J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

RE: G.R. NO. 191721: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO DOLORIDO Y ESTRADA (G.R. NO. 191721, 12 JANUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECTS: ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE; UNLAWFUL AGRESSION; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS OF MURDER; AWARD OF DAMAGES IN MURDER. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. DOLORIDO)

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SUBJECTS/ DOCTRINES:

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE?

(1) UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM; (2) REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED TO PREVENT OR REPEL SUCH AGGRESSION; AND (3) LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON RESORTING TO SELF-DEFENSE.

In order for self-defense to be successfully invoked, the following essential elements must be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.^[1][11]

WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE ELEMENTS?

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION. UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION MUST BE PROVED FIRST IN ORDER FOR SELF-DEFENSE TO BE SUCCESSFULLY PLEADED, WHETHER COMPLETE OR INCOMPLETE.

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the elements.^[2][12] However, the most important among all the elements is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. As this Court said in People v. Catbagan,^[3][13] “There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.”

SUBJECT: WHAT IS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION?

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION IS AN ACTUAL PHYSICAL ASSAULT, OR AT LEAST A THREAT TO INFLICT REAL IMMINENT INJURY, UPON A PERSON.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.^[4][15]  In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.^[5][16]  It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and intimidating action.”^[6][17]  It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life.”^[7][18]

SUBJECT: WHEN IS PLEA OF SELF DEFENSE JUSTIFIED?

IT MUST BE CREDIBLE AND CORROBORATED.

Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that “a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself.”^[8][19]  Moreover, “[a]bsent any showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive to testify against the appellant, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.”^[9][20]

SUBJECT: WHAT IS TREACHERY?

THE DIRECT EMPLOYMENT OF MEANS, METHODS, OR FORMS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WHICH TEND DIRECTLY AND SPECIALLY TO INSURE ITS EXECUTION, WITHOUT RISK TO THE OFFENDER ARISING FROM THE DEFENSE WHICH THE OFFENDED PARTY MIGHT MAKE.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF TREACHERY?

AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK, THE VICTIM WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF; AND (2) THE ACCUSED CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY ADOPTED THE PARTICULAR MEANS, METHODS OR FORMS OF ATTACK EMPLOYED BY HIM.^[10][21]

. . . In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.^[11][21] 

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF TREACHERY?

THE “ESSENCE OF TREACHERY IS THE SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED ATTACK BY AN AGGRESSOR ON THE UNSUSPECTING VICTIM, DEPRIVING THE LATTER OF ANY CHANCE TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND THEREBY ENSURING ITS COMMISSION WITHOUT RISK OF HIMSELF.”^[12][22]

WHAT IS DECISIVE IS THAT THE ATTACK WAS EXECUTED IN A MANNER THAT THE VICTIM WAS RENDERED DEFENSELESS AND UNABLE TO RETALIATE.

In the case at bar, it was clearly shown that Estose was deprived of any means to ward off the sudden and unexpected attack by accused-appellant. The evidence showed that accused-appellant hid behind a coconut tree and when Estose passed by the tree, completely unaware of any danger, accused-appellant immediately hacked him with a bolo.  Estose could only attempt to parry the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded.  Furthermore, when Estose tried to retreat, stumbling in the process, accused-appellant even took advantage of this and stabbed him resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by accused-appellant assured himself of no risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased might make.  What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.^[13][23] Without a doubt, treachery attended the killing.

SUBJECT: WHEN DOES SC FINDS NO REASON TO DISTURB THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT?

Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence “x x x that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.”^[14][24] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when affirmed by the appellate court.^[15][25]

SUBJECT: WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES DUE IN MURDER CASE?

(1) CIVIL INDEMNITY EX DELICTO FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM; (2) ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; (3) MORAL DAMAGES; (4) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AND (5) TEMPERATE DAMAGES.”^[16][28]   AND SIX PERCENT INTEREST.

This Court has held in People v. Beltran, Jr. that “[w]hen death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.”^[17][28]

Hence, in line with our ruling in People v. Sanchez,^[18][29] when the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua, the damages to be imposed are: PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.  These are the amounts proper in this case because of the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.

As to the award of temperate damages in the amount of PhP 25,000, such is proper “in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.”^[19][30]  Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.^[20][31]  Therefore, we sustain the award of the trial court of PhP 25,000 for temperate damages.

Finally, interest at the rate of six (6) percent should likewise be added to the damages awarded.^[21][32]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00575-MIN finding accused-appellant Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  In addition to the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages, accused-appellant is likewise sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.  Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity and moral, temperate, and exemplary damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of Daniel Estose.

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D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the November 27, 2009 Decision^[22][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00575-MIN entitled People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada, which affirmed the September 14, 2007 Decision^[23][2] in Criminal Case No. 5027 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The RTC found accused-appellant Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada guilty of murder.

The Facts

The charge against Dolorido stemmed from the following Information:

That on the 9^th day of May 2006 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Cagdapao, Municipality of Tago, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack, assault and hack one, DANIEL ESTOSE, causing his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased as follows:

P70,000.00      –           as life indemnity

P10,000.00      –           as moral damage

P10,000.00      –           exemplary damages

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[24][3]

On November 15, 2006, Dolorido was arraigned, and he pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged.

During the pre-trial conference on January 18, 2007, Dolorido admitted that he killed the deceased-victim Daniel Estose but invoked self-defense. Likewise, the prosecution and the defense stipulated that the Joint Affidavit of Aniolito Avila and Adrian Avila (the Avilas) would constitute as their direct testimony, subject to cross-examination by the defense; and the Counter Affidavit of the Accused and the Affidavit of Mario Jariol would also constitute as their direct testimony, subject to cross examination by the prosecution.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the Avilas and Loreta Estose. On the other hand, the defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Dolorido.

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

The Avilas were hired laborers of the victim, Estose, tasked to harvest the coconuts in the latter’s farm in Cagdapao, Tago, Surigao del Sur.^[25][4]

On May 9, 2006, while the Avilas were walking towards the coconut plantation at around 8:30 in the morning, they saw Dolorido standing near the coconut drier of Estose, appearing very angry. After some time, Dolorido proceeded to Rustica Dolorido’s coconut drier located a hundred meters away and hid behind a coconut tree.^[26][5]

Moments later, they saw Estose on his way to his own coconut drier. When Estose passed by Rustica Dolorido’s coconut drier, they saw Dolorido suddenly hack Estose twice, resulting in wounds on his arms.  When Estose tried to retreat, he fell down and it was then that Dolorido stabbed him on the left portion of his chest, which caused his death.  Dolorido suddenly left the place.

Afraid of Dolorido’s wrath, the Avilas did not immediately proceed to the scene of the crime.  It was only after 20 or so minutes that they felt it was safe to approach Estose.  When they were near, they saw Estose was already dead.^[27][6]  They then waited for Estose’s wife and the police.

Version of the Defense

Dolorido’s defense, on the other hand, consisted of the story of self-defense:

On the day of the death of the victim, Dolorido asked Estose why he was gathering Dolorido’s harvested coconuts. Estose just replied, “So, what about it?” and tried to unsheathe his bolo from its scabbard.^[28][7] Upon seeing this, Dolorido drew his own bolo and stabbed Estose.  When Estose tried to wrestle for the bolo, he sustained some wounds.  Afterwards, while Dolorido was pointing the bolo at Estose, the latter suddenly lunged at Dolorido, causing Estose to hit the bolo with his own chest which resulted in his death.^[29][8]  He denied the prosecutor’s claim that he hid behind a coconut tree and waited for Estose to come.  Thereafter, Dolorido, accompanied by one Mario Jariol, voluntarily surrendered to the Tago Police Station.

Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted accused Dolorido. The dispositive portion of its September 14, 2007 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay the heirs of deceased-victim Daniel Estose y Langres the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the cost.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.^[30][9]

On November 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC.^[31][10]

The Issues

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

The court a quo gravely erred in not appreciating self-defense interposed by accused.

II.

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of treachery.

III.

The court a quo gravely erred in awarding damages despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence to support their claim.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Self-defense is absent

In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the circumstance of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. He contends that he only acted in self-defense, and this is the reason why he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.

We do not agree.

In order for self-defense to be successfully invoked, the following essential elements must be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.^[32][11]

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the elements.^[33][12] However, the most important among all the elements is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. As this Court said in People v. Catbagan,^[34][13] “There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.”

In this case, we agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. But he maintains that Estose provoked him when the latter started to unsheathe his bolo from his scabbard. Nevertheless, as aptly found by the trial court, his testimony is too incredible to be believed, viz:

Accused’s plea failed to impress the Court. To be sure, his story on how the deceased was killed is too incredible to inspire belief. According to him, it was the deceased who first unsheathed his bolo but did not succeed in his attempt to fully unsheathe it because he (Accused) hacked him. Thereafter, the deceased tried to wrest Accused’s bolo but was injured instead. If the deceased failed to unsheathe his bolo because Accused was able to hack him, how could the deceased then have attempted to dispossess the Accused of the latter’s bolo? The truth, of course, is that the Accused waylaid the deceased, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses.^[35][14] x x x

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.^[36][15]  In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.^[37][16]  It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and intimidating action.”^[38][17]  It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life.”^[39][18]  Such is absent in the instant case.

Moreover, against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses who testified that accused-appellant hacked Estose twice and subsequently stabbed him without any provocation, accused-appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated assertion deserves scant consideration.

Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that “a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself.”^[40][19]  Moreover, “[a]bsent any showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive to testify against the appellant, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.”^[41][20]

          Therefore, absent any unlawful aggression from the victim, accused-appellant cannot successfully invoke the defense of self-defense.

Treachery is evident

In addition, accused-appellant argues that the trial court should not have appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He argues that it was impossible for the two prosecution witnesses to see the inception and the actual attack of accused-appellant to the victim because both were busy gathering coconuts.  Also, they were 50 meters away from where the actual stabbing occurred, in rolling hills with tall and short shrubs between the witnesses and the place where the actual stabbing occurred.

We disagree.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.^[42][21]  The “essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.”^[43][22]

In the case at bar, it was clearly shown that Estose was deprived of any means to ward off the sudden and unexpected attack by accused-appellant. The evidence showed that accused-appellant hid behind a coconut tree and when Estose passed by the tree, completely unaware of any danger, accused-appellant immediately hacked him with a bolo.  Estose could only attempt to parry the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded.  Furthermore, when Estose tried to retreat, stumbling in the process, accused-appellant even took advantage of this and stabbed him resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by accused-appellant assured himself of no risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased might make.  What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.^[44][23] Without a doubt, treachery attended the killing.

Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence “x x x that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.”^[45][24] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when affirmed by the appellate court.^[46][25]

In conclusion, all the elements of the crime of murder, as defined in paragraph 1 of Art. 248 of the RPC, were successfully proved: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.^[47][26]

Verily, in criminal cases such as the one on hand, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.^[48][27]  We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of murder with moral certainty.

Award of Damages

This Court has held in People v. Beltran, Jr. that “[w]hen death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.”^[49][28]

Hence, in line with our ruling in People v. Sanchez,^[50][29] when the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua, the damages to be imposed are: PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.  These are the amounts proper in this case because of the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.

As to the award of temperate damages in the amount of PhP 25,000, such is proper “in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.”^[51][30]  Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.^[52][31]  Therefore, we sustain the award of the trial court of PhP 25,000 for temperate damages.

Finally, interest at the rate of six (6) percent should likewise be added to the damages awarded.^[53][32]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00575-MIN finding accused-appellant Rogelio Dolorido y Estrada guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  In addition to the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages, accused-appellant is likewise sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.  Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity and moral, temperate, and exemplary damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of Daniel Estose.

SO ORDERED.

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                   Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO        MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

     Associate Justice                                            Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                                       Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO CAPITLE AND ARTURO NAGARES (G.R. NO. 175330, 12 JANUARY  2010, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION, WHEN ADMISSIBLE; ALIBI AND DENIAL; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT; DAMAGES WHEN DEATH OCCURS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. CAPITLE ET AL.

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the 27 January 2006 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 April 2000 Decision² of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch 267, in Criminal Case No. 105733, convicting appellants Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares for the crime of murder.

The Facts

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

The historical backdrop shows that at around 7:40 a.m. of August 6, 1993, at Orambo Drive, Orambo, Pasig City, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was gunned down by four (4) men who thereafter ran towards Shaw Blvd. The incident was witnessed by Ruiz Constantino and Solomon Molino who were seated six (6) arms length away and conversing on the flower pots planted with bougainvilla lined along Orambo Drive corner St. Jude Street, Orambo, Pasig City. Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was thereafter brought to Medical City Hospital where he expired due to multiple gunshot wounds in the body, in the neck and in the head. The most fatal wound was the one sustained in the head.

On that same day, at around 10:30 a.m., Solomon Molino, a Barangay Kagawad, gave his statement to the District Central Investigation Branch, Eastern Police District Command relating the incident he saw but failed to identify the assailants.

On September 29, 1993, Arturo Nagares was apprehended by the Pasig Police on account of his conviction in another case for Frustrated Homicide. He was later to be taken custody by the National Bureau of Investigation at its detention center along Taft Avenue where the next day, on September 30, 1993, Ruiz Constantino gave his statement identifying Arturo Nagares y De Leon from the four (4) pictures presented to him as one of the three (3) armed assailants of Barangay Captain Pagalunan on August 6, 1993.

Arturo Nagares was likewise identified from the four (4) pictures shown to another witness, Rodolfo Paat, who claims to be at Orambo Drive corner Shaw Blvd., Pasig City, when he heard several gun shots with people shouting “nagbabarilan, nagbabarilan.” Moments later, from the corner of St. Jude St. and Orambo Drive, he saw four (4) men each carrying guns running from Orambo Drive towards Shaw Blvd. and boarded a jeep going to Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

The third witness to give a statement to the NBI on same day was Solomon Molino who likewise identified Arturo Nagares from the four (4) pictures laid before him.

On October 19, 1993, while under detention at the NBI, Arturo Nagares executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan before Atty. Orlando V. Dizon, Chief, SOG, NBI. Assisting him in the confession was practicing lawyer, Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang, who was at the NBI following up the implementation of a warrant of arrest in one of the cases she was handling. In Nagares’ extrajudicial confession, he implicated Vice Mayor Anching De Guzman as the mastermind, and Rodolfo Capitle a.k.a. Putol, Elymar Santos and a John Doe as his cohorts in the killing of the Barangay Chairman.

On January 21, 1994, witness Solomon Molino executed his third affidavit before the NBI and identified Ramil Marquina in a police line-up as one of those who fired at Pagalunan.

Then again, on March 21, 1994, the same Solomon Molino gave a written statement before the Pasig Police identifying Rodolfo Capitle, who was earlier arrested by the police by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa of the Pasig Court for Frustrated Homicide.

On March 26, 1994, witness Rodolfo Paat executed another statement before the NBI identifying Rodolfo Capitle from the 20 pictures shown him as one of those armed men he saw on August 6, 1993 running from Orambo Drive to Shaw Blvd.

On April 4, 1994, a criminal charge sheet for Murder was filed against Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares.

On September 29, 1994, the Information was amended to include Ramil Marquina as one of the accused, together with Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares. The Amended Information reads:

The undersigned 2^nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses RODOLFO CAPITLE, ARTURO NAGARES and RAMIL MARQUINA of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6^th day of August 1993 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Brgy. Chairman Avelino Pagalunan on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal and fatal gunshot wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 17, 1997, all three (3) accused were properly arraigned. Assisted by their respective counsels, they entered a “not guilty” plea. After the case was set for pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.

During the trial, prosecution witness Ruiz Constantino testified and identified accused Arturo Nagares as one of those he saw shooting the victim, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan, but could not identify the rest of the assailants. Another witness for the People, Solomon Molino, with whom Constantino was conversing at the time, claimed to have witnessed the shooting incident and even prepared a sketch as to the respective positions of the victim, the assailants and where they were seated. Nevertheless, he found it hard to identify the gun wielders.

The third eyewitness, Rodofo Paat, who claims that during the incident he was at the end of the tricycle line along Orambo Drive between Shaw Blvd. and St. Peter St. when he heard gunshots coming from Orambo Drive corner St. Jude St. about 80 meters away from where he was. Upon hearing the gunshots, people in the vicinity scampered for cover but he stayed put and saw four (4) persons with guns emerged from the smoke running towards Shaw Blvd. He later on identified two (2) of them in open court as accused Arturo Nagares and Rodolfo Capitle.

Accused Arturo Nagares offered alibi as a defense. He was sleeping at the house of his sister Gaudelia Mercado at 92 F. Asedillo St., Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City, as he was suffering from fever due to boil (“pigsa”) at the right leg, he said. This testimony found corroboration from his sister, Gaudelia, and even narrated she accompanied Arturo to the Rizal Medical Center where he was treated and given medication by a certain Dr. Ong. As to the extrajudicial confession, Nagares claimed that he was violated, forced, coerced and tortured into admitting the crime, and to sign the already prepared extrajudicial confession.

For his part, accused Rodolfo Capitle as well put forth the defense of alibi insisting that on the day of the shooting, he was at their house at Bambang, Pasig, with his wife and children cleaning and feeding the hogs. Afterwards, he continued, he took a bath and rested for the rest of the day. His wife substantiated his testimony. Rodolfo went on saying that on March 18, 1994, he was arrested and detained at the Pasig Police Headquarters for another crime. On March 23, 1994, the NBI took custody of him at the NBI Headquarters along Taft Avenue. While at the NBI Headquarters, he complained of having been tortured by placing a plastic bag on his face, boxed on the chest and abdomen, electrocuted and was forced to admit to the killing of the Barangay Captain but was able to refuse, nonetheless.

x x x x³

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision dated 28 April 2000 finding appellants guilty as charged, while acquitting Ramil Marquina. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARTURO NAGARES and RODOLFO CAPITLE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and each accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Upon the other hand, considering that the Court failed to prove the guilt of the accused RAMIL MARQUINA beyond reasonable doubt, the aforesaid accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Accordingly, the Court orders accused Nagares and Capitle to pay jointly in solidum the widow of the victim, Merlie Pagalunan, the following amounts, to wit:

1.      PhP50,000.00 as indemnity;

2.      PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages;

3.      PhP 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4.      PhP 50,000.00 representing actual and compensatory damages;

5.      PhP 30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

6.      And costs.

The Jail Warden of the Pasig City Jail where accused Rodolfo Capitle is presently detained during the pendency of this case, is accordingly ordered to immediately transfer the person of the aforesaid accused to the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, as he is now considered an insular prisoner. Let therefore the corresponding Order/s of Commitment (Mittimus) be issued pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A, dated April 20, 1992 and Circular No. 66-97 dated October 14, 1997 of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, the Director of the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where accused Arturo Nagares is already serving sentence for another crime, is hereby informed of the latter’s conviction in the present case for his appropriate action and guidance.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.⁴

In convicting appellants, the trial court found that two out of three eyewitnesses, in the persons of Ruiz Constantino and Rodolfo Paat, positively identified appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. The trial court discarded appellants’ alibis and denial as such cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The trial court likewise rejected appellants’ claims of “frame-up” and torture as unsubstantiated.

The trial court found no violation of appellant Nagares’ constitutional rights insofar as his confession is concerned. Nagares’ Sinumpaang Salaysay is presumed to be voluntary and Nagares failed to overthrow such presumption. Further, there was sufficient evidence that Nagares was assisted by an independent and effective counsel during the custodial investigation, belying Nagares’ allegations.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, disposing of the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.⁵

In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Court of Appeals found the extrajudicial confession executed by Nagares admissible since it was (1) voluntary; (2) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (3) express; and (4) in writing. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the specific information stated in the impugned confession “not only categorically detailed [Nagares’] participation in the crime, it likewise show[ed] badges and traits of voluntariness of the confession.”

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during the custodial investigation. According to the Court of Appeals, “the photographs during the custodial investigation, and execution of the 6-page 70 questions and answers extrajudicial confession are at war against the presence of uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion.”

As regards Capitle, the Court of Appeals held that “an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the person making it (Nagares) and is not admissible against his co-accused (Capitle).” Hence, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle to the crime. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found sufficient circumstantial evidence warranting Capitle’s conviction for the crime charged.

The Issues

Appellants raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS WERE VIOLATED THEREBY RENDERING THE EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY OBTAINED THROUGH SAID VIOLATION AS NULL AND VOID.

2.      WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.⁶

The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the appellants’ conviction.

Nagares’ extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence

Nagares challenges the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, claiming that it was made under duress and that he was not assisted by an independent counsel during the custodial investigation. Nagares maintains such flaws in the investigation violated his right guaranteed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. This provision reads:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Based on the records, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, and thus admissible. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details, which makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given.

Likewise negating Nagares’ claim of a coerced confession are the photographs taken during the signing, thumbmarking, and swearing of the extrajudicial confession. All the pictures depicted a “cordial and pleasant atmosphere” devoid of any sign of torture, threat, duress or tension on Nagares’ person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagares smiling.

Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel.⁷ During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation.

Moreover, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.⁸ Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime.⁹ Here, the fact of death and the criminal
agency had been sufficiently established by the death certificate (Exhibit “F”) and the medico-legal report (Exhibit “C”) the veracity of which had been affirmed on the witness stand by the examining physician.¹⁰

Based on the foregoing, there is clearly no basis for Nagares’ plea that his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution.

Nagares was positively identified as one of the victim’s assailants

Apart from Nagares’ valid extrajudicial confession, the positive identification made by Ruiz Constantino strengthened the prosecution’s case. During the trial, Constantino identified Nagares as one of the victims’ assailants, to wit:

ATTY. BLANES:

Q You said you will be able to remember the face of those who shot Avelino Pagalunan, now, if you see them again, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q If they are inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point those who shot Avelino Pagalunan.

INTERPRETER

(witness pointing to a man in the first row wearing orange polo shirt and when asked he answered by the name of Arturo Nagares)¹¹

x x x x

COURT:

You said that you saw the three (3) person who were shooting the victim and you have identified one of the assailants a certain Arturo Nagares are the two (2) others inside the Courtroom?

A I cannot exactly say because my attention at that time was only with Arturo Nagares.¹²

Appellants’ attempt to discredit Constantino must fail since there was no showing of any improper motive on Constantino’s part that would induce him to testify falsely against Nagares.¹³ Further, settled is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal since the trial court was in a better position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.¹⁴

Nagares’ alibi and denial deserve scant consideration. Well-entrenched is the rule that alibi, which is inherently weak, cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses at the crime scene.¹⁵ Here, Constantino positively identified Nagares as one of the perpetrators of the crime overthrowing the latter’s alibi and denial. More importantly, Nagares miserably failed to establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the felony. Nagares testified that on that fateful day, he was sleeping in his sister’s house on F. Asedillo Street, Katipunan, Pasig City. He also claimed that on that day he was treated at Rizal Medical Center. It was not shown that it was impossible for Nagares to reach and be at the crime scene whether he was coming from his sister’s residence or from the hospital. Further, the defense failed to present any hospital record substantiating Nagares’ claim.

Capitle is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder

based on circumstantial evidence

To further establish appellants’ guilt, prosecution witness Paat testified, thus:

Q: What was that incident that took place?

A: I heard successive gun shots.

Q: Now in relation to where you were from what direction did you hear this successive gun shots?

A: At the corner of St. Jude and Oranbo Drive, sir.

Q: What did you notice, if any at the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude?

A: I saw 4 men coming from the smoke.

Q: More or less, Mr. Witness, could you estimate the distance from where you were to the corner of Oranbo Drive & St. Jude?

A: More or less 80 meters.

Q: Now, you said, you saw men coming from the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude where there was smoke, how many men more or less?

A: 4 men, sir.

Q: Where, where they headed to and when you had seen these 4 men coming from that direction?

A: On their way going to Shaw Blvd.

Q: Did you notice if they were holding something?

x x x x

A: I saw each one of them holding a gun.¹⁶

x x x x

Q: Now of these 4 men running and holding caliber 45 did you recognize any of them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If those whom you recognized is or are inside this court room, will you be able to point to them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please point to them, Mr. Witness?

INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to two (2) male persons, one (1) the right wearing an orange polo who when asked his name answered Arturo Nagares and a man beside him wearing yellow t-shirt who when asked his name answered Rodolfo Capitle.¹⁷

x x x x

Q: How at that time, you take a look at the alleged persons, four (4) persons whom you allegedly saw holding a gun?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: Could you make an estimate if it is less than one (1) minute.

ATTY. BLANES:

He said more or less your Honor, from the corner of Oranbo Drive and he said more or less.

Q: Is it less than one (1) minute?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: And that they were running?

A: Yes sir. Almost on the jogging phase.¹⁸

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle to the crime charged, only circumstantial evidence.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.¹⁹

Based on Paat’s testimony, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence justifying Capitle’s conviction. There is more than one circumstance: (1) the victim was gunned down at the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St., Mandaluyong City; (2) Paat heard several gunshots coming from that area; (3) Paat saw four men, including Nagares and Capitle, coming from the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St. and running away towards Shaw Blvd.; (4) the four men, including Nagares and Capitle, were all carrying guns; and (5) prosecution witness Constantino saw Nagares, together with several other men, shot the victim. To the unprejudiced mind, the foregoing circumstances, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion except that of appellants’ culpability for the victim’s death.²⁰

Modification in the award of damages

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the victim’s death; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.²¹
We sustain the award of P50,000 civil indemnity, which is mandatory and granted to the victim’s heirs without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.²²

For lack of factual basis, we delete the award of actual or compensatory damages. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.²³ No such documents were offered as evidence in this case. Nevertheless, we award P25,000 as temperate damages when no evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the victim’s heirs suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.²⁴

While we sustain the award of moral damages, which does not require allegation and proof other than the victim’s death, we reduce the amount from P100,000 to P50,000 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.²⁵

Since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proved in this case, the award of exemplary damages is proper. However, we reduce the amount of exemplary damages from P50,000 to P30,000 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.²⁶

The award of P30,000 attorney’s fees lacks factual and legal basis and thus must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 27 January 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. We award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The amounts of moral damages and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000 and P30,000, respectively. The award of actual damages and attorney’s fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 15 June 2009.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-19. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. De Leon concurring.

2 CA rollo, pp. 36-57. Penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.

3 Rollo, pp. 3-8.

4 CA rollo, pp. 56-57.

5 Rollo, p. 18.

6 CA rollo, p. 95.

7 See Records, p. 572. Nagares’ sworn statement, dated 19 October 1993, given to the police investigators pertinently reads:

02 T: Nais naming ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang hindi kumibo at ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamitin laban sa iyo sa isang kriminal, sibil o administratibong pag-uusig. Naiintindihan mo ba ito?

S: Opo.

03 T: Nais din naming ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. At kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado, kami ay hihirang ng isa para sa iyo na tutulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito. Naiintindihan mo ba ito?

S: Opo.

04 T: Ngayon, matapos mo malaman ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, ikaw ba ay nakahandang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay sa tulong ni ATTY. ESMERALDA GALANG na narito ngayon upang ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas at tulungan ka sa iyong mga sagot dito sa iyong salaysay?

S: Opo.

8 Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

9 People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 350, 355.

10 See People v. Bacor, 366 Phil. 197, 220 (1999).

11 TSN, 5 June 1995, p. 7.

12 Id. at 32-33.

13 People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 749 (2003).

14 People v. Jadap, G.R. No. 177983, 30 March 2010, 617 SCRA 179, 187; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 177740, 5 April 2010, 617 SCRA 318, 331.

15 Arceno v. People, 326 Phil. 576, 594 (1996); People v. Torrefiel, 326 Phil. 388, 396 (1996); People v. Caritativo, 326 Phil. 1, 8 (1996).

16 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 6-9.

17 Id. at 10-11.

18 TSN, 31 July1995, p. 44.

19 Bastian v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160811, 18 April 2008, 552 SCRA 43, 55.

20 People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683, 699 (2001).

21 People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, 2 March 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 456.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 456-457.

25 Id. at 457.

26 People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, 4 February 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 647.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RESINS INC. (G.R. NO. 175891, 12 JANUARY 2010, CARPIO, J.) (SUBJECTS: SERVICE OF JUDGMENT; BURDEN OF PROVING SERVICE; CERTIFICATE OF MAILING NOT SUFFICIENT).

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 175891 is a petition for review¹ assailing the Decision² promulgated on 25 May 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78516. The appellate court denied the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) in rendering its 17 March 1993³ Judgment and 17 January 1994⁴ Amended Judgment, as well as in issuing its 7 July 1999⁵ and 28 May 2003⁶ Orders in Land Registration Case No. N-91-012, LRA Record No. N-62407. The RTC allowed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a Decree of Registration in favor of Resins, Incorporated (Resins, Inc.) over eight lots in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental after the RTC’s Judgment⁷ dated 17 March 1993 became final and executory.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:

On 17 October 1991, [Resins, Inc.] filed x x x Land Registration Case [No. N-91-012] before the [RTC] for judicial confirmation of title over eight (8) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The initial hearing for said case was originally set on 4 February 1992. Prior to said date of hearing, the [LRA] filed with the [RTC] a report recommending that an Order be issued to [Resins, Inc.] directing it to submit the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining lot owners, and that after complying with the said Order, the initial hearing be reset “on a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.”

Pursuant to the LRA recommendation, the application for original registration of titles was amended. Thereupon, the [RTC] issued an Order dated 17 January 1992 setting the initial hearing on 30 April 1992.

On 10 February 1992, the OSG entered its appearance as counsel of the Republic x x x. In its notice of appearance, the [OSG] manifested thus:

The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City has been authorized to appear in this case and, therefore, should also be furnished notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions, processes. However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision and control of the representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal or other actions which appear to compromise the interests of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented.

On 27 February 1992, the OSG received the notice of initial hearing of the application. The notice of the initial hearing was also served on the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Director of the Bureau of Mines, the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Forest Management Bureau, the Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Engineer, the Public Works and Highways District Engineer, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer, Land Management Sector, the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, the adjoining lot owners, and to all whom it may concern.

The notice of initial hearing was published in the 16 March 1992 issue of the Official Gazette and the 11 March 1992 issue of the Golden Chronicle pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. On 19 March 1992, the City Sheriff posted the notice on the parcels of land sought to be registered, at the municipality building, and in conspicuous places in the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

During the initial hearing on 30 April 1992, the [RTC] issued an Order of general default against the whole world except against [the Republic] who had filed its opposition to the application and one RENATO BAUTISTA who intimated to the [RTC] that he would file his opposition.

Subsequent hearings were conducted on the following dates: 16 July 1992, 23 July 1992, 15 September 1992, and 16 December 1992.

On 08 January 1993, [Resins, Inc.] filed Applicant’s Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.

On 04 February 1993, the [RTC] issued an Order which states:

Considering the fact that all the exhibits of the applicant Resins, Incorporated were duly identified and attested to by the witnesses for the applicant and considering the fact that no opposition was filed by the government to the said exhibits, all the exhibits of the applicant from Exhibits “A” to “N,” inclusive, are hereby admitted as part of the testimonies of the witnesses for the applicant.

SO ORDERED.⁸

The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling

On 17 March 1993, the RTC rendered its Judgment⁹ in favor of Resins, Inc. The dispositive portion reads:

In [v]iew of the [f]oregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding applicant Resins Incorporated, as owner in fee simple of all the lots sought to be registered – Lot 980, Cad-367, Lot 1371, Cad-367, Lot 1372, Cad-367, Lot 1373, Cad-367, Lot 1417, Cad-367, Lot 3462, Cad-267, Lot 3463, Cad-367, and Lot 3465, Cad-367, all of Jasaan Cadastre and having registerable [sic] titles thereto, hereby decreeing that Lot Nos. 980, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1417, 3462, 3463, and 3465 be registered in the name of Resins Incorporated, a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the Philippines with its main office located at Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, in accordance with the technical descriptions correspondingly marked as Exhibits A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2, G-2, and H-2.

SO ORDERED.¹⁰

Despite the favorable judgment, Resins, Inc., was unable to have the lots registered in its name because of typographical errors in the RTC’s 17 March 1993 Judgment. On 6 January 1994, Resins, Inc. moved to correct the typographical errors and alleged:

1. That on March 17, 1993, the [RTC] rendered judgment approving the above-captioned application;

2. That up to the present no decree of registration has been issued and upon inquiry from the [LRA] [Resins, Inc.] learned that the reason is because [sic] there are two (2) typographical errors in the judgment, to wit:

a. Lot No. 3464 appearing on page 2, subpar[.] (g), line 1 should be Lot 3463 because par. 1 on the application shows that the 7^th lot applied for is Lot 3463;

b. That material omissions were made on page 4, line 31 as follow[s]:

ORIGINAL WORDINGS:

“poses per Tax Dec. Nos. 858391 and 09352 marked Cad-367, Jasaan”

which should read as follows after supplying the omissions:

“poses per Tax Dec. Nos. 858391 and 09352 marked Exhs. E-3 and E-6, that Lot 3463, Cad-367, Jasaan”¹¹

The RTC issued an Amended Judgment¹² on 17 January 1994. However, only the error on page 2 was corrected and the error on page 4 remained. Upon yet another motion of Resins, Inc., the RTC issued another Amended Judgment on 16 March 1994 which corrected both errors. The OSG received a copy of the Amended Judgment on 2 May 1994, and filed a notice of appeal on 12 May 1994. Resins, Inc. filed a second motion to order the LRA to issue a decree of registration in its favor.

On 7 July 1999, the RTC issued an Order¹³ granting Resins, Inc.’s motion. The Order reads, thus:

Submitted before this court is the “Second Motion to Order the LRA to Issue a Decree of Registration, etc.” dated May 10, 1999 and filed on June 14, 1999 praying that

“1. The appeal filed by the [OSG] on May 12, 1994 or more than one (1) year from receipt of the original judgment, be ordered dismissed;

“2. Another order be issued directing the LRA to issue a decree of registration for the eight (8) lots enumerated in par. 1 hereof, based on the Amended Judgment dated March 16, 1994 and for other reliefs due under the premises.”

Despite notice to the Solicitor General[,] he or his representative did not appear in the hearing of June 18, 1999, nor did he file an opposition to the motion.

The Court finds the motion meritorious. The motion is granted. Hence, the [OSG]’s appeal of May 12, 1999 is dismissed. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) is hereby directed to issue a decree of registration in favor of [Resins, Inc.] for Lots 986, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1417, 3462, 3463, and 3465, CAD-367 of the Jasaan Cadastre after the judgment dated March 17, 1993 became final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration¹⁴ of the 7 July 1999 Order. The Republic alleged that the OSG was never furnished a copy of the alleged original decision. The Republic cited Resins, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal,¹⁵ which stated “[t]hat the original judgment of this case was issued on March 19, 1993, copy of which was furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General c/o the City Prosecutor who was delegated to represent the former during the proceedings.” Therefore, the 17 March 1993 Judgment never acquired finality with respect to the Republic.

Resins, Inc. filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration¹⁶ on 19 August 1999. Resins, Inc. stated that the OSG was furnished a copy of the 17 March 1993 decision. The OSG received the decision on 6 April 1993, as certified by the RTC Clerk of Court,¹⁷ and as evidenced by post office return slips.¹⁸

On 28 May 2003, the RTC issued yet another Order.¹⁹ Said Order reads, thus:

For resolution is the motion for reconsideration filed by the oppositor Republic of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Solicitor General of the order dismissing the notice of appeal filed by the said oppositor alleging that the Republic was never furnished copy of the judgment dated March 17, 1993 and that an amended order of the decision is entirely new which supersedes the original decision.

The motion was vehemently opposed by the applicant alleging that the Cagayan de Oro City Prosecutor received copy of the said judgment on March 29, 1993 while the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and the Bureau of Lands received copy of the judgment on April 6, 1993.

The records of the case shows [sic] that indeed these offices received the copy of the judgment as mentioned in the opposition per return slips attached to the records. Since there is no appeal filed within 30 days from receipt of the judgment, the judgment of this Court therefore has already become final and executory.

Anent the issue that the amended judgment supersedes the original judgment and as correctly pointed out by the applicant, the amendment pertains to harmless clerical errors in pages 2 and 4 of the original judgment but the dispositive portion confirming applicant’s ownership over the lots was not changed.

The Republic then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition²⁰ with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The Republic sought to nullify, set aside, and prevent the implementation of the RTC’s Orders dated 7 July 1999 and 28 May 2003; as well as to nullify and set aside the Judgment dated 17 March 1993 and the Amended Judgment dated 17 January 1994. The Republic claimed that the entries in the logbook of the OSG’s Docket Division do not indicate that the 17 March 1993 Judgment was ever received by the OSG and actually transmitted to the lawyers assigned to represent the Republic in the present case.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 25 May 2006, the CA rendered its Decision²¹ and denied the Republic’s petition. The CA saw no grave abuse of discretion in the RTC’s dismissal of the Republic’s appeal, which appeal was based on the OSG’s alleged non-receipt of its copy of the original Judgment.

The CA found that the records of the case show that the OSG indeed received its copy of the original Judgment on 6 April 1993 as the return slip clearly indicated the date of service on the OSG. The OSG did not file an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the RTC ruled that the Judgment is already final and executory. The CA also rejected the OSG’s desire for examination of entries in the OSG’s logbook as well as the affidavit of its bookbinder. The CA ruled that evaluation of evidentiary matters is beyond the province of a writ of certiorari. Moreover, even if the evidence were considered, the same should still be rejected because the OSG failed to show that the bookbinder had authority to record and keep legal custody of the logbook. Finally, the CA ruled that the only issue in a petition for certiorari is lack or excess or grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the OSG’s contention that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its agents is misplaced.

The Issues

The Republic enumerated the following grounds to support its Petition:

I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20 acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed [the Republic’s] notice of appeal (in its Order dated July 7, 1999) and subsequently denied [the Republic’s] motion for reconsideration of such dismissal (in its Order dated May 28, 2003) because of the clear showing that the OSG, as [the Republic’s] statutory counsel, was not actually notified of and/or had not received a copy of the original Judgment dated March 17, 2003 in Land Registration Case No. N-91-912.

II. The Court of Appeals has gravely erred in not holding that the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20 acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the July 7, 1999 and May 28, 2003 Orders which unduly deprived petitioner of its opportunity to interpose an appeal from the original Judgment dated March 17, 1993 and/or Amended Judgment dated January 17, 1994 in the subject land registration case which found respondent-applicant Resins Incorporated to have registrable title to all the eight (8) lots applied for despite lack of clear factual and legal basis to support the conclusion that “applicant and his predecessor-in-interest had openly, continuosly [sic], adversely and uninterruptedly been in possession of the lots as owned for about 40 years prior to filing of the application.²²

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious. We rule that Resins, Inc. failed to prove that the Republic, via the OSG, indeed received the 17 March 1993 Judgment.

At the time of the promulgation of the trial court’s judgment, the applicable rules were those of the Revised Rules of Court. Pertinent portions of these sections are quoted below:

Sec. 5. Service by registered or ordinary mail. ‒ If service is not made personally, service by registered mail shall be required if registry service exists in the locality; otherwise service may be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his attorney at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered.²³

Sec. 7. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. ‒ Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or registered mail. x x x²⁴

Sec. 8. Completeness of service. ‒ x x x Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.²⁵

Sec. 10. Proof of service. ‒ x x x If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.²⁶

When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.²⁷ In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.²⁸

The OSG insists that it did not actually receive a copy of the 17 March 1993 Judgment. The OSG received a certified copy of the 17 March 1993 Judgment only after its 24 June 2003 written request to the Assistant City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro. The OSG presented a certified photocopy of the page of the OSG’s Docket Division Log Book listing the orders, pleadings, and other papers received by the OSG pertaining to the present case. The last document on the case received by the OSG before the receipt of the Amended Judgment on 2 May 1994 was an Order dated 26 December 1992 and received on 13 January 1993. There was no record of the Judgment dated 17 March 1993. Because of this non-receipt, the Republic was deprived of the opportunity to appeal or to ask for reconsideration of the judgment. The OSG filed a notice of appeal on 12 May 1994, only after its receipt of the Amended Judgment.

Resins, Inc., on the other hand, asserts that the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court and photocopies of the return slips from the post office are sufficient to prove that the OSG indeed received the 17 March 1993 Judgment.

Resins, Inc.’s argument must fail.

OSG’s denial of receipt of the 17 March 1993 Judgment required Resins, Inc. to show proof that the Judgment was sent through registered mail and that it was received by the Republic. While the certification from the RTC Clerk of Court and photocopies of the return slips prove that the Republic was served the judgment, it does not follow that the Republic, via the OSG, actually received the judgment. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.²⁹ Resins, Inc. also did not show a certification from the postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to the OSG such that service by registered mail may be deemed completed. It cannot be stressed enough that “it is the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and the affidavit of the person mailing, which proves service made through registered mail.”³⁰ Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.³¹

Mere certification of the RTC Clerk of Court is insufficient because the Clerk of Court may not be the person who did the mailing. The certification in this case is also not under oath. There must be an affidavit of the person who actually did the mailing. In the present case, the certification of the Clerk of Court states:

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

This certifies that the original carbon copy of the Judgment of the above-entitled case appearing on pages 484-488 dated March 17, 1993 was received by the Office of the Solicitor-General on April 6, 1993 as per return slip. A copy of which is attached herewith.

Posted on this 13^th day of August, 1999 in the city of Cagayan de Oro.

TAUMATURGO U. MACABINLAR

Clerk of Court V³²

It is clear that the certification does not state that the Clerk of Court did the mailing. Mere photocopies of the return slips are also insufficient. The original copies of the registry receipt or, in lieu thereof, the unclaimed notice and a certification from the postmaster of the issuance of notice, should be presented. Indeed, we declared in Delgado v. Hon. P.C. Ceniza, et al. that:

We find that the service of the judgment rendered in the case suffers from two defects, namely, there is no affidavit of the clerk of court, the person mailing, and there is no registry return card, or a certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.³³ (Emphasis supplied)

While we concede that there may be a presumption of regularity, in the ordinary course of events, that the RTC Clerk of Court sent the 17 March 1993 Judgment to the OSG, such presumption should fail when the OSG itself denies receipt. When the service of the judgment is questioned, such as in the present case, there is a need to present both the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and the affidavit of the person mailing. Since the OSG presented proof of non-receipt, it became incumbent upon Resins, Inc. to prove receipt, which Resins, Inc. failed to do.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78516 promulgated on 25 May 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City is directed to hear the appeal of the Republic of the Philippines in Land Registration Case No. N-91-012, LRA Record No. N-62407.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 21 June 2010.

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo, pp. 82-99. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

3 Id. at 124-128. Penned by Judge Alejandro M. Velez.

4 Id. at 129-133. Penned by Judge Alejandro M. Velez.

5 Id. at 143. Penned by Judge Anthony E. Santos.

6 Id. at 157-158. Penned by Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr.

7 Id. at 124-128.

8 Id. at 83-86.

9 Id. at 124-128.

10 Id. at 128.

11 Id. at 87.

12 Id. at 129-133.

13 Id. at 143.

14 Id. at 144-149.

15 Id. at 137-138.

16 Id. at 150.

17 Id. at 151.

18 Id. at 152.

19 Id. at 157-158.

20 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

21 Rollo, pp. 82-99.

22 Id. at 36-37.

23 Now Section 7, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

24 Now Section 9, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

25 Now Section 10, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

26 Now Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

27 Government of the Philippines v. Aballe, G.R. No. 147212, 24 March 2006, 485 SCRA 308, 317.

28 Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara v. Judge Gedorio, Jr., 450 Phil. 623, 634 (2003). See also note 26.

29 Ting v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481, 493 (2000) citing Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580 (1928).

30 Supra note 27, at 318. Emphasis in the original.

31 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 652 (2002).

32 Rollo, p. 151.

33 101 Phil. 740, 743 (1957).