Archive for February, 2011


 

CASE  NO. 2011-0041: NILO PADRE VS. FRUCTOSA BADILLO, FEDILA BADILLO, PRESENTACION CABALLES, EDWINA VICARIO (D) REPRESENTED BY MARY JOY VICARIO-ORBETA AND NELSON BADILLO (G.R. NO. 165423, 19 JANURY 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: JURISDICTION OF MTC; CERTIORARI. (BRIEF TITLE: NILO PADRE VS. BADILLO ET AL.) 

x –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

 

 

“A void judgment is no judgment at all.  It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.  All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.”[1][1]

 

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Orders dated July 21 and September 20, 2004[2][2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927, which affirmed the ruling of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Isidro, Northern Samar that it has jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 104.

Factual Antecedents

 

On October 13, 1986, the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23, rendered judgment[3][3] in Civil Case No. A-514 for Ownership and Recovery of Possession with Damages in favor of therein plaintiffs Fructosa Badillo, Fedila Badillo, Edwina Badillo, Presentacion Badillo and Nelson Badillo and against therein defendants, including Consesa Padre.  The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

            WHEREFORE, on preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, declaring and ordering as follows:

1.               That the herein plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the five-sixth (5/6) portion of Lot No. 4080, Pls-54, registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 736, more particularly, the said five-sixth portion is described, delineated and/or indicated in the Sketch Plan which is now marked as Exhibit “B-1”;

2.              That the said five-sixth (5/6) portion which [is] herein adjudged as being owned by the herein plaintiffs, include the portions of land presently being occupied by defendants x x x, Concesa Padre, x x x;

3.              Ordering the defendants mentioned in No. 2 hereof to vacate x x x the lots respectively occupied by them and restore to [the herein plaintiffs] the material possessions thereof;

4.              Condemning and ordering each of the same defendants herein above-named to pay plaintiffs the amount of P100.00 per month, as monthly rental, starting from January 19, 1980, until the lots in question shall have been finally restored to the plaintiffs; and

5.              Condemning and ordering the herein defendants named above to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 representing attorney’s fees and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[4][4] 

            This Decision became final and executory on November 5, 1986.[5][5] 

            On December 29, 1997, the Badillo family filed another complaint against those who occupy their property which included some of the defendants in Civil Case No. A-514.[6][6]  The case was filed with the MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar and was docketed as Civil Case No. 104.[7][7]  As Consesa Padre had already died in 1989, her heir, Nilo Padre (Nilo), was impleaded as one of the defendants.  While some of the defendants filed their respective answers, Nilo was one of those who were declared in default for failure to file their answer to the complaint.[8][8]

            Although denominated as one for “Ownership and Possession,” the Badillo family alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. 104 viz:

4.     That plaintiffs are the joint owners of Lot No. 4080. Pls-54, with a total area of 10,167 square meters, covered by OCT No. 736 in the name of Eutequio Badillo, deceased husband of plaintiff Fructosa Badillo and father of the rest of the other plaintiffs, covered by Tax Declaration No. 9160 and assessed at P26,940.00;

5.     That plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-514, entitled Fructosa Badillo versus Celso Castillo, et. al., were the prevailing parties in the aforesaid case as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the above-entitled case and marked as Annex “A” and made integral part of this complaint;

6.     That after the judgment in the above-mentioned case became final, the same was executed as evidenced by a copy of the writ of execution hereto attached as Annex “B” and made integral part hereof;

 

7.     That despite the service of the writ of execution and vacating the properties x x x illegally occupied by the afore-mentioned defendants, [said defendants] re-entered the property in 1990 after the execution and refused to vacate the same [thereby] reasserting their claims of ownership x x x despite repeated demands;

8.     That all attempts towards a peaceful settlement of the matter outside of Court to avoid a civil suit, such as referring the matter of the Brgy. Captain and the Brgy. Lupon of Brgy. Alegria, San Isidro, N. Samar were of no avail as the defendants refused to heed lawful demands of plaintiffs to x x x vacate the premises[. I]nstead, defendants claimed ownership of the property in question [and] refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands [such] that having lost all peaceful remedies, plaintiffs were constrained to file this suit.  Certificate to file Action is hereby attached and marked as Annex “C” and made integral part hereof;[9][9]  (Emphasis supplied.)

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court

 

 

            The MTC rendered judgment[10][10] on July 17, 2003.  Interpreting the suit of the Badillo family as an action to revive the dormant judgment in Civil Case No. A-514, the court recognized the right of the plaintiffs to finally have such judgment enforced.  The MTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is ordered reviving the previous judgment of the Regional Trial Court there being, and still, preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs, as follows:

1.              That the herein plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the five-sixth (5/6) portion of Lot No. 4080, Pls-54, registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 730, more particularly x x x described, delineated and/or indicated in the Sketch Plan which is now marked as Exhibit “B-1”;

2.              That the said five-sixth portion which is herein adjudged as being owne[d] by herein plaintiffs, includes the portions of land presently being occupied by defendants Victor Eulin, Consesa Padre, Celso Castillo, Leo Atiga, Santos Corollo, Iñego Armogela, Salustiano Millano, Milagros Gile, Pusay Enting, Galeleo Pilapil, more particularly indicated in Exhibit “B-1” and marked as Exhibits “B-3”, “B-4”, “B-5,” “B-6,” “B-7,” “B-8,” “B-9,” “B-10,” “B-11,” “B-12,” and “B-13”, respectively;

3.              Ordering the defendants mentioned in No. 2, hereof and THOSE PRESENTLY NAMED AS PARTY-DEFENDANTS IN THIS REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT AND THOSE ACTING IN PRIVITY to vacate from the lots respectively occupied by them and restore [to] the herein plaintiff x x x the material possession thereof;

4.              Condemning and ordering each of the same defendants named in the previous civil case and those NAMED ANEW to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00, representing attorney’s fees, and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses;

5.              CONDEMNING ALL DEFENDANTS HEREIN TO PAY EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR OBSTINATELY VIOLATING THE DECISION OF THE COURT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY X X X THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[11][11]       

            Nilo thereafter appeared and moved to reconsider[12][12] the MTC judgment.  He argued that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the case, opining that the action for revival of judgment is a real action and should be filed with the same court, i.e., the RTC, which rendered the decision sought to be revived.  Or, assuming arguendo that the MTC has jurisdiction over real actions, it must be noted that the subject property is assessed at P26,940.00, an amount beyond the P20,000.00 limit for the MTC to have jurisdiction over real actions, in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 7691.[13][13] Nilo also contended that the action is dismissible for a) lack of certificate of non-forum shopping in the complaint and b) prescription, the complaint for revival of judgment having been filed beyond the 10-year reglementary period[14][14] from the time the judgment sought to be revived became final and executory in November 1986.       

            The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.[15][15]  It held that the case is an action for revival of judgment and not an action for ownership and possession, which had already long been settled.  To the MTC, the former is a personal action under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which may be filed, at the election of plaintiffs, either at the court of the place where they reside or where the defendants reside.  The court found excusable the absence of the certification against forum shopping, justifying that the action filed before it is merely a continuation of the previous suit for ownership.  Moreover, the counsel for the Badillo family, a nonagenarian, may not yet have been familiar with the rule when Civil Case No. 104 was filed.  To it, this mistake should not prejudice the Badillo family who deserve to possess and enjoy their properties.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

 

            By way of a special civil action for certiorari, Nilo elevated the case to the RTC to question the MTC’s jurisdiction,[16][16] reiterating the same grounds he had raised before the MTC.  The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. A-927.

On July 21, 2004, however, the RTC dismissed said petition[17][17] on the ground that it was filed late.  Moreover, the RTC upheld the MTC’s jurisdiction over the case, affirming the MTC’s ratiocination that an action for enforcement of a dormant judgment is a personal action, and hence may be filed either at the court of the place where plaintiffs reside or where the defendants reside.

            In his Motion for Reconsideration,[18][18] Nilo contended that his petition with the RTC was timely filed as shown by the registry receipt dated March 1, 2004,[19][19] stamped on the mailing envelope he used in filing said petition.  He argued that this date of mailing is also the date of filing.  He also contended that the RTC’s Decision was bereft of any explanation as to why it ruled that the case is a personal action.  He further alleged that the RTC failed to discuss the issues of prescription and non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping.   

            In its Order dated September 20, 2004, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.  It said:

Assuming  that  the  date  of  posting was March 1, 2004, as shown in the registry

receipts, still the 60-day reglementary period had already lapsed with December 30, 2003 as the reckoning period when petitioner received the December 9, 2003 Order of Hon. Judge Jose A. Benesisto.  With the month of February, 2004 having 29 days, it is now clear that the petition was filed sixty one (61) days after; hence, there is no timeliness of the petition to speak of.

                Civil Case No. 104 is an ordinary action to enforce a dormant judgment filed by plaintiffs against defendants.  Being an action for the enforcement of dormant judgment for damages is a personal one and should be brought in any province where the plaintiff or defendant resides, at the option of the plaintiff.  As regards prescription, the present rule now is, the prescriptive period commences to run anew from the finality of the revived judgment. A revived judgment is enforceable again by motion within five years and thereafter by another action within ten years from the finality of the revived judgment.  There is, therefore, no prescription or beyond the statute of limitations to speak [sic] in the instant case.  Petitioner’s contention must therefore fail.

                It is but proper and legal that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 514 of which they are the prevailing parties to institute for the enforcement of a dormant judgment [which right] they have failed to exercise x x x for more than a decade.  Being an ordinary action to enforce a dormant judgment, not even testimonial evidence is necessary to enforce such judgment because the decision had long obtained its finality.

x x x x[20][20]

            Hence, this petition.

Petitioner’s Arguments

 

            Nilo finds the RTC’s adverse ruling as wanting in sufficient explanation as to the factual and legal bases for upholding the MTC.  He also highlights the failure of the Badillo family to attach to their complaint a certificate of non-forum shopping.  Petitioner also argues that the date of mailing of his petition with the RTC is the date of his filing.  He stressed that the filing of his petition on March 1, 2004 was well within the prescriptive period.  As the 60th day from December 30, 2003 fell on a Saturday, he maintains that the Rules of Court allows him to file his petition on the next working day, which is March 1, 2004, a Monday.

            As  have  already  been   raised  in   the  courts   below,  Nilo   mentions  the

following grounds for the dismissal of the action against him before the MTC:

a)           The MTC lacks jurisdiction.  Nilo reiterates that the prime objective of the Badillo family in Civil Case No. 104 is to recover real property, which makes it a real action.  Citing the case of Aldeguer v. Gemelo,[21][21] he contends that this suit must be brought before the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.  Besides, the assessed value of the land in controversy, i.e., P26,940.00, divests the MTC of jurisdiction.       

b)          Prescription.  Nilo claims that the Badillo family’s suit had already lapsed as they allowed 11 years to pass without resorting to any legal remedy before filing the action for revival of judgment.  Although the Badillo family moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. A-514, the same did not interrupt the running of the period to have the judgment enforced by motion or by action.     

Respondents’ Arguments

 

            While impliedly acknowledging that Nilo seasonably filed his petition for certiorari with the RTC, the Badillo family note that he should have filed an appeal before the RTC.  They claim that they properly filed their case, a personal action, with the MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar as they are allowed under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court to elect the venue as to where to file their case. 

Granting that their action is considered a revival of judgment, the Badillos claim that they filed their suit within the 10-year period.  They contend that in filing Civil Case No. 104 in December 1997, the prescriptive period should not be counted from the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. A-514, but should be reckoned from August 22, 1989, when the RTC issued an Order that considered as abandoned  the  motion  to   declare  the  defendants   in  default  in  the   contempt

proceedings.

Issue

           

            The question that should be settled is whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTC ruling that it has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104.

Our Ruling

 

            Indeed, “[t]he existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari.”[22][22]  The court a quo could have instead dismissed Nilo’s petition on the ground that this question should have been raised by way of an appeal.[23][23]  This rule is subject to exceptions, such as “when the writs issued are null and void or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.”[24][24]  As will be later on discussed, the RTC, although it ultimately erred in its judgment, was nevertheless correct in entertaining the special civil action for certiorari.  The exceptions we mentioned apply in the case at bar, as it turns out that petitioner’s jurisdictional objection has compelling basis.        

Timeliness of the petition for certiorari

 

The petition for certiorari before the RTC was timely filed.  If the pleading filed was not done personally, the date of mailing, as stamped on the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the date of filing.[25][25]  By way of registered mail, Nilo filed his petition for certiorari with the RTC on March 1, 2004, as indicated in the date stamped on its envelope.  From the time Nilo received on December 30, 2003 the MTC’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, the last day for him to file his petition with the RTC fell on February 28, 2004, a Saturday.  Under the Rules, should the last day of the period to file a pleading fall on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, a litigant is allowed to file his or her pleading on the next working day,[26][26] which in the case at bar, fell on a Monday, i.e., March 1, 2004.

Jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104

 

We shall now look into the core argument of Nilo anent the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the case and the alleged prescription of the action.

“[W]hat determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.”[27][27]  In their complaint in Civil Case No. 104, some of the allegations of the Badillo family, which petitioner never opposed and are thus deemed admitted by him, states:

4.     That plaintiffs are the joint owners of Lot No. 4080. Pls-54, with a total area of 10,167 square meters, covered by OCT No. 736 in the name of Eutequio Badillo, deceased husband of plaintiff Fructosa Badillo and father of the rest of the other plaintiffs, covered by Tax Declaration No. 9160 and assessed at P26,940.00;

5.     That plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-514, entitled Fructosa Badillo versus Celso Castillo, et. al., were the prevailing parties in the aforesaid case as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the above-entitled case and marked as Annex “A” and made integral part of this complaint;

6.     That after the judgment in the above-mentioned case became final, the same was executed as evidenced by a copy of the writ of execution hereto attached as Annex “B” and made integral part hereof;

 

7.     That despite the service of the writ of execution and vacating the properties x x x illegally occupied by the afore-mentioned defendants, the latter re-entered the property in 1990 after the execution and refused to vacate the same [thereby] reasserting their claims of ownership over [the disputed properties] and refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands;

                8.     That all attempts towards a peaceful settlement of the matter outside of Court to avoid a civil suit, such as referring the matter of the Brgy. Captain and the Brgy. Lupon of Brgy. Alegria, San Isidro, N. Samar were of no avail as the defendants refused to heed lawful demands of plaintiffs to x x x vacate the premises[. I]nstead, defendants claimed ownership of the property in question refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands [such] that having lost all peaceful remedies, plaintiffs were constrained to file this suit.  Certificate to file Action is hereby attached and marked as Annex “C” and made integral part hereof;[28][28]  (Emphasis supplied.)

Under paragraph 6 of their complaint, the Badillos alleged that judgment in Civil Case No. A-514 had become final and had been executed.  Further, in paragraph 7, they alleged that in 1990, the defendants re-entered the property and despite repeated demands they refused to vacate the same.  Thus, the Badillos were not at all seeking a revival of the judgment.  In reality, they were asking the MTC to legally oust the occupants from their lots. 

The Badillo family would have been correct in seeking judicial recourse from the MTC had the case been an action for ejectment, i.e., one of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court wherein essential facts constituting forcible entry[29][29] have been averred and the suit filed within one year from the time of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, as the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over such suit.[30][30]  However, as the alleged dispossession occurred in 1990, the one-year period to bring a case for forcible entry had expired since the Badillos filed their suit only in December 1997.  We thus construe that the remedy they availed of is the plenary action of accion publiciana, which may be instituted within 10 years.[31][31]  “It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.”[32][32] 

Whether the case filed by the Badillo family is a real or a personal action is irrelevant.  Determining whether an action is real or personal is for the purpose only of determining venue.  In the case at bar, the question raised concerns jurisdiction, not venue.

Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion publiciana, they pleaded their case before the wrong court.  In civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction only if the assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.[33][33]  As the assessed value of the property subject matter of this case is P26,940.00, and since more than one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC.[34][34]  Hence, the MTC has no judicial authority at all to try the case in the first place.  “A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.”[35][35] 

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is not anymore necessary to discuss the issue raised concerning the failure to include a certification of non-forum shopping.  

Although we are compelled to dismiss respondents’ action before the MTC, they are nonetheless not precluded from filing the necessary judicial remedy with the proper court.  

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Orders dated July 21 and September 20, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927 are hereby SET ASIDE.  The Municipal Trial Court of San Isidro, Northern Samar is DIRECTED to dismiss Civil Case No. 104 for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 

 

                                               

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice


 


[1][1]   Polystyrene Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Privatization and Management Office, G.R. No. 171336, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 640, 651.

[2][2]   RTC Records, pp. 62 and 81-82, respectively; penned by Executive Judge Salvador L. Infante.

[3][3]   MTC Records, pp. 18-24.

[4][4]   Id. at 24.

[5][5]   Defendants received the copy of the Decision on October 21, 1986 and did not file any appeal within the 15-day period.

[6][6]   Defendants in Civil Case No. 104 were Leo Atiga, Nestor dela Cruz, Galileo Pilapil, Domingo Flor, Santos Corollo, Devena Obeda, Leo Siago, Iñigo Armohila, Nilo Padre, Milagros Gelle, Egol Avila, Mag Cabahug, Berong Albuera, Erning Sampayan and Berting Armohila.

[7][7]   MTC Records, pp. 7-10.

[8][8]   Id. at 99.

[9][9]   Id. at 8-9.

[10][10]         Id. at 443-449.

[11][11]         Id. at 448-449.  The Decision was rendered by Acting MTC Judge Jose A. Benesisto.

[12][12]         Id. at 473-482.

[13][13]         An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for that purpose Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1990.”

[14][14]         Civil Code, Article 1144 and Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 6.

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

SEC. 6.  Execution by motion or by independent action.—A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

[15][15]         MTC Records, pp. 514-516.

[16][16]         RTC Records, pp. 5-20.

[17][17]         Id. at 62.

[18][18]         Id. at 67-74.

[19][19]         Id. at 76-79.  The copies of the petition for the opposing counsel, the Branch Clerk of Court of the MTC, and the Office of the Solicitor General were mailed on the same day.

[20][20]         Id. at 81.

[21][21]         68 Phil. 421 (1939).

[22][22]         Balindong v. Dacalos, 484 Phil. 574, 579 (2004).

[23][23]         Rules of Court, Rule 40.

[24][24]         Iloilo La Filipina Uygongco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170244, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 178, 189.

[25][25]         Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 3. Manner of filing. – The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case.

[26][26]         Rules of Court, Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

[27][27]         Munsalud v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 167181, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 144, citing Villena v. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 592, 597.

[28][28]         MTC Records, p. 4.

[29][29]         An averment of dispossession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth is necessary in the complaint for forcible entry.

[30][30]         Batas Pambansa Bilang. 129, Section 33 (2).  Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases – x x x

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,  That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; x x x.

[31][31]         Civil Code, Article 555.  A possessor may lose his possession:

                x x x x

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year.  But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.

[32][32]         Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179, citing Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.

[33][33]         Supra note 33, Section 33 (3).  As amended by Republic Act No. 7691.  Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases – 

(3)  Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x.

[34][34]         Id. Section 19 (2).  Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

                x x x x

                (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.

[35][35]         Laresma v. Abellana, 484 Phil. 766, 779 (2004).

LEGAL NOTE 0026: CONTRUCTOR SUED DPWH. CAN HE SUE WITHOUT FIRST EXHAUSTING ADMIN REMEDIES? CAN CONTRACTOR BE PAID EVEN IF HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH PD1445? CAN DPWH INVOKE THE DOCTRINE OF THE NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE?

 

SOURCE: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18 JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

THE CASE STORY:

AQUINO CONSTRUCTED A DIKE BULLDOZING A PART OF THE PORAC RIVER IN JULY 1992. HE FILED  A COLLECTION CASE AGAINST DPWH ET AL. THE DEFENSES OF DPWH ARE: NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE; FAILURE OF AQUINO TO EXHAUST ADMIN REMEDIES AND HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PD 1445. RTC AND CA RULED IN FAVOR OF AQUINO. SC AFFIRMED.

 

THE DOCTRINES:

 

DPWH ARGUES THAT AQUINO SHOULD HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMIN REMEDIES BY FIRST FILING ITS CLAIM AT COA.

 

SC SAID, AQUINO’S CASE FALSE UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES BECAUSE THERE IS UNREASONABLE DELAY OR OFFICIAL INACTION THAT WILL IRRETRIEVABLY PREJUDICE THE COMPLAINANT AND THE QUESTION INVOLVED IS PURELY LEGAL AND WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURTS OF JUSTICE.

Said the Court:

Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done without exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,[1][9] this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.

The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent.

More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. In Lacap, this Court said:

… It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

DPWH ARGUES THAT AQUINO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PD 1445.

 

SC RULED THAT EVEN IF AQUINO  VIOLATED PD 1445, STILL EQUITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST DEMAND THAT AQUINO BE PAID.

Secondly, in ordering the payment of the obligation due respondent on a quantum meruit basis, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Royal Trust Corporation v. COA,[2][10] Eslao v. COA,[3][11] Melchor v. COA,[4][12] EPG Construction Company v. Vigilar,[5][13] and Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects.[6][14] All these cases involved government projects undertaken in violation of the relevant laws, rules and regulations covering public bidding, budget appropriations, and release of funds for the projects. Consistently in these cases, this Court has held that the contracts were void for failing to meet the requirements mandated by law; public interest and equity, however, dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work done.

Specifically, C.V. Canchela & Associates is similar to the case at bar, in that the contracts involved in both cases failed to comply with the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Nevertheless, “(t)he illegality of the subject Agreements proceeds, it bears emphasis, from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality.  As such, the Agreements are not illegal per se, and the party claiming thereunder may recover what had been paid or delivered.”[7][15]

The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Eslao to the present case. In Eslao, this Court stated:

…the Court finds that the contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered, which were for the benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. (Emphasis supplied.)

DPWH ARGUES THAT THE STATE IS IMMUNED FROM SUIT.

 

 

SC RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT CANNOT BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PERPETUATE INJUSTICE.

Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking the state’s immunity from suit.  This Court has long established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu,[8][16] and recently reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,[9][17] that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. As this Court enunciated in EPG Construction:[10][18]

To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor.

…                                 …                                 …

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.

…                                 …                                 …

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State’s immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit.

To be sure, this Court — as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare — cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. (Emphasis supplied.)


[1][9] G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.

[2][10]Supreme Court Resolution En Banc, G.R. No. 84202, November 22, 1988, cited in Eslao v. COA, 195 SCRA 730.

[3][11] G.R. No. 89745, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 730.

[4][12] G.R. No. 95938, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 705.

[5][13] G.R. 131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566.

[6][14] Supra at note 7.

[7][15] DOH v. C.V. Canchela Associates, Architects, G.R. Nos. 151373-74, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 218.

[8][16] G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464.

[9][17] G.R. No. 186192, August 25, 2010.

[10][18] G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566.

CASE NO. 2011-0039: MODESTO AGYAO, JR. VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. NO. 182591, 18 JANUARY 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE COVERS PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS ONLY. (BRIEF TITLE: AGYAO VS. CSC).

   

x ——————————————————————————x

D E C I S I O N

 

MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the September 26, 2007 Decision[1][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 92569, which affirmed Resolution No. 05-0821 dated June 16, 2005, issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  The CSC Resolution, in turn, affirmed the invalidation by the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (CSCFO-BSP) of the appointment of petitioner Modesto Agyao, Jr. (Agyao) as Department Manager II of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). 

         

Records show that on June 16, 2004, Agyao was re-appointed as Department Manager II of PEZA. As a matter of course, the renewal of Agyao’s appointment was submitted by PEZA to the CSC.

On July 16, 2004, however, Agyao’s re-appointment was invalidated by the CSCFO-BSP, through a letter of Director Mercedes P. Tabao (Director Tabao). The letter stated that Agyao lacked the prescribed Career Executive Service Office (CESO)/ Career Service Executive Examination (CSEE) eligibility, and there were qualified eligibles actually available for appointment.  Section 2 (b), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998, provides as follows:

b. Temporary – issued to a person who meets the education, experience and training requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except for the appropriate eligibility but only in the absence of a qualified eligible actually available, as certified to by the Civil Service Regional Director or Field Officer. xxx

          On August 31, 2004, PEZA Director-General Lilia B. De Lima (Director-General De Lima) sent a letter-appeal to the CSC seeking a reconsideration of its action on the appointment of Agyao.

On June 16, 2005, the CSC issued Resolution No. 05-0821[2][2] denying Director-General De Lima’s appeal and affirming the invalidation by the CSCFO–BSP of Agyao’s appointment as Department Manager II of PEZA. The CSC referred to CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 9, Series of 2005 (Limitations on Renewal of Temporary Appointments), which clearly provides that only one renewal of a temporary third-level appointment is allowed provided that there are no qualified applicants actually available and willing to assume the position. Moreover, although Agyao’s temporary appointment was renewed four (4) times, he failed to acquire the appropriate third level eligibility.  In addition, CSCFO-BSP Director Tabao certified that there were qualified eligibles available for appointment to the position of Department Manager II.

          On July 18, 2005, Agyao was informed by PEZA Deputy Director for Finance and Administration, Justo Porfirio LL. Yusingco, about his appointment as Division Chief III, Permanent, effective July 16, 2005.

          On August 21, 2005, Agyao filed with the CSC a Letter-Motion for Reconsideration of its July 16, 2005 Resolution. The motion, however, was denied in the cited CSC Resolution No. 05-1486 dated October 17, 2005.

          On appeal, the CA rendered a decision dated September 26, 2007 affirming the resolution of the CSC. It ruled, among others, that Agyao could not qualify for the position of Department Manager II because he was not a Career Civil Service Eligible (CESE).  He could not invoke the provisions of CSC MC No. 9, Series of 2005, issued on March 22, 2005 because the invalidation of his temporary appointment was made earlier on July 16, 2004. Moreover, CSC Office Memorandum No. 05, Series of 2005, issued on August 5, 2005 as a clarification on CSC MC No. 9, Series of 2005, expressly provides that “all renewals issued on or after July 24, 2005 can no longer be renewed after they lapse.”

          Aggrieved, Agyao filed this petition for review before this Court raising the following

 

ISSUES

 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECLARING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PETITIONER AS DEPARTMENT MANAGER II OF THE PEZA AS INVALID.

 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POSITION OF THE PETITIONER AS DEPARTMENT MANAGER II IS NOT COVERED UNDER THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT HE IS NOT A PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE.

            Agyao argues that CSC MC No. 9, Series of 2005, is applicable to him because its provisions are favorable to him. He claims that CSC Office Memorandum No. 05, Series of 2005, which clarified CSC MC No. 9, Series of 2005, allows one renewal of temporary third level appointments issued before July 24, 2005 subject to existing rules and regulations regardless of previous renewals granted before said date. Accordingly, he insists that the renewal of his appointment was valid because it was made on June 16, 2004.

          Agyao further points out that there are no qualified applicants actually available and willing to assume his position as Director Manager II at the PEZA. Director Tabao’s “qualified eligibles” in her list are from different agencies of the government and that none of them has applied for the position. It is the reason why the position is still vacant.

Finally, Agyao contends that the position of Department Manager II of PEZA is not among those covered by the Career Executive Service (CES) also known as presidential appointees. The appointment to the position is made by the PEZA Director-General. Accordingly, he does not need to possess the required CESO/CSEE to continue acting as Department Manager II.

          The CSC, on the other hand, argues that Agyao’s temporary appointment on June 16, 2004 was properly invalidated because he lacked the eligibility to qualify as Department Manager II.  Although he was re-appointed several times to the position, he still failed to acquire third level eligibility considering that he failed in the November 2004 CSEE.

          Moreover, CSC MC No. 9, Series of 2005, and CSC Office Memorandum No. 05, Series of 2005, cannot apply in Agyao’s favor because they were issued after the invalidation of his fifth temporary appointment and did not provide for a retroactive application.

          The CSC also regards Agyao’s contention that there are no qualified applicants who are actually willing to assume the position of Department Manager II as speculative and hearsay.  Actually, Director Tabao certified and furnished PEZA a list of qualified eligibles for possible appointment as Department Manager II.

          Finally, the CSC argues that although the position of Department Manager II does not require a presidential appointment, it is a third level position which requires either a CESO or CSEE eligibility. The list of third level positions in the Career Executive Service enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987, namely: Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, is not strictly limited. Citing jurisprudence,[3][3] the CSC avers that the classification of a particular position in the bureaucracy is determined by the nature of the functions of the office. The third level embraces positions of a managerial character involving the exercise of management functions such as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of an organization or of a unit thereof.  It also requires some degree of professional, technical or scientific knowledge and experience, and application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance, leadership and supervision.

The rank of Department Manager II falls under the coverage of CES under the aforementioned CSC issuances as the same is a third level career position above the division chief level and performing executive or managerial functions. Pursuant to the merit-and-fitness rule in the Constitution, the consistent policy is to the effect that non-presidential appointees to positions with managerial and executive functions must possess third level eligibility.

           In sum, the core issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the position of Department Manager II of PEZA requires CESO or CSEE eligibility.

RULING OF THE COURT

 

The issue is not novel.  In Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission cases,[4][4] Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation v. Civil
Service Commission
[5][5] and National Transmission Corporation v. Hamoy,[6][6] the Court has consistently ruled that the CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES.

Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V, Title 1 (Subtitle A) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, classifies the positions in the Civil Service as follows:

 

Section 8.  Classes of positions in the Career Service.—( 1) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three  major levels as follows:

(a)      The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;

(b)     The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and

(c)      The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

          In the Home Insurance case, the Court ruled that “the position of Vice-President of HIGC does not belong to the 3rd level of the career service. Respondent Cruz has not satisfactorily shown that his former position as Vice-President in the HIGC belongs to the third level in the career service as prescribed by law. His former position as Vice President is not among those enumerated by law as falling under the third level, nor has he established that it is one of those identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank to those listed by law. Neither is it claimed that he was appointed by the President.”

In the Office of the Ombudsman case, the Court wrote:

The CSC’s opinion that the Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman are covered by the CES is wrong. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of EO[7][7][7] 292, otherwise known as “The Administrative Code of 1987,” provides: 

SECTION 7.  Career Service. – The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.

The Career Service shall include:

(1)       Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

(2)       Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3)       Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;

x x x          x x x          x x x (emphasis supplied) 

Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only. As this Court ruled in Office of the Ombudsman v. CSC [G.R. No. 159940, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 570]: 

From the above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code, persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. x x x (emphasis supplied)

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES eligibility.

To classify the positions of Director II in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution or (2) including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

The same ruling was cited in the National Transmission Corporation case, where it was further written:

 “Positions in the CES under the Administrative Code include those of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.  Simply put, third-level positions in the Civil Service are only those belonging to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the President of the Philippines.  This was the same ruling handed down by the Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, wherein  the Court declared   that the CES covers presidential appointees only. 

x x x               x x x               x x x

Respondent was appointed Vice-President of VisMin Operations & Maintenance by Transco President and CEO Alan Ortiz, and not by the President of the Republic. On this basis alone, respondent cannot be considered as part of the CES. 

Caringal and Erasmo cited by petitioner are not in point.  There, the Court ruled that appointees to CES positions who do not possess the required CES eligibility do  not enjoy security of tenure.  More importantly, far from holding that presidential appointment is not required of a position to be included in the CES, we learn from Caringal that the appointment by the President completes the  attainment of the CES rank, thus:

Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank.  Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes the official’s  membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the CES. 

To classify other positions not included in the above enumeration as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences.  It will result either in (1) vesting the appointing power for non- CES positions in the President, in violation of the  Constitution; or (2) including  in the CES  a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

Interestingly, on 9 April 2008, CSC Acting Chairman Cesar D. Buenaflor issued Office Memorandum No. 27, s. 2008, which states in part: 

For years, the Commission has promulgated several policies and issuances identifying positions in the Career Service above Division Chief Level performing executive and managerial functions as belonging to the Third Level covered by the  Career Executive Service (CES) and those outside the CES, thus, requiring third level eligibility for purposes of permanent appointment and security of tenure.

However, the issue as to whether a particular position belongs to the Third Level has been settled by jurisprudence enshrined in Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95450 dated March 19, 1993 and Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) v. Civil Service Commission; G.R. No. 162215 dated July 30, 2007, where the Honorable Supreme Court ruled citing the provision of Section 7(3) Chapter 2, Title I-A, Book V of Administrative Code of 1987, that the Third Level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service (CES).  Positions in the Career Executive Service consists of Undersecretary, Assistant  Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board (CESB), all of whom are appointed by the President. To classify other positions not included in the above enumeration as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences.  It will result either: in (1) vesting the appointing power for non-CES positions in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or, (2) including in the CES  a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

x x x 

While the above-cited ruling of the Supreme Court refer to particular positions in the OMB and HIGC, it is clear, however, that the intention was to make the doctrine enunciated therein applicable to similar and comparable positions in the bureaucracy. To reiterate, the Third Level covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the CESB as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines.  Consequently, the doctrine enshrined in these Supreme Court decisions has ipso facto nullified all resolutions, qualification standards, pronouncements and/or issuances of the Commission insofar as the requirement of third level eligibility to non-CES positions is concerned.

In view thereof, OM No. 6, series of 2008 and all other issuances of the Commission inconsistent with the afore-stated law and jurisprudence are likewise deemed repealed, superseded and abandoned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioner can no longer invoke Section 1(b) of Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 21, it being inconsistent with the afore-quoted Office Memorandum and thus deemed repealed by no less than the CSC itself.

All three cases were also cited in the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[8][8] where a similar ruling was handed down.

Doubtless, the position of Director Manager II at the PEZA is not among the enumerated positions in the Career Executive Service, much less, a position that requires presidential appointment.  Even the CSC admits that the position of Director Manager II does not require presidential appointment.

For said reason, Agyao only needs the approval of the PEZA Director-General to validate his appointment or re-appointment.  As he need not possess a CESO or CSEE eligibility, the CSC has no valid and legal basis in invalidating his appointment or re-appointment as Department Manager II.

WHEREFORE, the September 26, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered holding that the appointment of Modesto Agyao, Jr. as Department Manager II of PEZA was valid.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

                                                                                       Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO                      CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                                                                                        Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                                                                                                                                  Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                   Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                             LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

  Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

 

                                                                                                                                                          (No part)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                        ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.                JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                   Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

                                                                                                                                                                             Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice


 


[1][1] Rollo, pp. 40-47. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, concurring and promulgated September 26, 2007.

[2][2] Id. at 66-69.

[3][3]  GSIS v. CSC, G.R. No. 87146, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 826.

[4][4] G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 535, 542.

[5][5] G.R. No. 95450, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 148, 154.

[6][6] G.R. No. 179255, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 410.

 

[8][8] G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010.