J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0090: JURISPRUDENCE ON “SWEETHEART DEFENSE” IN THE CRIME OF RAPE.

SOURCE: CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  (G.R. NO. 176740, 22 JUNE 2011,  DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: RAPE, SWEETHEART DEFENSE, CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES,  PENALTY, DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. DUMADAG)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

APPELLANT  ARGUED THAT THEY WERE LOVERS. IS THIS DEFENSE VALID?

NO.  THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THIS.

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BUT WITNESSES SAW THEM TOGETHER AND THAT THEY WERE WRITING TO EACH OTHER. ARE THESE NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?

NO.  THESE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

            There is no question that “AAA” underwent sexual intercourse as admitted by appellant himself and as shown by the medical findings of Dr. Toribio-Berona.^[1][33]  However, appellant denies having raped her and instead, claims that he and “AAA” were lovers and the act of sexual intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them.  In short, he interposes the “sweetheart” theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.

            Appellant’s claim that they are lovers is untenable.  For one, such claim was not substantiated by the evidence on the record.  The only evidence adduced by appellant were his testimony and those of his relatives Boyet and Nieves Irish. According to Boyet, he knows of their relationship because they were conversing and writing each other^[2][34] while Nieves Irish saw them once walking in the street.^[3][35]  To the mind of the Court, these are not enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship existed between appellant and “AAA”. . . .

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HOW WOULD SUCH ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP BE PROVEN?

INTIMACIES SUCH AS LOVING CARESSES, CUDDLING, TENDER SMILES, SWEET MURMURS OR ANY OTHER AFFECTIONATE GESTURES THAT ONE BESTOWS UPON HIS OR HER LOVER WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN.

. . . . . In People v. Napudo^[4][36]  where the accused likewise invoked the sweetheart defense, this Court held that:

[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other, conversing during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the relationship.

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FOR SWEETHEART DEFENSE TO BE CREDIBLE WHAT OTHER PROOF MAY SUFFICE?

SOME DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RELATIONSHIP [SUCH AS NOTES, GIFTS, PICTURES, MEMENTOS] AND THE LIKE.^[5][37]

            Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supports appellant’s claim that he and “AAA” were indeed lovers. “A ‘sweetheart defense,’ to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos] and the like.^[6][37] Appellant failed to discharge this burden.

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SUPPOSE APPELLANT AND THE ALLEGED VICTIM WERE INDEED SWEETHEARTS, CAN THERE STILL BE RAPE?

YES. A MAN CAN EMPLOY VIOLENCE UPON HER FIANCEE ON THE PRETEXT OF LOVE.

            Besides, even if it were true that appellant and “AAA” were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.  “Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.”^[7][38] But what destroyed the veracity of appellant’s “sweetheart” defense were the credible declaration of “AAA” that she does not love him^[8][39] and her categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.^[9][40]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

            The fact of sexual intercourse in this case is undisputed. What confronts this Court is the question of whether the sexual congress between appellant and the private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary and consensual.

For review is the July 3, 2006 Decision^[10][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 affirming with modification the Decision^[11][2] dated April 16, 2001^[12][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 08, Aparri, Cagayan, finding Carlo Dumadag y Romio (appellant) guilty of the crime of rape.

Factual Antecedents

            On June 14, 1999, an Information for rape was filed with the RTC against appellant, which contained the following accusations:

            The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, upon complaint filed by the offended party, “AAA”,^[13][4] in the Municipal Trial Court of “CCC”, “DDD” found on page one (1) of the records of the case and forming an integral part of this Information, of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 [sic], of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, of Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

                That on or about December 25, 1998, in the Municipality of “CCC”, province of “DDD”, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, a woman below eighteen (18) years of age, all against her will and consent.

                                CONTRARY TO LAW.^[14][5]

            During his arraignment on October 26, 1999, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, entered a negative plea to the charge.  At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense made stipulation of facts as to the identities of the private complainant and the appellant and that a medical certificate was issued to the former.  Shortly after termination of the conference, trial on merits commenced.

Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

“AAA”, a young barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified on February 21, 2000, declared that in the early morning of December 25, 1998, she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at “BBB”, “CCC”, “DDD”.  She was a little bit behind Thelma, Carlos and Clarence, all surnamed Dumadag.  All of a sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts.  He pulled her towards the house of Joel “Boyet” Ursulum (Boyet).  Once inside, she was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear.  Appellant also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed.  Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina.  Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.  After appellant was through, they stayed inside the house until six o’clock in the morning of December 25, 1998.  All this time, appellant continued to hold the knife.  Pleading that she be allowed to go home, appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her parents.  “AAA” decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear.  Nevertheless, “AAA’s” uncle, “EEE” learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse with her.  Her uncle relayed the information to her father who confronted her about the incident.  After confirming the same from “AAA”, they decided to report the matter to the police where she was investigated and her sworn statement taken.

Dr. Jane Toribio-Berona (Dr. Toribio-Berona) conducted a physical examination on “AAA”.  She identified the medical certificate^[15][6] issued by her wherein it was indicated that there was laceration on “AAA’s” hymen.

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant does not deny having had sexual intercourse with “AAA”.  Instead, he claimed that it was voluntary and without the use of force since they were lovers.  To support his claim that “AAA” was his girlfriend, appellant presented Boyet and Nieves Irish Oandasan (Nieves Irish) who both corroborated his sweetheart defense.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC declared appellant guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt  of

the charge lodged against him after finding “AAA”’s testimony to be credible^[16][7] as it was given in a candid and straightforward manner.^[17][8] It rejected appellant’s “sweetheart” defense holding that a sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.^[18][9] Consequently he was condemned to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and payment of damages, viz:

                WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay “AAA” the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (p100,000.00) as moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

                SO ORDERED.^[19][10]

            Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal^[20][11] on April 24, 2001 with the trial court. The records of this case were transmitted to this Court.  Both parties filed their respective Briefs.^[21][12]  Consistent however to this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,^[22][13] the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.^[23][14]

In his brief, appellant assigned the following errors, viz:

            I.      The trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of [the] private complainant that accused poked a knife at the left side of her [abdomen] after she came out from [the] church.

                II.    The trial court erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on [the] ground of reasonable doubt.^[24][15]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Resolving jointly the foregoing imputations against the trial court, the CA affirmed with modification the appealed judgment of conviction. The CA ruled that there is nothing on record which shows that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance which would have affected the case.  The CA junked appellant’s contentions that he and “AAA” were lovers; that no force or intimidation was employed on “AAA;” and that there was contradiction as to which of his hands was placed around the neck of “AAA.”  The CA further held that “AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal evinces sincerity and truthfulness.  It disposed of the appeal in its assailed Decision promulgated on July 3, 2006, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision promulgated on April 19, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 08, in Criminal Case No. 08-1157, finding the accused-appellant Carlo Dumadag y Romio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay the victim “AAA” the reduced amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to the Php50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.^[25][16]

Aggrieved, appellant is now before this Court submitting anew for resolution the same matters he argued before the CA.  Per Resolution^[26][17] dated June 4, 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire within 30 days from notice.  Appellant informed the Court that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters were already taken up.^[27][18]  Appellee, for its part, opted not to file any supplemental brief.^[28][19]  Thus, this case was submitted for decision on the basis of their respective briefs filed with the CA.

In his bid for acquittal, appellant points out several circumstances purportedly showing that “AAA’s” testimony is not worthy of credence.  According to appellant, it is highly improbable for him to poke a knife on her without being noticed since the members of his (appellant) family were just a little bit ahead of her.  He claims that from a distance of 200 meters from the church to the house of Boyet, it would be impossible that nobody saw them considering that his right arm was allegedly placed around her neck and at the same time a knife was poked on the left side of her body.  He further asserts that she could have made an outcry considering that she was with his (appellant) parents in going home after the midnight mass.

Our Ruling

            The appeal is bereft of merit.

The improbabilities alluded to by the appellant hinge on the assessment of the credibility of “AAA”.  When credibility is the issue that comes to fore, this Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court which had the first hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude during their presentation.  Hence, the trial court’s factual findings especially when affirmed by the appellate court are accorded the highest degree of respect and are conclusive and binding on this Court.  A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted save upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances “such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which[, if considered, would] affect the result of the case.”^[29][20] Unfortunately for appellant, none of these recognized exceptions necessitating a reversal of the assailed Decision obtains in this instance.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.^[30][21]  On the basis of the records, the Court finds “AAA” candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will.  “AAA” consistently testified that while she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass on December 24, 1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand around her neck and poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she shouts.  He made her walk towards the house of Boyet where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.^[31][22]  Reviewing the antecedents of this case, the Court, just as the courts below, is convinced of the truth and sincerity in the account of “AAA”.  It bears to stress that “[a]s a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth.”^[32][23]

Neither is it improbable for appellant to employ such criminal design in the presence of his (appellant) own family especially when overcome by lust.  “It is a common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby.”^[33][24]  “[L]ust is no respecter of time and place.”^[34][25]  As established, “AAA” was silenced by appellant’s threat of killing her with a knife.^[35][26]  Thus, the reason for “AAA’s” failure to shout or cry for help is because she was overcame by fear.  It has been held that minors, like “AAA”, could be easily intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against their lives.^[36][27]

Also it is not impossible for them to walk from the church to the house of Boyet unnoticed.  Except for his bare argument, nothing was adduced that church goers passed through that road about the same time as the incident.  In fact, “AAA” testified that she did not encounter other persons on the way to the house of Boyet.^[37][28]

            In trying to discredit further “AAA’s” testimony, appellant assails her behavior before, during and after the rape incident.  He contends that in all these instances, “AAA” had all the chances to escape but she did not.  He argues that “AAA” had the opportunity to run when they were entering the house of Boyet and during their more or less five hours stay inside the house yet she decided to remain.  He claims that such behavior is unnatural, incredible and beyond human experience.

Appellant’s contentions fail to persuade.

The failure of “AAA” to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human conduct.  It bears emphasis that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault.  There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped.^[38][29]  Moreover, “[n]ot all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.”^[39][30]  “AAA”, being then a minor and subjected to a threat to her life, should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected of mature persons.

The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of “AAA” does not cloud her credibility.  “The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her] and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s assault because of fear for life and physical safety.”^[40][31]  In this case, “AAA” was dragged by appellant with a knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the incident to anyone or else she would be killed.  That warning was instilled in “AAA’s” mind such that even when appellant was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee.  The intimidations made by the appellant are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit to his bestial demands, something bad would befall her.  “Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist.”^[41][32]

            There is no question that “AAA” underwent sexual intercourse as admitted by appellant himself and as shown by the medical findings of Dr. Toribio-Berona.^[42][33]  However, appellant denies having raped her and instead, claims that he and “AAA” were lovers and the act of sexual intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them.  In short, he interposes the “sweetheart” theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.

            Appellant’s claim that they are lovers is untenable.  For one, such claim was not substantiated by the evidence on the record.  The only evidence adduced by appellant were his testimony and those of his relatives Boyet and Nieves Irish. According to Boyet, he knows of their relationship because they were conversing and writing each other^[43][34] while Nieves Irish saw them once walking in the street.^[44][35]  To the mind of the Court, these are not enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship existed between appellant and “AAA”.  In People v. Napudo^[45][36]  where the accused likewise invoked the sweetheart defense, this Court held that:

[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other, conversing during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the relationship.

            Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supports appellant’s claim that he and “AAA” were indeed lovers. “A ‘sweetheart defense,’ to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos] and the like.^[46][37] Appellant failed to discharge this burden.

            Besides, even if it were true that appellant and “AAA” were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.  “Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.”^[47][38] But what destroyed the veracity of appellant’s “sweetheart” defense were the credible declaration of “AAA” that she does not love him^[48][39] and her categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.^[49][40]

            With the credibility of “AAA” having been firmly established, the courts below did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed through force and intimidation. The “sweetheart” theory interposed by appellant was correctly rejected for lack of substantial corroboration.

The Proper Penalty

            Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.  At the time of the commission of the offense on December 25, 1998, Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997”) was already in effect.  The amendatory law, particularly Article 266-B thereof, provides an identical provision and imposes the same penalty when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, such circumstance was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established during the trial.  In People v. Macapanas,^[50][41] the Court ruled that “[b]eing in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, ‘use of a deadly weapon’ increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty.  This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”  Since the Information does not allege and the prosecution failed to prove any other attending circumstance in the commission of the offense, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua^[51][42] conformably with Article 63^[52][43] of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the courts below on appellant.

            As to damages, the Court affirms the grant by the appellate court to “AAA” of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and its reduction of the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00 based on prevailing jurisprudence.^[53][44] “Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.”^[54][45]  Moral damages, on the other hand, are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the commission of the crime.^[55][46]

            The Court notes that both the courts below failed to award exemplary damages.  Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded by reason of the established presence of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon as the Court recently ruled in People v. Toriaga.^[56][47]  The Court further held in said case that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the rape victim is entitled to recover exemplary damages following the ruling in People v. Catubig.^[57][48]

            In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid likewise pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.^[58][49]

            WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant Carlo Dumadag y Romio is ordered to further pay “AAA” P30, 000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

LEGAL NOTE 0089: JURISPRUDENCE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SOURCE: ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 170658, 22 JUNE 2011) SUBJECT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BRIEF TITLE: CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

PETITIONERS WERE IN POSSESSION OF A PARCEL OF LAND DECLARED AS MILITARY RESERVATION BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 80. PRIOR TO SUCH PROCLAMATION, PETITIONERS HAD ALREADY TITLE TO THE LAND. THE REPUBLIC FILED A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. PETITIONERS RAISE THE DEFENSE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED AND THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 80 STATES IT RESPECTS EXISTING PRIVATE RIGHTS. RTC, WITHOUT HEARING,  ISSUED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLIC. CA CONFIRMED. WAS THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER?

NO.  PRIOR TO RENDERING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT THERE MUST BE MOTION AND HEARING. HERE, THERE WAS NONE.

            The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.^[1][41]   The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.^[2][42]

            In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor.  In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary judgment.  Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact.  Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment.  Considering that the remedy of summary judgment is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections. 

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WHEN IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PERMITTED?

ONLY IF  THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND [THE] MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.”^[3][36]  THE TEST OF THE PROPRIETY OF RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IS THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT,^[4][37] “AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A SHAM, FICTITIOUS, CONTRIVED OR FALSE CLAIM.”^[5][38]

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WHEN IS A FACTUAL ISSUE CONSIDERED AS SHAM?

WHEN BY ITS NATURE IT IS EVIDENT THAT IT CANNOT BE PROVEN OR IT IS SUCH THAT THE PARTY TENDERING THE SAME HAS NEITHER ANY SINCERE INTENTION NOR ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO PROVE IT. 

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 WHEN DO PARTIES USUALLY RAISE SHAM ISSUES?

THIS USUALLY HAPPENS IN DENIALS MADE BY DEFENDANTS MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING AN ISSUE AND THEREBY GAINING DELAY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THEIR ANSWERS ARE NOT UNDER OATH ANYWAY.”^[6][39]

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HOW DOES A COURT DETERMINE THE GENUINESS OF THE ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

THE COURT IS OBLIGED TO CAREFULLY STUDY AND APPRAISE, NOT THE TENOR OR CONTENTS OF THE PLEADINGS, BUT THE FACTS ALLEGED UNDER OATH BY THE PARTIES AND/OR THEIR WITNESSES IN THE AFFIDAVITS THAT THEY SUBMITTED WITH THE MOTION AND THE CORRESPONDING OPPOSITION.  THUS, IT IS HELD THAT, EVEN IF THE PLEADINGS ON THEIR FACE APPEAR TO RAISE ISSUES, A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SO LONG AS “THE AFFIDAVITS, DEPOSITIONS, AND ADMISSIONS PRESENTED BY THE MOVING PARTY SHOW THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE NOT GENUINE.”^[7][40]

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IN THIS CASE WHAT WAS THE ERROR OF THE COURT?

THE COURT PRESUMED THAT THE DEFENSES OF PETITIONERS CANNOT BE PROVEN. THIS IS PREMATURE AND UNFAIR. THE GUIDELINES ON RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE IGNORED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

            More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all.  This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair.  No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial.  The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so. 

            It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court.  The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

            Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment.

            Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari^[8][1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 21, 2005 Decision,^[9][2] as well as the November 30, 2005 Resolution,^[10][3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83073.  The two issuances of the appellate court ruled against petitioners and ordered them to reconvey the subject properties to respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).  The CA upheld the April 26, 2004 Decision^[11][4] of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, the dispositive portion of which decreed as follows:

                WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the Republic of the Philippines is the owner of that certain property denominated as Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao with an area of three hundred ninety two thousand nine hundred ninety six (392,996) square meters which is registered in its name as evidenced by Original Certificate No. 13562, and as such, is entitled to the possession of the same, and that the defendants illegally occupied a five (5) hectare portion thereof since 1992. 

                Defendants are then ordered to vacate the portion so occupied by them, and pay to the national government the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per year of occupancy, from 1992 up to the time the property is vacated by them.

                Defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed.

                No pronouncement as to cost.

                IT IS SO ORDERED.^[12][5]

Factual Antecedents

            On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80,^[13][6] which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation expressly stated that it was being issued “subject to private rights, if any there be.”  Accordingly, the respondent obtained an Original Certificate of Title No. 13562^[14][7] over the property, which is more particularly described as follows:

            A parcel of land (Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao), situated in the barrio of Caggay,Municipality ofTuguegarao.  Bounded on the E. by Lot No. 2594: on the SE, by theProvincial Road: on the SW by Lot Nos. 2539, 2538, and 2535: and on NW, byLot Nos. 2534, 2533, 2532, 2478 and 2594.

            On January 16, 1995, respondent^[15][8] filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of possession^[16][9] against petitioners alleging that sometime in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property) thereof.  Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite repeated demands to do so.^[17][10]  Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is restored to possession.^[18][11]

            Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the subject property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992.^[19][12] They maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s.^[20][13]  Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the area as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document entitled Convenio.  In 1926, Antonio’s children applied for a homestead patent but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands.^[21][14]  Nevertheless, these children continued cultivating the subject property.

            Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17, 1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation.  Petitioners cite as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military reservation site “private rights, if any there be.”^[22][15]  Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against them.

            The pre-trial conference conducted on August 21, 1995 yielded the following admissions of fact:

1.  Lot No. 2470 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre is a parcel of land situated in Alimanao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with an area of 392,996 square meters.  On August 17, 1936, the President of thePhilippinesissued Proclamation No. 80 reserving the lot for military purposes.  On the strength of this Proclamation, OCT No. 13562 covering said lot was issued in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines.

2.  The defendants are in actual possession of a 5-hectare portion of said property.

3. The Administrator of the Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation demanded the defendants to vacate but they refused.

4.  The defendants sought presidential assistance regarding their status on the land covered by the title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.  The Office of the President has referred the matter to the proper administrative agencies and up to now there has been no definite action on said request for assistance.^[23][16]

Given the trial court’s opinion that the basic facts of the case were undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment.^[24][17]  Neither party filed the motion.  In fact, respondent expressed on two occasions^[25][18] its objection to a summary judgment.  It explained that summary judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and vital factual issue, which is the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property.  It argued that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.

            On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus:

                The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to raise any issue.  For this reason, a summary judgment is in order.

                Let this case be submitted for summary judgment. 

                SO ORDERED.^[26][19]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court^[27][20]

            Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004 Decision^[28][21] dismissing petitioners’ claim of possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.  The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80 recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners’ position could “not be sustained, as there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government.”^[29][22] 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals^[30][23]

            Petitioners appealed^[31][24] to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision, in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The appealed decision dated April 26, 2004 of theRegionalTrialCourtofTuguegaraoCity, Cagayan Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4846 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.^[32][25]

            The CA explained that, in order to segregate the subject property from the mass of public land, it was imperative for petitioners to prove their and their predecessors-in-interest’s occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to the issuance of the proclamation.^[33][26] There must be clear, positive and absolute evidence that they had complied with all the requirements of the law for confirmation of an imperfect title before the property became a military reservation site.^[34][27]  Based on these standards, petitioners failed to establish any vested right pertaining to them with respect to the subject property.^[35][28]  The CA further held that petitioners did not say what evidence they had of an imperfect title under the Public Land Act.^[36][29] 

            The CA denied reconsideration of its Decision, hence petitioners’ appeal to this Court.

Petitioners’ Arguments

            Petitioners maintain that the subject property was alienable land when they, through their ancestors, began occupying the same in the early 1900s.  By operation of law, they became owners of the subject parcel of land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.  Thus, when Proclamation No. 80 declared that “existing private rights, if there be any” are exempt from the military reservation site, the subject property remained private property of the petitioners.

            Petitioners then ask that the case be remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence.  They maintain that the case presents several factual  issues, such as the determination of the nature of the property (whether alienable or inalienable) prior to 1936 and of the veracity of petitioners’ claim of prior and adverse occupation of the subject property.^[37][30]

Respondent’s Arguments

            Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that petitioners were not able to prove that they had a vested right to the subject property prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 80.  As petitioners themselves admit, their application for homestead patent filed in 1926 was not acted upon, hence they did not acquire any vested right to the subject property. Likewise, petitioners did not prove their occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to August 17, 1936, the date when Proclamation No. 80 took effect.^[38][31] 

Issue^[39][32]

            The crux of the case is the propriety of rendering a summary judgment. 

Our Ruling

            The petition has merit.

            Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.^[40][33]  A deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:^[41][34]

                Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

                An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x.  In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.^[42][35]

            “A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”^[43][36]  The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact,^[44][37] “as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.”^[45][38]  “[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it.  This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway.”^[46][39]

            In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition.  Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as “the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.”^[47][40]

            The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.^[48][41]   The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.^[49][42]

            In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor.  In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary judgment.  Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact.  Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment.  Considering that the remedy of summary judgment is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections. 

            More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all.  This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair.  No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial.  The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so. 

            It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court.  The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense.

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.  The April 26, 2004 summary judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is SET ASIDE.  The case is REMANDED to the RegionalTrialCourtofTuguegaraoCity, Branch 1, for trial.  The Presiding Judge is directed to proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice