J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0051: ADELIA C. MENDOZA AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF ALICE MALLETA VS. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, INC. (G.R. NO.  165575, 2 FEBRUARY 2011, PERALTA, J.) (SUBJECT: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON APPELLANT’S BRIEF). (BRIEF TITLE: MENDOZA VS. UCPB)

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DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari^[1] of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated July 2, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79796, and its Resolution dated September 9, 2004, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Appellants’ Brief filed by petitioners for failure to comply with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The facts are as follows:

On November 5, 2001, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact of petitioner Alice Malleta, filed a Complaint^[2] for annulment of titles, foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Fourth Judicial Region.  

In their Complaint, herein petitioners stated that on October 6, 1995, they entered into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of P4,925,000.00.^[3]  On August 27, 1998, the properties were sold at public auction in the total amount of P31,300,00.00 to UCPB.  On September 17, 2001, an Affidavit of Consolidation was executed by UCPB. 

Petitioners contended that the foreclosure proceedings violated due process and the legal requirements under Act No. 3135, as amended, on the following grounds:

a)                 There was no valid and legal notice to petitioner Adelia Mendoza of the foreclosure proceedings;

b)                There was no valid and legal notice of the auction sale;

c)                 There was no valid and legal notice of the consolidation of ownership;

d)                There was no valid publication and notice as required by law;

e)                 There was a violation of Republic Act No. 3765,  “An Act to Require the Disclosure of Finance Charges in Connection with Extensions of Credit,” specifically Section 6 of the law;

f)                  There was no clear and accurate financial statement showing the application of payments of the plaintiffs (petitioners herein); and

g)                 There was no valid letter of demand showing the clear finance charges.

 Petitioners prayed that the foreclosure proceedings and Certificate of Sale be annulled, and that if ever any new title is issued in lieu of their Transfer Certificates of Titles,^[4]  the same should be cancelled and annulled; that respondent be ordered to pay petitioners attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00.    

In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,^[5] respondent UCPB denied that petitioners entered into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with it in the amount of P4,925,000.00, the truth being that petitioner Adelia Mendoza executed several promissory notes in the total principal amount of P27,500,000.00, and to secure these obligations she executed, together with petitioner Alice Malleta, several real estate mortgages over several parcels of land in favor of UCPB.

Respondent denied that the foreclosure proceedings were legally defective, as the said proceedings were done in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended.  It countered that the law does not require personal notice to the mortgagor of the foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale, as the publication of the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes constructive notice to the whole world.  Moreover, there is no legal requirement of personal notice to the mortgagor of the consolidation of ownership, as the registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes notice to the whole world that the mortgagor or any interested party has one year from the date of such registration to redeem the foreclosed properties. Respondent claimed that it complied with the posting requirements, and that it had also complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3765 and had regularly furnished petitioners with statements of account pursuant to standard banking practice.        

Respondent contended that petitioners knew that the foreclosure was forthcoming due to their default in the payment of their obligations. Petitioners had been sent several verbal and written demands to pay their obligations and had been warned that failure to settle their obligations would result in the foreclosure of their properties.  Further, petitioners had one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale to redeem their property, but they failed to do so. 

Respondent denied that there was “non-disclosure of finance charges without lawful and legal demand,” since it had regularly sent petitioners statements of account and had regularly given verbal and written notices to pay their obligations.  It also denied the allegations of lack of reconciliation and verification of accounts.  In this regard, respondent stated that petitioners could have easily verified their account with the account officers of UCPB, but they failed to do so.

As special and affirmative defenses, respondent stated that on August 9, 1994, petitioner Mendoza applied for and was granted a credit line in the amount of P25 million, which is supported by a Loan Agreement.^[6]  On October 9, 1995, the credit line was increased by P2.5 million, as evidenced by a Loan Agreement.^[7]  Petitioner Mendoza availed of the said credit line in the aggregate principal amount of Twenty-Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P27.5 million) and executed promissory notes^[8] therefor. Among other conditions, the promissory notes carried acceleration clauses, making these notes immediately due and payable even before maturity in case an event of default occurred, including, but not limited to, payment of principal and interest amortizations.

Moreover, respondent stated that on August 10, 1995, as partial security for the promissory notes, petitioner Malleta, through her attorney-in-fact, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, executed a real estate mortgage in favor of UCPB over several parcels of land registered under the name of Alice B. Malleta with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City.  Later, pursuant to petitioner Mendoza’s commitment with UCPB, the titles of the mortgaged properties were transferred under the name of Adelia B. Mendoza upon release of the loan proceeds and the mortgage annotation was carried over to the new titles. 

According to respondent, on October 6, 1995,  petitioner Mendoza executed a real estate mortgage over 12 parcels of land,^[9]all registered in her name, as additional security for the said promissory notes.

Respondent stated that petitioner Mendoza failed to discharge her obligations under the promissory notes, despite written and verbal demands made by UCPB upon her, the latest of which was the demand letter dated January 29, 1998.^[10]  Hence, it had no other recourse but to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the aforementioned securities.

Respondent averred that on May 6, 1998, it filed a Petition^[11] for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before the Ex Officio Sheriff of Lipa City. 

On July 21, 1998, the Sheriff prepared a Notice of Sale^[12] and set the date of the public sale on August 27, 1998.^[13]  OnJuly 28, 1998, the Sheriff posted the Notice of Sale in three public places and the Notice was, likewise, published in Tambuling Batangas, a newspaper of general circulation, on July 22 and 29, 1998, and on August 5, 1998.  The certificate of posting and publisher’s affidavit of publication were attached as Annexes “12,”^[14] and “13,”^[15] respectively.

The public sale was conducted on August 28, 1998.  The mortgaged properties were sold in the amount of P31,300,000.00  to UCPB as  the highest and winning bidder.  A Certificate of Sale^[16] was issued in favor of UCPB, which was duly registered in July 2000 at the back of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City.

Petitioners failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the one-year redemption period that expired on July 21, 2001. Consequently, UCPB consolidated its ownership over the said properties and new certificates of title were issued under its name.

Respondent stated that on August 27, 1998, the date of the auction sale, petitioners’ outstanding obligation wasP58,692,538.63, as evidenced by a Statement of Account.^[17]

According to respondent, the proceeds of the foreclosure sale amounted to P31,300,000.00, leaving a deficiency ofP27,392,538.63, an amount which it is entitled to payment from petitioner Mendoza, together with penalties and interest due thereon.

Respondent prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered (1) dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit; (2) on the counterclaim, ordering petitioners to pay the deficiency claim of P27,392,538.63, including the penalties and interests due thereon from August 27, 1998, and P1 million as attorney’s fees and P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.

On March 25, 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss^[18] for failure to prosecute.  Respondent contended that petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of its Answer on August 26, 2002, as shown by the photocopy of the registry return receipt.   It stated that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners have the positive duty to promptly set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading had been filed.  It stated that the Answer was the last pleading, since petitioners failed to file a Reply thereon within the reglementary period.

Respondent stated that since August 26, 2002, or almost a period of six months, petitioners had not taken steps to set the case for pre-trial as mandated by the rules.   Respondent submitted that the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable period of time as provided by Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.  It asserted that failure to set the case for pre-trial for almost six (6) months is an unreasonable period of time, as a period of three (3) months had been found to constitute an unreasonable period of time in Montejo v. Urotia.^[19]

Petitioners, through counsel Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Set the Case for Pre-trial,^[20] and stated therein that their counsel on record is Atty. Monchito C. Rosales, who died on December 22, 2002; that Atty. Jose P. Malabanan forgot the case because of the death of Atty. Rosales (who is his law partner), and that he was setting the case for pre-trial.  Petitioners prayed that the Opposition and motion to set the case for pre-trial be granted.

On April 15, 2003, the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 12 issued an Order^[21] dismissing the case.  The court found the Motion to Dismiss (for failure to prosecute) to be in accordance with the rules.  It stated that the records of the case showed that since August 20, 2002, the issues in this case had already been joined, and that Atty. Monchito C. Rosales was still alive then, yet he did not take any step to have the case set for pre-trial.  It found the claim of Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, that he forgot about the case because of the death of Atty. Rosales, as unpardonable, flimsy and an invalid excuse. 

The Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 15, 2003 was denied for lack of merit by the trial court in an Order dated May 26, 2003.^[22]

Thereafter, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Orders to the Court of Appeals, and filed an Appellant’s Brief on April 5, 2004. 

On May 20, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the Appellant’s Brief failed to comply with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.  Respondent contended that the Appellant’s Brief contained only the following topics:  (1) Prefaratory Statement; (2) Statement of Facts and Antecedent Proceedings; (3) Parties; (4) Statement of the Case; (5) Issues; (6) Arguments/Discussion; and (7) Prayer.  The Appellants’ Brief did not have the following items:  (1) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and  a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited; (2) an assignment of errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references to the page of the report at which the case begins and page of the report on which the citation is found; (4) page references to the  record in the Statement of Facts and Statement of the Case.

Respondent contended that the absence of a specific assignment of errors or of page references to the record in the Appellants’ Brief is a ground for dismissal of the appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.^[23]  

On June 4, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal.^[24]  They contended that the assignment of errors were only designated as “Issues” in their Appellants’ Brief; and although the designation of the “Assignment of Error” may vary, the substance thereof remains.  Moreover,  petitioners stated that  the textbooks and statutes were cited immediately after the portion where they are quoted, which is more convenient and facilitates ready reference of the legal and jurisprudential basis of the arguments. They claimed that the absence of a subject index does not substantially deviate from the requirements of the Rules of Court, because one can easily go over the Appellants’ Brief and can designate the parts with nominal prudence.  They pointed out that Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides for a liberal construction of the Rules in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.  

On July 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal.  The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant-appellee UCPB’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby GRANTED. This appeal is ordered DISMISSED for failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.^[25]     

The Court of Appeals held that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules.  It found that the Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

In this case, the plaintiff-appellant’s brief failed to provide an index, like a table of contents, to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready references to the records and documents referred to therein.  This Court has to thumb through the brief page after page to locate the party’s arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered.  In so doing, the plaintiff-appellant unreasonably abdicated her duty to assist this Court in the appreciation and evaluation of the issues on appeal.

Further, the statement of facts is not supported by page references to the record.  Instead of reasonably complying with the requirements of the rules, plaintiff-appellant annexed the plain photocopy of the documents being referred to in the statements of facts.  Thus, if only to verify the veracity of the allegations in the brief and the existence of the attached documents, this Court has to pore over the entire records of this case.

There is no merit in the plaintiff-appellant’s argument that the “Assignment of Error” was merely designated as “Issues” but the substance thereof remains and should not cause the dismissal of the appeal.  The Supreme Court categorically stated in De Liano vs. Court of Appeals that the statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors because they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the rules would not have required a separate statement of each.^[26]

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated September 9, 2004.  The appellate court held that petitioners merely reiterated the arguments raised in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, which arguments were already passed upon by the court.  Moreover, the  Court of Appeals noted that despite ample opportunity, petitioners never attempted to remedy the deficiency in their Appellants’ Brief by filing another brief in conformity with the rules, but obstinately maintained that their Appellants’ Brief substantially complied with the rules.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues:  

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE PETITIONERS’ SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [WITH] SECTION 13, RULE 44 [OF] THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LIPA CITY, BRANCH 12 ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO PROSECUTE THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

III

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LIPA CITY, BRANCH 12 ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE POSTING REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 3, ACT NO. 3135 IS FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.

IV

THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND AUCTION SALE OF THE SUBJECT REALTIES VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT ON 06 OCTOBER 1995.

V

RESPONDENT UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK VIOLATED SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3765 ON THE REQUIREMENT OF FULL DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXTENSIONS OF CREDIT.

VI

PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES.^[27]

The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the said brief did not have a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references to the record in the Statement of Facts.

Petitioners argue that the absence of a subject index in their Appellants’ Brief is not a material deviation from the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and that each portion of the 12-page brief was boldly designated to separate each portion.

Moreover, petitioners contend that while the “assignment of errors” was not designated as such in their Appellants’ Brief, the assignment of errors were clearly embodied in the “Issues” thereof, which substantially complies with the rules.

The petition is without merit. 

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.^[28] An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.^[29]  

In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, such as this case, Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the contents of an Appellant’s Brief, thus:

Sec. 13. Contents of appellant’s brief.—The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:

(a)        A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited;

(b)        An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated without repetition and numbered consecutively;

(c)        Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d)       Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

(e)        A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment;

(f)        Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with page references to the record.  The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;

(g)        Under the heading “Relief,” a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks; and

(h)        In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant’s brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.

In this case, the Appellants’ Brief of petitioners did not have a subject index.  The importance of a subject index should not be underestimated.  De Liano v. Court of Appeals^[30] declared that the subject index functions like a table of contents, facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready reference.  It held that:

[t]he first requirement of an appellant’s brief is a subject index.  The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents.  Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate courts.  The danger of this is the very real possibility that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous documents.  This occurs even though the rules consistently urge the parties to be “brief” or “concise” in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in court.  The subject index makes readily available at one’s fingertips the subject of the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to locate a party’s arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is obviated.^[31]

Moreover, the Appellants’ Brief had no assignment of errors, but petitioners insist that it is embodied in the “Issues” of the brief.  The requirement under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for an “assignment of errors” in paragraph (b) thereof is different from a “statement of the issues of fact or law” in paragraph (e) thereof.  The statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors, since they are not one and the same; otherwise, the rules would not require a separate statement for each.^[32]  An assignment of errors is an enumeration by the appellant of the errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court for which he/she seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while the statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court.^[33] 

Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Statement of Facts was not supported by page references to the record. De Liano v. Court of  Appeals held:

x x x The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern the appropriate relief.  Appellants should remember that the Court of Appeals is empowered to review both questions of law and of facts.  Otherwise, where only a pure question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to this Court.  An appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to present them in a manner favorable to one party.  x x x  Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in dispute must be backed by evidence.  Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that one’s statement of facts should be supported by page references to the record.  Indeed, disobedience therewith has been punished by dismissal of the appeal. Page references to the record are not an empty requirement.  If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page reference to the record, it may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether.^[34]

The assignment of errors and page references to the record in the statement of facts are important in an Appellant’s Brief as the absence thereof is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:  

SECTION 1.  Grounds for dismissal of appeal. —  An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

x x x x

(f ) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.

Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.^[35]  Rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.^[36]  The Court of Appeals noted in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration that despite ample opportunity, petitioners never attempted  to file an amended appellants’ brief correcting the deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately clung to their  argument that their Appellants’ Brief substantially complied with the rules.  Such obstinacy is incongruous with their plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal.^[37]

De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:

Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a meaningless purpose, that these may be ignored with little risk in the smug certainty that liberality in the application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to remedy the infirmities.  This misses the point.  We are not martinets; in appropriate instances, we are prepared to listen to reason, and to give relief as the circumstances may warrant.  However, when the error relates to something so elementary as to be inexcusable, our discretion becomes nothing more than an exercise in frustration.  It comes as an unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an appellant’s brief should still be raised as an issue now.  There is nothing arcane or novel about the provisions of Section 13, Rule 44. The rule governing the contents of appellants’ briefs has existed since the old Rules of Court, which took effect onJuly 1, 1940, as well as the Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, until they were superseded by the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.  The provisions were substantially preserved, with few revisions.^[38]

In fine, the Court upholds the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of petitioners on the ground that their Appellants’ Brief does not comply with the requirements provided in Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the dismissal is supported by Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and jurisprudence.^[39]  With the dismissal of the appeal, the other issues raised by petitioners need not be discussed by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Court of Appeals’ Resolutions dated July 2, 2004 and September 9, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79796, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED. 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                             Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

   ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA            ROBERTO A. ABAD

                 Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                    Associate Justice

                                    Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                           Chief Justice

^[1]               Under Rule 45 of  the Rules of Court.

^[2]               Rollo, pp. 41-91.

^[3]               Annex “A,” id. at 47.

^[4]               Annexes “A-1” to “A-63,” records, pp. 14-76.

^[5]               Records, p. 96.

^[6]               Annex “1,” id. at 107.

^[7]               Annex “2,” id. at 113.

^[8]               Annexes, “3,” “4,” “5,” id. at 119, 120, 121.

^[9]               Annex “8,” id. at 133.

^[10]             Annex “9,” id. at 143.

^[11]             Annex “10,” id. at 145.

^[12]             Annex “11,” id. at 148.

^[13]             Annexes “10” and “11,” id. at 145, 148.

^[14]             Records, p. 149.

^[15]             Id. at 150.

^[16]             Annex “15,” id. at 169.

^[17]             Annex “17,” id. at 238.

^[18]             Records, p. 239.

^[19]             148-B Phil. 43, 50 (1971).

^[20]             Records, p. 245.

^[21]             Id. at 248.

^[22]             Id. at 257.

^[23]             Rule 50, Section 1.  Grounds for dismissal of appeal. —  An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

x x x x

(f ) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.

^[24]             CA rollo, p. 135.

^[25]             Id. at 147.

^[26]            Id. at 162-163.

^[27]             Rollo, pp. 7-8.

^[28]             Mejillano v. Lucillo, G.R. No. 154717, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 1, 9-10.

^[29]             Id. at 10.

^[30]              421 Phil. 1033 (2001).

^[31]              Id. at 1042.

^[32]              Id. at 1044.  (Emphasis supplied.)

^[33]             Id. at 1042, 1044.

^[34]             Id. at 1044.

^[35]             Lumbre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160717, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 419, 431.

^[36]             Id. at 434.

^[37]             Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113890, February 22, 1995, 241 SCRA 553.

^[38]             De Liano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 1046-1047.

^[39]             Id.; Estate of Tarcila Vda. de Villegas v. Gaboya, G.R. No. 143006, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 30, 41, citing Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 and  Bucad v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 423 (1993).

CASE NO. 2011-0050:  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERLINDA CAPUNO Y TISON (G.R. NO. 185715, 19 JANUARY 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; CHAIN OF CUSTODY. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. CAPUNO).

                  Appellant.             

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D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

We review the May 27, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.  9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

          The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:

That on or about the 21^st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar physiological effects.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.

PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk officer to record their operation. They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, “Paiskor ng halagang piso”; he then handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellant’s arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the appellant to the police station for investigation. According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.

PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw one “alias Erlinda” selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and talked to her.  Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant; the appellant took “something” from her pocket and handed it to PO1 Antonio. Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from the appellant’s left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination.

On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust operation took place outside the appellant’s house. He recalled that the appellant had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her.

The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.

On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:

Exhibit “A” – the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez

Exhibit “B” – the request for laboratory examination

Exhibit “C” – Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E

Exhibit “D” – the buy-bust money

Exhibit “E” – Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03

Exhibit “F” – the specimen confiscated from the appellant

Exhibit “G” – Police Blotter

The defense presented a different version of the events.

The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house. They invited the appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they were talking about, the police put her in jail. The appellant further stated that she saw the seized specimen only in court.

On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs. She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the two persons who entered her house were policemen.

Maria, the appellant’s daughter, corroborated her mother’s testimony on material points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but merely “looked around.”

The RTC, in its decision of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days.  The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine.

The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its decision dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be increased to P500,000.00. 

The CA found unmeritorious the appellant’s claim that the prosecution witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal.

The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added that the appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular manner.

Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established.

In her brief, the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellant’s illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.

The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellant’s bare denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade.

The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.  It further claimed that the failure to comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution of drug cases.

THE COURT’S RULING

          After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused – in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21

of Article II of R.A. No. 9165

In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

            1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs   shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:

                        FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:

Q:        Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do?

                        PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:

A:        We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.

Q:        After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do?

A:        I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked to Erlinda Capuno.

Q:        You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you approached her?

A:        I told her “Paiskor ng halagang piso.”

Q:        When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what did he do? [sic]

A:        When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out something from her pocket.

Q:        What is the denomination of the marked money?

A:        One Hundred Peso bill.

Q:        Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?

A:        After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic]

Q:        What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this plastic sachet?

A:        When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic]

Q:        After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?

A:        We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her full name and also turned over the suspected items[.]

Q:        Who recovered the buy-bust money?

A:        Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.

Q:        You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do you have that buy bust money with you?

A:        After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money. [sic]

x x x x

Q:        The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?

A:        We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.

Q:        Were you able to know the result of this examination?

A:        Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.

          From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonio’s testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiro’s testimony did he even intimate that they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.

A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974. Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Lorenzo, we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items.  People v. Garcia likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever  made,  and  no  photograph  of  the  seized items was taken  under  the  circumstances  required  by  R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v. People, we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.

We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez, People v. Denoman, People v. Partoza, People v. Robles, and People v. dela Cruz, where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,”non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]” This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.

These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items.

The “Chain of Custody” Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as “the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.” As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.  The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.

In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.

The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence.

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.

Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts’ ruling, the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002, and informed them that one “alias Erlinda” was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1 Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one “alias Erlinda” was selling illegal drugs.

We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellant’s illegal activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002. What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiro’s gave conflicting statements in his joint affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

Presumption of Regularity in the

Performance of Official Duties

          In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.  The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. As we explained in People v. Sanchez:

While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because “First, the presumption is precisely just that – a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.” The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

All told, we find merit in the appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.

 Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                   CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                Associate Justice

    LUCAS P. BERSAMIN                        MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

         Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                          CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                             Associate Justice

                                                                                 Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

  Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, and concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr; rollo, pp. 3-12.

  Penned by Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes; CA rollo, pp. 9-17.

  Records, p. 1.

  Id. at 23-24.

  TSN, October 30, 2002, pp. 2-3.

  Id. at 3-5.

  Id. at 6. 

  TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 3-4.

  Id. at 5-6.

Id. at 6-7.

TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 5-6.

Id. at 9-10.

Records, pp. 120-121.

TSN, January 24, 2004, pp. 3-4.

Id. at 5.

Id. at 8.

Id. at 8-9.

TSN, July 13, 2005, pp. 1-11.

Supra note 2.

Supra note 1.

Rollo, p. 8.

Id. at 9-10.

Id. at 10.

CA rollo, pp. 29-39.

Id. at 33-38.

Id. at 62-64.

Id. at 69.

Id. at 69-71.

People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207.

People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273, 283.

See People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 12, 2010.

Supra note 5, at 3-6.

See People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 86, 95.

G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010.

G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.

G.R. No. 173804, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 497.

G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92.

G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257.

G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 809.

G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.

G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.

People v. Garcia, supra note 35.

People v. Sanchez, supra note 29, citing People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51 (2004) and Lopez v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008).

See People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 149.

See People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 357.

Records, p. 10.

See also Zarraga v. People, G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639, a case that, although not squarely in point, underscores the importance of consistency in the statements of the members of the buy-bust team. In the said case, the Court reversed a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 largely due to the conflicting testimonies of the police officers who conducted the operation on when and where the seized drugs were marked.

People v. Pagaduan, supra note 31.

Cariño v. People, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 388, 406.

Supra note 29, at 221.

CASE 2011-0049: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO UYBOCO Y RAMOS (G.R. NO. 178039, 19 JANUARY 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; WARRANTLESS ARREST; WARRANTLESS SEARCH. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. UYBOCO).

x—————————————————–x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

          Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) Judgment in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:

          In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:

          That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents.

In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents.

In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.

The arraignment was held in abeyance twice. Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996.  Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea.  This prompted the RTC to enter a plea of “Not Guilty” for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as follows:

At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila.  While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc.  When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way.  One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car.  The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboy’s lap.  They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque.

While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision.  She came back to the car undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside the comfort room.

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993.  He received a call from his wife asking him if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier.  After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the car when she roamed around the area.  Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his sons were missing.  When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts.  When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million.

Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge.  He asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employer’s telephone number. She feigned ignorance of those information.  She even claimed that she was merely a new employee.  Sarge informed Nimfa that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home.  Nimfa chose to stay with her wards.  When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in Merville Subdivision.

Jepson, through Jaime’s help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at 8:00 p.m.  Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino).  Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue Jepson’s sons and arrest the kidnappers. 

At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million.  That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her.  She recognized one of them as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer’s office sometime in the first week of December 1993.

On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate for the ransom.  In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred times during a span of two to four years.  

On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million.  Jepson offered P1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.  Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center.  Jepson called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off.

At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they would be released that afternoon.  At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center.  He placed the money inside a gray bag and put it on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back.  Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone.  Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway.  He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station.

P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other police officers.  They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center.  He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off.  He took a total of 24 shots.  He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom.

P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off.  He witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of Jepson.

P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves’ children and helper.  His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson.  They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed.  They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio.  At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction.  A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati.  They continuously followed the car inside the village.  When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle. 

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant.  Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place.  They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him.  Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside.  P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp Crame for questioning.

At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame.  He and Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson.  He then saw the bag containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table.  Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to identify them. 

A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag.  It was found out that a portion of the ransom money was missing.  It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the possession of Macias.  Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in Camp Aguinaldo.  P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him under arrest.  Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet.  P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized property from Macias.  Macias placed his signature on the receipt.

Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were detained.  She stated that she leased the house to appellant.  On 23 December 1993, it came to her knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping.  She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was reversed so that it could only be locked from the outside.  She considered this unusual because she personally caused the door knob to be installed.

The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr. Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).

Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989 as the importer of police equipment and accessories.  Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging system.  Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency in July 1993.  He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993.  Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him coffee.

In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother.  He was given the key to the house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993. 

At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial payment of his loan.  Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children.  Out of pity, appellant agreed.  He actively participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million. 

On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to the kidnappers.  Appellant acceded to the request.  He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to accompany him.  The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further instructions.  Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes.  He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked.  Appellant took the money from Jepson’s car and put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station.  Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepson’s children at the station.  He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him.  They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City.  At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the victims.  Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmariñas Village, Makati.  When he was about ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path.  He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were heavily armed.  They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms. 

Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant.  She saw appellant arrive at the office with Macias.

Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been sustained during the scuffle.

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson.  He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter.  He even served as guarantor of some of the obligations of appellant.  When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually acquitted.

While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died.  Consequently, his criminal liability is totally extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

          On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.  The dispositive portion reads:

          WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084.  He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law.  He should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.

            The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.

            The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.  The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing soonest as to when the said official took custody of the accused.

          The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime. 

          Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court.  Conformably to People v. Mateo, this Court in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

          On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

          WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.  No costs.

          A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22 December 2006.  Hence, this appeal.

          On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.  On 25 October 2007, appellant’s counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance.  Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing a Supplemental Brief.  Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de oficio for appellant.  Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the arguments in the appellant’s brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.

          Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the following assignment of errors:

I.                   The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the disturbing whispers of doubt replete in the prosecution’s theory.

II.                The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz’ testimony notwithstanding the incredibility of her story.

III.             The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official functions over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused uyboco.

IV.             The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez notwithstanding his displayed propensity for untruthfulness.

V.                The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented against the accused-appellant since they were procured in violation of his constitutional rights.

VI.             The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by accused-appellant from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where nimfa celiz and her wards were allegedly detained.

VII.          The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated in the abduction of jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single evidence on record supports the same.

VIII.       The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that abduction, an important element of the crime, was never established against him.

IX.             The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom without discussing the participation of accused macias considering that the charge was for conspiracy.

The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.  Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.

In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the prosecution, thus:

1)                  Accused Uyboco is a private individual;

2)                  Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco, referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or “yaya” Nimfa Celiz.  Their abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993.  The three victims were on board Jepson’s Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepson’s driver Pepito Acon.  The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep.  A man in white t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential Security Group.  Pepito was made to ride in a jeep.  The same man drove the pick-up to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were illegally detained from December 20 to 23, 1993.

x x x x

3)                  The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal.  Their detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion for personal gain;

x x x x

5)                  Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x.

These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecution’s witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom ransom was extorted. 

Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque, thus:

A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.

x x x x

A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2) children and myself, Sir.

x x x x

A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.

x x x x

Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?

A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.

Q: And then what followed next?

A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley, Sir.

x x x x

Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: What?

A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.

Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?

A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.

Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?

A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side, sir.

Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?

A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.

Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?

x x x x

A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacañang, Sir.

x x x x

Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?

A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.

Q: Then what followed next?

A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was the one who drove, Sir.

x x x x

A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passenger’s side, Sir.

x x x x

Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?

A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.

x x x x

A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.

Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened?

A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.

Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?

A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.

x x x x

Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?

A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.

Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of the money, thus:

A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.

A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the one continuing the conversation, Sir.

Q: What did you say?

A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?

A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.

Q: What followed?

A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x.

x x x x

Q: And after that what followed?

A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.

Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?

A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.

Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?

A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.

Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?

A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.

Q: How about the other balance?

A: My jewelry, Sir.

x x x x

Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and the bag?

A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.

Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?

A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.

Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?

A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the

Magallanes Commercial Center.

Q: Where did you place that bag?

A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House.

x x x x

Q: What else did he tell you?

A:  x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?

A: After few minutes, he called again.  He told me to drive and park the car beside the car Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.

Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?

A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.

Q: And then, what did you do?

A: I followed his instruction.

Q: And what followed next?

A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store already.

Q: And what was your answer?

A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.

Q: And?

A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.

ATTY. PAMARAN:

Q: Did you comply with that instruction?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do?

A:  I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.

Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that Colt Mirage?

A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.

Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?

A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.

Q: And what followed thereafter?

A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies, untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies. 

Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely:   First, Nimfa stated that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while appellant stayed behind.  However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the number of kidnappers.  Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge had a gun.  Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because she was not allegedly blindfolded.  Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her.  Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity.  The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:

The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the reference thereto would understandably vary.  The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies.  The inconsistencies and discrepancies of the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the decision appealed from.  On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz’ testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed.

The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the crime.  Besides, familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its commission.  Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime.  On a different view, it may even be posited that the incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions.  Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims.

Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million.  Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address appellant as “Ernie.”  Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant.  Finally, appellant claims that Jepson’s motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against him boils down to money.  Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the PNP.  To eliminate competition and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and considering his brother’s close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson crafted and executed a frame up of appellant. 

          And the Court of Appeals had this to say:

          For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves’ children is, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise, the police operatives’ call or prerogative.  Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official duties and disregard Uyboco’s unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up.

            Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon the prosecution.  This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case.  As the prosecution had other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of other witnesses cannot be taken against the same.

Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.

We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower  courts in giving credence to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers.  Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them.   As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.  While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.

Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecution’s theory, thus:

If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom money using his own car registered in his son’s name?  Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its contents? Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to his family residence x x x with the ransom money still intact in the trunk of his car?

If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were they not tied x x x?  

x x x x

If it is true that the house at Merville, Parañaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his own name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence.

x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment?  Why did they not apply for a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the kidnapper?

Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the kidnappers x x x.

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.

          If we indulge appellant’s speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions – that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because he could not trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant went back to his family residence because he never thought that Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who appeared to  be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to escape; that appellant never thought that the police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and the kidnappers.

          However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard evidence takes precedence.  On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that kidnapping occurred and that appellant is the author thereof. 

          Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated in the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue the kidnap victims.  Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview made by a reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of appellant’s alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson.  Appellant insists that these taped conversations do exist.

          Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of P/Supt. Chan.  The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped conversations.  The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the non-production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court’s assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-up.

          Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a warrant.  The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:   

SEC. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)

The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case.  The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping.  They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. 

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.  The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.  A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.  Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes.

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper.  This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.  

Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz.  Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach.  Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.  Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.

Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the abduction of the victims.  Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted.  In a related argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellant’s participation was not sufficiently established.

The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:

The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the Dichaves’ children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves’ children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the contrary, Uyboco’s presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the balance of the ransom payment is with Macias.  All these circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom. 

x x x x

x x x Uyboco’s claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep which waylaid the Dichaves’ vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of kidnapping for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the victims were kept, is misplaced.

Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan.

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant.  While he was not present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson.  The conspiracy was likewise proven by the above testimonies.  Appellant conspired with Macias and other John Does in committing the crime.  Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellant’s conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

      PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.    TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

               Associate Justice                                  Associate Justice  

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                   Chief Justice

              Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Jose Catral Mendoza (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring. Rollo, pp. 3-27.

              Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Edelwina Catubig Pastoral.  CA rollo, pp. 94-128. 

              Records, Vol. I, pp. 260-261.

              Id. at 257-258.

              Id. at 260-261.

              The first arraignment was held in abeyance and the DOJ was ordered to conduct preliminary investigation by the Court of Appeals while the second arraignment was postponed when the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order. See CA rollo, p.  

              TSN, 12 December 1996, pp. 23-38.

              Id. at 43-45.

              TSN, 8 May 1997, pp. 8-14.

            TSN, 12 December 1996, pp. 48-50.

            TSN, 9 January 1997, pp. 14-16.

            TSN, 8 May 1997, p. 18.

            Id. at 27.

            TSN, 9 January 1997, pp. 19-22.

            TSN, 8 May 1997, pp. 32-34.

            Id. at 52-53.

            Id. at 60.

            TSN, 7 January 1997, pp. 41-42.

            TSN, 9 May 1997, pp. 6-13.

            TSN, 15 April 1999, pp. 8-16.

            Id. at 34-42.

            TSN, 8 June 1999, pp. 5-11.

            TSN, 16 February 1999, pp. 4-13.

            Id. at 13-22.

            TSN, 9 May 1997, pp. 15-27.

            TSN, 16 February 1999, pp. 4-24.

            Id. at 33-42.

            CA rollo, p. 108.

            TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 10-30.

            TSN, 10 December 1999, pp. 23-62.

            TSN, 13 December 1999, pp. 8-26.

            TSN, 8 December 2000, pp. 4-6.

            TSN, 29 May 2001, pp. 11-12.

            TSN, 4 June 2001, pp. 3-9.

         Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1.        By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

            CA rollo, pp. 127-128.

            G.R. No. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

            Rollo, p. 2.

            Id. at 27.

            Id. at 36.

            Id. at 49.

            CA rollo, pp. 192-193.

            People v. Cruz, Jr., G.R. No. 168446, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 449, 463-464 citing People. v. Soberano, G.R.  No. 116234, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 438, 446; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 177566, 26 March 2008, 549 SCRA 489, 498 citing People v. Ejandra, G.R. No. 134203, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 364, 381-382.

            CA rollo, p. 122.

            TSN, 12 December 1996, pp. 24-45.

             TSN, 8 May 1997, pp. 51-54.

            TSN, 9 May 1997, pp. 5-12.

            CA rollo, pp. 211-225.

            Rollo, pp. 19-20. 

            Id. at 22.

            People v. Silongan, 449 Phil. 478, 497 (2003).  

            People v. Morales, G.R. No. 148518, 15 April 2004, 427 SCRA 765, 784.

            People v. Pacapac, G.R. No. 90623, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 77, 92.

            CA rollo, pp. 203-205.

            People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 384 citing Mamangun v. People, G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 44, 53; People v. Chua Uy, 384 Phil. 70, 85 (2000).

            People v. Agojo, G.R. No. 181318, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 652, 664-665.

            Abelita III v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 226-227 citing People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249, 267 (2001); Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 251, 261; People v. Lozada, 454 Phil. 241, 250-251 (2003).

            Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 41, 55-56 citing People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163 (1998); People v. Cubcubin, Jr., id. at 271; People v. Estella, 443 Phil. 669, 683 (2003).

            Rollo, pp. 24-25.

            People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198, 239 (2003) citing People v. Boller, 429 Phil. 754, 766 (2002); People v. Bacungay, 428 Phil. 798 (2002); People v. Manlansing, 428 Phil. 743, 756 (2002).