CASE 2011-0111: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR. (G.R. NO. 172011, 7 MARCH 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.)  SUBJECT: LAND REGISTRATION; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; PD 1525. (BRIEF TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. RIZALDO)

THIRD DIVISION

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647 which affirmed the Decision^[2] of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving respondent’s application for registration of an 8,957-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union. 

The facts are undisputed.

On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration^[3] of a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706,^[4] located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square meters.

Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer^[5] dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land.  In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206^[6] for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment^[7] of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. 

On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership.  The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition. 

At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth.  Consequently, the trial court issued an Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines and entered the same in the records of the case. 

At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject property by purchase from his mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as evidenced by a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962.^[8]  He also testified that he was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property; that no one was questioning his ownership over the land; and that he was the one paying the real property tax thereon, as evidenced by the bundle of official receipts covering the period of 1953 to 2000.  He also stated that he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one opposed the survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete markers on the boundaries of the property.  Further, he stated that he was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mother’s ownership and possession of the subject property. 

Respondent’s mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also presented during the trial.  She stated that she purchased the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale^[9] dated July 8, 1952.  She confirmed that before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner of the subject property and was in possession thereof, without anyone questioning her status as owner.  She further stated that she was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she even installed improvements on the subject property.

After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report^[10] on July 17, 2001.  Aside from the technical description of the land, the report certified that indeed the subject parcel of land was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land. 

On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any evidence.

As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its Decision^[11] on November 29, 2001, approving respondent’s application.  The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads–

WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special Default, hereby approves the application and orders the adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey Plan No. PSU-200706 (Exh. “A”) and the Technical Description of the land (Exh. “B”) situated at Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union containing an area of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Seven (…8,957) square meters.

Once this decision becomes final and executory let the corresponding decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.^[12]

On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal.  In its Brief,^[13] the OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicant proved a registrable title to the property.  However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision^[14] on March 14, 2006, affirming the trial court’s decision.

The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to seek relief. 

In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all lands of public domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its alienable and disposable lands is a mere privilege.  Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is strictly construed against the grantee/applicant.^[15]

The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show indubitably that he has complied with all the requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law. The OSG maintains that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest failed to show convincingly that he or they were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land of the public domain as required by law.  The OSG points out that there is no evidence showing that the property has been fenced, walled, cultivated or otherwise improved.  The OSG argues that without these indicators which demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation, the application for registration cannot be allowed.^[16]

On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented sufficient proof that the subject property was indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.  He also asserts that his title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback to 1948 and hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition of an imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied.^[17] 

Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of ownership, tax declarations and official receipts of payment of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real property.  In addition, he highlights the fact that since the occupancy and possession of his predecessors-in-interest, there has been no question about their status as owners and possessors of the property from adjoining lot owners, neighbors, the community, or any other person.  Because of this, he claims that his possession of the land is open, continuous, adverse, and public — sufficient for allowing registration.

Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the manner and length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 

          We answer in the negative.

Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529^[18] or the Property Registration Decree.  The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:

            SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

x x x x

Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 

The first requirement was satisfied in this case.  The certification and report^[19] dated July 17, 2001 submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21, 1987.

In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,^[20] we have ruled that a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the classification of the land described therein. We held:

            In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic,^[21] we ruled that said Certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals^[22] and intoned therein that the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. 

            Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the subject lot.

Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession.  The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.  In Buenaventura v. Pascual,^[23] we reiterated,

            Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts.  The trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of their credibility. Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court.  x x x.

However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied.  Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale^[24] dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo.  He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078^[25] for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.^[26]  In Llanes v. Republic,^[27] the Court held that tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.^[28] However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier.  What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.^[29]

But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529?  To this question we likewise answer in the negative.

An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. The laws on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.^[30]

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.  However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.^[31]  In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled, 

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)^[32], and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.^[33]

In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general public use.^[34]  Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.

Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice^[35] we are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow respondent’s application for registration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Respondent’s application for registration is DENIED.

          No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

^*       Designated additional member per Special Order No. 940 dated February 7, 2011.

^[1]       Rollo, pp. 99-109.  Dated March 14, 2006. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.

^[2]       Records, pp. 183-189. Dated November 29, 2001. Penned by Judge Romeo V. Perez.

^[3]       Id. at 1-3.

^[4]       Id. at 4.

^[5]       Id. at 72-73.

^[6]       Id. at 76.

^[7]       Id. at 91-173.

^[8]       Supra note 5.

^[9]       Id. at 175-176.  The date appearing on the Deed is July 8, 1952 but was referred to as July 8, 1958 in the TSN and other parts of the records.

^[10]     Id. at 181-182.

^[11]     Supra note 2.

^[12]     Id. at 189.

^[13]     CA rollo, pp. 20-32.

^[14]     Supra note 1.

^[15]     Id. at 81.

^[16]     Id. at 81, 87-89.

^[17]     Id. at 180-181.

^[18]     AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which took effect on June 11, 1978.

^[19]     Supra note 10.

^[20]     G.R. No. 167652, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 233, 243-244, citing Republic v. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 150; Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37995, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 351, 357 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).

^[21]     G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 284-285.

^[22]     Supra note 20, at 711.

^[23]     G.R. No. 168819, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 143, 157.

^[24]     Records, pp. 175-176.

^[25]     Id. at 90.

^[26]     Id. at 91.

^[27]     G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258.

^[28]     Id. at 270-271, citing Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132161, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 347, 369.

^[29]     Republic v. Enciso, G.R. No. 160145, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 700, 712.

^[30]     Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 197, citing Art. 1113, CIVIL CODE; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65663, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, August 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).

^[31]     Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, id. at 203.

^[32]     Article 420, CIVIL CODE.

^[33]     Supra note 31.

^[34]     Records, pp. 181-182.

^[35]     Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 268, 277, citing Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128, 141.

CASE 2011-0111: (DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) MA.        MERCEDITAS    N. GUTIERREZ VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); AND JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) [FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.] (G.R. NO. 193459, 8 MARCH 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.)

                                       EN BANC

x————————————————————————————–x

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

          For resolution is petitioner’s “Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)” dated February 25, 2011 (Motion). 

          Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent reason to reconsider its Decision.  A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioner’s previous contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw petitioner’s attention to certain markers in the Decision.

I

          Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,^[1] the Decision of February 15, 2011 reaffirmed and illuminated the Francisco doctrine in light of the particular facts of the present case. 

          To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee “separately, one after the other”^[2] is to dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint.  Petitioner’s Motion concedes^[3] that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint.  By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint. 

          Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not “constructive initiation by legal fiction” as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco. 

          In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.^[4] Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12^th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be “deemed initiated” upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,^[5] which was clearly referred to as the instances “presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters.”^[6]  Definitely, “constructive initiation by legal fiction” did not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

          The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term “initiate,” either of which could disrupt the provision’s congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision.  Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow. 

          Petitioner urges that the word “initiate” must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

          Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as “no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year,” in which case the reckoning would literally point to the “start of the beginning.”  To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.  

          In re-affirming what the phrase “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated” means, the Court closely applied Franciscoon what comprises or completes the initiation phase.  Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco.  Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

          Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.^[7] 

          The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however.  Suffice it to restate a footnote in the Court’s Decision that in such case of “an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act.”^[8]  Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.

          Petitioner’s discussion on the singular tense of the word “complaint” is too tenuous to require consideration.  The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment complaints.  If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.

          Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing of the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust of the Filipino people and their Representatives.  To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence of power nor a reason to invalidate a law. 

          The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power.  Since the issue precisely involvesupholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into the rationale behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of power.  The Court’s duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered by the framers of the Constitution (i.e., incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function of Congress and unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically the same grounds being invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired conclusion. 

          Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly illustrate her perceived oppression.  And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence of the pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on “the respect for and adherence of the House and the respondent committee to the same.”^[9] 

While petitioner concedes that there is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down in Article XI of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile without implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded at will. 

          Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the House’s conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment proceeding.   The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine.  Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.

          Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of course, be referred to the Committee.    

          The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar.  To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion.  It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the House’s power or function to refer a complaint.

          Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint.  The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

          To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression.  She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the amount of time spent if “multiple impeachment charges”^[10] are allowed.  She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge.

          IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with Franciscoas the guiding light.  Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

II

Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication.  She again cites her thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v. Tuvera^[11] cases mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity.  Petitioner raises nothing new to change the Court’s stance on the matter.

          To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.  Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. 

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations^[12] where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation.  If the Constitution warranted the publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in the case of legislative inquiries.

          The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules.  It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.  

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that “to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…”  She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.

Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion.  Note that the Court discussed the above-mentioned scenario only “in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress.”  Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution contains relevant self-executing provisions which must be observed at the start of the impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules notwithstanding.  

Petitioner rehashes her allegations of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee Chairperson, Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen performance of his avowed duties and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment proceeding.  Besides, the actions taken by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s sole act but rather the collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership.  The Committee members even took to voting among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions presented to the Committee.            

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise.  Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases.  Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding.  The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only.  And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision. 

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s control.  Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.^[13]  And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

FINALLY, the Court has, in its February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010 Status Quo Ante Order^[14]which, as said Order clearly stated, was “effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court.”^[15]  Such “further order” points to that part of the disposition in the February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of the Status Quo AnteOrder. 

The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding.  There is thus no faulting the Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court released its February 15, 2011 Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

  SO ORDERED.

                                                CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I maintain my dissenting vote with J. Brion

 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

^* No part.

^[1]               460 Phil. 830 (2003).

^[2]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.

^[3]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9: “From these entries, it is clear that each impeachment complaint was the subject of separate and distinct referrals.  Following Francisco, upon the referral of the First Impeachment Complaint to the respondent Committee, an impeachment proceeding against petitioner Ombudsman has already been initiated.” (underscoring supplied)   

^[4]               Vide Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 1054-1055.

^[5]               Id. at 865.

^[6]               Id. at 1055.

^[7]               CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 3, par. (4).   

^[8]               Decision of February 15, 2011, footnote 61.  

^[9]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36.

^[10]             Vide II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 282 (July 26, 1986).

^[11]             220 Phil. 422 (1985); 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

^[12]             G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77; and September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.

^[13]             Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra. 

^[14]             Rollo, pp. 264-267.

^[15]             Id. at 266, emphasis and underscoring supplied.