Archive for July, 2011


TIP 0007: THE CASE OF JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR. OF RTC BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA.

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July 14, 2011

TIP 0007: THE CASE OF JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR. OF RTC BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA.

 

ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA VS. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA (A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2044, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN)

 

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

  

FINDING OF THE COURT:

 

The Court finds that Judge Causapin is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

. . . . . .

 

In conclusion, the Court finds Judge Causapin guilty of (1) gross ignorance of the law for dismissing, without hearing, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G on the ground of non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court on execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping; and (2) gross misconduct for having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G and requesting Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

 

THE JUDGE ALREADY RETIRED. WHAT IS HIS PENALTY?

  FINE OF P20,000.00 TO BE TAKEN FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFIT OR TO BE PAID BY HIM.

 The Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty imposable upon Judge Causapin for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. 

 

Rule 140, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court characterizes both gross ignorance of the law and procedure and gross misconduct as grave offenses.  The penalties prescribed for such offense are:  (1) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 

 

          Since Judge Causapin already retired compulsorily on November 24, 2006, the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible.  Hence, the Court imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

WHAT IS THE RULE ON GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 WHERE THE LAW INVOLVED IS SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY, LACK OF CONVERSANCE THEREWITH CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

 Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.  They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.  Judicial competence requires no less.  The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.[1][26]  The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.

 

In Pesayco v. Layague,[2][27] the Court stressed that:

 

A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law x x x.  Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[3][28]

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

THE JUDGE  DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF A PROPER CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WITHOUT HEARING.

IS HEARING REQUIRED BEFORE A COMPLAINT CAN BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A PROPER CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

YES.

Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are required.

 

SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provided that:

 

2.         Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum-shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

The same requirement was subsequently carried over to Rule 7, Section 5, second paragraph of the 1997 Rules of Court.

 

………………………….

 

Morever, defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G did not file a proper motion to dismiss.  According to Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint[.]”  Defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G incorporated their motion to dismiss into their answer with counterclaim.  They actually raised the defect in plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping as a special and affirmative defense.  This calls for the application of Rule 16, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

 

SEC. 6.  Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

 

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

 

Going by the foregoing rule, Judge Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No. 1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary hearing specifically on the defect in the plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping; or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case and tackling the issue in the course thereof.  In both instances, parties are given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint.  Judge Causapin neither conducted such a preliminary hearing or trial on the merits prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

THE JUDGE HAD BEEN HAVING DRINKING SPREES WITH THE DEFENDANTS. IS THIS GROSS MISCONDUCT?

YES. THESE RENDER SUSPECT HIS IMPARTIALITY.  A JUDGE SHOULD SO BEHAVE AT ALL TIMES AS TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY.  THE CONDUCT OF A JUDGE MUST BE FREE FROM ANY WHIFF OF IMPROPRIETY NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES BUT ALSO TO HIS BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE HIS SALA AND EVEN AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL.[4][30]

 

Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautista’s allegations; and the Court deems Judge Causapin’s silence as admission of the same.  Judge Causapin could have easily denied the allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent, notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.[5][29] 

 

Judge Causapin’s drinking sprees with the defendants and request for Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default are evidently improper.  These render suspect his impartiality.  A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private individual.[6][30] 

 

 

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

 

FIRST DIVISION

 

 

ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA,  

                     Complainant,                                                                                                                                     

 

 

 

– versus –

 

 

 

jUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Guimba, Nueva Ecija,

                       Respondent.

   A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044      

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2553-RTJ)

 

Present:

 

CORONA, C.J.,

      Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,* and

MENDOZA,** JJ.

 

Promulgated:

 

June 22, 2011

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

 

D e c i s I O N

 

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

 

          Before the Court is an administrative Complaint[7][1] filed by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista (Atty. Bautista) against Judge Blas O. Causapin, Jr. (Judge Causapin), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

 

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

 

On December 15, 2005, the heirs of Baudelio T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista; the heirs of Aurora T. Bautista, represented by Reynaldo B. Mesina; Elmer B. Polangco; Nancy B. Polangco; and Gabriel Bautista (plaintiffs), through counsel, Atty. Bautista, filed a Complaint for Partition before the RTC against Jose Bautista and Domingo T. Bautista (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 1387-G.  Civil Case No. 1387-G was raffled to Judge Causapin’s branch.

 

Defendants had until January 26, 2006 to file their answer, but on January 24, 2006, they filed a motion for an extension of 15 days within which to file the said pleading.  Judge Causapin granted defendants’ motion in an Order dated January 25, 2006.

 

Defendants filed on February 6, 2006 a second motion for extension to file answer.  In an Order of even date, Judge Causapin granted defendants an “inextendible” extension of 15 days. 

 

Defendants filed on February 20, 2006 a final motion for extension of 10 days within which to file their answer, which was again granted by Judge Causapin in an Order issued on the same day.

 

On February 25, 2006, Atty. Bautista filed a comment[8][2] on defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer.  He pointed out that all three motions did not contain a notice of the time and place of hearing, thus, these should be considered mere scraps of paper.

 

Finally, on March 20, 2006, defendants filed their joint Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss.

 

Plaintiffs countered by filing onMarch 27, 2006a motion to declare defendants in default.  Judge Causapin set the plaintiffs’ motion for hearing onApril 28, 2006.

 

Plaintiffs and Atty. Bautista appeared for the hearing set onApril 28, 2006, but defendants failed to appear.  Judge Causapin reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to May 19, 2006.

 

Plaintiffs and defendants with their respective counsels appeared during the hearing onMay 19, 2006.  Defendants’ counsel, however, moved for time within which to file pleading, which was granted by Judge Causapin.  The hearing was reset toJune 20, 2006.

 

Only plaintiffs and their counsel, Atty. Bautista, appeared for the hearing on June 20, 2006, thus, Judge Causapin again reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to July 11, 2006.

 

Atty. Bautista failed to appear for the hearing onJuly 11, 2006.  Judge Causapin once more reset the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to August 28, 2006.

 

At the hearing onAugust 28, 2006, the parties and their counsels were present.  Judge Causapin finally submitted for resolution plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default.

 

In the Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default[9][3]  dated September 18, 2006, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and Nancy Polangco did not sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the complaint, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.  He cited the ruling in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[10][4] that “[w]here there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition signed by only one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by his co-parties to represent them and to sign the certification.”[11][5]  Judge Causapin observed further that compulsory parties – plaintiffs heirs of Baudelio T. Bautista and Aurora T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista and Reynaldo Mesina, respectively – were not properly named in the complaint, in violation of Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Rules of Court.  Hence, Judge Causapin held in the end that defendants could not be declared in default for not answering a defective complaint, which in law does not exist.

 

Consequently, Atty. Bautista filed the present administrative Complaint against Judge Causapin for Gross Ignorance of the Law, for issuing (1) the Orders dated January 25, 2006, February 6, 2006, and February 20, 2006, which granted defendants’ motions for extension of time to file their answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, without notice of hearing; and (2) the Resolution dated September 18, 2006, which summarily dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G without ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default. 

 

Atty. Bautista averred that Judge Causapin, in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and utter lack of professional competence.  Atty. Bautista disputed the application of Loquias to Civil Case No. 1387-G, and insisted that Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile[12][6] was the more appropriate jurisprudence.  In Cavile, the Supreme Court recognized the execution of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of the petitioners, on behalf of all other petitioners therein, as substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.  In addition, Judge Causapin cannot motu proprio dismiss a case without complying with Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that the dismissal of a case without prejudice shall be upon motion and hearing.  Atty. Bautista denied that there were other compulsory heirs who were not impleaded in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and even if there were, the non-inclusion of compulsory parties was not a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint.  

 

Atty. Bautista also questioned Judge Causapin’s impartiality considering that (1) Judge Causapin was seen having a drinking spree with Jose T. Bautista, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, as attested to by Delia Ronquillo in an Affidavit dated October 16, 2006;[13][7] and (2) Judge Causapin and Jose Bautista, the other defendant in Civil Case No. 1387-G, are both active members of the Masonic Organization and drink together regularly.[14][8]

Lastly, Atty. Bautista charged Judge Causapin with gross misconduct.  Atty. Bautista alleged that he was categorically requested by Judge Causapin to withdraw the motion to declare defendants in default since, as assured by said Judge, the plaintiffs’ civil case for partition was already strong and there was no chance of plaintiffs losing the case.  Likewise constituting gross misconduct was the granting by Judge Causapin of defendants’ many motions for extension of time to file answer on the very same day said motions were filed.  A written motion without a Notice of Hearing was a mere scrap of paper.  

 

In the 1st Indorsement[15][9] datedNovember 9, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, required Judge Causapin to comment on Atty. Bautista’s complaint within 10 days from receipt.

 

On November 22, 2006, while the OCA was still awaiting Judge Causapin’s comment to Atty. Baustista’s complaint, said judge issued in Civil Case No. 1387-G a Resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated September 18, 2006,[16][10] wherein he clarified his reasons for dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G: 

 

The unsigning of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is the reason for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.

 

The Court considered also the fact that the Court cannot make a decision with finality in this case for partition since the names of the heirs of Baudelio Bautista were not on record as well as the heirs of Aurora T. Bautista represented by Reynaldo Mesina and since the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping was not signed by two of the plaintiffs.  The Court further considered the provisions of the Rules of Court in Rule 7, Section 5, paragraph 2 which provides “failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be caused for the dismissal of the case without prejudice unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.” x x x

 

The Court under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar was of the opinion that dismissing the case without prejudice would make it easier and simpler for the plaintiffs to rectify the errors observed by the Court by refiling a new complaint.

 

x x x x

 

The claim of the plaintiffs that there was no hearing held to hear is in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is without merit. 

 

The defendants in their Answer pointed to the fact that the plaintiffs’ verification of their complaint was defective.

 

The case was scheduled for Pre-trial on June 20, 2006 but the parties did not finish the Pre-trial scheduled for several times.  Both parties filed on June 20, 2006, separate motions submitting the issues for resolution of the court, hence, the questioned resolution of the court finding the defendants not in default and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice.

 

The order dismissing the complaint without prejudice was made so that the plaintiffs will be afforded time to correct whatever deficiencies very much apparent in their complaint as to parties to the case and as to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which according to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court cannot be cured by amendment.[17][11]

 

 

As regards the question of the appropriate jurisprudence, Judge Causapin held in his Resolution of November 22, 2006:

 

This Court cannot find any difference in the rule of Non-Forum shopping in the cases of Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman earlier cited and the case of Cavile et al. vs. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et al., also herein before cited.

 

x x x x

 

The only difference between the two above-cited cases is that “the Supreme Court in the case of Cavile found an exception to the general rule and allowed an exception to the general rule because it found the signature of one of the petitioners Thomas George Cavile, Sr. as the signature of the other petitioners who were all named as petitioners in the case to be having a common interest as against all the defendants calling the situation as a “special circumstance” to allow substantial compliance with the mandatory requirement of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

 

The circumstance of parties to the case present in the case of Cavile do not obtain in this case which by no stretch of imagination and of facts cannot apply to the case at bar because there is no indication that all the parties-plaintiffs have a common interest against the defendants because not all the plaintiffs were named in the complaint.[18][12]

 

 

In the same Resolution, Judge Causapin defended his Orders granting defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer to the complaint, thus:

 

While it is true that all defendants[’] Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer were furnished the plaintiffs, it is also true that all the motions of the defendants did not contain a setting of the motions for hearing. 

 

The Court considered the motions for extension of time to file answer “motions” which the Court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court x x x.

 

The Court therefore Granted all the motions of extension of time filed by the defendants favorably.[19][13]

 

 

On December 6, 2006, Judge Causapin filed his Comment[20][14] to Atty. Bautista’s complaint against him, essentially reiterating the ratiocinations in his Resolution dated November 22, 2006 in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

The OCA submitted on February 20, 2007 its Report[21][15] with the following recommendations:

 

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation that (a) the instant case be RE-DOCKETTED as an administrative matter; and (b) respondent judge be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00, which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits; in case such accrued leave credits be found insufficient to answer for the said fine, the respondent Judge shall pay the balance thereof to the Court.[22][16]

 

 

          The Court re-docketed Atty. Bautista’s Complaint as a regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they are willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[23][17]  Even though both parties duly received notices, only Judge Causapin submitted such a Manifestation[24][18] on June 11, 2007.  The Court finally deemed the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

          The Court finds that Judge Causapin is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court – which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91,[25][19] as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94[26][20] – requires the plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.   

 

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court prescribes:

 

SEC. 5.  Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

 

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.  The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.  If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

 

 

No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and constitutes a defect in the petition.  The attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition.[27][21]

 

It is true that in Loquias, the Court required strict compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

 

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case.  We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.  Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.  Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.  There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification.  It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending.  We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.  The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.  Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.  Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[28][22]

 

 

Nevertheless, in Cavile,[29][23] the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing substantial compliance with the rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping:

 

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient.  However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.  This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.  It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

 

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.  All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon.  They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents.  Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.  There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.  Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as “special circumstance” for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.[30][24]

 

 

Atty. Bautista argues that:

 

[T]he Cavile Case is more relevant to the case before [Judge Causapin] – the Loquias Case being an Election Contest; whereas, the Cavile Case was an action for Partition under Rule 69.  Expectedly, the parties in an Election case may have different causes of action or defences; whereas, in a simple action for Partition, the plaintiffs normally have a common interest in the subject of the case, and therefore, a common cause of action against the defendants.  Precisely, the matter of “common cause of action” was the rationale in allowing the signature of only one plaintiff in the Cavile case as substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 7 Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The conclusion of respondent-Judge is this respect displays his ignorance of the law and lack of competence.[31][25]

 

 

Judge Causapin concluded that Cavile does not apply to Civil Case No. 1387-G because the plaintiffs in the latter case do not have a common interest.  Without notice and hearing, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint in the said civil case because of the purported defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping.  Thus, plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to explain, justify, and prove that the circumstances in Cavile are also present in Civil Case No. 1387-G. 

 

Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are required.

 

SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provided that:

 

2.         Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum-shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

The same requirement was subsequently carried over to Rule 7, Section 5, second paragraph of the 1997 Rules of Court.

 

Morever, defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G did not file a proper motion to dismiss.  According to Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint[.]”  Defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G incorporated their motion to dismiss into their answer with counterclaim.  They actually raised the defect in plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping as a special and affirmative defense.  This calls for the application of Rule 16, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

 

SEC. 6.  Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

 

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

 

 

Going by the foregoing rule, Judge Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No. 1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary hearing specifically on the defect in the plaintiffs’ certificate of non-forum shopping; or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case and tackling the issue in the course thereof.  In both instances, parties are given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint.  Judge Causapin neither conducted such a preliminary hearing or trial on the merits prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.  They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.  Judicial competence requires no less.  The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.[32][26]  The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.

 

In Pesayco v. Layague,[33][27] the Court stressed that:

 

A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law x x x.  Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[34][28]

 

 

Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautista’s allegations; and the Court deems Judge Causapin’s silence as admission of the same.  Judge Causapin could have easily denied the allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent, notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.[35][29] 

 

Judge Causapin’s drinking sprees with the defendants and request for Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default are evidently improper.  These render suspect his impartiality.  A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private individual.[36][30] 

 

Nonetheless, we cannot hold Judge Causapin administratively liable for granting defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer without hearing and on the same day said motions were filed. 

 

Atty. Bautista questions defendants’ motions for extension of time to file answer, which did not contain notices of hearing as required by the following provisions under Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

 

SEC. 4.  Hearing of motion.  – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

 

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. 

 

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

 

 

As prescribed by the aforequoted provisions, a movant shall set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party.  The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.[37][31]   

 

The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose.  The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant.  In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded.[38][32]

 

Yet the rule requiring notice of hearing is not unqualifiedly applicable to all motions, and there are motions which may be heard ex parte, as Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court also clearly acknowledges.  Among the latter class of motions are precisely those seeking extension of time to plead, and the reason these are not strictly held to the requirement of notice is that they are non-contentious and do not as a rule involve the substantial rights of the other parties in the suit. [39][33]  In Amante v. Suñga,[40][34] the Court declared that:

 

The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion “made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.”  As “a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard…”

 

It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objection of the motion.”[41][35]

 

 

Considering that a motion for extension of time may be acted upon by the court ex parte or without hearing, then it need not contain a notice of hearing.  It is equally unnecessary for the court to wait until motion day, under Rule 15, Section 7[42][36] of the 1997 Rules of Court, to act on a motion for extension of time.  Therefore, contrary to the finding of the OCA, Judge Causapin did not commit abuse of discretion in granting defendants’ motions for extension of time on the same day said motions were filed and even when the same motions did not contain a notice of hearing.

 

In conclusion, the Court finds Judge Causapin guilty of (1) gross ignorance of the law for dismissing, without hearing, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1387-G on the ground of non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court on execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping; and (2) gross misconduct for having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G and requesting Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No. 1387-G.

 

The Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty imposable upon Judge Causapin for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. 

 

Rule 140, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court characterizes both gross ignorance of the law and procedure and gross misconduct as grave offenses.  The penalties prescribed for such offense are:  (1) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 

 

          Since Judge Causapin already retired compulsorily on November 24, 2006, the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible.  Hence, the Court imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. 

 

WHEREFORE, Judge Blas O. Causapin, Jr. is found GUILTY of both gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct and is accordingly FINED the amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits or accrued leave credits; and if such amount is insufficient to answer for the said fine, Judge Causapin shall pay the balance thereof.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice
   
   
   
   
   
   

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

[1][26]          Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 20, 32.              

[2][27]          A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.

[3][28]         Id. at 459.

[4][30]          Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

[5][29]          See Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-936, November 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 665, 670-671.

[6][30]          Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

*               Per Raffle dated June 13, 2011.

**             Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.

[7][1]           Rollo, pp. 8-19.

[8][2]          Id. at 34-36.

[9][3]          Id. at 58-59.

[10][4]          392 Phil. 596 (2000).

[11][5]          Rollo, p. 59.

[12][6]          448 Phil. 302 (2003).

[13][7]          Rollo, pp. 60-61.

[14][8]         Id. at 62-63.

[15][9]         Id. at 64.

[16][10]        Id. at 68-77.

[17][11]        Id. at 71-77.

[18][12]        Id. at 76.

[19][13]        Id. at 72.

[20][14]        Id. at 65-67.

[21][15]         Id. at 1-5.

[22][16]        Id. at 5.

[23][17]         Id. at 79.

[24][18]         Id. at 84.

[25][19]         Effective January 1, 1992.

[26][20]         Effective April 1, 1994.

[27][21]         Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 47 (2005).

[28][22]         Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 4 at 603-604.

[29][23]         Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, supra note 6.

[30][24]        Id. at 311-312.

[31][25]         Rollo, p. 88.

[32][26]         Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 20, 32.              

[33][27]         A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.

[34][28]        Id. at 459.

[35][29]         See Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-936, November 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 665, 670-671.

[36][30]         Atty. Omaña v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 549, 558-559 (2002).

[37][31]         Basco v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 671, 685 (2000); Marcos v. Ruiz, G.R. Nos. 70746-47, September 1, 1992, 213 SCRA 177, 192; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA 520, 539; Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, December 6, 1991, 204 SCRA 654, 667; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses, Corp., G.R. No. 89125, July 2, 1991, 198 SCRA 689, 698; Cui v. Madayag, 314 Phil. 846, 858  (1995).

[38][32]         Atty. Neri v. Judge De la Peña, 497 Phil. 73, 81 (2005).

[39][33]         Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256, 266 (1987).

[40][34]         159-A Phil. 474 (1975).

[41][35]        Id. at 476-477.

[42][36]         SECTION 7. Motion day. – Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day.

 

Comment

CASE 2011-0153: RUEL AMPATUAN “ALIAS RUEL” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 183676, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; BUY BUST OPERATION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE (AMPATUAN VS. PEOPLE

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)CASE 2011-0153: RUEL AMPATUAN “ALIAS RUEL” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 183676, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; BUY BUST OPERATION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE (AMPATUAN VS. PEOPLE)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

 

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS TO PROVE IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?

 

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN: (1) THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE TOOK PLACE; (2) THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OR THE ILLICIT DRUG WAS PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE; AND (3) THAT THE BUYER AND SELLER WERE IDENTIFIED.

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WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESENT TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED?

 THE PRESENTATION  IN COURT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI — THE BODY OR SUBSTANCE OF THE CRIME – ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT A CRIME HAS ACTUALLY BEEN COMMITTED.

 In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[1][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.[2][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.[3][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.[4][22]

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WHAT IS A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

 

A BUY-BUST  OPERATION IS A FORM OF ENTRAPMENT WHEREBY WAYS AND MEANS ARE RESORTED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRAPPING AND CAPTURING THE LAWBREAKERS IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR CRIMINAL PLAN.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

IS BUY-BUS OPERATION LEGAL?

 YES PROVIDED THAT DUE REGARD TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SAFEGUARDS IS UNDERTAKEN.

           A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[5][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[6][25]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

HOW MUCH WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO TESTIMONIES OF POLICE OFFICERS?

 

MUCH CREDENCE BE GIVEN TO THEM UNLESS THERE IS EVIDCENCE TO THE CONTRARY. THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A REGULAR MANNER.

 In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[7][26]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

HOW MUCH WEIGHT IS GIVEN TO TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS?

 ACCORDED RESPECT WHEN NO GLARING ERRORS, GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OR SPECULATIVE AND ARBITRARY CONCLUSIONS CAN BE GATHERED.

 Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[8][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[9][28]

 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

HOW DOES ONE   OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS?

 THERE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS EITHER DID NOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES OR THAT THEY WERE PROMPTED WITH ILL MOTIVE.

         Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.[10][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.[11][30]

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WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED DRUGS?

 As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)[12][31]

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

WHAT ARE THE LINKS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

 FIRST: EIZURE OF DRUG BY APPREHENDING OFFICER, SECOND: URNOVER BY APPREHENDING  OFFICER TO INVESTIGATING OFFICER; THIRD: URNOVER BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO FORENSIC CHEMIST AND FOURTH: TURNOVER BY THE FORENSIC CHEMIST TO THE COURT.

 The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[13][32]

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEIZED DRUG?

 Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[14][36]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

PETITIONER DENIES KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRANSACTION AND HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COMPANIONS WERE JUST VISITORS IN THAT HOUSE. IS THIS VALID DEFENSE.

 NO.

 Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[15][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

====================================

 

FIRST DIVISION

RUEL AMPATUAN “Alias RUEL,”                                                Petitioner, G.R. No. 183676
 

– versus –

 

 

 

 

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

                                             Respondent.

                               

 Present:CORONA, C. J.,     Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DELCASTILLO,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA,* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

 

         For review through this appeal[16][1] is the Decision[17][2] dated 25 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant RUEL AMPATUAN “Alias Ruel” under Section 4[18][3] of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” as amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”  The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 4, Panabo City, in Criminal Case No. 98-76, finding appellant Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659) [as further amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002] is hereby AFFIRMED.[19][4] 

The facts as presented by the prosecution before the appellate court, follows:

On 13 October 1997, at around 10:00 a.m., police operatives PO1 Arnel Micabalo (PO1 Micabalo) and PO2 Francisco S. Caslib (PO2 Caslib) together with around fifteen (15) to sixteen (16) police members belonging from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Compound in Tagum City and Panabo Police Station were given a briefing by their team leader, a certain SPO1 Derrayal, regarding a buy-bust operation they would later conduct that day against a certain suspected drug pusher by the name of Totong Ibrahim (Ibrahim) who lives near the Coca-Cola warehouse at Barangay Cagangohan, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.[20][5] 

The buy-bust operation was conducted at around 1:00 p.m. of the same day.  Police officers PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib, prepared marked money in the amount of P500.00[21][6] and went to the house of Ibrahim posing as buyers.  The rest of the team positioned themselves at the grassy area nearby awaiting for the pre-arranged signal from PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib.  The policemen saw the accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan (Mr. Ampatuan) and his wife Linda, at the gate of the fence.[22][7]  They talked to the couple and pretended to buy for a party, marijuana worth P500.00.[23][8]  The couple told them to wait outside the fence and then went inside the house. Several minutes later, the couple came out with another man identified as Maguid Lumna (Lumna).  Mr. Ampatuan asked for the payment.  The poseur-buyers handed the marked money to Mr. Ampatuan, who in turn handed it to his wife, Linda.  Mr. Ampatuan then showed the police officers the marijuana contained in one pack.  This was placed inside a black bag and given to the poseur-buyers.  The pre-arranged signal of talking aloud was made and the rest of the police officers proceeded to the scene.  The couple and Lumna were arrested and brought to the Panabo Police Station.[24][9] 

On 23 October 1997, the confiscated object was turned over by the Panabo Police Station to Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero (Austero) of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Davao City.[25][10]  Upon examination, the sample taken yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana.  The total weight of the confiscated specimen as testified by Austero was approximately 1.3 kilos.[26][11] 

The version of the defense is:

On 13 October 1997, Mr. Ampatuan, his wife Linda and bodyguard Lumna went to the house of one Arnulfo Morales (Morales) in TagumCityto inquire about reports that the town of Asuncionwas impassable because of flooding.  Mr. Ampatuan explained in his testimony that the alleged flooding was the reason given by his debtor Muker Ganda (Muker) to explain the belated payment of a loan.   Morales advised them that they should go directly to the house of Muker at PanaboCity, Davao del Norte to collect the amount due in his favor.[27][12] 

Upon boarding a bus going to PanaboCity, the three met Arlene, the wife of Ibrahim.  Arlene, Linda’s classmate in elementary, invited them for lunch at her house, which was near Muker’s residence.  When they reached Muker’s house, the latter was not able to pay for his loan, hence they just acceded to the invitation of Arlene.  While inside the house, they saw Ibrahim outside with two companions.  At that point, five police officers entered the premises where Ibrahim was and one of them fired his gun.  Ibrahim and his companions ran, were chased by the police but were not apprehended.  Failing to capture Ibrahim, the police officers then barged back to the house where the couple, Lumna, and Arlene were.  They accused Mr. Ampatuan to be the owner of the black bag containing marijuana samples carried by the police officers.  Mr. Ampatuan vehemently denied the ownership of the same and his participation in the sale and/or possession of illegal drugs.  He explained that he and his companions were merely visitors of Arlene.  Nevertheless, the police officers insisted that he owned the samples and the black bag and they were eventually brought to the police station.[28][13]

An Information was filed against Mr. Ruel Ampatuan, Linda Ampatuan and Maguid Lumna dated 17 March 1998 which reads:

The undersigned accuses RUEL AMPATUAN alias “Ruel,” LINDA AMPATUAN alias “LINDA” and MAGUID LUMNA of the crime of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about October 13, 1997, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deal and distribute two (2) packs of dried Marijuana leaves weighing one (1) kilo and three hundred fifty nine & 3/100 grams.[29][14]

Upon arraignment, the couple and Lumna entered a plea of not guilty.

On 31 January 2002, the trial court found Mr. Ampatuan guilty but acquitted Linda and Lumna of the offense charged.  The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00 pursuant to law.  Accused Linda Ampatuan alias “Linda” and accused Maguid Lumna are ACQUITTED for reasons of reasonable doubt.  The two packs of dried marijuana leaves weighing a total of 1.3 kilos are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be destroyed in accordance with law.  Costs de oficio.[30][15]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the judgment of the trial court.[31][16]  The appellate court ruled that the prosecution proved the requisites for illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, to wit: (1) that the accused sold and delivered the prohibited drugs to another, and (2) that the accused knew that what was sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.[32][17]  It noted that the prosecution presented as evidence in court the corpus delicti.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

In this petition, the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan raised two assignments of errors:

First, Whether or not there was a correct application of the law and jurisprudence by the lower courts on the matter; and,

Second, Whether or not the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leaning on the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt are correct.[33][18]

The accused-appellant questions the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers related to his apprehension.  He likewise invokes denial of any knowledge and ownership of the black bag which contained the marijuana samples and asserts that he was mauled by the police officers to admit the ownership thereof and of the purported illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

The Court’s Ruling

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[34][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.[35][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.[36][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.[37][22]

As per record of the case, this Court is convinced that there was complete compliance with all the requisites under the law.

The prosecution established that at 1 p.m. of 13 October 1997, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the members of the police force to entrap a drug pusher named Ibrahim.  However, despite his absence in the target area, the entrapment operation ensued within the same place between the police officers who acted as poseur-buyers and the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan.  This was shown in the direct testimony[38][23] of PO2 Caslib:

Q:  So what did you do with the money when they asked for it?

A:  I gave the money personally and then the other person gave to us the marijuana.

Q:  When you said the other person, is that male or female?

A:  He is male, sir.

Q: You said you handed the money, to whom did you hand the money?

A:  I handed it to Ruel.

Q:  Now tell us, if this Ruel and Linda that you mentioned are in court, will you able to identify them?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Please point to the court this Ruel Ampatuan.

A:  That man, sir.

            (Witness is pointing to a person wearing maong pants and maroon long sleeves and when asked, identified himself as Ruel Ampatuan.)

x x x x

Q:  After you handed the money to Ruel Ampatuan, what did you do next, if any?

A:  I handed the money to Ruel and then he gave it to his wife.

Q:  And after he gave the money to his wife, what happened next?

A:  He gave us the item.

Q:  Where did this item come from?

A:  It came from the black bag, from the house of Totong Ibrahim.

Q:  Why, where were you exactly talking with the two accused?

A:  We were in front of the house of Totong Ibrahim.

x x x x

Q:  You mentioned that he got this bag of marijuana, what did the accused do with it?  Where did he bring it?

A:  He brought it outside.

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A:  We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy-bust operation. 

Q:  What happened next?

A: We apprehended the two (2) and then our back-up companions also identified themselves.

            We find credit to the straight-forward testimony of PO2 Caslib.  Absence of any ill-will on the part of the prosecution witnesses who were the best witnesses in prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, we sustain the findings of the lower courts.

Further, the accused-appellant challenges the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers in the purported transaction of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.  He argues that the police officers forced him to admit the ownership of the marijuana samples due to their failure to apprehend their real target, Ibrahim. 

          A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[39][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[40][25]

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[41][26]

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[42][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[43][28]

        Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.[44][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.[45][30]

As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)[46][31]

 

 

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[47][32]

As testified by PO2 Caslib, the marijuana came from the black bag and was handed by Mr. Ampatuan to them.    The marijuana was eventually turned over to the police station.  It was positively identified by PO2 Caslib in open court. 

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A: We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy- bust operation.[48][33]

x x x x

Q:  I am showing to you a bag here which was earlier marked as Exhibit “F,” tell us what relation had this to the bag that you mentioned?

A:  That is the bag, sir.

Q:  How do you know that this is the one?

A:  Because it is somewhat an old bag.

Q:  Were you able to look at the contents of this bag on that day?

A:  Yes, during our arrival at the police station.

Q:  Do you mean to say that that was your first time to look at the contents of this bag?

A:  We saw the content of the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim and we removed everything at the police station.

Q:  Who opened the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim?

A:  It was Ruel Ampatuan.

Q:  When Ruel opened this, what was the content?

A:  Marijuana, sir.

Q: Can you tell us how they were arranged or how they were packed inside?

A:  They were arranged by files, sir.

Q:  How many files if you can remember?

A:  it is wrapped with cellophane.

Q:  I will open this bag and show its contents to you.  Tell us what relation has this marijuana to the marijuana which you purchased from the accused?

Q:  This is the one, sir.[49][34]

The corpus delicti of the crime which was the illicit drug was tested by Forensic Chemist Austero who later testified[50][35] and confirmed that the sales confiscated during the sale was marijuana.

Q: Now, you mentioned that you were the one who conducted the examination, tell us what kind of examination was this?

A: The examination was qualitative, Sir.  That is to determine the presence of the sought for substance.  So in this case, it is alleged to be marijuana.  It is the determination of the presence of marijuana on these specimens submitted.

Q:  Now, briefly, how is your examination done, can you describe it?

A: A sample is treated with a duquenois-levine reagent and if the purple color appears, it indicates the presence of marijuana plant. 

Q:  Now, by the way, how much was the quantity of the marijuana handed to the laboratory?

A:  The first which I marked as “A”, the weight is 774.5 grams and the one which I marked as ‘B,” weighed 584.8 grams.

Q:  Now, how much sample from “A” did you use for your examination?

A:  Sir, I did not weigh the samples that were taken from the specimens.

Q: Now, by the way, what was the result of this examination that you conducted?

A: Both specimens gave positive result to the test for the presence of marijuana, Sir.

Q:  Did you reduce your report into writing?

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Do you have a copy with you.

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Where in your report [indicates] that the result was positive?

A:  Under findings, Sir.

Q: How much, by the way, was the total weight of the entire specimens that were handed to your office?

A:  The total weight of the specimens Sir was 1, 359.3 grams.

Q:  In terms of kilos, how will you convert that?

A:  1.3 kilos.

Q: Now, in this report of yours, there is a signature over the typewritten name on the right side, whose signature is that?

A:  That is my signature, Sir.

Pros. dela Banda:

At this point, Your Honor, may we request that this Chemistry Report No. D-200-97 be marked as Exhibit “J” in accordance with the pre-trial, Your Honor.  This is the original also, Your Honor.

Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[51][36]

Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[52][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

          WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The 25 June 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 4, finding accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan guilty of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425[53][38], as amended by Section 13, Republic Act No. 7659, as further amended by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.  Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

                                                                                      JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                                                                                          Associate Justice 
               WE CONCUR:   

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                        RENATO C. CORONA

    Chief Justice

[1][19]       People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 757 citing People v. Bandang, G.R. No. 151314, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 579.

[2][20]       People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 552, 567.

[3][21]       People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 630, 636-637 citing People v. Orteza, supra note 16 at 758 citing further People v. Zeng Hua Dian, G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 34.

[4][22]       People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101 citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.

[5][24]          People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 118, 135; Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, 6 February 2009, 578 SCRA 147, 152.

[6][25]          People v. De Leon, id.; People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, 21 August 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439.

[7][26]       People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552

[8][27]          People v. Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 9 February 2010, 612 SCRA 91, 106; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 366 citing People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295-296 (2003).

[9][28]          People v. Villamin, id. at 106-107 citing People v. Macatingan, id. at 366 citing further People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 741, 752-753.

[10][29]      People v.  Roa, G.R. No. 186134, 6 May 2010, 620 SCRA 359, 367-368.

[11][30]      Id. at 368 citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116 (2002).

[12][31]      People v. Presas, G.R. No. 182525, 2 March 2011.

[13][32]      People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 441, 451 citing People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.

[14][36]      People v. Quiamanlon, G.R. No. 191198, 26 January 2011.

[15][37]        People v. De Leon, supra note 21 at 136; People v. Isnani, G.R. No. 133006, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 454 citing People v. Ganenas, 417 Phil. 53, 68 (2001) citing further People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 788 (2000).

*              Per Special Order No. 1022.

[16][1]          Via notice of appeal, pursuant to Section 2(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

[17][2]          Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring.  Rollo, pp. 34-45. 

[18][3]                          Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions. In case of a practitioner, the additional penalty of the revocation of his license to practice his profession shall be imposed. If the victim of the offense is a minor, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed.

Should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section, be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the pusher.

[19][4]          Court of Appeals Decision.  Rollo, p. 44.

[20][5]          Testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib. TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 5-8.

[21][6]          Broken down to five (5) P100.00 bill.

[22][7]          Testimony of Arnel Micabalo.  TSN, 10 March 1999, p. 6.

[23][8]          Decision of the Court of Appeals.  Rollo, p. 36.

[24][9]          Testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib. TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 9-13.

[25][10]         Testimony of Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero.  TSN, 19 January 2000, pp. 5-19.

[26][11]        Id. at 8-10.

[27][12]         Testimony of Ruel Ampatuan.  TSN, 15 August 2001, pp. 4-6.

[28][13]         Decision of the Court of Appeals.  Rollo, pp. 37-38.

[29][14]         Records, p. 1.

[30][15]        Id. at 114-115.       

[31][16]         Decision of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, p. 44.

[32][17]        Id. at 41.

[33][18]         Petition. Id. at 21.

[34][19]      People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 757 citing People v. Bandang, G.R. No. 151314, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 579.

[35][20]      People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 552, 567.

[36][21]      People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 630, 636-637 citing People v. Orteza, supra note 16 at 758 citing further People v. Zeng Hua Dian, G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 34.

[37][22]      People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101 citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.

[38][23]         Direct testimony of PO2 Francisco S. Caslib.  TSN, 8 March 2000, pp. 11-13.

[39][24]         People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 118, 135; Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, 6 February 2009, 578 SCRA 147, 152.

[40][25]         People v. De Leon, id.; People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, 21 August 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439.

[41][26]      People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552

[42][27]         People v. Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 9 February 2010, 612 SCRA 91, 106; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 366 citing People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295-296 (2003).

[43][28]         People v. Villamin, id. at 106-107 citing People v. Macatingan, id. at 366 citing further People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 741, 752-753.

[44][29]      People v.  Roa, G.R. No. 186134, 6 May 2010, 620 SCRA 359, 367-368.

[45][30]      Id. at 368 citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116 (2002).

[46][31]      People v. Presas, G.R. No. 182525, 2 March 2011.

[47][32]      People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 441, 451 citing People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.

[48][33]         Testimony of PO2 Arnel Micabalo.  TSN, 8 March 2000, p. 12.

[49][34]        Id. at 13-14.

[50][35]         Direct Testimony of Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero. TSN, 19 January 2000, pp. 8-9.

[51][36]      People v. Quiamanlon, G.R. No. 191198, 26 January 2011.

[52][37]        People v. De Leon, supra note 21 at 136; People v. Isnani, G.R. No. 133006, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 454 citing People v. Ganenas, 417 Phil. 53, 68 (2001) citing further People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 788 (2000).

[53][38]      Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the “THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972” provides in part: 

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, x x x, any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions. x x x.

Comment

CASE 2011-0152: IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES, RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES. (G.R. NO. 182645, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: INTERVENTION (BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES).

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 1 Comment
July 13, 2011

CASE 2011-0152: IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES, RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES. (G.R. NO. 182645, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: INTERVENTION (BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES).

====================

 

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

 

PETITIONER WAS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE AT RTC AND CA. CAN BE FILE THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?

 

NO. HE MUST BE A PARTY AGRIEVED BY A DECISION. AN AGRIEVED PARTY UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 65 [OF THE RULES OF COURT] IS ONE WHO WAS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.  X X X. A PERSON NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN THE CA CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT TO HAVE THE JUDGMENT REVIEWED.

           

 

First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.[1][8]

 

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.[2][9]

 

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.[3][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.[4][11]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

BUT PETITIONER ONLY ACQUIRED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN JANUARY 2005 AND HE FILED THE PETITION ONLY AFTER LEARNING OF THE RTC AND CA DECISION. HE COULD NOT HAVE INTERVENED EARLIER. . IS HIS ARGUMENT RIGHT.

 

NO. HIS SITUATION IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION. TO DO SO WOULD PUT INTO THE HANDS OF THE LITIGANTS IN A CASE THE POWER TO RESURRECT OR TO INTRODUCE ANEW, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF INTERVENORS, ISSUES TO A LITIGATION WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN LONG SETTLED ON APPEAL.

 

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

 

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

 

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,[5][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.[6][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

 

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.[7][14]

 

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

 

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,[8][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

 

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x[9][16]

 

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

====================

 

 

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

                         

                                                                        SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

 

In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, Antonio Rodriguez, Macario J. Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates,

 

RENE B. PASCUAL,

                                         Petitioner,                                    

 

– versus –

 

 

 

JAIME M. ROBLES,                         

                                         Respondent.

 G.R. No. 182645

 

 

Present:

 

 

   CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

   VELASCO, JR.,

   PERALTA,

  MENDOZA, and

   PEREZ,* JJ.

 

 

 

Promulgated:

 

     June 22, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

                                                 

 

DECISION

 

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

 

          On December 15, 2010, this Court promulgated a Resolution[10][1] which set aside its Decision[11][2] earlier issued on December 4, 2009 on the ground that herein petitioner, Rene B. Pascual failed to implead herein respondent Jaime M. Robles, who is an indispensable party to the present case.

 

          After receiving respondent’s Comment and Opposition,[12][3] as well as petitioner’s Reply[13][4] thereto, the Court will now proceed to determine the merits of the instant petition for certiorari.

 

          Again, the Court finds it apropros to restate the pertinent antecedent facts and proceedings as set forth in the December 4, 2009 Decision as well as in the December 15, 2010 Resolution, to wit:

                        On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the [Regional Trial Court] RTC [ofIrigaCity]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.

 

                        Henry, Certeza and Rosalina’s claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.

 

                        At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of thePhilippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.

 

                        Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.

 

                        Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.

 

                        Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:

 

                        (1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;

                        (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;

                        (3) Jaime Robles;

                        (4) Florencia Rodriguez;

                        (5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

                        (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez

 

                        Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.

 

                        In his opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan,Pasig, Rizal.

 

                        After hearing on Jamie Robles’ application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.

 

                        On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.

 

                        On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.[14][5]           

 

 

                   Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a notice of appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles’ failure to file a record on appeal.

 

                        Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

 

                        In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance.

 

                        On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.

 

                        Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004.  Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

 

                        On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory.

 

                        On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.[15][6]

 

          Petitioner posits the following reasons relied upon for the allowance of his petition:

 

            I

                        THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED APRIL 16, 2002 WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

 

 

II

                        THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, BASED ON THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

                       

 

 

III

                        THE AFOREMENTIONED COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, WERE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AS THEY CONTRAVENED, INCONSISTENT WITH AND CONTRADICTORY TO THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULE THAT ALL COURTS SHOULD TAKE THEIR BEARINGS FROM THE SUPREME COURT.[16][7]

 

          The Court finds that there are compelling reasons to dismiss the present petition, as discussed below.

 

          First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.[17][8]

 

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.[18][9]

 

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.[19][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.[20][11]

 

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

 

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

 

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,[21][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.[22][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

 

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.[23][14]

 

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

 

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,[24][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

 

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x[25][16]

 

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

 

          Considering the foregoing, the Court no longer finds it necessary to address the issues raised by petitioner.

 

          WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                             Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

       PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                    JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA   

            Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice 

 

 

 

 

 

[1][8]           The complete text of Section 1, Rule 65 reads as follows:

                Section 1. Petition for certiorari.– When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

                The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

[2][9]           Concepcion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 420, 434-435, citing Tang v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)

[3][10]          Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  183905 and 184275, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 679, 697; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p.  724, citing Ramos v. Lampa, 63 Phil. 215 (1936).

[4][11]          Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 36.

[5][12]          G.R. No.  134269, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 258.

[6][13]               Id. at 280.

[7][14]          Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 293.

[8][15]          G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362.

[9][16]               Id. at 372-373.

*               Designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 1008 dated June 10, 2011.

[10][1]          Rollo, pp. 422-431.

[11][2]          Id. at 193-213.

[12][3]          Id. at 656-701.

[13][4]          Id. at 705-711.

[14][5]          Id. at 228-231.

[15][6]          Id. at 425-426.

[16][7]          Id. at 12-13.

[17][8]          The complete text of Section 1, Rule 65 reads as follows:

                Section 1. Petition for certiorari.– When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

                The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

[18][9]          Concepcion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 420, 434-435, citing Tang v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)

[19][10]         Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  183905 and 184275, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 679, 697; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p.  724, citing Ramos v. Lampa, 63 Phil. 215 (1936).

[20][11]         Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 36.

[21][12]         G.R. No.  134269, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 258.

[22][13]             Id. at 280.

[23][14]         Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 293.

[24][15]         G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362.

[25][16]             Id. at 372-373.

Comment