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CASE 2011-0201: PEDRO ANGELES , REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT VS. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL AND EDWIN PASCUAL (G.R. NO. 157150, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, BERSAMIN J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. (BRIEF TITLE: ANGELES VS. PASCUAL)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 3 Comments

October 9, 2011

CASE 2011-0201: PEDRO ANGELES , REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT VS. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL AND EDWIN PASCUAL (G.R. NO. 157150, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, BERSAMIN J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. (BRIEF TITLE: ANGELES VS. PASCUAL)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61600. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

===========================

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.^{^[1]}^[11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.^{^[2]}^[12]

Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.^{^[3]}^[13]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^{^[4]}^[14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC. Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’sLot4 was proved by preponderant evidence.

It is noteworthy to point out, too, that the argument of Angeles based on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens titles pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) is inapplicable considering that the ownership of Lot 4 andLot 5 was not the issue. Nor were the metes and bounds of the lots as indicated in the respective TCTs being assailed, for the only issue concerned the exact and actual location of Lot 4 andLot 5.

Angeles was a builder in good faith

To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.^{^[5]}^[15]

With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEDRO ANGELES , Represented by ADELINA T. ANGELES, Attorney-in Fact,

Petitioner,

– versus –

ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL and EDWIN PASCUAL,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 157150

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DELCASTILLO, and

^*PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 21, 2011

x—————————————————————————————–x

R E S O L U T I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under appeal is the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 in CA- G.R. CV No. 61600,^{^[6]}^[1] which involved a dispute about the true location of the respective lots of the parties, with the respondents claiming that the petitioner had encroached on their lot but the latter denying the encroachment.

Antecedents

Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in CabanatuanCity. Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2 (Lot4) of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-951, a portion of the consolidation of Lots 1419-B-2B-3, 1419-B-2-B-4 and 1419-B-2-B-5, Psd- 9016, LGC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 94 covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-43707 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija;^{^[7]}^[2] Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-subdivision plan covered by TCT No. T-9459 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.^{^[8]}^[3] Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual’s house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his ownLot4 and discovered that Angeles’ house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprisingLot4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area ofLot4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles’ house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inCabanatuanCity.

In the course of the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Lot4.^{^[9]}^[4] Fajardo testified that Angeles’ house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand, Angeles presented Juan Fernandez, the geodetic engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his claim that there had been no encroachment.^{^[10]}^[5] However, Fernandez explained that he had performed only a “table work,” that is, he did not actually go to the site but based the sketch plan on the descriptions and bearings appearing on the TCTs of Lot 4, Lot 5 and Lot 6; and recommended the conduct of a relocation survey.^{^[11]}^[6]

In its decision of November 3, 1998,^{^[12]}^[7] the RTC held that there was no dispute that Pascual and Angeles were the respective registered owners of Lot 4 and Lot 5; that what was disputed between them was the location of their respective lots; that Pascual proved Angeles’ encroachment on Lot 4 by preponderant evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief. The RTC thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

1) ordering the defendant or persons claiming right through him to cause the removal of his house insofar as the same occupies the portion ofLot4, Block 2 (TCT No. T-43707), of an area of 252 square meters, as particularly indicated in the Sketch Plan (Exhibit C-1); and

2) and without pronouncement to damages in both the complainant and counterclaim.

With Costs.

SO ORDERED.^{^[13]}^[8]

Angeles appealed to the CA.

On January 31, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC,^{^[14]}^[9] and held that as between the findings of the geodetic engineer (Fajardo) who had actually gone to the site and those of the other (Fernandez) who had based his findings on the TCTs of the owners of the three lots, those of the former should prevail. However, the CA, modifying the RTC’s ruling, applied Article 448 of the Civil Code (which defined the rights of a builder, sower and planter in good faith). The decision decreed thus:^{^[15]}^[10]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision their option to either buy the portion of defendant-appellant’s house on theirLot. No. 4, or to sell to defendant-appellant the portion of their land on which his house stands. If plaintiffs-appellees elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render the defendant-appellant’s house useless, then plaintiffs-appellees should sell the encroached portion of their land to defendant-appellant. If plaintiffs-appellees choose to sell the land but defendant-appellant is unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time plaintiffs-appellees made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then defendant-appellant may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease. From the moment plaintiffs-appellees shall have exercised their option, defendant-appellant shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms. This is without prejudice to any future compromise which may be agreed upon by the parties.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles expectedly sought reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on February 13, 2003.

Issues

Hence, Angeles appeals, assailing: (a) the credence the CA accorded to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo as opposed to the survey plan prepared by Fernandez; and (b) the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of Angeles’ house or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary to its finding of good faith.

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.^{^[16]}^[11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.^{^[17]}^[12]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^{^[19]}^[14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

Angeles was a builder in good faith

To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][11] FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514, 517.

[2][12] II Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Edition, p. 648; citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Edition.

[3][13] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630.

[4][14] Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).

[5][15] Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 10, 18; Floreza v. Evangelista, No. L-25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130.

* Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.

[6][1] Rollo, pp. 46-74; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (later a Member of the Court, but now retired) and Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria- Tirona (retired) concurring.

[7][2] Records, p. 69.

[8][3] Id., p. 171.

[9][4] Id., p. 69.

[10][5] Id., p. 161.

[11][6] TSN dated March 12, 1996, pp. 10-12.

[12][7] Rollo, pp. 96-104.

[13][8] Id., p. 104.

[14][9] Id., pp. 46-74.

[15][10] Id., pp. 73-74.

[16][11] FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514, 517.

[17][12] II Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Edition, p. 648; citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Edition.

[18][13] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630.

[19][14] Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).

[20][15] Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 10, 18; Floreza v. Evangelista, No. L-25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130.

Comment

TIP 0013: THE CASE OF JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR.

Filed under: TIPS FOR JUDGES — Leave a comment

October 8, 2011

TIP 0013: THE CASE OF JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR.

SOURCE: ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA AND LEGAL RESEARCHER DIANA G. RUIZ, ALL OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18 TAGAYTAY CITY (G.R. NO. RTJ-11-2265, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECTS: FILING FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST COURT PERSONNEL; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION AS MINISTERIAL DUTY. (BRIEF TITLE: ATTY. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE LARIDA).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/ DOCTRINES/ DIGESTS:

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE MINISTERIAL CHARACTER OF THE JUDICIAL DUTY TO ISSUE WRITS OF POSSESSION?

AFTER ALL THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION, WHICH ARE: (1) CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MORTGAGOR’S NAME; AND (2) ISSUANCE TO MORTGAGOR OF A NEW TCT, SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY ESTABLISHED, THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ISSUE THE WRIT PRAYED FOR. IT CANNOT WITHHOLD, SUSPEND, OR OTHERWISE DENY THIS RELIEF FROM PETITIONER.

The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. ^{^[1]}^[32] Thus:

A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person’s recovery of possession of real or personal property. An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:

Section 6. Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

Section 7. Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the same was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by aTorrenstitle. Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.

On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.

Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment. The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent’s right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners’ failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]

Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor’s name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.

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JUDGE LARIDA JR. DID NOT GRANT IMMEDIATELY COMPLAINANT’S URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION. HE RULED THAT COMPLAINANT HAD YET TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE WRIT. CAN HE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

NO. JUDGE LARIDA JR.’S FAITHFULLY ADHERED TO HIS JUDICIAL DUTY TO REVIEW THE CASES, SERVE DUE PROCESS TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND TO EVENTUALLY DECIDE THE PETITIONS BASED SOLELY ON LAW AND EVIDENCE.

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.^{^[2]}^[33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN CAN A JUDGE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

IF IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT HE COMMITTED AN ERROR SO GROSS AND PATENT AS TO PRODUCE AN INFERENCE OF BAD FAITH. IN ADDITION TO THIS, THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF MUST NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, BUT SHOULD ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY BAD FAITH, FRAUD, DISHONESTY, AND CORRUPTION.^{^[3]}^[34]

It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.^{^[4]}^[34]

The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect respondent Judge Larida Jr.’s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

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WHAT MUST BE DONE TO A LAWYER WHO FILES AN UNFOUNDED COMPLAINT?

HE MUST BE SANCTIONED. FILING OF BASELESS COMPLAINT IS CONTEMPTUOUS.

“A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.”^{^[5]}^[41]

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO,

Complainant,

– versus –

JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA and

LEGAL RESEARCHER

DIANA G. RUIZ,

all of Regional Trial Court,

Branch 18 Tagaytay City,

Respondents.

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265

[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2986-RTJ]

Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 21, 2011

x ————————————————————————————— x

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Doubtless, the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary. However, it will not hesitate to protect innocent court employees against any baseless accusation or administrative charge that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.^{^[6]}^[1]

At bench is an administrative case against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. (Judge Larida, Jr.), Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma (Atty. Calma) and Legal Researcher Diana G. Cruz (LR Ruiz), all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18,TagaytayCity.

The Facts:

In a Letter-Complaint dated August 26, 2008,^{^[7]}^[2] complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo (complainant), counsel for Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (CRBC), charged Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz with ignorance of the law.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the letter-complaint and its attachments as follows:

I. Four (4) Petitions for issuance by the Clerk of Court of Certificates of Sale under Act 3135, as amended:

Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Freddie P. Magno, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re: application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

2. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Sixto & Norma Tolentino, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re: application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Jonathan & Yolanda Peñaranda, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re: application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 01 October 2001);

4. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Celia Bay, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re: application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

II. Four (4) Ex-parte Joint Petitions for the issuance by the Honorable Trial Court of Writs of Possession under Act 3135, as amended:

TG-05-1103, 08 August 2005, Sps. Babestil & Sancha Pendatum, mortgagors;

2. TG-05-1104, 24 November 2005, Josefina Villanueva, mortgagor;

3. TG-05-1105, 08 August 2005, Sps. Josefa Desipeda & Roqueno Calderon, mortgagors;

TG-05-1141, 28 December 2005, Norma Malabanan, mortgagor;

Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo avers that the aforementioned Petitions have long been pending before the above-mentioned court saying that the ongoing hearings of said cases may be further extended by the respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.

Anent TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo argues that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed an error when he recognized the appearance and participation of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as lawyer for the oppositors to the said petitions in the hearings thereof, and thereafter gave due course to the two oppositions filed, both dated 15 November 2005. Respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed another error when he failed to require the oppositors and Atty. Anarna the required guaranty bonds as mandated by Section 47 of Republic Act 8791.

Likewise, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo bewails the issuance by respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. of the Order dated 10 July 2008 in TG-05-1141 which denied complainant’s Ex Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession (in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141) by ruling that the petitioner has yet to present evidence besides marking of exhibits. Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo considers the said Order as contrary to Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which mandates, among others, that the trial court shall issue the Writ of Possession regardless of opposition thereto.

In addition, complainant Emmanuel B. Andamo accuses respondent Diana Ruiz, as then Officer-in-Charge and Acting Clerk of Court, and Atty. Stanlee Calma, as the incumbent Clerk of Court, for not having “lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Court’s working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[’s] acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon….”

Furthermore, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo implicated Atty. Ireneo Anarna, charging the latter of ignorance on the provisions of Act 3135 and for obstruction of justice for filing misplaced oppositions to non-litigious ex-parte petitions for issuance of Writ of Possession and for not submitting the required oppositor’s bond.^{^[8]}^[3]

The Joint Comment of respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz dated October 3, 2007was also summarized by the OCA, viz:

Respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo mainly charges them for the non-issuance of certificates of sale in the abovementioned extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings which were filed by Pepito Abueg as Acting Manager of petitioner Cavite Rural Banking Corporation. Respondents Calma and Ruiz declare that in all the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, were undated certificates of sale signed by then Deputy Sheriff Victor Hernandez, and Clerk of Court Analiza Luna. However, these certificates do not bear the signature of approval of then Assisting Judge (and eventually Deputy Court Administrator) Reuben P. Dela Cruz.

Likewise, respondents Calma and Ruiz stress that there is an Order in an undocketed case, entitled Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (then Cavite Development Bank), mortgagee v. Sps. Jonathan Peñaranda, Sps. Simon and Petronila Peji, Celia M. Bay, Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno, mortgagors. This Order was issued by then Judge Reuben Dela Cruz on17 March 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda; Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino; and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, including the petition for issuance of certificates of sale, were properly brought before and deliberated by the court. Hence, taking into consideration the issuance of the17 March 2004Order which they cannot alter or modify, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that any issuance of certificates of sale on the subject applications for foreclosure cannot be done.

Respondents Calma and Ruiz further explicate that in a copy of the 17 March 2004Order, there appears a signature over a handwritten name “Sibano J. Sibero” dated “3-17-04.” Thus suggesting that he received a copy of said Order in behalf of Cavite Rural Banking Corporation. Hence, respondents Calma and Ruiz chide complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo for not mentioning in his complaint the 17 March 2004 Order. Furthermore, assuming ex gratia argumenti that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo is not aware of said Order, respondents Calma and Ruiz still blame complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo that it took him almost seven (7) years before he made a follow up on the petitions for issuance of certificates of sale. If only their attention were called, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that they would have searched for the records and inform complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo about the Order.

In addition, respondents Calma and Ruiz call as an unfair accusation complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo’s imputation that they were the reason for the issuance of the10 July 2008Order. Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that said Order is a judicial action and an exercise of discretion by the court to which they, being merely the Clerk of Court and the Legal Researcher, respectively, do not have any control. Moreover, they point out that the said Order was also given in the other petitions of complainant where there is no oppositor, thus, rendering complainants’ perception as unfounded.

Lastly, while complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo charges respondents Calma and Ruiz with gross ignorance of Act No. 3135, respondents Calma and Ruiz find it ironic that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo misses the entire point of the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which states complainant’s failure to show compliance with the same Act No. 3135.^{^[9]}^[4]

After perusing the records, the OCA found that the allegations in the complaint and the defenses raised by respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented conflicting factual issues that could not be categorically resolved merely on the basis of the records submitted. Judge Larida, Jr. even failed to submit his Comment on the matter. The OCA then pointed out the necessity for a formal investigation where the complainant and the respondents would be given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. Thus, it recommended that the administrative complaint against respondents be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case, and the same be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.

In the Resolution dated January 19, 2011,^{^[10]}^[5] the Court resolved to: (1) note the letter-complaint of Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo against respondents Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz, for gross ignorance of the law relative to LRC Case Nos. 05-1105, 05-1104, 05-1103, and 05-1141 for the issuance of writs of possession under Act 3135, as amended, and the joint comment dated October 3, 2007 of respondents Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher; (2) re-docket the instant administrative complaint; (3) refer this case to a Justice of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records, and direct the Presiding Justice of the CA to raffle the case among the incumbent Justices of the CA who shall conduct the investigation and submit the required report and recommendation; and (4) note the Report dated June 18, 2010 of the OCA.

The case was eventually assigned to CA Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-Javier) who, as directed by the Court, conducted the corresponding investigation on the complaint.

Notably, during the initial stage of the proceedings, Judge Larida, Jr. filed his Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Comment^{^[11]}^[6] dated April 14, 2011.^{^[12]}^[7] The same was granted in the interest of substantial justice.^{^[13]}^[8] In his Comment, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. denied that he delayed the resolution of complainant’s petitions for issuance of writs of possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. He claimed that he was unaware of unacted foreclosure proceedings pending before the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC-Br. 18, Tagaytay City; that he never talked to complainant about the cases in his chambers; that it was only out of prudence and propriety that he acknowledged the oppositions to complainant’s four (4) petitions as the said oppositions were necessarily part of the proceedings; and that he eventually set the petitions for hearing since there was a need for complainant to present evidence to support his entitlement to the four (4) writs prayed for.

Judge Larida, Jr. also informed the Court that per Supreme Court Resolution dated November 18, 2008,^{^[14]}^[9] he was detailed as Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

During the hearing on April 14, 2011, the parties agreed to submit their affidavits with attachments to constitute their testimony subject to cross-examination.^{^[15]}^[10]

Complainant did not submit an affidavit and opted to adopt his Letter-Complaint as his direct testimony. He further submitted several documentary evidence.^{^[16]}^[11]

For his part, Judge Larida, Jr. submitted his Judicial Affidavit dated April 18, 2011. He essentially iterated therein his allegations in his Comment. He also offered various documentary evidence^{^[17]}^[12] to refute the charges against him.

Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz likewise submitted their undated Joint Affidavit.

Atty. Calma emphasized that then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz had long denied complainant’s undocketed petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure in CRBC v. Magno, in his Order of March 17, 2004. The grounds for the said denial were: (1) non-payment of entry fees; (2) non-assignment of docket numbers; (3) absence of proofs of service to the sheriff and the parties; (4) non-attachment of photocopies of the official receipts to the cases; and (5) non-payment of sufficient amount of docket fees. Atty. Calma also disclosed that he was no longer connected with the judiciary as he had opted to engage in the private practice of law.

Aside from those previously submitted exhibits, Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented the following: (1) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Magno;^{^[18]}^[13] (2) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Spouses Tolentino;^{^[19]}^[14] (3) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;^{^[20]}^[15] (4) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in Celia M. Bay;^{^[21]}^[16] (5) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Freddie P. Magno;^{^[22]}^[17] (6) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^{^[23]}^[18] (7) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Sps. Tolentino;^{^[24]}^[19] (8) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^{^[25]}^[20] (9) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;^{^[26]}^[21] (10) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^{^[27]}^[22] (11) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Celia Bay;^{^[28]}^[23] (12) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^{^[29]}^[24] (13) Order of Judge Reuben Dela Cruz dated March 17, 2004;^{^[30]}^[25] (14) Certification dated June 7, 2004 by Judge Reuben dela Cruz;^{^[31]}^[26] (15) Comment dated October 3, 2007 filed before the OCA;^{^[32]}^[27] and (16) Joint Affidavit of respondent Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz.^{^[33]}^[28]

The Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, TagaytayCity, submitted a status report and certified copies of the pertinent documents in LRC Case Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141.^{^[34]}^[29]

After the formal offer of evidence and the admission of the exhibits, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda. Only respondent Judge Larida, Jr. complied.

Accordingly, in her Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2011, Justice Lazaro-Javier recommended that Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz be EXONERATED of the charges against them for ignorance of the law. In sum, Justice Lazaro-Javier found that:

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure. Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphasis supplied]

Now, the Court resolves.

After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of Justice Lazaro-Javier.

Notably, respondents are all charged with gross ignorance of the law for their alleged acts or omissions, as follows:

Name	Cases	Acts or Omission Charged
Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.	LRC No. TG-05-1103	Issuing Order datedAugust 9, 2005which set the petition for hearingOctober 21, 2005
	LRC No. TG-05-1105	Issuing Order datedAugust 11, 2005which set the petition for hearing onOctober 21, 2005
	LRC Nos. TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105	a) Recognizing the appearance of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as oppositors’ counsel; b) Not requiring the oppositors therein to file guaranty bonds pursuant to Section 47 of RA 8791.
	LRC No. TG-05-1141	For issuing Order dated10 July 2008denying the Ex Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession in LRC Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 on the ground that CRBC had yet to present evidence besides marking of exhibits.
Atty. Stanlee Calma and Legal Researcher Diana Ruiz		For not having “lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Court’s working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[‘s] acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon.”

As to respondent

Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.

According to complainant, it was Judge Larida Jr.’s ministerial duty under Act 3135, specifically Sections 7^{^[35]}^[30] and 8^{^[36]}^[31] thereof, to issue the writs of possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. This being so, there was no need for him to still require applicant to present evidence as condition for granting them. The fact that he did, nonetheless, was a clear defiance of his ministerial duty and rendered him guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant is mistaken.

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.^{^[38]}^[33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

At any rate, the filing of this administrative complainant is not the proper remedy for complainant. Complainant should have sought relief from higher courts. The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law; neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions. As regards this matter, the case of Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis^{^[40]}^[35] is enlightening:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

Complainant also held against Judge Larida, Jr. his alleged failure to require oppositors to post guaranty bonds in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. Complainant invokes Section 47 of Republic Act (R.A) No. 8791.^{^[41]}^[36]

Clearly, the provision cited by complainant refers to restraint of foreclosure proceedings which requires posting of bond by one who seeks it. It does not apply to the present case wherein the subject properties had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thus, petitioner’s insistence for imposition of guaranty bonds on the oppositors in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 is misplaced. On this score too, Judge Larida, Jr. cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the law for not imposing these bonds in the cases mentioned.

As to respondents

Atty. Calma and

LR Ruiz

Records bear out that as early as March 17, 2004, then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz of RTC Branch 18, TagaytayCity, under Order^{^[42]}^[37] of even date, had already denied CRBC’s petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda, thus:

Hence, it is very evident, therefore, that there is no payment of the entry fees; there are no docket numbers assigned and stamped on the cases; there are no proofs of service of the notices of the Sheriff to the parties, particularly the mortgagors; there are no xerox copies of the official receipts attached to the cases, except Spouses Peñaranda; and that official receipts issued do not cover the correct amounts and entries for each pertinent book of accounts, in violation of RA 3135, as amended and the issuances of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda, Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji;CeliaM.Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

SO ORDERED. [Italics supplied]

It is worth noting, too, that there were no pending motions for reconsideration filed or other incidents initiated by complainant in the subject cases to warrant their entry in the court calendar. As a matter of fact, complainant does not deny that the assailed Order dated March 17, 2004had long attained finality. For Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to put them back in the court calendar, for no cogent reason at all, is obviously improper.

Finally, the trial court, through then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz, had already spoken when it denied the petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda. As stated, it was beyond Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to order the trial court what to do next with these cases. At that time, complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to him under the rules. He could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from the Order of denial datedMarch 17, 2004 but he did not. What complainant failed to do as a judicial remedy, he cannot revive through an administrative complaint against these court employees. It bears pointing out that it was only onAugust 26, 2008 or more than four years since the Order ofMarch 17, 2004 was issued when the complainant unfairly turned his ire on these innocent and helpless respondents by wrongly accusing them in this administrative case.

Clearly, this is a frivolous and baseless complaint. The respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. At this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice Lazaro-Javier, to wit:

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure. Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphases supplied]

A repeat of this cannot be tolerated.

This administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judge, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. “As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice.”^{^[43]}^[38] “Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”^{^[44]}^[39]

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.”^{^[45]}^[40]

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

[1][32] G.R. No. 159882,November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 390, 394-397.

[2][33] Rollo, p. 17

[3][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.

[4][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.

[5][41] Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-On, A.M. No. P-07-2343,August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 1, 11.

[6][1] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197,April 13, 2011.

[7][2] Rollo, pp. 1-8.

[8][3]Id. at 114-116.

[9][4]Id. at 116-117.

[10][5]Id. at 124-125.

[11][6]Id. at 128-129

[12][7]Id. at 130-132.

[13][8]Id. at 142.

[14][9] Id. at 119-120.

[15][10]Id. at 140.

[16][11] Exhs. “A” to “A-6,” “B,” “B-1,” and “B-1-a,” “C” to “C-3,” “D” to “D-4,” “E,” “F” to “F-6-a,” “G” to “G-3-a,” “H” to “H-4-a,” “I” to “I-7-a,” “J” to “J-2,” “K” to “K-2,” “L,” “M,” “N,” “O,” “P,” “Q,” to “X.”

[17][12] Exhs. “1” (with submarkings), “2” (with submarkings), “3” (with submarkings), “4,” “4-a,” “5” (with submarkings), “6” (with submarkings), “7” (with submarkings), unmarked status report.

[18][13] Exh. “8.”

[19][14] Exh. “9.”

[20][15] Exh. “10.”

[21][16] Exh. “11.”

[22][17] Exh. “12.”

[23][18] Exh. “12-a.”

[24][19] Exh. “13.”

[25][20] Exh. “13-a.”

[26][21] Exh. “14.”

[27][22] Exh. “14-a.”

[28][23] Exh. “15.”

[29][24] Exh. “15-a.”

[30][25] Exh. “16.”

[31][26] Exh. “17.”

[32][27] Exh. “18.”

[33][28] Exh. “19.”

[34][29] Rollo, pp. 154-202.

[35][30] Section 7. Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

[36][31] Section 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

[37][32] G.R. No. 159882,November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 390, 394-397.

[38][33] Rollo, p. 17

[39][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.

[40][35] 341 Phil. 299, 312-313 (1997).

[41][36] Section 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.—In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with interest thereon at rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank of institution from the sale and custody of said property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser of the auction sale concerned whether in a judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with law. Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure proceeding. Notwithstanding act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration.

[42][37] Rollo, pp. 105-108.

[43][38] Cordova v. Hon. Labayen, 319 Phil. 273, 287 (1995).

[44][39] Cruz v. Aliño-Hormachuelos, A.M. No. CA-04-38,March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 573, 581.

[45][40]Id. at 580.

[46][41] Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-On, A.M. No. P-07-2343,August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 1, 11.

Comment

TIP 0012: FACTUAL ALLEGATION AGAINST THE COURT IS STILL CONTEMPTUOUS IF THE LANGUAGE USED IS ABUSIV E OR INSULTING.

Filed under: TIPS FOR TRIAL LAWYERS — 1 Comment

TIP 0012: FACTUAL ALLEGATION AGAINST THE COURT IS STILL CONTEMPTUOUS IF THE LANGUAGE USED IS ABUSIV E OR INSULTING.

SOURCE: FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON (DECEASED), JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY (G.R. NO. 170404, 28 SEPTEMBER 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT (BRIEF TITLE: CRUZ VS. GINGOYON)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/ DIGEST:

WHY WAS ATTY. CRUZ CITED FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT?

BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGATION IN HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH READS:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.^{^[1]}^[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WAS COUNSEL’S PLEADING CONTEMPTUOUS? WHY?

YES. BECAUSE THE ALLEGATION WAS UNSUBSTANTIATED AND BEREFT OF FACTUAL BASIS. IT BRINGS THE COURT INTO DISREPUTE.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his “fair observation or conclusion.”^{^[2]}^[29]

………………………………….

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SUPPOSE THE ALLEGATION OF THE PETITIONER IS JUSTIFIED. WOULD HIS PLEADING STILL BE CONTEMPTUOUS?

YES. BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE USED WAS ABUSIVE OR INSULTING. RESPECT FOR THE COURT SHOULD ALWAYS BE OBSERVED.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.”^{^[3]}^[32]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ,		G.R. No. 170404
Petitioner,
		Present:

– versus –		LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
		Acting Chairperson,
		BERSAMIN,
JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON,		DELCASTILLO,
[Deceased],		PEREZ,^⃰ and
JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Acting		MENDOZA,^{⃰ ⃰} JJ.
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
Branch 117, Pasay City,		Promulgated:
Respondent.		September 28, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.

By this Petition for Certiorari,^{^[4]}^[1] petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order^{^[5]}^[2] dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.^{^[6]}^[3]

Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix the amount of bond.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint^{^[7]}^[4] filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the “basketball goal” which was permanently attached to the second floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right of way.

Mina was declared in default^{^[8]}^[5] hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision^{^[9]}^[6] dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked “locus standi.” Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.

Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who display their wares in their choice spots in the alley and their customers that mill around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the residents of the places of this kind, they still find order in this madness and get out of this kind of life unscathed. It’s because they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the residents of the area have become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at play throw every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they cannot be faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon their neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the people in their place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better still move to an upscale residential area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.^{^[10]}^[7]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration,^{^[11]}^[8] he took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:

The 12^th and 13^th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are off-tangent and even spouses illegality;

Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking food? In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;

The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of property is all right and justified when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that “residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;”

For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way or alley has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place to be;

Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. For the information of the court, plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to consider thePasayCityresidence of the plaintiffs as a blighted human settlement. Apparently the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his litany of eye sore descriptions;

Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving way to illegality in the name of live and let live principle?

Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located and the specific activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.^{^[12]}^[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005.^{^[13]}^[10]

In an Order^{^[14]}^[11] dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,^{^[15]}^[12] and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.^{^[16]}^[13] Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present. Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his serious charge that he “has been communicating with the defendant off the record, given that the latter has already been declared in default”. He is therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not be punished for contempt of court for committing improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.^{^[17]}^[14]

On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order^{^[18]}^[15] in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause. The Order reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this court today, Friday, November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded to his wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.

When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who might represent himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff. Instead it was the defendant and his counsel who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

x x x x

In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in today’s hearing, the court considers the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be cited for contempt. x x x^{^[19]}^[16]

In his Compliance^{^[20]}^[17] to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: “…where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated October 21, 2005.”^{^[21]}^[18]

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order^{^[22]}^[19] finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. The Order reads:

Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge that the Judge “has been communicating with the defendant off the record”. But instead of presenting proof of facts or stating facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: “Where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court…“ By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has been communicating with the defendant off the record.

The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge [to] know the blight in his place inPasayCityis for the Judge to communicate with the defendant. It is only by communicating with the defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such blight.

Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed inPasayCityin 1991 and that he has been a judge inPasayCitysince 1997. The nuisance that Cruz complained of, or the blight of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is replicated in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but a microcosm of what is prevalent not only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in many other highly urbanized areas in the country. Judges are no hermits that they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to make this allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.

Cruz’s open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the defendant is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or offends its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De Leon, L-10236, January 31, 1958). x x x By alleging that the judge communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.^{^[23]}^[20]

An Order of Arrest^{^[24]}^[21] was issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)^{^[25]}^[22] with the respondent court. In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred that:

x x x x

2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;

x x x x

The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order^{^[26]}^[23] dated December 1, 2005 based on petitioner’s failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005. In a Resolution^{^[27]}^[24] dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition “inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their personal capacities.”^{^[28]}^[25]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER x x x PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

WHETHERRESPONDENT COURTHAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR CITING PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURTABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO FIX BOND.^{^[29]}^[26]

The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the respondent court of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Petitioner avers that no other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence during trial. Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.

Our Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.

“[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt.”^{^[30]}^[27] “[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to ‘misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same’ within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt.”^{^[31]}^[28]

Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court.

Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance to the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005which he filed with the respondent court. The allegation was repeated despite Judge Gingoyon’s outright denial of communicating with the defendant and explanation in the Order^{^[33]}^[30] dated November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon was familiar with the area as he was detailed inPasayCity since 1991 as State Prosecutor, and thereafter, as judge since 1997.

Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.

On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what normally happens in places such as Edang Street, to wit: “x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or [do] their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in x x x. Ambulant vendors who display their wares in the alley and their customers that mill around them; x x x children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking] from awnings or canopies; x x x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys x x x.”^{^[34]}^[31]

Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioner’s act amounts to direct contempt of court.^{^[36]}^[33]

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion. Petitioner insists that the respondent court should have granted his Ex-Parte Motion since he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He further avers that respondent court violated his right to due process by fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.

The respondent court was well within the bounds of its authority when it denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court^{^[37]}^[34] without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.^{^[38]}^[35]

Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.^{^[39]}^[36] and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M.^{^[40]}^[37] Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court. Significantly, the records show that respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005.^{^[41]}^[38] It is therefore clear that at the time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.^{^[42]}^[39] Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the remedy prayed for. Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct contempt. However, as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of P2,000.00 commensurate with the acts committed.

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. “A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.”^{^[43]}^[40] For the guidance of the petitioner, “[t]his Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive.”^{^[44]}^[41] Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases.^{^[45]}^[42] “However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.”^{^[46]}^[43] Unwarranted demands upon this Court’s attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, “[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.”^{^[47]}^[44] In consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel^{^[48]}^[45] within 15 days from notice. Petitioner failed to comply hence we directed him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated September 6, 2010.^{^[49]}^[46] Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he was fined P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 2011^{^[50]}^[47] which was increased to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29, 2011. Consequently, petitioner is hereby directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][9] Id. at 271-272.

[2][29] Rollo, pp. 83-89.

[3][32] Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 729 (1935), citing In re Stewart, 118La., 827; 43 S., 455.

⃰ In lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.

⃰ ⃰ In lieu of Chief Justice Renato C.Corona, per Special Order No. 1093 dated September 21, 2011.

[4][1] Rollo, pp. 3-12.

[5][2] Exhibit “A” of the Petition, id. at 12-14.

[6][3] Id. at 14.

[7][4] Records, pp. 1-8.

[8][5] Id. at 214.

[9][6] Id. at 257-264.

[10][7]Id. at 259-260.

[11][8]Id. at 267-273.

[12][9]Id. at 271-272.

[13][10] Id. at 273

[14][11] Exhibit “D” of the Petition, id. at 26.

[15][12] See the Notice of Hearing in the Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit “B” of the Petition, id. at 21.

[16][13] In the same Order, Judge Gingoyon denied the allegation of the petitioner that he was communicating with the defendant off the record, thus: “x x x This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present. x x x.”

[17][14] Records, p. 274

[18][15] Id. at 304.

[19][16] Id.

[20][17] Id. at 311-313.

[21][18] Id. at 312.

[22][19] Id. at 316-318.

[23][20] Id. at 317-318.

[24][21] Id. at 319.

[25][22] Id. at 320-322.

[26][23] Id. at 327.

[27][24] Rollo, p. 31.

[28][25] Id.

[29][26] Id. at 86.

[30][27] Atty. Ante v. Judge Pascua, 245 Phil. 745, 747 (1988).

[31][28] Wicker v. Hon. Arcangel, 322 Phil. 476, 483 (1996), citing Ang v. Judge Castro, 221 Phil. 149, 153 (1985) and Atty. Ante v. Judge Pascua, 245 Phil. 745 (1988).

[32][29] Rollo, pp. 83-89.

[33][30] Id. at 12-14.

[34][31] Id. at 24-25.

[35][32] Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 729 (1935), citing In re Stewart, 118La., 827; 43 S., 455.

[36][33] Malolos v. Hon. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113 (1961).

[37][34] Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be the Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

[38][35] Rules of Court, Rule 71, Section 2.

[39][36] See the RTC’s stamped receipt on the motion, records, p. 320.

[40][37] See the Supreme Court’s stamped receipt on the petition, rollo, p. 3.

[41][38] See the RTC’s stamped receipt on a copy of the petition, records, p. 328.

[42][39] Id. at 327.

[43][40] People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989).

[44][41] Id. at 426.

[45][42] Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil 28, 34 (2002).

[46][43] Id., citing Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto, 240 Phil. 719, 732 (1987).

[47][44] Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto, 240 Phil. 719, 733 (1987).

[48][45] Rollo, p. 121.

[49][46] Id. at 123.

[50][47] Id. at 124.

Comment

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Archive for October, 2011

TIP 0013: THE CASE OF JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR.

TIP 0012: FACTUAL ALLEGATION AGAINST THE COURT IS STILL CONTEMPTUOUS IF THE LANGUAGE USED IS ABUSIV E OR INSULTING.

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