of the award; and

5.           Interest at 12% per annum on the total amount of the awards commencing from the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 137863 until full payment thereof.

6.           The award for the monetary conversion of vacation and sick leave is deleted.  

The Voluntary Arbitrator is hereby ORDERED TO RECOMPUTE the amounts due to Zenaida Uy in accordance with the above disposition.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The base figure in computing the award of back wages to an illegally dismissed employee is the employee’s basic salary plus regular allowances and benefits received at the time of dismissal, unqualified by any wage and benefit increases granted in the interim.^[1][1]

            By these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari,^[2][2] the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila (the Union) and Zenaida Uy (Uy) seek modification of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Amended Decision^[3][3] dated July 4, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92631.  Said Amended Decision computed Uy’s back wages and other monetary awards pursuant to the final and executory Decision^[4][4] dated March 31, 2005 of this Court in G.R. No. 137863 based on her salary rate at the time of her dismissal and disregarded the salary increases granted in the interim as well as other benefits which were not proven to have been granted at the time of Uy’s dismissal from the service.

Factual Antecedents

            On December 14, 1995, Uy’s services as a bank teller in BPI’s Escolta Branch was terminated on grounds of gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an officer, insubordination and absence without leave.  Uy, together with theUnion, thus filed a case for illegal dismissal.

            On December 31, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator^[5][5] rendered a Decision^[6][6] finding Uy’s dismissal as illegal and ordering BPI to immediately reinstate Uy and to pay her full back wages, including all her other benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and attorney’s fees.^[7][7]

            On October 28, 1998, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator.  Instead of reinstatement, the CA ordered BPI to pay Uy her separation pay.  Further, instead of full back wages, the CA fixed Uy’s back wages to three years.^[8][8]

The case eventually reached this Court when both parties separately filed petitions for review on certiorari.  While BPI’s petition which was docketed as G.R. No. 137856 was denied for failure to comply with the requirements of a valid certification of non-forum shopping,^[9][9]  Uy’s and the Union’s petition which was docketed as G.R. No. 137863 was  given due course.

On March 31, 2005, the Court rendered its Decision^[10][10] in G.R. No. 137863, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed 28 October 1998 Decision and 8 March 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby MODIFIED as follows: 1) respondent BPI is DIRECTED to pay petitioner Uy backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal until her actual reinstatement; and 2) respondent BPI is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner Uy to her former position, or to a substantially equivalent one, without loss of seniority right and other benefits attendant to the position.

SO ORDERED.^[11][11]

Ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator

After the Decision in G.R. No. 137863 became final and executory, Uy and the Unionfiled with the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.^[12][12]

In Uy’s computation, she based the amount of her back wages on the current wage level and included all the increases in wages and benefits under the CBA that were granted during the entire period of her illegal dismissal. These include the following: Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), Financial Assistance, Quarterly Bonus, CBA Signing Bonus, Uniform Allowance, Medicine Allowance, Dental Care, Medical and Doctor’s Allowance, Teller’s Functional Allowance, Vacation Leave, Sick Leave, Holiday Pay, Anniversary Bonus, Burial Assistance and Omega watch.^[13][13]

BPI disputed Uy’s/Union’s computation arguing that it contains items which are not included in the term “back wages” and that no proof was presented to show that Uy was receiving all the listed items therein before her termination.  It claimed that the basis for the computation of back wages should be the employee’s wage rate at the time of dismissal.^[14][14] 

In an Order dated December 6, 2005,^[15][15] the Voluntary Arbitrator agreed with Uy’s/Union’s contention that full back wages should include all wage and benefit increases, including new benefits granted during the period of dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator opined that this Court’s March 31, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 137863 reinstated his December 31, 1997 Decision which ordered the payment of full back wages computed from the time of dismissal until actual reinstatement including all benefits under the CBA.  Nonetheless, the Voluntary Arbitrator excluded the claims for uniform allowance, anniversary bonus and Omega watch for want of basis for their grant.

The Voluntary Arbitrator thus granted the motion for issuance of writ of execution and computed Uy’s back wages in the total amount of P3,897,197.89 as follows: 

Basic Monthly Salary (BMS) ………………………………………….P 2,062, 087.50

Cost of Living Allowance………………………………………………….           56, 100.00

Financial Assistance…………………………………………………………..           39,000.00

Total Quarterly Bonuses ………………………………………………….       693, 820.00

CBA Signing Bonus………………………………………………………….          32, 500.00

Medicine Allowance………………………………………………………….          58, 400.00

Dental Care   ………………………………………………………………………         14, 120.00

Medical and Doctor’s Allowance………………………………        58, 400.00

Teller’s Functional Allowance………………………………….             25, 500.00

Vacation Leave………………………………………………………………….         187, 085.50

Sick Leave…………………………………………………………………………        187, 085.50

HolidayPay……………………………………………………………………….        128, 808.65

Attorney’s Fee……………………………………………………………………        354, 290.72

Grand Total…………………………………………………………………………P 3,897,197.89^[16][16]

A Writ of Execution^[17][17] and a Notice of Garnishment^[18][18] were subsequently issued.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

            Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator, BPI filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.^[19][19] BPI alleged that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s erroneous computation of back wages amended and varied the terms of the March 31, 2005 final and executory Decision in G.R. No. 137863.  

            Specifically, it averred that the Voluntary Arbitrator erred in computing back wages based on the current rate and in including the wage increases or benefits given in the interim as well as attorney’s fees.  BPI further argued that there was no basis for the award of teller’s functional allowance, cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves and dental care allowance.

In their Comment,^[20][20] Uy and the Union alleged that  BPI’s remedy is not a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but an appeal from judgments, final orders and resolutions of voluntary arbitrators under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.  They also contended that BPI’s petition is wanting in substance.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a TRO^[21][21] restraining the implementation of the December 6, 2005 Order of the Voluntary Arbitrator and the corresponding Writ of Execution issued on December 12, 2005.  Upon receipt of the TRO, Uy and the Union filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification^[22][22] on whether the TRO encompasses even the implementation of the reinstatement aspect of the March 31, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 137863.

The CA initially rendered a Decision^[23][23] on May 24, 2006.  In said Decision, the CA held that BPI’s resort to certiorari was proper and that the award of CBA benefits and attorney’s fees has legal basis.  The CA however found that the Voluntary Arbitrator erroneously computed Uy’s back wages based on the current rate.  The CA also deleted the award of dental allowance since it was granted in 2002 or more than six years after Uy’s dismissal.

Both parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration.  Consequently, on July 4, 2007, the CA issued the herein assailed Amended Decision. 

In its Amended Decision, the CA upheld the propriety of BPI’s resort to certiorari.  It also ruled that this Court’s March 31, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 137863 did not reinstate the December 31, 1997 Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator awarding full back wages including CBA benefits. The CA ruled that the computation of Uy’s full back wages, as defined under Republic Act No. 6715, should be based on the basic salary at the time of her dismissal plus the regular allowances that she had been receiving likewise at the time of her dismissal.  It held that any increase in the basic salary occurring after Uy’s dismissal as well as all benefits given after said dismissal should not be awarded to her in consonance with settled jurisprudence on the matter.  Accordingly, the CA pronounced that Uy’s basic salary, which amounted to P10,895.00 at the time of her dismissal on December 14, 1995, is to be used as the base figure in computing her back wages, exclusive of any increases and/or modifications. As Uy’s entitlement to COLA, quarterly bonus and financial assistance are not disputed, the CA retained their award provided that, again, the base figure for the computation of these benefits should be the rate then prevailing at the time of Uy’s dismissal. 

The CA deleted the award of CBA signing bonus, medicine allowance, medical and doctor’s allowance and dental care allowance for lack of sufficient proof that these benefits were already being received and enjoyed by Uy at the time of her dismissal. However, it held that the teller’s functional allowance should rightfully be given to Uy as a regular bank teller as well as the holiday pay and monetary equivalent of vacation and sick leave benefits.  As for the attorney’s fees, the CA ruled that Uy’s right over the same has already been resolved and has attained finality when it was neither assailed nor raised as an issue after the Voluntary Arbitrator awarded it in favor of Uy.

Finally, the CA likewise ruled that Uy’s reinstatement was effectively restrained by the TRO issued by it.  Pertinent portions of the CA’s Amended Decision read:

All told, We find Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration to be partly meritorious and so hold that Private Respondent Uy is entitled to the following sums to be included in the computation:

1.              Basic Monthly Salary, COLA and Quarterly Bonus, with P10,895.00 as the base figure, computed from the time of her dismissal up to her actual reinstatement;

2.              Teller’s Functional Allowance, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

3.              Monetary Equivalent of Vacation and Sick Leaves, and Holiday Pay, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

4.              Attorney’s Fees, which is 10% of the total amount of the award.

Anent the Private Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Clarification, Private Respondent asked whether the TRO issued by this Court on January 3, 2006 restrained the reinstatement of Private Respondent Uy.

We answer in the affirmative.

The wordings of the Resolution ordering the issuance of a temporary restraining order are clear. The TRO was issued to restrain the implementation and/or enforcement of the Public Respondent’s Order dated December 6, 200[5] and the Writ of Execution, dated December 12, 200[5]. Considering that said Order and the ensuing Writ are for the reinstatement of Private Respondent Uy, hence, the TRO, indeed, effectively restrained Uy’s reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, Private Respondents’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration is DENIED and Petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of this Court promulgated on May 24, 2006 is hereby amended, and the Public Respondent Voluntary Arbitrator is ordered to recompute the amount of backwages due to Private Respondent Uy consistent with the foregoing ruling.

SO ORDERED.^[24][24]

From the foregoing Amended Decision, both parties separately filed petitions before this Court.  Uy’s and the Union’s petition is docketed as G.R. No 178699, and that of BPI is docketed as G.R. No. 178735.  The Court resolved to consolidate both petitions in a Resolution dated September 3, 2007.^[25][25]

Issues

G.R. No. 178699

Uy and theUnionargue that the CA effectively amended the final Decision in G.R. No. 137863.  They allege that the issues raised in G.R. No. 137863 were confined only to the propriety of the CA’s award of back wages for a fixed period of three years as well as the order for the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.  Hence, the Voluntary Arbitrator’s award of CBA benefits as  components of Uy’s back wages and the attorney’s fees, which were not raised as issues in G.R. No. 137863, should no longer be disturbed. 

Uy and the Unionlikewise assail the CA’s order restraining Uy’s reinstatement despite the finality of this Court’s Decision ordering such reinstatement.  They also fault the CA in not dismissing BPI’s petition for being an improper mode of appeal.  Finally, Uy and the Unionassert that a twelve percent (12%) interest per annum should be imposed on the total amount due to Uy, computed from the finality of the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 137863 until full compliance thereof by BPI. 

G.R. No. 178735

On the other hand, BPI alleges that Uy’s/Union’s petition should be dismissed for lack of proof of service of the petition on the lower court concerned as required by the Rules of Court.  BPI also argues that the CA erred in including the teller’s functional allowance and the vacation and sick leave cash equivalent in the computation of Uy’s backwages.  Also, BPI questions the propriety of the award of attorney’s fees.

Our Ruling

The March 31, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 137863 did not reinstate the December 31, 1997 Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator which ordered the payment of full back wages including all benefits under the CBA.

            We agree with the CA’s finding that the March 31, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 137863 did not in anyway reinstate the Voluntary Arbitrator’s December 31, 1997 Decision regarding the award of CBA benefits.

To recall, after Uy and the Unionfiled the case for illegal dismissal, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered his Decision^[26][26] on December 31, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:

                WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Zenaida Uy as illegal and ordering the respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands to immediately reinstate her to her position as bank teller of the Escolta Branch without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages computed from the time she was dismissed on December 14, 1995 until she is actually reinstated in the service, and including all her other benefits which are benefits under their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

                For reasonable attorney’s fees, respondent is also ordered to pay complainant the equivalent of 10% of the recoverable award in this case.

                SO ORDERED.^[27][27]

On appeal, the CA, in its October 28, 1998 Decision,^[28][28] affirmed with modification the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator.  Instead of full back wages, the CA limited the award to three years.  Also, in lieu of reinstatement, the CA ordered BPI to pay separation pay, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that instead of reinstatement, the petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is DIRECTED to pay Uy back salaries not exceeding three (3) years and separation pay of one month for every year of service. The said judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.^[29][29]

As already discussed, both parties appealed to this Court. However, BPI’s petition was dismissed outright for failure to comply with the requirements for a valid certification of non- forum shopping. Uy’s and theUnion’s petition docketed as G.R. No. 137863, on the other hand, was given due course. On March 31, 2005, the Court rendered its Decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed 28 October 1998 Decision and 8 March 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby MODIFIED as follows: 1) respondent BPI is DIRECTED to pay petitioner Uy backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal until her actual reinstatement; and 2) respondent BPI is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner Uy to her former position, or to a substantially equivalent one, without loss of seniority right and other benefits attendant to the position.

SO ORDERED.^[30][30]

From the foregoing, it is clear that Uy’s and the Union’s contention that the March 31, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 137863 in effect reinstated the December 31, 1997 Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator awarding full back wages including the CBA benefits, is without basis. What is clear is that the March 31, 2005 Decision modified the October 28, 1998 Decision of the CA by awarding full back wages instead of limiting the award to a period of three years.  This interpretation is further bolstered by the Court’s discussion in the main body of March 31, 2005 Decision as to the meaning of “full back wages” in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 6715^[31][31] on March 21, 1989 which amended Article 279 of the Labor Code, as follows:

ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Italics supplied)

Jurisprudence dictates that such award of back wages is without qualifications and deductions,^[32][32] that is, “unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by co-workers who were not dismissed.”^[33][33] It is likewise settled that the base figure to be used in the computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the employee’s dismissal unqualified by deductions, increases and/or modifications.^[34][34]

We thus fully agree with the observation of the CA in its Amended Decision that the back wages as discussed in the March 31, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 137863 did not include salary increases and CBA benefits, viz:       

There is no ambiguity or omission in the dispositive portion of the SC decision but Public Respondent erroneously concluded that said SC decision effectively reinstated Public Respondent’s December 31, 1997 Decision.  There is a need to read the findings and conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in the subject decision to understand what was finally adjudicated.

In the dispositive portion of Its Decision of March 31, 2005, the Supreme Court expressly awarded Uy full backwages from the time of her dismissal up to the time of her actual reinstatement.  The full backwages, as referred to in the body of the decision pertains to “backwages” as defined in Republic Act No. 6715.  Under said law, and as provided in numerous jurisprudence, “full backwages” means backwages without any deduction or qualification, including benefits or their monetary equivalent the employee is enjoying at the time of his dismissal.

Clearly, it is the intention of the Supreme Court to grant unto Private Respondent Uy full backwages as defined under RA 6715.  Consequently, any benefit or allowance over and above that allowed and provided by said law is deemed excluded under said SC Decision.  The CBA benefits awarded by Public Respondent is not within the benefits under RA 6715.  Said benefits are not to be included in the backwages.  x x x^[35][35] 

The CA correctly deleted the

award of CBA benefits.

Thus, we find that the CA properly disregarded the salary increases and correctly computed Uy’s back wages based on the salary rate at the time of Uy’s dismissal plus the regular allowances that she had been receiving likewise at the time of her dismissal.^[36][36] The CA also correctly deleted the signing bonus, medicine allowance, medical and doctor’s allowance and dental care allowance, as they were all not proven to have been granted to Uy at the time of her dismissal from service.

The award of attorney’s fees is proper.

We likewise affirm the CA’s award of attorney’s fees.  The issue on its grant has already been threshed out and settled with finality when the parties failed to question it on appeal.  As aptly held by the CA in its Amended Decision:

Based on the evidence, We find Uy to be entitled to Attorney’s fees. True, the SC Decision did not include the award of attorney’s fees; however, after the Public Respondent awarded said attorney’s fees in favor of Private Respondent Uy, said award was neither assailed nor raised as an issue before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Hence, the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals’ Decision as modified no longer mention said award.

Consequently, as the right of Uy to attorney’s fees has already been resolved and had attained finality, Petitioner cannot now question its inclusion to the computation of awards given to Private Respondent Uy during the execution proceedings.^[37][37]

The issue concerning the CA’s temporary restraining order which covered the reinstatement aspect of this Court’s final decision has been rendered moot by Uy’s subsequent reinstatement in BPI’s payroll on August 1, 2006.

            While we agree with Uy’s/Union’s postulation that it was improper for the CA to restrain the implementation of the reinstatement aspect of this Court’s final and executory Decision considering that BPI’s appeal with the CA only questioned the propriety of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s computation of back wages, suffice it to say that this particular issue has already been rendered moot by Uy’s reinstatement.  As manifested by BPI in its Comment,^[38][38] Uy, with her acquiescence, was reinstated in BPI’s payroll on August 1, 2006.  Notably, this fact was not at all disputed or denied by Uy in any of her pleadings.

BPI’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper.

            Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution, the remedy of an aggrieved party being an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, BPI correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it assailed the December 6, 2005 order of execution of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

A  legal   interest   at   12%   per   annum

should be imposed upon the monetary awards granted in favor of Uy commencing from the finality of this Court’s March 31, 2005 Decision  until full satisfaction thereof.

            Pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,^[39][39] the legal interest of 12% per annum shall be imposed upon the monetary award granted in favor of Uy, from the time this Court’s March 31, 2005 Decision became final and executory until full satisfaction thereof, for the delay caused. This natural consequence of a final judgment is not defeated notwithstanding the fact that the parties were at variance in the computation of what is due to Uy under the judgment.^[40][40]

The CA was properly served with a copy of Uy’s/Union’s petition in compliance with the Rules of Court.

            BPI’s allegation that Uy’s/Union’s petition in G.R. No. 178699 should be dismissed outright for failure to furnish the lower court concerned of their petition is without basis.  Records disclose that Uy’s/Union’s petition was accompanied with an affidavit of service with the corresponding registry receipt^[41][41] showing that the CA was duly provided with a copy of the petition.  

Uy is entitled to teller’s functional allowance but not to vacation and sick leave cash conversion.

            BPI contends that at the time of Uy’s dismissal, she was no longer functioning as a teller but as a low-counter staff and as such, Uy is not anymore entitled to the teller’s functional allowance pursuant to company policy.  Furthermore, BPI argues that Uy is neither entitled to the monetary conversion of vacation and sick leaves for failure to prove that she is entitled to these benefits at the time of her dismissal. 

            We rule that Uy is entitled to the teller’s functional allowance since Uy’s function as a teller at the time of her dismissal was factually established and was never impugned by the parties during the proceedings held in the main case.  Besides, BPI did not present any evidence to substantiate its allegation that Uy was assigned as a low-counter staff at the time of her dismissal.  It is a hornbook rule that he who alleges must prove.^[42][42]  Neither was there any proof on record which could support this bare allegation.

            As to the vacation and sick leave cash conversion benefit, we disagree with the CA’s pronouncement that entitlement to the same should not be necessarily proved. It is to be noted that this privilege is not statutory or mandatory in character but only voluntarily granted.^[43][43]  As such, the existence of this benefit as well as the employee’s entitlement thereto cannot be presumed but should be proved by the employee.^[44][44]  The records, however, failed to prove that Uy was receiving this benefit at the time of her dismissal on December 14, 1995.  The CBA covering the period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2006, which was presented by the parties does not at all prove that vacation and sick leave credits, as well as the privilege of converting the same into cash, were granted before the CBA’s effectivity in 2001.  We thus hold that Uy failed to prove that she is entitled to such benefit as a matter of right.

            WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 178699 and 178735 are both PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The Amended Decision dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92631 is hereby AFFIRMED with  MODIFICATIONS.  The back wages of Zenaida Uy should be computed as follows:

1.           Basic Monthly Salary, Cost of Living Allowance, Financial Assistance and Quarterly Bonus, with P10,895.00 as the base figure which is her salary rate at the time of her dismissal, computed from the time of her dismissal on December 14, 1995 up to her reinstatement on August 1, 2006;

2.           Teller’s Functional Allowance, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

3.           Holiday Pay, based on the rate at the time of her dismissal;

4.           Attorney’s Fees, which is 10% of the total amount of the award; and

5.           Interest at 12% per annum on the total amount of the awards commencing from the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 137863 until full payment thereof.

6.           The award for the monetary conversion of vacation and sick leave is deleted.  

The Voluntary Arbitrator is hereby ORDERED TO RECOMPUTE the amounts due to Zenaida Uy in accordance with the above disposition.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice