Archive for February, 2011


LEGAL NOTE 0018: IS RPN 9 A GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION?

 SOURCE: ANTONIO M. CARANDANG VS. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 148076); ANTONIO M. CARANDANG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) (G.R. NO. 153161) (12 JANUARY 2011, BERSAMIN, J.)

X ————————————————————————————————- X

 

IS RADIO PHILIPPINE NETWORK (RPN) A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION?

 

NO.

Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of the Government’s total share in RPN’s capital stock being only 32.4%.

SANDIGANBAYAN ORDERED BENEDICTO TO TRANSFER HIS 72.4%  IN RPN TO RPN. DOES THIS MAKE RPN NOW A GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORP?

 

NO. BECAUSE BENEDICTO FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHERE HE CLARIFIED THAT THE SHARES CEDED TO RPN WAS ONLY 32.4%. SUCH MOTION IS NOT YET RESOLVED WITH FINALITY.

Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of Benedicto’s shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of Benedicto’s shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedicto’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he  clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. With the extent of Benedicto’s holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government held the majority of RPN’s capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis.  

 

 

WHAT OTHER PROOF EXISTS  THAT RPN IS NOT AN OGCC?

 

EVEN OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND PCGG RECOGNIZED RPN’S STATUS AS BEING NEITHER A GOVERNMENT-OWNED NOR CONTROLLED CORP. CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE BY GOVT AGENCIES DESERVE RESPECT.

 

Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have recognized RPN’s status as being neither a government-owned nor -controlled corporation.

In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, the PCGG communicated to San Luis as the president and general manager of RPN regarding a case involving RPN and Carandang:[1][29]

MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS

President & General Manager

Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking “PCGG’s position on the following:

“1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporation outside the scope of OGCC and COA’s control given 32% Government ownership x x x.

x x x

It appears that under the RP-Benedicto Compromise Agreement dated November 3, 1990 – validity of which has been sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087, March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) – Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation, if he has any, in RPN-9, among others, to the government which rights, interest and/or participation per PCGG’s understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e, about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN-9.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), on motion of the government through PCGG, ordered the president and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to “effect the immediate cancellation and transfer of the 9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedicto’s proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of the Philippines c/o PCGG” (Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, contending that the number of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only his personal holdings and those of his immediate family and nominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding the RPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (“FEMIE”), which is about 40%, as they are corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his personal holdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan.

x x x

We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not a government owned or controlled corporation within the contemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs and profits, and not for public needs and was not specifically vested with functions relating to public needs.

Neither could RPN-9 be considered a “government-owned or controlled corporation” under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said terms as follows:

“Sec.2. Definition. – A government owned- or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions which is directly chartered by special law or organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock;

Provided, that a corporation organized under the general corporation law under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time, shall not be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation before such disposition and even if the ownership or control thereof is subsequently transferred to another government-owned or controlled corporation.”

A government-owned or controlled corporation is either “parent” corporation, i.e., one “created by special law” (Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a “subsidiary” corporation, i.e, one created pursuant to law where at least a majority of the outstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by parent government corporation and/or other government-owned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029).

RPN-9 may not likewise be considered as an “acquired asset corporation” which is one organized under the general corporation law (1) under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time” (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the following reasons:

1.   as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9 shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) of its capital stock;

2.   said 32.4% shares of stock, together with the contested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to a government corporation or the government “in satisfaction of debts incurred with government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise;

3.   RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith.

It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4% shares of stocks were turned over to the government by virtue of a compromise agreement between the government and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is “a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos” and others, to recover from them ill-gotten wealth” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case between the government and Benedicto, his family and nominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncement was made as to the character or nature of the assets and properties turned over by Benedicto to the government – whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not.[2][30]    

The PCGG’s Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OP itself on February 10, 2000: [3][31]                     

                                                               February 10, 2000

Mr. Edgar S. San Luis

President and General Manager

Radio Philippines Network Inc.

Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman

Quezon City

Dear President San Luis,

x x x

Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm the PCGG’s opinion that RPNI is not a government-owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13), Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. As government ownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stock, pending the final judicial determination of the true and legal ownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private.[4][32]

Even earlier, a similar construction impelled the Ombudsman to dismiss a criminal  complaint  for violation of R.A. 3019 filed against certain RPN officials, as the Ombudsman’s resolution dated December 15, 1997 indicates,[5][33] a pertinent portion of which is quoted thus:

This is not to mention the fact that the other respondents, the RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this Office (Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a private corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the RPN, which is not a government owned or controlled corporation x x x[6][34]

Considering that the construction of a statute given by administrative agencies deserves respect,[7][35] the uniform administrative constructions of the relevant aforequoted laws defining what are government-owned or -controlled corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive.


[1][29] Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 66-72.

[2][30] Emphasis and underscoring supplied..

[3][31] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), p. 358.

[4][32] Emphasis supplied.

[5][33] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 634-638.

[6][34] Emphasis supplied.

[7][35] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 658, 667; Alfonso v. Office of  the President, G.R. No. 150091, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 64, 75; Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 351, 359.

 

CASE 2011-0033: ANTONIO M. CARANDANG VS. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 148076); ANTONIO M. CARANDANG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) SUBJECTS: DEFINITION OF OGCC; RADIO PHILIPPINE NETWORK. (BRIEF TITLE: CARANDANG VS. DESIERTO ET AL.)

(G.R. NO. 153161) (12 JANUARY 2011, BERSAMIN, J.)

X ————————————————————————————————- X

 

 

DOCTRINES:

 

DO THE  OMBUDSMAN AND SANDIGANBAYAN HAVE  JURISDICTION OVER ADMIN CASES INVOLVING GRAVE MISCONDUCT COMMITTED BY EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION?

 

YES.

 

It is not disputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and employees, including presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. The respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly defined and delineated by the law.[1][25]

 

WHAT ARE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION?

 

 

Similarly, the law defines what are government-owned or -controlled corporations. For one, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2029 (Defining Government Owned or Controlled Corporations and Identifying Their Role in National Development) states:  

Section 2. A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by a special law or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock.

Section 2 (13) of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)[2][26] renders a similar definition of government-owned or -controlled corporations:

Section 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

x x x

(13) government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.

It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Applying this statutory criterion, the Court ruled in Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman:[3][27]

But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of “government owned or controlled corporation” contained in par. (13), Sec.2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) of its capital stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, xxx. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. x x x The Court thus concludes that the CIIF are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.[4][28]

IS RADIO PHILIPPINE NETWORK A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION?

 

NO.

Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of the Government’s total share in RPN’s capital stock being only 32.4%.

SANDIGANBAYAN ORDERED BENEDICTO TO TRANSFER HIS 72.4%  IN RPN TO RPN. DOES THIS MAKE RPN NOW A GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORP?

 

NO. BECAUSE BENEDICTO FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHERE HE CLARIFIED THAT THE SHARES CEDED TO RPN WAS ONLY 32.4%. SUCH MOTION IS NOT YET RESOLVED WITH FINALITY.

Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of Benedicto’s shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of Benedicto’s shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedicto’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he  clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. With the extent of Benedicto’s holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government held the majority of RPN’s capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis.  

 

 

WHAT OTHER PROOF EXISTS  THAT RPN IS NOT AN OGCC?

 

EVEN OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND PCGG RECOGNIZED RPN’S STATUS AS BEING NEITHER A GOVERNMENT-OWNED NOR CONTROLLED CORP. CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE BY GOVT AGENCIES DESERVE RESPECT.

 

Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have recognized RPN’s status as being neither a government-owned nor -controlled corporation.

In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, the PCGG communicated to San Luis as the president and general manager of RPN regarding a case involving RPN and Carandang:[5][29]

MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS

President & General Manager

Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking “PCGG’s position on the following:

“1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporation outside the scope of OGCC and COA’s control given 32% Government ownership x x x.

x x x

It appears that under the RP-Benedicto Compromise Agreement dated November 3, 1990 – validity of which has been sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087, March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) – Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation, if he has any, in RPN-9, among others, to the government which rights, interest and/or participation per PCGG’s understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e, about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN-9.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), on motion of the government through PCGG, ordered the president and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to “effect the immediate cancellation and transfer of the 9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedicto’s proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of the Philippines c/o PCGG” (Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, contending that the number of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only his personal holdings and those of his immediate family and nominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding the RPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (“FEMIE”), which is about 40%, as they are corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his personal holdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan.

x x x

We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not a government owned or controlled corporation within the contemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs and profits, and not for public needs and was not specifically vested with functions relating to public needs.

Neither could RPN-9 be considered a “government-owned or controlled corporation” under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said terms as follows:

“Sec.2. Definition. – A government owned- or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions which is directly chartered by special law or organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock;

Provided, that a corporation organized under the general corporation law under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time, shall not be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation before such disposition and even if the ownership or control thereof is subsequently transferred to another government-owned or controlled corporation.”

A government-owned or controlled corporation is either “parent” corporation, i.e., one “created by special law” (Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a “subsidiary” corporation, i.e, one created pursuant to law where at least a majority of the outstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by parent government corporation and/or other government-owned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029).

RPN-9 may not likewise be considered as an “acquired asset corporation” which is one organized under the general corporation law (1) under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time” (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the following reasons:

1.   as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9 shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) of its capital stock;

2.   said 32.4% shares of stock, together with the contested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to a government corporation or the government “in satisfaction of debts incurred with government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise;

3.   RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith.

It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4% shares of stocks were turned over to the government by virtue of a compromise agreement between the government and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is “a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos” and others, to recover from them ill-gotten wealth” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case between the government and Benedicto, his family and nominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncement was made as to the character or nature of the assets and properties turned over by Benedicto to the government – whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not.[6][30]    

The PCGG’s Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OP itself on February 10, 2000: [7][31]                     

                                                               February 10, 2000

Mr. Edgar S. San Luis

President and General Manager

Radio Philippines Network Inc.

Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman

Quezon City

Dear President San Luis,

x x x

Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm the PCGG’s opinion that RPNI is not a government-owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13), Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. As government ownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stock, pending the final judicial determination of the true and legal ownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private.[8][32] 

Even earlier, a similar construction impelled the Ombudsman to dismiss a criminal  complaint  for violation of R.A. 3019 filed against certain RPN officials, as the Ombudsman’s resolution dated December 15, 1997 indicates,[9][33] a pertinent portion of which is quoted thus:

This is not to mention the fact that the other respondents, the RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this Office (Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a private corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the RPN, which is not a government owned or controlled corporation x x x[10][34]

Considering that the construction of a statute given by administrative agencies deserves respect,[11][35] the uniform administrative constructions of the relevant aforequoted laws defining what are government-owned or -controlled corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive.

BUT PRESIDENT ESTRADA ALLEGEDLY APPOINTED CARANDANG AS GENERAL MANAGER OF RPN. DOES THIS APPOINTMENT NOT MAKE HIM A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL?

 

NO.

Lastly, the conclusion that Carandang was a public official by virtue of his having been appointed as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN by President Estrada deserves no consideration. President Estrada’s intervention was merely to recommend Carandang’s designation as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN to the PCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis-à-vis said positions.[12][36] Under the circumstances, it was RPN’s Board of Directors that appointed Carandang to his positions pursuant to RPN’s By-Laws.[13][37]

In fine, Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[14][38]

x————————————————————————————–x

 

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

 

Petitioner Antonio M. Carandang (Carandang) challenges the jurisdiction over him of the Ombudsman and of the Sandiganbayan on the ground that he was being held to account for acts committed while he was serving as general manager and chief operating officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; hence, he was not a public official or employee.

In G.R. No. 148076, Carandang seeks the reversal of the decision[15][1] and resolution[16][2] promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision[17][3] of the Ombudsman dismissing him from the service for grave misconduct.

In G.R. No. 153161, Carandang assails on certiorari the resolutions dated October 17, 2001[18][4] and March 14, 2002[19][5] of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) that sustained the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the criminal complaint charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

                                      Antecedents

 

Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto) was a stockholder of RPN, a private corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).[20][6]  In March 1986, the Government ordered the sequestration of RPN’s properties, assets, and business. On November 3, 1990, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) entered into a compromise agreement with Benedicto, whereby he ceded to the Government, through the PCGG, all his shares of stock in RPN. Consequently, upon motion of the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) directed the president and corporate secretary of RPN to transfer to the PCGG Benedicto’s shares representing 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN.

However, Benedicto moved for a reconsideration, contending that his RPN shares ceded to the Government, through the PCGG, represented only 32.4% of RPN’s outstanding capital stock, not 72.4%. Benedicto’s motion for reconsideration has remained unresolved to this date.[21][7]

Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct

On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN.[22][8]

On April 19, 1999, Carandang and other RPN officials were charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman. The charge alleged that Carandang, in his capacity as the general manager of RPN, had entered into a contract with AF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an incorporator, director, and stockholder of that corporation; that he had thus held financial and material interest in a contract that had required the approval of his office; and that the transaction was prohibited under Section 7 (a) and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct.

Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative charge on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation.[23][9]

On May 7, 1999, the Ombudsman suspended Carandang from his positions in RPN.

On September 8, 1999, Carandang manifested that he was no longer interested and had no further claim to his positions in RPN. He was subsequently replaced by Edgar San Luis.[24][10]

In its decision dated January 26, 2000,[25][11] the Ombudsman found Carandang guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. 

Carandang moved for reconsideration on two grounds: (a) that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; and (b) that he had no financial and material interest in the contract that required the approval of his office.[26][12]

The Ombudsman denied Carandang’s motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2000.[27][13]

On appeal (CA G.R. SP No. 58204),[28][14] the CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman on February 12, 2001, stating:

The threshold question to be resolved in the present case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the herein petitioner.

It is therefore of paramount importance to consider the definitions of the following basic terms, to wit: A public office “is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the state to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” (San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 276: Chapter I, Section 1, Mechem, A Treatise on Law of Public Offices and Officers). The individual so invested is called the public officer which “includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in xxx [Sec. 2 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended].” (Sec. 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

With these time-honored definitions and the substantial findings of the Ombudsman, We are constrained to conclude that, indeed, the herein petitioner (Antonio M. Carandang) is a public officer. Precisely, since he (Antonio M. Carandang) was appointed by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN-9 (page 127 of the Rollo). As a presidential appointee, the petitioner derives his authority from the Philippine Government. It is luce clarius that the function of the herein petitioner (as a presidential appointee), relates to public duty, i.e., to represent the interest of the Philippine Government in RPN-9 and not purely personal matter, thus, the matter transcends the petitioner’s personal pique or pride.

x x x

Having declared earlier that the herein petitioner is a public officer, it follows therefore that, that jurisdiction over him is lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

It is worth remembering that as protector of the people, the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any, subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. (Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770).

x x x

Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman is, therefore, clothed with the proper armor when it assumed jurisdiction over the case filed against the herein petitioner. x x x

x x x

It appears that RPN-9 is a private corporation established to install, operate and manage radio broadcasting and/or television stations in the Philippines (pages 59-79 of the Rollo). On March 2, 1986, when RPN-9 was sequestered by the Government on ground that the same was considered as an illegally obtained property (page 3 of the Petition for Review; page 2 of the Respondent’s Comment; pages 10 and 302 of the Rollo), RPN-9 has shed-off its private status. In other words, there can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its sequestration by the Government, RPN-9, while retaining its own corporate existence, became a government-owned or controlled corporation within the Constitutional precept.

Be it noted that a government-owned or controlled corporation “refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether government or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock; Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the department of Budget, the Civil Service, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.” (Section 2 [13], Executive Order No. 292).  

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, this Court is of the view and so holds that RPN-9 perfectly falls under the foregoing definition. For one, “the government’s interest to RPN-9 amounts to 72.4% of RPN’s capital stock with an uncontested portion of 32.4% and a contested or litigated portion of 40%.” (page 3 of the Petition for Review; pages 8-9 of the Respondent’s Comment). On this score, it ought to be pointed out that while the forty percent (40%) of the seventy two point four percent (72.4%) is still contested and litigated, until the matter becomes formally settled, the government, for all interests and purposes still has the right over said portion, for the law is on its side. Hence, We can safely say that for the moment, RPN-9 is a government owned and controlled corporation. Another thing, RPN 9, though predominantly tackles proprietary functions—those intended for private advantage and benefit, still, it is irrefutable that RPN-9 also performs governmental roles in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general.

x x x

Coming now to the last assignment of error- While it may be considered in substance that the “latest GIS clearly shows that petitioner was no longer a stockholder of record of AF Broadcasting Corporation at the time of his assumption of Office in RPN 9 x x x” (Petitioner’s Reply [to Comment]; page 317 of the Rollo), still severing ties from AF Broadcasting Corporation does not convince this Court fully well to reverse the finding of the Ombudsman that Antonio Carandang “appears to be liable for Grave Misconduct” (page 10 of the Assailed Decision; page 36 of the Rollo). Note that, as a former stockholder of AF Broadcasting Corporation, it is improbable that the herein petitioner was completely oblivious of the developments therein and unaware of the contracts it (AF Broadcasting Corporation) entered into. By reason of his past (Antonio Carandang) association with the officers of the AF Broadcasting Corporation, it is unbelievable that herein petitioner could simply have ignored the contract entered into between RPN-9 and AF Broadcasting Corporation and not at all felt to reap the benefits thereof. Technically, it is true that herein petitioner did not directly act on behalf of AF Broadcasting Corporation, however, We doubt that he (herein petitioner) had no financial and/or material interest in that particular transaction requiring the approval of his office—a fact that could not have eluded Our attention.    

x x x

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision (dated January 26, 2000) of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0349 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[29][15]

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration,[30][16] Carandang commenced G.R. No. 148076.

Violation of Section 3 (g), Republic Act No. 3019

 

 

On January 17, 2000, the Ombudsman formally charged Carandang in the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 by alleging in the following information, [31][17] viz:

That sometime on September 8, 1998 or thereabouts, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, a high ranking officer (HRO) being then the General Manager of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9), then a government owned and controlled corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to On Target Media Concept, Inc. (OTMCI) through manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence and caused the government undue injury, by pre-terminating the existing block time contract between RPN 9 and OTMCI for the telecast of “Isumbong Mo Kay Tulfo” which assured the government an income of Sixty Four Thousand and Nine Pesos (P 64,009.00) per telecast and substituting the same with a more onerous co-production agreement without any prior study as to the profitability thereof, by which agreement RPN-9 assumed the additional obligation of taking part in the promotions, sales and proper marketing of the program, with the end result in that in a period of five (5) months RPN-9 was able to realize an income of only Seventy One Thousand One Hundred Eighty Five Pesos (P 71,185.00), and further, by waiving RPN-9’s collectible from OTMCI for August 1-30, 1998 in the amount of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand and Forty Five Pesos (P 320,045.00).  

Carandang moved to quash the information,[32][18] arguing that Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because he was not a public official due to RPN not being a government-owned or -controlled corporation.

The Sandiganbayan denied Carandang’s motion to quash on October 17, 2001.[33][19]

After the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his motion for reconsideration,[34][20] Carandang initiated G.R. No. 153161.[35][21]

On May 27, 2002, Carandang moved to defer his arraignment and pre-trial, citing the pendency of G.R. No. 153161.[36][22]

On July 29, 2002, the Court directed the parties in G.R. No. 153161 to maintain the status quo until further orders.[37][23]

On November 20, 2006, G.R. No. 148076 was consolidated with G.R. No. 153161.[38][24]

Issue

Carandang insists that he was not a public official considering that RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; and that, consequently, the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over him. He prays that the administrative and criminal complaints filed against him should be dismissed. Accordingly, decisive is whether or not RPN was a government-owned or -controlled corporation.

Ruling

We find the petitions to be meritorious.

It is not disputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and employees, including presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. The respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly defined and delineated by the law.[39][25]

Similarly, the law defines what are government-owned or -controlled corporations. For one, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2029 (Defining Government Owned or Controlled Corporations and Identifying Their Role in National Development) states:  

Section 2. A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by a special law or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock.

Section 2 (13) of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)[40][26] renders a similar definition of government-owned or -controlled corporations:

Section 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

x x x

(13) government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.

It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Applying this statutory criterion, the Court ruled in Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman:[41][27]

But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of “government owned or controlled corporation” contained in par. (13), Sec.2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) of its capital stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, xxx. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. x x x The Court thus concludes that the CIIF are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.[42][28]

Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of the Government’s total share in RPN’s capital stock being only 32.4%.

Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of Benedicto’s shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of Benedicto’s shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedicto’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he  clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. With the extent of Benedicto’s holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government held the majority of RPN’s capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis.  

Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have recognized RPN’s status as being neither a government-owned nor -controlled corporation.

In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, the PCGG communicated to San Luis as the president and general manager of RPN regarding a case involving RPN and Carandang:[43][29]

MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS

President & General Manager

Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking “PCGG’s position on the following:

“1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporation outside the scope of OGCC and COA’s control given 32% Government ownership x x x.

x x x

It appears that under the RP-Benedicto Compromise Agreement dated November 3, 1990 – validity of which has been sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087, March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) – Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation, if he has any, in RPN-9, among others, to the government which rights, interest and/or participation per PCGG’s understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e, about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN-9.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), on motion of the government through PCGG, ordered the president and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to “effect the immediate cancellation and transfer of the 9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedicto’s proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of the Philippines c/o PCGG” (Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, contending that the number of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only his personal holdings and those of his immediate family and nominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding the RPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (“FEMIE”), which is about 40%, as they are corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his personal holdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan.

x x x

We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not a government owned or controlled corporation within the contemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs and profits, and not for public needs and was not specifically vested with functions relating to public needs.

Neither could RPN-9 be considered a “government-owned or controlled corporation” under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said terms as follows:

“Sec.2. Definition. – A government owned- or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions which is directly chartered by special law or organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock;

Provided, that a corporation organized under the general corporation law under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time, shall not be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation before such disposition and even if the ownership or control thereof is subsequently transferred to another government-owned or controlled corporation.”

A government-owned or controlled corporation is either “parent” corporation, i.e., one “created by special law” (Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a “subsidiary” corporation, i.e, one created pursuant to law where at least a majority of the outstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by parent government corporation and/or other government-owned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029).

RPN-9 may not likewise be considered as an “acquired asset corporation” which is one organized under the general corporation law (1) under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time” (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the following reasons:

1.   as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9 shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) of its capital stock;

2.   said 32.4% shares of stock, together with the contested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to a government corporation or the government “in satisfaction of debts incurred with government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise;

3.   RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith.

It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4% shares of stocks were turned over to the government by virtue of a compromise agreement between the government and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is “a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos” and others, to recover from them ill-gotten wealth” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case between the government and Benedicto, his family and nominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncement was made as to the character or nature of the assets and properties turned over by Benedicto to the government – whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not.[44][30]    

The PCGG’s Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OP itself on February 10, 2000: [45][31]                     

                                                               February 10, 2000

Mr. Edgar S. San Luis

President and General Manager

Radio Philippines Network Inc.

Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman

Quezon City

Dear President San Luis,

x x x

Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm the PCGG’s opinion that RPNI is not a government-owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13), Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. As government ownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stock, pending the final judicial determination of the true and legal ownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private.[46][32]

Even earlier, a similar construction impelled the Ombudsman to dismiss a criminal  complaint  for violation of R.A. 3019 filed against certain

RPN officials, as the Ombudsman’s resolution dated December 15, 1997 indicates,[47][33] a pertinent portion of which is quoted thus:

This is not to mention the fact that the other respondents, the RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this Office (Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a private corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the RPN, which is not a government owned or controlled corporation x x x[48][34]

Considering that the construction of a statute given by administrative agencies deserves respect,[49][35] the uniform administrative constructions of the relevant aforequoted laws defining what are government-owned or -controlled corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive.

Lastly, the conclusion that Carandang was a public official by virtue of his having been appointed as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN by President Estrada deserves no consideration. President Estrada’s intervention was merely to recommend Carandang’s designation as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN to the PCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis-à-vis said positions.[50][36] Under the circumstances, it was RPN’s Board of Directors that appointed Carandang to his positions pursuant to RPN’s By-Laws.[51][37]

In fine, Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[52][38]

                               

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions in G.R. No. 148076 and G.R. No. 153161.

We reverse and set aside the decision promulgated on February 12, 2001 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 58204, and dismiss the administrative charge for grave misconduct against the petitioner.

We annul and set aside the resolutions dated October 17, 2001 and March 14, 2002, as well as the order dated March 15, 2002, all issued by the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in Criminal Case No. 25802, and dismiss Criminal Case No. 25802 as against the petitioner.

SO  ORDERED.

                                                                    LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                                                                          Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 Chairperson

 

      ARTURO D. BRION                         MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.      

          Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

                                                    CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                     Associate Justice

                                                                        Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

                                                          RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                     Chief Justice


 


[1][25] Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution; Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989; Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution (See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147706-07, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 413); Section 4 (a) (1) (g), Republic Act No. 8249 (approved on February 5, 1997), entitled An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

[2][26] Enacted on July 25, 1987.

[3][27] G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 227, 235-236.

[4][28] Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis.

[5][29] Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 66-72.

[6][30] Emphasis and underscoring supplied..

[7][31] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), p. 358.

[8][32] Emphasis supplied.

[9][33] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 634-638.

[10][34]         Emphasis supplied.

[11][35]         Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 658, 667; Alfonso v. Office of  the President, G.R. No. 150091, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 64, 75; Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 351, 359.

[12][36]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), p. 99.

[13][37]         Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 56 and 182.

[14][38]         Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747.

[15][1] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 34-50; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired), with Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (later Presiding Justice of the CA, and a Member of the Court, but already retired) and Hilarion L. Aquino (retired), concurring.

[16][2] Id., pp. 52-53.

[17][3] Id., pp. 285-297.

[18][4] Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 30-39; penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario (later Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, and a Member of the Court, but already retired), with Associate Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada (later Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, but already retired) and Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer (retired), concurring.

[19][5] Id., pp. 40-43; penned by Associate Justice Chico-Nazario with Associate Justice Cortez-Estrada and Associate Justice Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., concurring.

[20][6] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 66-86.

[21][7] Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 68-69.

[22][8] Id., p. 182.

[23][9] Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 150 and 170-190.

[24][10]         CA rollo, pp. 397 and 629-630.

[25][11]         Supra, note 3.

[26][12]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 298-304.

[27][13]         Id. pp. 305-308.

[28][14]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 309-324.

[29][15]         Supra, note 1, pp. 43-49.

[30][16]         Supra, note 2.

[31][17]         Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 89-90.

[32][18]         Id., pp. 94-100.

[33][19]         Supra, note 8.

[34][20]         Supra, note 9.

[35][21]         Supra, note 7.

[36][22]         Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 133-138.

[37][23]         Id., pp. 140-141.

[38][24]         Id., p. 219.

[39][25]         Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution; Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989; Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution (See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147706-07, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 413); Section 4 (a) (1) (g), Republic Act No. 8249 (approved on February 5, 1997), entitled An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

[40][26]         Enacted on July 25, 1987.

[41][27]         G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 227, 235-236.

[42][28]         Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis.

[43][29]         Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 66-72.

[44][30]         Emphasis and underscoring supplied..

[45][31]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), p. 358.

[46][32]         Emphasis supplied.

[47][33]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), pp. 634-638.

[48][34]         Emphasis supplied.

[49][35]         Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 658, 667; Alfonso v. Office of  the President, G.R. No. 150091, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 64, 75; Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 351, 359.

[50][36]         Rollo (G.R. No. 148076), p. 99.

[51][37]         Rollo (G.R. No. 153161), pp. 56 and 182.

[52][38]         Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747.

 CASE 2011-0032: LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, AND MARY JANE TAN, MARY LYN TAN, CELEDONIO CHAIRPERSON,TAN, JR., MARY  JOY TAN,   AND MARK ALLAN  TAN, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY THEIR MOTHER, LETICIA TAN, VS. OMC CARRIERS, INC. AND BONIFACIO ARAMBALA,  (G.R. NO. 190521, 12 JANUARY 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECTS: ACTUAL DAMAGES, HOW PROVEN; TEMPERATE DAMAGES; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; ATTORNEY’S FEES IN WRECKLESS IMPRUDENCE CASE. (BRIEF TITLE: TAN ET AL VS. OMC CARRIERS ET AL)

x——————————————————————x

 

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

 

We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1][1] – filed by Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina, Marilou Spooner, Rosalinda Tan, Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan, and Mark Allan Tan (petitioners), all heirs of the late Celedonio Tan – asking us to reverse and set aside our Resolution of February 17, 2010.[2][2]  We denied in this Resolution their petition for review on certiorari for failing to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision of June 22, 2009[3][3] sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

The CA decision, in turn, affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-186, finding the respondents – OMC Carriers, Inc. (OMC) and Bonifacio Arambala – guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to the petitioners.

 

THE FACTS

On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against OMC and Bonifacio Arambala.[4][4]  The complaint states that on November 24, 1995, at around 6:15 a.m., Arambala was driving a truck[5][5] with a trailer[6][6] owned by OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa City.  When Arambala noticed that the truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to jump out.  Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the truck.  Driverless, the truck rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the doorway of the house at the time.[7][7] 

          The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMC’s gross negligence in not properly maintaining the truck, and to Arambala’s recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck. Thus, they claimed that the respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages that they suffered, which include the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred for Celedonio Tan’s burial, as well as the loss of his earning capacity. The petitioners also asked for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.[8][8]  

          The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the damage to the petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil.[9][9]

THE RTC DECISION

 

          After trial, the RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the petitioners for damages.[10][10]  Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held that it was unusual for a truck to suddenly lose its brakes; the fact that the truck rammed into the petitioners’ house raised the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondents. These, the respondents failed to refute.[11][11]

The RTC did not agree with the respondents’ claim of a fortuitous event, pointing out that even with oil on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any precautionary measure to prevent the truck from skidding off the road. The alleged oil on the road did not also explain why the truck lost its brakes. Had OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its use, the defective brake could have been discovered. The RTC, thus, held OMC jointly and severally liable with Arambala for the damage caused to the petitioners, based on the principle of vicarious liability embodied in Article 2180[12][12] of the Civil Code.[13][13]

The dispositive portion of the decision stated:

            WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering:

1.      The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Celedonio Tan;

2.      The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of Celedonio Tan, plus interest thereon from the date of death of Celedonio Tan;

3.      The defendants to pay the plaintiff Leticia Tan jointly and severally the amount of P355,895.00 as actual damages;

4.      The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

5.      The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

6.      The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the amount of P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.[14][14]

 

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

          On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings on the issues of the respondents’ negligence and liability for damages. However, the CA modified the damages awarded to the petitioners by reducing the actual damages award from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The CA observed that only the latter amount was duly supported by official receipts.[15][15]

The CA also deleted the RTC’s award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained that the petitioners failed to substantiate Celedonio Tan’s claimed earning capacity with reasonable certainty; no documentary evidence was ever presented on this point. Instead, the RTC merely relied on Leticia Tan’s testimony regarding Celedonio Tan’s income. The CA characterized this testimony as self-serving.[16][16]  

The CA further reduced the exemplary damages from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00, and deleted the award of attorney’s fees because the RTC merely included the award in the dispositive portion of the decision without discussing its legal basis.[17][17]

THE PETITION

          In the petition for review on certiorari before us,[18][18] the petitioners assert that the CA erred when it modified the RTC’s awarded damages.  The petitioners submit the reasons outlined below.

          First, the CA erred when it reduced the RTC’s award of actual damages from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they sought compensation for the damage done to petitioner Leticia Tan’s house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, as well as other household appliances. Since the damages primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property, and not the cost of repairing or replacing them, the value cannot be evidenced by receipts. Accordingly, the RTC correctly relied on petitioner Leticia Tan’s testimony and the documentary evidence presented, consisting of pictures of the damaged property, to prove their right to recover actual damages for the destroyed property.

Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of Celedonio Tan’s earning capacity.  While they admit that they did not submit any documentary evidence to substantiate this claim, the petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan was undisputably a self-employed tailor who owned a small tailor shop; in his line of work, no documentary evidence is available.

Third, the petitioners maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 because the RTC and the CA  consistently found that the collision was caused by the respondents’ gross negligence. Moreover, the respondents acted with bad faith when they fabricated the “oil slick on the road” story to avoid paying damages to the petitioners.  As observed by the CA, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report did not mention any motor oil on the road at the time of the accident. SPO4 Armando Alambro, the Investigation Officer, likewise testified that there was no oil on the road at the time of the accident. For the public good and to serve as an example, the respondents should be made to pay P500,000.00 as exemplary damages.

          Lastly, the petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees based on  Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that attorney’s fees can be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, and when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

          We initially denied the petition in our Resolution of February 17, 2010, for the petitioners’ failure to show any reversible error in the CA decision sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.  In our Resolution of August 11, 2010, we reinstated the petition on the basis of the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

 

OUR RULING

 

          Finding merit in the petitioners’ arguments, we partly grant the petition.

Procedural Issue

 

As both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents’ gross negligence led to the death of Celedonio Tan, as well as to the destruction of the petitioners’ home and tailoring shop, we see no reason to disturb this factual finding.  We, thus, concentrate on the sole issue of what damages the petitioners are entitled to.

We are generally precluded from resolving a Rule 45 petition that solely raises the issue of damages, an essentially factual question, because Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that –

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

In light, however of the RTC’s and the CA’s conflicting findings on the kind and amount of damages suffered which must be compensated, we are compelled to consider the case as one of the recognized exceptions.[19][19]  We look into the parties’ presented evidence to resolve this appeal.

Temperate damages in lieu

of actual damages

We begin by discussing the petitioners’ claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on petitioner Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various household appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered.[20][20] As we explained in Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos:[21][21]

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.[22][22]

The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for actual damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring shop when the truck rammed into them.  Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop can be awarded.

Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.[23][23] As defined in Article 2224 of the Civil Code:

Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,[24][24] we disallowed the award of actual damages arising from breach of contract, where the respondent merely alleged that it was entitled to actual damages and failed to adduce proof to support its plea. In its place, we awarded temperate damages, in recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered.

The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners’ appliances and equipment.[25][25]  Irrefutably, this damage was directly attributable to Arambala’s gross negligence in handling OMC’s truck. Unfortunately, these photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty.  From the attendant circumstances and given the property destroyed,[26][26] we find the amount of P200,000.00 as a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages. 

 

Temperate damages in lieu of

loss of earning capacity

Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity. Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which states that:

Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death[.]

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity.[27][27] By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[28][28]

According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned approximately P156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At the time of his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00,[29][29] or P3,770.00 per month, provided the wage earner had only one rest day per week.  Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary evidence of the income it earns, Celedonio’s alleged monthly income of P13,000.00 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply.

In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured party’s actual income.

In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,[30][30] we sustained the award of temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity because the plaintiff’s income was not sufficiently proven.

We did the same in People v. Singh,[31][31] and People v. Almedilla,[32][32] granting temperate damages in place of actual damages for the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of the deceased’s income.

Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,[33][33] we deleted the award of damages for loss of earning capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss. Nevertheless, because the income-earning capacity lost was clearly established, we awarded the heirs P500,000.00 as temperate damages.

In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed.  Petitioners Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the time the petition was filed on February 4, 2010,[34][34] and they all relied mainly on the income earned by their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance and support.  Under these facts and taking into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.

Reduction of exemplary damages proper

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[35][35] In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[36][36]

Celedonio Tan’s death and the destruction of the petitioners’ home and tailoring shop were unquestionably caused by the respondents’ gross negligence. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the pubic and as a deterrent against the repetition of this kind of deleterious actions.[37][37]  The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CA’s reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 to be proper.

 

Attorney’s fees in order

 

In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners attorney’s fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code.[38][38]  We find the award of attorney’s fees, equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the circumstances.

 

 

Interests due

 

 

          Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[39][39] which held that:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on “Damages” of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts to run from May 14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the time this judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment amount and the interest earned up to that date, until the judgment is wholly satisfied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The June 22, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 84733, which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No. 96-186, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioners the following:

(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Celedonio Tan;

(2) P72,295.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses;

(3)  P200,000.00 as temperate damages for the damage done to petitioner Leticia’s house, tailoring shop, household appliances and shop equipment;

(4) P300,000.00 as damages for the loss of Celedonio Tan’s earning capacity;

(5) P500,000.00 as moral damages;

(6) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(7) 10% of the total amount as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.

In addition, the total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from May 14, 2003, and at the rate of 12% per annum, from the finality of this Resolution on the balance and interest due, until fully paid.

 

SO ORDERED.

                                                                   ARTURO D. BRION

                                                                       Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

    LUCAS P. BERSAMIN                         MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

        Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                          CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                             Associate Justice

                                                                                 Chairperson

 

 CERTIFICATION

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice


 


[1][1]  Rollo, pp. 251-261.

[2][2]  Id. at 242.

[3][3]  Id. at 43-55; Penned by Associate Justice Pampio Abarintos, with Associate Justices Amelita Tolentino and Antonio Villamor concurring.

[4][4]  Id. at 70-78.

[5][5]  With plate number PRS-885.

[6][6]  With plate number CZA 233.

[7][7]  Rollo, p. 58.

[8][8]  Id. at 70-78.

[9][9]  Id. at 86-87.

[10][10] Decision dated May 14, 2003.

[11][11] Rollo, pp. 59-60.

[12][12] Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x  x  x  x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

[13][13] Rollo, p. 60.

[14][14] Id. at 60-61.

[15][15] Id. at 52.

[16][16] Id. at 53-54.

[17][17] Id. at 54-55.

[18][18] Id. at 26-39.

[19][19] The recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8); when said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 846 [1998]).

[20][20] Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 146141, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 321, 329. 

[21][21] G.R. No. 138296, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 509, 519, citing Marina Properties Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 273.

[22][22] Id. at 519.

[23][23] Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159352, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 686, 699.

[24][24] Supra note 20.

[25][25] Rollo, pp. 203-231.

[26][26] Consisting of the petitioners’ home, the tailoring shop, sewing machines and appliances.

[27][27] Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010.

[28][28] Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 598.

[29][29] Based on Wage Order No. NCR-03, series of 1993, and the Rules Implementing Wage Order No. NCR-03.

[30][30] G.R. No. L-56505, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 208, 224-225.

[31][31] 412 Phil. 842, 859 (2001).

[32][32] G.R. No. 150590, August 21, 2003, 409 SCRA 428, 433.

[33][33] G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355.

[34][34] As alleged in their petition for review on certiorari, an allegation which the respondents did not dispute in their Comment dated October 5, 2010.

[35][35] CIVIL CODE, Article 2229.

[36][36] CIVIL CODE, Article 2231.

[37][37] Cebu Country Club, Inc.  v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008, 542 SCRA 65, 75, citing Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 136914, January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 653.

[38][38] CIVIL CODE, Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded.

[39][39] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95.