Archive for April, 2011


CASE 2011-0090: SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALAGAR AND AURORA ALAGAR VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (G.R. NO. 171870, 16 MARCH 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECTS: CASE WHERE PROCEEDS OF WRIT OF EXECUTION WERE ORDERED RETURNED; CERTIORARI; MANDAMUS; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES ALAGAR VS. PNB)

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April 7, 2011

CASE NO. 2011-0090: SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALAGAR AND AURORA ALAGAR VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (G.R. NO. 171870, 16 MARCH 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECTS: CASE WHERE PROCEEDS OF WRIT OF EXECUTION WERE ORDERED RETURNED; CERTIORARI; MANDAMUS; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES ALAGAR VS. PNB)

SECOND DIVISION

 

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALAGAR                  G.R. No. 171870

AND AURORA ALAGAR,

                             Petitioner,                       Present:

                                                                     CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

          – versus –                                             CARPIO MORALES,*

  PERALTA,

  ABAD, and

  MENDOZA, JJ.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

                             Respondent.                            Promulgated:

 

                                                                      March 16, 2011

x ———————————————————————————— x

 

DECISION

 

ABAD, J.:

          This case is about a) a claim that the defendant is estopped from questioning the validity of a writ of execution that he subsequently complied with; b) an assertion that a supplemental petition cannot elevate to the higher court those orders of the lower court that were issued more than 60 days earlier; and c) a contention that the petition was not one for mandamus which is the proper remedy when the trial court refuses to give due course to an appeal.

The Facts and the Case

          On April 14, 1992 petitioner spouses Antonio and Aurora Alagar (the Alagars) got a personal loan of P500,000.00 from respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB), secured by a mortgage over a 368-square meter lot on General Luna Street in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.[1]  The Alagars subsequently increased their loan to P1,700,000.00 and later to P2,900,000.00 with corresponding amendments to the mortgage.

          Meanwhile, in 1995 PNB gave New Taj Resources, Inc., a corporation owned by the Alagars, a loan of P9,300,000.00, secured by a mortgage on an 8,086-square meter lot in Pantay Daya, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.  The Alagars also executed a joint and solidary agreement that bound them with other persons to pay the corporate loan to the bank.[2]

          After a few years, the Alagars’ outstanding balance on their personal loan with PNB rose to P4,003,134.36 as of May 31, 1997.  In the face of this, they negotiated with the bank and requested the condonation of interests so they could settle their debt. Meantime they paid the bank P3,900,000.00 while awaiting approval of their request. When the bank granted it, the Alagars paid the balance of P330,221.50 and sought the release of the General Luna title to them.  The bank refused, however, citing the Alagars’ other unsettled account.

          On January 12, 2001 the Alagars filed a petition for mandamus[3] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur to compel PNB to release the General Luna title to them.  They claimed that PNB had no reason to retain the title since they already paid their personal loan. They insisted that the unsettled account cited by PNB referred to the corporate loan of New Taj Resources, Inc. which was secured by the Pantay Daya title.  The Alagars claimed moral and exemplary damages for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of their property.      

          In its answer,[4] PNB alleged that the petition did not state a cause of action since mandamus is not the proper remedy for compelling the performance of contractual obligations.  Further, the bank had the right to retain the General Luna title since, as solidary debtors in the corporate loan, which had then become due, the Alagars still had an outstanding obligation with the bank. The mortgage contract between PNB and the Alagars provided that the property on General Luna was to secure, not only their personal loan, but also “any and all other obligations of the Mortgagors to the Mortgagees of whatever kind and nature.”

          At the trial, the Alagars presented their evidence and on June 26, 2001 formally offered their documentary exhibits.  The RTC set PNB’s presentation of its evidence on July 30, 2001 but its counsel failed to appear.  Consequently, the RTC deemed PNB to have waived presentation of evidence and submitted the case for decision.  It appears, however, that on the day of the hearing, the PNB branch manager in Vigan wrote the RTC a letter, explaining that the bank could not come to the hearing due to the retirement of its counsel of record.  PNB asked the court for 60 days within which to find another lawyer.[5]          

          On August 6, 2001 Atty. Benjamin V. Sotero entered his appearance as PNB’s new counsel.  He then filed a motion for reconsideration asking that PNB be allowed to present evidence.  He set the motion for hearing on September 17, 2001.  On August 7, 2001 the RTC denied PNB’s motion on the ground that it violated Sections 3[6] and 5[7] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.[8] PNB failed to accompany its motion with supporting affidavits and other papers and set it for hearing more than 10 days after its filing.

          Subsequently, Atty. Sotero failed to appear during the hearing on September 17, 2001 that he himself set for the bank’s motion for reconsideration. This prompted the trial court to issue another order on that date,[9] reiterating its earlier order submitting the case for decision. The trial court also noted that PNB did not react to its August 7, 2001 order that was sent to it by registered mail.

          On October 5, 2001 PNB filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the orders of July 30, August 7, and September 17, 2001.  The bank again asked for an opportunity to present evidence in support of its defense.  In an order dated October 29, 2001,[10] the trial court denied the omnibus motion for its failure to state when the bank received the questioned orders.  Moreover, the trial court rejected counsel’s excuse for not reacting to the August 7, 2001 order.  Counsel claimed that he had to attend to other urgent legal matters of equal importance.

          On January 15, 2002 the trial court rendered judgment[11] in favor of the Alagars.  It held that, although the pleading was denominated as a petition for mandamus, its allegations actually made out a case for specific performance. Since the Alagars’ personal loan had already been fully paid, the real estate mortgage had nothing more to secure, such that both law and equity required that the collateral given to secure it be released to the owners. 

          PNB filed a motion for new trial or for reconsideration.  It asserted in addition to its arguments on the merit of the case that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the issue of whether or not the controversial stipulation in the mortgage contract was valid and binding. The only issues presented by the pleadings were: 1) whether or not the petition stated a cause of action; (2) whether or not the title should be released to the Alagars upon full payment of their personal loan; and (3) whether or not the Alagars were entitled to damages.

          Meanwhile, PNB filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 68661, seeking to annul and set aside the trial court orders of August 7 (which denied PNB’s motion for reconsideration due to technical defects), September 17 (reiterating the August 7 order when PNB’s counsel failed to show up at the hearing he set for its motion for reconsideration), and October 29, 2001 (which denied as unmeritorious PNB’s omnibus motion for reconsideration).  Since the trial court had in the meantime already rendered a decision in the case, however, on March 20, 2002 the CA dismissed the petition for being moot and academic.[12]

          On March 25, 2002 the RTC issued an order, denying PNB’s motion for new trial or for reconsideration for failing to raise new matters and violating the 10-day hearing schedule rule.  This prompted PNB to file a notice of appeal.   The RTC issued an order on April 29, 2002, however, denying due course to the appeal on the ground that the bank filed it beyond the required 15-day period. The court said that, since PNB’s motion for new trial or reconsideration was pro forma, it did not toll the running of the period to appeal.              

          Meantime, on motion of the Alagars, the trial court caused the issuance on June 4, 2002 of a writ of execution against the bank.[13]  This prompted the PNB to file on June 13, 2002 a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. SP 71116, assailing the RTC’s March 25, April 29, and June 4, 2002 orders as well as the writ of execution that it issued.[14]  In a parallel move, PNB asked the trial court to quash the writ of execution, claiming that it was improvidently issued and that, as a matter of judicial courtesy, it should await the CA action on the bank’s petition before it.

          On July 17, 2002 the RTC denied PNB’s urgent motion to quash the writ.  The court said that issuing the writ was a ministerial duty after its decision became final and executory.  Further, the CA had not issued any restraining order against the RTC.[15]  PNB moved for reconsideration of this last order but the RTC denied the same on September 16, 2002.[16]  Thus, an alias writ of execution was issued, compelling PNB to abide by it in full.[17]    

          Later, the Alagars asked the RTC by motion to order the cancellation of the mortgage annotated on its title, alleging that this was a necessary and logical consequence of the implementation of the writ of execution.  The RTC granted the motion on August 4, 2003, stating that although the dispositive part of the decision did not say so, the order to release the General Luna title necessarily included with it the cancellation of the mortgage.[18]    

          Again, PNB sought reconsideration of the RTC’s August 4, 2003 order and the quashal of the second writ of execution.[19] In response, the Alagars filed a petition to cite the PNB for indirect contempt for failing to release the mortgage. PNB opposed the petition.  On October 21, 2003[20] the RTC granted PNB’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed the Alagars’ petition for indirect contempt. At the same time, however, it ordered the amendment of the dispositive part of its January 15, 2002 decision to read as follows:

            Wherefore, finding the allegations in the Complaint proven by competent and preponderant evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:

 

1.         Ordering the defendant Philippine National Bank (PNB), Vigan, Ilocos Sur Branch, through its Manager, Mrs. Rosalia A. Quilala to release Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3576 in the name of Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora J. Alagar to the plaintiffs herein;

2.         Ordering defendant PNB to pay same plaintiffs the amount of P1,825.00 as actual damages;

3.         Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

4.         ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO EXECUTE THE DEED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CANCEL THE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF-SPOUSES ANTONIO ALAGAR AND AURORA ALAGAR AND TO DELIVER SAID DEED TO THE LATTER;

5.         AS AN ALTERNATIVE, SHOULD THE DEFENDANT FAIL OR REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH THE HEREINABOVE ORDER NO. 4, THE DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THIS COURT, MR. TERENCIO FLORENDO IS HEREBY APPOINTED TO EXECUTE THE DEED OF CANCELLATION OF THE MORTGAGE IN SUIT IN BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT PNB FOR REGISTRATION IN THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR.

 

The counterclaim not having been proven, the same is dismissed.[21]

The Alagars filed a motion for reconsideration of the above insofar as it granted PNB’s motion for reconsideration of the August 4, 2003 order and motion to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt.  On December 18, 2003 the RTC issued an order,[22]granting the Alagars’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating its August 4, 2003 order that directed the issuance of a writ of execution.  The order also deleted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the amended dispositive portion of the decision, thus reinstating the original version.

PNB moved for reconsideration of the RTC’s December 18, 2003 order and prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance in view of CA-G.R. SP 71116 which was pending before the CA.  But the RTC denied the motion on March 11, 2004, stating that it had the inherent power to amend its decision to make it conform to law and justice.  It also declined to hold matters in abeyance since the RTC had not been amply informed about the CA action and since there was no possibility that the issues before the CA would be rendered moot if the proceedings below continued.[23]

In view of the trial court’s conflicting directives, PNB filed a motion for clarification of the March 11, 2004 order.  Further, on June 3, 2004 it also filed a supplemental petition[24] in CA-G.R. SP 71116, assailing all the RTC actions and orders subsequent to the filing of the original petition.  On June 14, 2004 the RTC issued an order,[25] resolving PNB’s motion for clarification and recalling in the meantime the writ of execution that it issued on August 4, 2003. It also deleted paragraph 5 of the amended dispositive portion of its decision but retained paragraph 4 ordering PNB to execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage in favor of the Alagars.

On September 30, 2005 the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP 71116, annulling and setting aside all the RTC’s orders beginning March 25, 2002, when the RTC denied as pro forma PNB’s motion for reconsideration of its January 12, 2002 decision. The CA held that the motion was not pro forma and, therefore, it tolled the running of the period to appeal.  PNB did not belatedly file its notice of appeal, as it still had three days to elevate the trial court’s decision to the CA.  Consequently, the decision did not become final and executory and could not be the subject of a writ of execution.[26]

Moreover, said the CA, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it substantially amended its decision which, by its own ruling, had already become final and executory.  Inasmuch as the RTC decision merely ordered the PNB to release the mortgaged title to the Alagars, the additional order directing the bank to cancel and release the mortgage constituted on that title cannot be regarded as a simple clerical correction since it would substantially prejudice PNB’s rights as mortgagee.[27]                     

The Alagars filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it for lack of merit,[28] hence this petition for review.

The Issues Presented

          The case presents the following issues:

1.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that PNB was estopped from assailing the validity of the writ of execution after it had been implemented;

2.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that it could no longer nullify the RTC’s orders that PNB assailed by supplemental petition beyond 60 days from the issuance of such orders; and

3.       Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that PNB’s petition before it was not the proper remedy for assailing the order that denied due course to its appeal.

 

The Rulings of the Court

 

FIRST.  The Alagars contend that the issue of whether the RTC validly issued a writ of execution in the case had become moot since PNB willingly obeyed the writ, returned the General Luna title to the Alagars, and paid them the damages that the RTC awarded in its decision.  Going further, the Alagars argue that the full implementation of the writ foreclosed any question concerning the validity of the decision itself.[29]   

But the execution of a judgment pending an action in a higher court essentially challenging its finality cannot be deemed an abandonment of that action.  The rules grant parties the right to question by special civil actions those orders and rulings that inferior courts issue with grave abuse of discretion.  That the PNB complied with the writ of execution after its several attempts to stop it cannot be deemed a voluntary abandonment of its action before the CA.  PNB had no choice but to obey the RTC orders, given that the CA did not then deem it appropriate to issue a restraining order.  And PNB did not relent in pursuing its action before the CA. Besides, the Alagars did not raise this issue of estoppel before the CA.  Consequently, they cannot raise the same for the first time before the Court.              

SECOND. The Alagars point out that PNB can no longer question the RTC orders that were issued from July 17, 2002 onwards since more than 60 days had elapsed when PNB challenged their validity by supplemental petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116. These orders have thus become final under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[30]   

          Again, the Alagars did not raise this issue before the CA.  Indeed, they did not file a comment on the supplemental petition despite having been required to do so.  They also failed to mention it in their memorandum before the CA.[31]  Consequently, the Court cannot adjudicate the issue. 

          Besides, the RTC’s subsequent orders were founded on the assumption that it correctly denied for being pro forma PNB’s motion for reconsideration of its decision.  All such orders assumed that the RTC decision had become final and executory.  As it turned out, however, the CA held that PNB filed a valid motion for reconsideration, that it filed a timely appeal after the motion was denied, and that, therefore, the RTC decision had not become final and executory.

THIRD.  Finally, the Alagars assert that PNB availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action of certioraribefore the CA rather than one of mandamus to compel the RTC to give due course to its notice of appeal after the latter held that itspro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the period of appeal which had then already elapsed.[32]

          But a reading of PNB’s allegations in its petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116 shows that its action was not only for certiorari and prohibition but also for mandamus.  The bank alleged that by its whimsical, capricious and arbitrary actions the RTC deprived the PNB of its appeal, leaving it with no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  The PNB petition also specifically prayed the CA to direct the trial court to give due course to its appeal.[33]  Following the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the pleading and the character of the relief sought, it is unmistakable that CA-G.R. SP 71116 was also a petition for mandamus.

          The Alagars fail to show any reversible error in the CA’s decision. That court’s finding that PNB’s motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and, therefore, tolled the running of PNB’s period to appeal, is supported by the evidence on record.  The motion for reconsideration specified the RTC’s findings and conclusions in its decision that PNB thought to be contrary to law.  The latter even raised new arguments, not previously considered by the trial court, which even the latter recognized in its assailed March 25, 2002 order.  From all indications, the motion for reconsideration complied with requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.[34]  Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to have simply concluded that the motion was pro forma and did not toll the running of the period to appeal.  The RTC should have given due course to PNB’s appeal.

          WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP 71116 dated September 30, 2005 in its entirety.  The petitioner spouses Antonio and Aurora Alagar are further ordered to RETURNto respondent PNB OCT 0-3576, as well as the amount of P181,825.00 and all other amounts that they received under the Alias Writ of Execution dated October 22, 2002.

          SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES                  DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                 Associate Justice                                Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                

 

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order 933-B dated January 24, 2011.

[1]  Registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 0-3576; CA rollo, pp. 32-36.

[2]  Id. at 37-46.

[3]  Id. at 50-54; docketed as Civil Case 5534-V.

[4]  Id. at 55-58.

[5]  Id. at 82.

[6]  SEC. 3. Contents. – A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers.

[7]  SEC. 5. Notice of Hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

[8]  CA rollo, p. 83.

[9]  Id. at 84.

[10]  Id. at 85-87.

[11]  Rollo, pp. 56-70.

[12]  CA rollo, pp. 114-116.

[13]  Rollo, pp. 79-80.

[14]  CA rollo, pp. 2-23.

[15]  Rollo, pp. 81-83.

[16]  Id. at 91-93.

[17]  Id. at 98.

[18]  Id. at 102-104.

[19]  Id. at 106-109.

[20]  Id. at 112-118.

[21]  Id. at 117-118.

[22]  Id. at 119-120.

[23]  Id. at 123-125.

[24]  CA rollo, pp. 189-206.

[25]  Rollo, p. 126.

[26]  Id. at 42-47.

[27]  Id. at 49.

[28]  Id. at 52-55.

[29]  Id. at 305.

[30]  Id.

[31]  Id. at 54; CA rollo, p. 291.

[32]  Rollo, p. 306.

[33]  CA rollo, p. 20.

[34]  SEC. 1.  Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

x x x x

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.

SEC. 2.  Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.

x x x x

                A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.

                A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0050: DIRECT CONTEMPT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION IN LAW PRACTICE.

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April 6, 2011

LEGAL NOTE 0050: DIRECT CONTEMPT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION IN LAW PRACTICE.

 

SOURCE: ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS. THE HON. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAWAN, BRANCH 52, ANDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO.  190171, 14 MARCH 2011, MENDOZA, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: RODRIGUEZ ET AL. VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR).

 

 

THE CASE

 

WHILE JUDGE BLANCAFLOR WAS HANDLING AN ARSON CASE. AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WAS FILED AGAINST HIS  DRIVER AWAYAN BY PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR RODRIGUEZ ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN BRIBERY TO SECURE ACQUITAL OF ACCUSED AMI IN THE ARSON CASE. A DAY BEFORE PROMULGATION, TRIAL FISCAL TULALI FILED EX PARTE MANIFESTATION WITHDRAWING HIS APPEARANCE TO AVOID ANY SUSPICION OF COLLUSION.  HE ATTACHED TO HIS MANIFESTATION A COPY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST AWAYAN. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR ACQUITTED ACCUSED AMI. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST CAWAYAN WAS WITHDRAWN. PERHAPS THINKING THAT THE FILING OF THE EX-PARTE MANIFESTATION BY TULALI AND THE FILING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIS DRIVER WERE INTENDED TO SMEAR HIM, JUDGE BLANCAFLOR INTERVIEWED SEVERAL WITNESSES. TULALI WAS INTERVIEWED ALSO. RODRIGUES WAS SUMMONED. RODRIGUEZ FILED MOTION ASKING CLARIFICATION AS TO WHY THE JUDGE WAS CONDUCTING INQUIRIES. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR THEN INFORMED THE PETITIONERS THAT HE WAS PROCEEDING AGAINST THEM FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT AND VIOLATION OF THEIR OATH OF OFFICE ON THE BASIS OF TULALI’S EX-PARTE MANIFESTATION. AFTER PETITIONERS  SUBMITTED THEIR POSITION PAPERS JUDGE BLANCAFLOR ISSUED A DECISION FINDING THEM GUILTY OF DIRECT CONTEMPT AND FINED THEM P100,000.00 EACH AND SUSPENDED THEM FROM PRACTICE OF LAW INDEFINITELY. ALSO THEY HAVE TO MAKE PUBLIC APOLOGY UNDER PAIN OF ARREST.

 

 

WAS THE DECISION OF THE JUDGE CORRECT?

 

NO. THE FINDINGS OF THE JUDGE HAVE NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. GRANTING THAT THERE WAS DIRECT CONTEMPT. THE PENALTY WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES. CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION ARE DIFFERENT PROCEEDINGS AND MUST BE SEPARATELY CONDUCTED. AND THE GROUND FOR SUSPENSION IS NOT AMONG THE GROUNDS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE RULES.

 

WHAT IS THE POWER TO PUNISH A PERSON IN CONTEMPT?

IT IS A POWER INHERENT IN ALL COURTS. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PRESERVE ORDER IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND TO UPHOLD THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

 

HOW WILL JUDGES EXERCISE SUCH POWER?

THEY MUST EXERCISE SUCH POWER JUDICIOUSLY AND SPARINGLY, WITH UTMOST RESTRAINT, AND WITH THE END IN VIEW OF UTILIZING THE SAME FOR CORRECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT.

SUCH POWER MUST BE EXERCISED ON THE PRESERVATIVE, NOT THE VINDICTIVE PRINCIPLE; AND ON THE CORRECTIVE, NOT THE RETALIATORY IDEA OF PUNISHMENT.[6]  SUCH POWER, BEING DRASTIC AND EXTRAORDINARY IN ITS NATURE, SHOULD NOT BE RESORTED TO UNLESS NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.[7]

 

WHAT IS DIRECT CONTEMPT?

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including:

–                     disrespect toward the court;

–                     offensive personalities toward others;

–                     refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness;

–                     refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.[8]

 

AS APPLIED TO THE CASE HOW DID THE COURT RULE?

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt.  It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused.  Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court.  Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation.  It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case.  The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and  not with the RTC.  

Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis.  There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.

Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners.  Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. 

The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.

 

PETITIONERS FAULT THE JUDGE FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS IN THE CONTEMPT CASE BECAUSE  NO HEARINGS WERE CONDUCTED AND THEY WERE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT WITNESSES. ARE PETITIONERS CORRECT?

NO.

It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules.  Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.        

 

WAS THE ALLEGED VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN DIRECT CONTEMPT?

NO.  

At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG.  For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:

Sec. 3.  Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d)       any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

                        x x x.  

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

 

IF IT WAS INDIRECT CONTEMPT WAS THERE A PROPER PROCEEDING?

NONE.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing.  There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them.  In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order.  Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. 

 

BUT PETITIONERS WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE POSITION PAPERS. WAS DUE PROCESS OBSERVED?

 

NO.

The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already been completed.

 

WAS THE JUDGE IMPARTIAL?

NO.

In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate.  He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:

a.      Your [petitioner Rodriguez’s] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov. Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;

b.  Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know, and if so what was the official action thereon;

c.       Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez, calling him “extortionist.”

Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and facilitator;

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0’clock in the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?

d.      Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why?

e.      Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate of yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and ring), why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009.  Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court?  Do you still recognize this duty and obligation?[9]

Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him.  A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]

 

CAN CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS BE CONDUCTED IN ONE PROCEEDING?

 

NO.

Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct.  They have different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established.  Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings.  As held in the case of People v. Godoy,[11] thus:

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office.  The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle.  The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

 

 

x x x.  It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.

 

Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law.                                                                                                                                                                                 

DOES A JUDGE HAVE POWER TO SUSPEND AN ATTORNEY?    

YES.

 

This Court is not unmindful of a judge’s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 

 

WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN THE REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF AN ATTORNEY?

HE MUST HAVE FULL OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE CHARGES, TO PRODUCE WITNESSES AND TO BE HEARD.

 

Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz:

          Sec. 30.  Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. – No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel.  But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.  His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.  It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.[12] 

 

AS APPLIED TO THE CASE, WAS DUE PROCESS OBSERVED?

NO.

In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession.  Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel.  Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process.

 

WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF  A LAWYER?

 

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.  

 

WAS THE BASIS OF THE JUDGE IN SUSPENDING THE PETITIONERS LEGAL?

NO.

Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.   

 

 

WHAT IS THE REMEDY IF THE JUDGE IN A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING COMMITS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ISSUING AN ORDER WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS OR IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?

 

PROHIBITION.

         

In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides: 

SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.[13]

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

[1] Annex “A” of Petition, rollo, pp. 41-46.

[2] Id. at 46.

[3] Id. at 47.

[4] Id. at 11.

[5] Id. at 67.

[6] Baculi v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA 69, 80.

[7]Bank of Philippine Island v. Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph Calanza, et al., G.R. No. 180699, October 13, 2010, citing Lu Ym v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 169476, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 253.

[8] Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[9]  Rollo, pp. 8-9.

[10]Baculi v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA 69, 80, citing Nazareno v. Barnes, 220 Phil. 451, 463 (1985), citing Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 690 (1967).

[11] 312 Phil. 977, 1032, 1033 (1995).

[12] Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Tagbilaran City, Against Atty. Samuel C. Occena, 433 Phil. 138, 154 (2002).

[13]Tiongco v. Salao, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2009, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 575, 583, citing Oclarit v. Paderanga, 403 Phil 146, 152 (2001).

Comment

CASE 2011-0089: ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS. THE HON. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAWAN, BRANCH 52, ANDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 190171, 14 MARCH 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: DIRECT CONTEMPT. (BRIEF TITLE: RODRIGUEZ ET AL. VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR).

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CASE NO. 2011-0089: ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS. THE HON. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAWAN, BRANCH 52, ANDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO.  190171, 14 MARCH 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: DIRECT CONTEMPT. (BRIEF TITLE: RODRIGUEZ ET AL. VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR).

  

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

 

ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI,

Petitioners,

– versus –

THE HON. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, andPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,                                                  

                                   Respondents.

   G.R. No.  190171

 

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Promulgated:

   March 14, 2011

 

X ———————————————————————————– X

 

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen Ross Rodriguez(Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside the October 13, 2009 Decision[1] of  respondent Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor(Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said decision.

In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court.  In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of P100,000.00.

Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave offenses and should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[2]

The Facts

 

          Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case. 

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-ParteManifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion.  He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.

On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies.  On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-partemanifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others.

On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.

In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.

As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt.  The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.                                              

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the assailed November 6, 2009 Order.[3]

Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on the following

GROUNDS

(A)

 

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

 

(B)

 

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.

 

 

(C)

 

SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.[4]    

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law.  They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence.  According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the “direct contempt” proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,[5] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness.  It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.[6]  Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.[7]

In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.    

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.[8]

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt.  It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused.  Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court.  Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation.  It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case.  The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and  not with the RTC.  

Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis.  There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.

Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners.  Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. 

The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.

Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings.  It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules.  Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.        

In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged “vilification campaign” against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt.  At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG.  For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:

Sec. 3.  Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d)       any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

                        x x x.  

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing.  There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them.  In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order.  Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. 

The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already been completed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

          In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate.  He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:

a.      Your [petitioner Rodriguez’s] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov. Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;

b.  Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know, and if so what was the official action thereon;

c.       Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez, calling him “extortionist.”

Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and facilitator;

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0’clock in the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?

d.      Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why?

e.      Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate of yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and ring), why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009.  Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court?  Do you still recognize this duty and obligation?[9]

            Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him.  A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]

Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct.  They have different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established.  Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings.  As held in the case of People v. Godoy,[11] thus:

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office.  The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle.  The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

 

 

x x x.  It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.

 

          Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

          Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted, the suspension of petitioners must still fail.

         

This Court is not unmindful of a judge’s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.  Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz:

          Sec. 30.  Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. – No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel.  But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.  His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.  It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.[12] 

In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession.  Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel.  Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process.

Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action.  Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.  Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.   

         

In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides: 

SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.[13]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order are hereby annulled and set aside.  Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory.

 

SO ORDERED.

                                                               JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA                                                                                Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

 Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                    DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

               Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                                          Associate Justice

                                                                  Chairperson, Second Division

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                    RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                       Chief Justice

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

[1] Annex “A” of Petition, rollo, pp. 41-46.

[2] Id. at 46.

[3] Id. at 47.

[4] Id. at 11.

[5] Id. at 67.

[6] Baculi v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA 69, 80.

[7]Bank of Philippine Island v. Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph Calanza, et al., G.R. No. 180699, October 13, 2010, citing Lu Ym v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 169476, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 253.

[8] Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[9]  Rollo, pp. 8-9.

[10]Baculi v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA 69, 80, citing Nazareno v. Barnes, 220 Phil. 451, 463 (1985), citing Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 690 (1967).

[11] 312 Phil. 977, 1032, 1033 (1995).

[12] Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Tagbilaran City, Against Atty. Samuel C. Occena, 433 Phil. 138, 154 (2002).

[13]Tiongco v. Salao, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2009, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 575, 583, citing Oclarit v. Paderanga, 403 Phil 146, 152 (2001).

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