J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0150: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUCRESIO ESPINA (G.R. NO. 183564, 29 JUNE 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: STATUTORY RAPE (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. ESPINA)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF STATUTORY RAPE?

For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.^[1][13]

Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.^[2][14]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

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DECISION

BRION, J.:

            We resolve in this Decision the appeal from the April 22, 2008 decision^[3][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00345. The CA affirmed with modification the judgment^[4][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35,OrmocCity, finding appellant Lucresio Espina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.

On December 7, 1997, AAA,^[5][3] together with her stepmother BBB and stepsister CCC, went to the dance hall in Barangay Bantigue, Isabel, Leyte, to watch the “benefit dance.”^[6][4] At around 11:00 p.m., AAA went outside the dance hall to look for her friends. Suddenly, her father, herein appellant, called from a nearby mango tree and told her that he has an errand for her. AAA went with the appellant, as bidden. When they arrived at a “distant dark place,”^[7][5] the appellant removed his short pants and brief. The appellant then removed AAA’s panty, ordered her to lie down, went on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. AAA shouted for help, but the appellant covered her mouth with his hands. Thereafter, the appellant ordered AAA to put her panty back on. When the appellant asked why there was so much blood in her anus, AAA replied that it came from her vagina. The appellant then threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to anyone. The appellant brought AAA to their house and ordered her to change her clothes. The appellant took AAA’s clothes and hid them. Afterwards, they returned to the dance hall.^[8][6]

          At the dance hall, BBB told AAA that she had been looking for her. AAA, BBB and CCC returned to their house at around 1:00 a.m. When AAA was already asleep, DDD, the appellant’s sister, told BBB to examine AAA because she noticed that the latter had difficulty climbing the stairs. BBB examined AAA’s body and saw blood in her vagina. When BBB confronted AAA, the latter stated that she had been molested by the appellant.^[9][7] In the early morning of December 8, 1997, BBB accompanied AAA to the Municipal Health Center of Isabel, Leyte, where the latter was examined by Dr. Refelina Cerillo.^[10][8]

          The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape.^[11][9] The appellant denied the charge against him and claimed that he had a drinking session with his friends at the house of Melanio Velasco on the day of the incident. According to him, he fell asleep on a grassy area and woke up at 8:00 a.m. of the next day.^[12][10]

          The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. It also ordered the appellant to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.^[13][11]

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC  judgment, with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (2) the amount of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; (3) the amount of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and (4) the appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.^[14][12]

We DENY the appeal but modify the designation of the crime committed, the penalty imposed, and the amount of the awarded exemplary damages.

For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.^[15][13]

Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.^[16][14]

In her testimony dated May 19, 1999, AAA positively identified the appellant as the one who raped her. Her testimony was clear and straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse. In addition, her testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Cerillo.

We, likewise, find unmeritorious the appellant’s twin defenses of denial and alibi. Denial could not prevail over the victim’s direct, positive and categorical assertion.  Significantly, the appellant admitted that he was in Barangay Bantigue when the incident happened. It is settled that alibi necessarily fails when there is positive evidence of the physical presence of the accused at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity.^[17][15]

The prosecution, therefore, positively established the elements of statutory rape under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim. Not only did AAA identify her father as her rapist, she also recounted the sexual abuse in detail, particularly how her father inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, the prosecution established that AAA was below 12 years of age at the time of the rape. During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that AAA was “only 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.”^[18][16] AAA herself testified that she was born on October 26, 1986, and was 11 years old when she was raped. This testimony was corroborated by her stepmother, BBB.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. As earlier stated, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The parties likewise stipulated that AAA is the appellant’s legitimate daughter.^[19][17] During trial, AAA, BBB and the appellant testified to this fact. We, however, cannot impose the death penalty in view of R.A. No. 9346, signed into law on June 24, 2006. Pursuant to this law, we affirm the CA’s reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, with the modification, however, that the appellant shall not be eligible for parole.

We affirm the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, as they are in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.^[20][18] Civil indemnity is awarded on the finding that rape was committed.^[21][19] In like manner, moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, on the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.^[22][20]

However, we increase the amount of the awarded exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00, pursuant to established jurisprudence.^[23][21]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the April 22, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00345, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a)        appellant Lucresio Espina is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of STATUTORY RAPE, as defined and penalized in Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code;

(b)       he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, without eligibility for parole; and

(c)        the amount of the awarded exemplary damages is INCREASED from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

                                      ARTURO D. BRION

                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                      Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0149: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON (G.R. NO. 193023, 22 JUNE 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. TUAZON)

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST

DIGEST:

NAPOCOR’S TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENT’S PROPERTY. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS THAT THEY  BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER, R.A. 6395, WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT?

 NO. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. THE FORMULA PROVIDED IN NAPOCOR’S CHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT. IT IS ONLY A GUIDE.

 NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.^[1][33] In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,^[2][34] we categorically held: 

  Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court.  It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)

 The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.^[3][35] This judicial function has constitutional raison d’être; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,^[4][36] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:

 The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.  To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. 

SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY. IS NAPOCOR’S CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE COMPANY, HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND, OR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM.

That the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.^[5][38] This insinuation  has  no  legal  basis. Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,^[6][39] we ruled:

“The  owner  of  land,  who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.” (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.)

“One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company’s taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.” (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35La.Ann., 924.)

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

            This is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision^[7][1] (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of Appeals (CA)^[8][2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order^[9][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon and Maria Teresa Tuazon against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages.

ANTECEDENTS

          The antecedent facts are not in dispute.

The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land^[10][4] in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR^[11][5] installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL Project.  In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-way agreement^[12][6] with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents payments for “damaged improvements” (P23,970.00), “easement and tower occupancy fees” (P1,808.21), and “additional damaged improvements” (P1,200.00).

In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging from P2,000.00 to P2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the determination made by different branches of the RTC inSamar.

Instead of filing an answer, NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss based on the full satisfaction of the respondents’ claims. The RTC granted the motion in this wise:

ORDER

Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in favor of the Defendant.

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without costs.

            IT IS SO ORDERED.

Tarangnan,Samar,Philippines,February 3, 2004.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO A. NAVIDAD

Acting Presiding Judge^[13][7]

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals

The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellee’s Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of “just compensation” equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.^[14][8]

The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon. Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga, etc., et al.^[15][9] and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation,^[16][10] the CA pointed out that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted “taking” under the power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous and restrictive of the land’s use for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents’ land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, etc., et al.,^[17][11] the CA maintained that NAPOCOR “cannot hide behind the mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of appellants” since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. “No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings,”^[18][12] the CA added. The dispositive of the assailed decision reads:

In sum, after establishing that NAPOCOR’s acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the portion of the appellant’s land was a definite taking under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants [referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only easement fee.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation.^[19][13]

The Petition

The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not expropriate the respondents’ land, but merely established a right-of-way easement over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of transfer of the land’s title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents’ claim involved an easement, its charter — a special law — should govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code.^[20][14] NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that establishing right-of-way easements over lands traversed by its transmission lines was the “only mode” by which it could “acquire” the properties needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that R.A. 8974,^[21][15] specifically its implementing rules, supports this position.

THE COURT’ RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation.

The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to support this position.

This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay^[22][16] which was correctly cited by the CA in the assailed decision.

In Manubay,^[23][17] NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCOR’s transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court — echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al.^[24][18] — formulated the doctrinal issue in Manubay,^[25][19] as follows:

            How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case.^[26][20]

In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said:

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:

“x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.”

True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.”^[27][21] (Emphasis ours; citations omitted.)

We find it significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay^[28][22] in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez^[29][23] which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain may also “be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.”^[30][24] NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez^[31][25] as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section 3-A(b) in 1976.^[32][26] To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a “fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right-of-way.” Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues:

Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar.^[33][27]

We do not find NAPOCOR’s position persuasive. 

The application of Gutierrez^[34][28] to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable.^[35][29] The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owner’s use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez^[36][30] — that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession^[37][31] — therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.^[38][32]

NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.^[39][33] In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,^[40][34] we categorically held: 

            Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court.  It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)

          The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.^[41][35] This judicial function has constitutional raison d’être; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,^[42][36] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:

            The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.  To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. 

The same principle further resolves NAPOCOR’s contention that R.A. 8974, specifically its implementing rules, supports NAPOCOR’s claim that it is liable to the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land. We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods^[43][37] where we held that:

            While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “justness” of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.)

That the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.^[44][38] This insinuation  has  no  legal  basis. Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,^[45][39] we ruled:

            “The  owner  of  land,  who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.” (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.)

            “One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company’s taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.” (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35La.Ann., 924.)

In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation.  We so ruled in National Power Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co,^[46][40] and we reiterate this ruling today:

            As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.)

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated onMarch 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480.

          SO ORDERED.

                                                ARTURO D. BRION

                                                Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                             ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                             Associate Justice

                             Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                             RENATO C. CORONA

                             Chief Justice