Archive for February, 2011


CASE 2011-0038: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18 JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)

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February 7, 2011

CASE  2011-0038: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18 JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)

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D E C I S I O N

 

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1][1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[2][2] of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 82268, dated 25 September 2006.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

          On 19 June 1992, petitioner Angelito M. Twaño, then Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) 2nd Engineering District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to Bid to respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino, the owner of A.D. Aquino Construction and Supplies. The bidding was for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga.

Subsequently, on 7 July 1992, the project was awarded to respondent, and a “Contract of Agreement” was thereafter executed between him and concerned petitioners for the amount of PhP1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost.

By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. The certificate was signed by Romeo M. Yumul, the Project Engineer; as well as petitioner Romeo N. Supan, Chief of the Construction Section, and by petitioner Twaño.

Respondent Aquino, however, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint[3][3] for the collection of sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 3137.

Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense[4][4] that the Complaint was a suit against the state; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of Agreement” covering the project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.[5][5]

On 28 November 2003, the lower court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Department of Public Works and Highways is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Arnulfo D. Aquino the following:

1.      PhP1,873,790.69, Philippine Currency, representing actual amount for the completion of the project done by the plaintiff;

2.      PhP50,000.00 as attorney’s fee and

3.      Cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED. [6][6] 

It is to be noted that respondent was only asking for PhP1,262,696.20; the award in paragraph 1 above, however, conforms to the entire contract amount.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision of the lower court and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The “CONTRACT AGREEMENT” entered into between the plaintiff-appellee’s construction company, which he represented, and the government, through the Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH) – Pampanga 2nd Engineering District, is declared null and void ab initio.

The assailed decision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

In line with the pronouncement in Department of Health vs. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects,[7][7] the Commission on Audit (COA) is hereby ordered to determine and ascertain with dispatch, on a quantum meruit basis, the total obligation due to the plaintiff-appellee for his undertaking in implementing the subject contract of public works, and to allow payment thereof, subject to COA Rules and Regulations, upon the completion of the said determination.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[8][8]

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners are now before this Court, seeking a reversal of the appellate court’s Decision and a dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. G-3137. The Petition raises the following issues:

1.      WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.

2.      WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

3.      WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE COA TO ALLOW PAYMENT TO RESPONDENT ON A QUANTUM MERUIT BASIS DESPITE THE LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1445.

After a judicious review of the case, the Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done without exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,[9][9] this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.

The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. In Lacap, this Court said:

… It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

Secondly, in ordering the payment of the obligation due respondent on a quantum meruit basis, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Royal Trust Corporation v. COA,[10][10] Eslao v. COA,[11][11] Melchor v. COA,[12][12] EPG Construction Company v. Vigilar,[13][13] and Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects.[14][14] All these cases involved government projects undertaken in violation of the relevant laws, rules and regulations covering public bidding, budget appropriations, and release of funds for the projects. Consistently in these cases, this Court has held that the contracts were void for failing to meet the requirements mandated by law; public interest and equity, however, dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work done.

Specifically, C.V. Canchela & Associates is similar to the case at bar, in that the contracts involved in both cases failed to comply with the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Nevertheless, “(t)he illegality of the subject Agreements proceeds, it bears emphasis, from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality.  As such, the Agreements are not illegal per se, and the party claiming thereunder may recover what had been paid or delivered.”[15][15]

The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Eslao to the present case. In Eslao, this Court stated:

…the Court finds that the contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered, which were for the benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking the state’s immunity from suit.  This Court has long established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu,[16][16] and recently reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,[17][17] that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. As this Court enunciated in EPG Construction:[18][18]

To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor.

…                                 …                                 …

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.

…                                 …                                 …

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State’s immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit.

To be sure, this Court — as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare — cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. (Emphasis supplied.)

          WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 82268 dated 25 September 2006 is AFFIRMED.

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

      ANTONIO T. CARPIO                   CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

           Associate Justice                                             Associate Justice

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

              Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

 

    

     TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO            ARTURO D. BRION

               Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice   

            DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                         LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

               Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice                              

       MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                 ROBERTO A. ABAD

                  Associate Justice                                            Associate Justice

 

       MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.            JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                  Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                                Chief Justice

 

[1][1] Rollo at 10-32.

[2][2] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok concurring, rollo at 33-48.

[3][3] Rollo at 51-55.

[4][4] Petitioners’ Answer, rollo at 56-59.

[5][5] Sections 85-87, Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (1978).

[6][6] Rollo at 60-64.

[7][7]G.R. Nos. 151373-74, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 218.

[8][8] Rollo at 47.

[9][9] G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.

[10][10]Supreme Court Resolution En Banc, G.R. No. 84202, November 22, 1988, cited in Eslao v. COA, 195 SCRA 730.

[11][11] G.R. No. 89745, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 730.

[12][12] G.R. No. 95938, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 705.

[13][13] G.R. 131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566.

[14][14] Supra at note 7.

[15][15] DOH v. C.V. Canchela Associates, Architects, G.R. Nos. 151373-74, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 218.

[16][16] G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464.

[17][17] G.R. No. 186192, August 25, 2010.

[18][18] G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566.

Comment

CASE 2011-0037: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA (A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2198, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J) SUBJECT: FAILURE OF JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. JUDGE LEONIDA)

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CASE 2011-0037: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA (A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2198, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J) SUBJECT: FAILURE OF JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. JUDGE LEONIDA)

 

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D E C I S I O N

 

Per Curiam:

This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and inventory of pending cases conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City (Branch 74, Malabon).

The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L. Leonida (Judge Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008.  Judge Leonida was the presiding judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from October 1997 until his retirement and was detailed as assisting judge of Branch 74, Malabon.

On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a Memorandum[1][1] on the audit team’s findings, among which are:  

1)     As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a total caseload of 507 cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil cases based on the records actually presented to, and examined by, the audit team. 

2)     Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action was taken after varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases.[2][2]

3)     Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases[3][3] were left unresolved for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three months in 2 cases.

4)     Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases[4][4] submitted for decision, the earliest in 2001, were undecided.

5)     Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no further action was taken on 46 cases.[5][5]

6)     Twenty-four (24) civil cases[6][6] have pending motions/incidents awaiting resolution, the earliest since 2002.

7)     Fifty-seven (57) civil cases[7][7] submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009 were undecided at the time of the audit.  

8)    In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of criminal cases were found to be incomplete. The records were not paginated. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were missing from the files.

9)    The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178,[8][8] an appealed case submitted for resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge Leonida as per certification issued by Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch Clerk of Court.[9][9]

Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly Report of Cases submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and January-March 2008 and noted that 95 criminal cases and 18 civil cases were submitted for decision.[10][10]   Considering that Judge Leonida applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of the 95 submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases.

In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27 and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27.

The same report bears the recommendations of the OCA that were eventually adopted by the Court in a Resolution dated July 29, 2009,[11][11] to wit: 

(1)               RE-DOCKET the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against former Judge Leonardo L. Leonida for gross incompetence and inefficiency;

(2)              REQUIRE Judge Leonida to MANIFEST whether he is willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within ten (10) days from notice;

(3)            DIRECT:

(a) Hon. Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna to:

(1) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Case Nos. xxx which are without further action for a considerable length of time;

(2) RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents/motions in Criminal Case Nos. xxx and furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the resolution/order within ten (10) days from issuance/resolution thereof; and

(3)    DECIDE with dispatch Criminal Case Nos. xxx and Furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the decision within ten (10) days from its promulgation; and

(b) Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, to:

(1) APPRISE the Acting Presiding Judge, from time to time, of cases submitted for resolution/decision and those cases that require immediate action;

(2) ORDER the stitching of all orders issued, minutes taken, notices of hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all appropriate case folders especially those jointly tried, including their chronological arrangement and pagination as well as the proofreading of all orders and notices; and

(3) SUBMIT report of compliance therewith to this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice.

On October 4, 2009, Judge Leonida filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Manifest and Memorandum.[12][12] He cited the short period compounded by the typhoons and floods which ravaged Manila as his reason for requesting an additional period of twenty (20) days within which to file the same.  In its October 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court noted Judge Leonida’s motion.

On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum[13][13] expressing his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings.  He explained that he failed to finalize and promulgate cases pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of Branch 74.  With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an average of 30 cases daily in order to “keep all the cases moving.”  According to Judge Leonida, “the court sessions together with the preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases set for hearing almost ate up” his time as a judge.  The fact that Branch 74, a commercial court, was still included in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the situation. Voluminous pleadings requiring extensive dissection and research, and cases involving numerous intervenors who raised different and complex issues, made matters much more difficult that he even had to conduct hearings on applications for search and seizures until nighttime.  Judge Leonida further claimed that his work encroached upon the time he had to devote to his wife and eight children. Finally, the reconstruction and review of case records submerged in flood waters added up to his struggle to expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court. 

Anent the missing record in Branch 27, Judge Leonida alleged that the case was raffled to said branch long after he assumed the position of Assisting Judge of Branch 74; that he neither saw nor had possession of the said record; and that there was no reason for him to take the record anywhere. He pleaded for compassion and leniency from the Court, invoking his unblemished record in government service for twenty-three (23) years. He likewise offered his sincere apologies to those who were prejudiced.

In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA recommended that for his failure to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases; decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and twenty-seven (27) civil cases in Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and sixteen (16) civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and inefficiency, and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.

Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction.  The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.[14][14] Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.[15][15]

No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the date of submission.  The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[16][16]  In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the court’s business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.

Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases.[17][17] Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge.[18][18] 

Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not take the above constitutional command to heart.  Neither did he observe the above rules which have encapsulated the Court’s strict message: “the need and the imperative” for judges to promptly and expeditiously decide cases including all incidents therein.[19][19]  In this case, the findings of the OCA showed that Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of cases: (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases.  Judge Leonida openly admitted his culpability in the delay of disposition of cases.

His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had.  He cannot take refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and resolve cases promptly.  He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose of the cases but did not.

Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of neglect.  Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business, the lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain, not to mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants.  Delay derails the administration of justice.  It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility.  More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly between the original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses.  If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit.  If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be right.[20][20]  

The Court has always considered a judge’s delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.[21][21]   Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.  The raison d’ etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.[22][22]

Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings likewise show that the case records/rollo in Branch 27 were not chronologically arranged. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel, or worse, missing from the files.  Judge Leonida was asked to explain the whereabouts of the case records of Criminal Case No.  12178.  His bare denial however, does not overcome the fair conclusion that Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court[23][23] was not observed.  The expectation directed at judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the records of cases was certainly not met, or at least approximated.

The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them.[24][24] As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity.  They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence.  The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent. [25][25]

Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and considering the unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must be imposed. The penalty imposed for undue delay in deciding cases varies in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and fine, and even dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within the reglementary period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and the age of the judge.[26][26] 

The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge Leonida failed to timely decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules.  In Lugares v. Judge Gutierrez-Torres,[27][27] the defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for her undue delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was dismissed from the service.

In view of Judge Leonida’s retirement on July 5, 2008, the only penalty that the Court can impose against him is a fine, pursuant to the rule that the retirement of a judge does not release him from liability incurred while in the active service.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which he is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.

Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are hereby ordered to report on their respective compliance with the orders of the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its February 10, 2010 Resolution, Judge Blancaflor was granted a non-extendible period of sixty (60) to comply with its July 29, 2009 Order.

Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal Case No. 12178 within three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report his compliance thereon within ten (10) days from completion.

Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case in her Monthly Report of Cases.

 SO ORDERED.

                                          RENATO C. CORONA

                                                   Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO                       CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

             Associate Justice                                                 Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

                     Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                               LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                          ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                            Associate Justice

 

                                                                                                     (No part)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.           JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice                                                    Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA            MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

            Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

 

[1][1] Id. at 1-21.

[2][2] Case Nos. 4697, 8562, 11247, 9652, 9653, 9654, 9651, 9655, 11952, 11099, 11428, 10996, 10090, 8602.

[3][3] Case Nos. 12460, 12000, 7178, 11236, 13006, 7112, 7122, 11804.

[4][4] Case Nos. 6998, 4859, 6130, 8457, 7887, 7302, 8169, 10032, 8304, 7636, 8419, SC-6623, 7701, SC-8438, 8864, 8833, 9138, 9801, 8541, 8681, 8867, SC-10730, SC-13000, 9649, SC-10912, SC- 9059, 11084, 11907, 11802.

[5][5]  Case Nos. 4214, SP-1783, 1687, LRC 786, SP 2110, 4078, 3616, SC- 3913, 4431, 154 (06), SC- 3941, SP 150 (06), SP Pet. 200, SP. Pet. 184, 4352, Sp Pro. 307, 4444, Sp 289, SP 213, 4683, 3934, SP 1673, SP 2059, SC-4591, SP 24, SP 37, SP 40, SP 42, SP 141, SP 253, SP 297, SC 319, SP 2284, SP 55, SC 368, SP 1749, SC-4593, 3445, 4404, 4666, SC-3844, LRC 15, LRC 16, LRC 39, SP 216, 4741.

[6][6]  Case Nos. SC-4118, SC-4174, SC-4153, 4022, SC-4096, SP-1879, CAD 2 lot 1145 OCT 21128, 4318, SC-4519, SC-3870, SC 4668, SP 1981, SP 737, SC 4346, SC 4045, LRC 638, SC-3842, LRC 143 (06), SC- 3885, SC-4674, 4193, 3294, 4412, 4581.

[7][7]  Case Nos. SC 3098, SC-3440, 3856, SC-3226, SC-3982, 4046, SC-4208, SC-3313, SC-3988, LRC CAD No.8, SC 4053, SC-3707, SC-3981, SC-3239, 3873, SC-4372, 4099, SC-4157, SC-4201, 4330, SC-4320, SC-4369, SC-3876, SC-2147, SC-3966, SC-4087, 3585, SC-1769, 1686, 4592, SC-4395, SC-4151, SP Pet. 373, 4038, SP 123 (05), SCA 4678, SC 4686, SC-4361, 1372, 4719, 4699, 4069, 4469, 2705, 2447, 4616, 4312, 4324, 4694, 4620, Sp-472 (08), Sp-501 (08), Sp Pet 443, SP-500-08, SC-4180, 3651, SP-528 (08).  

[8][8]  Entitled People v. Leonila Cruz.

[9][9]  Rollo, p. 92.

[10][10] Id. at 15-18.

[11][11] Id. at 159-162.

[12][12] Id. at  163.

[13][13] Id. at 342-343.

[14][14] OCA v. Garcia-Blanco, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1941, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 109, 121, citing Bangco v. Gatdula, 428 Phil. 598, 604 (2002).

[15][15] Duque v. Garrido,,  A.M. No. RTJ-06-2027, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 321, 327.

[16][16] Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1662, June 8, 2007,  524 SCRA 13, 17, citing Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20 1997, 274 SCRA 540, 548-549.

[17][17] Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan, Former Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Resolution A.M. No. RTJ-10-2226, March 22, 2010.

[18][18] Lopez v. Alon, 324 Phil. 396, 398 (1996).

[19][19] Isip Jr. v. Nogoy, 448 Phil. 210, 222 (2003).

[20][20]Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio v. Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, August 19, 2008, 562 SCRA 347, 357, citing Southern Pac. Transport. Co. v. Stoot, 530 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. 1975).

[21][21] Guintu v. Judge Lucero, 329 Phil. 704, 711 (1996).

[22][22] Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 93, 98, citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, 26 April 2006, 488 SCRA 285, 296 and Lim, Jr. v. Magallanes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1932, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 12.

[23][23] “No record shall be taken from the clerk’s office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules.”

[24][24] OCA v. Legaspi Jr.,  A.M. No. MTJ-06-1661, January 25, 2007,  512 SCRA 570, 583.

[25][25] Re: Report on the judicial audit in the RTC, Br. 32, Manila, 481 Phil. 431, 447 (2004), citing Juan De los Santos v. Mangino, 453 Phil. 467, 479 (2003).

[26][26] Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2171, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 585, 592.

[27][27] A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719, November 23, 2010.

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LEGAL NOTE 0025: PRIMER FOR JUDGES RE DEADLINE FOR DECIDING CASES.

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 LEGAL NOTE 0025: PRIMER FOR JUDGES RE  DEADLINE FOR DECIDING/RESOLVING CASES/MOTIONS.

 SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA (A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2198, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J) SUBJECT: FAILURE OF JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. JUDGE LEONIDA)

x —————————————————————————–x

 

JUDGE LEONIDA FAILED TO RESOLVE MOTIONS IN TEN (10) CIVIL CASES; DECIDE ELEVEN (11) CRIMINAL CASES, AND TWENTY-SEVEN (27) CIVIL CASES IN BRANCH 27, AND TO DECIDE NINETY-ONE (91) CRIMINAL CASES AND SIXTEEN (16) CIVIL CASES IN BRANCH 74 WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. WHAT IS HIS OFFENSE AND PENALTY?

 

JUDGE LEONIDA IS GUILTY OF GROSS INCOMPETENCY AND INEFFICIENCY. SC FINED HIM P50,000.00 PESOS TO BE DEDUCTED FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

 

WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE OF A JUDGE TO DECIDE A CASE WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

 

IT DEPRIVES LITIGANT OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE;

IT MAGNIFIES COST OF SEEKING JUSTICE;

IT UNDERMINES PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY; AND

IT LOWERS ITS STANDARDS AND BRINGS IT TO DISREPUTE.

Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction.  The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.[1][14] Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.[2][15]

 

HOW LONG IS THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

 

90 DAYS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION.

No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the date of submission.  The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.

 

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUCH DEADLINE?

 

MANDATORY.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[3][16]

 

WHAT IS THE BASIS?

 

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ADMIN CIRCULAR DATED 15 JANUARY 1999

 In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the court’s business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.

Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases.[4][17] Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge.[5][18] 

 

IF JUDGE FAILS TO DECIDE WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD, WHAT IS HIS OFFENSE?

 

GROSS INEFFICIENCY.

The Court has always considered a judge’s delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.[6][21]   Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.  The raison d’ etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.[7][22]

 

WHAT MUST JUDGES OBSERVE IN CONNECTION WITH SAID DEADLINE?

 

EFFICIENCY WITH PROBITY.

The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them.[8][24] As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity.  They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence.  The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent. [9][25]

[1][14] OCA v. Garcia-Blanco, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1941, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 109, 121, citing Bangco v. Gatdula, 428 Phil. 598, 604 (2002). 

[2][15] Duque v. Garrido,,  A.M. No. RTJ-06-2027, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 321, 327.

[3][16] Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1662, June 8, 2007,  524 SCRA 13, 17, citing Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20 1997, 274 SCRA 540, 548-549.

[4][17] Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan, Former Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Resolution A.M. No. RTJ-10-2226, March 22, 2010.

[5][18] Lopez v. Alon, 324 Phil. 396, 398 (1996).

[6][21] Guintu v. Judge Lucero, 329 Phil. 704, 711 (1996).

[7][22] Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 93, 98, citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, 26 April 2006, 488 SCRA 285, 296 and Lim, Jr. v. Magallanes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1932, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 12.

[8][24] OCA v. Legaspi Jr.,  A.M. No. MTJ-06-1661, January 25, 2007,  512 SCRA 570, 583.

[9][25] Re: Report on the judicial audit in the RTC, Br. 32, Manila, 481 Phil. 431, 447 (2004), citing Juan De los Santos v. Mangino, 453 Phil. 467, 479 (2003).

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