Archive for January, 2011


 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIPE NACHOR y OMAYAN (G.R. NO. 177779, 14 DECEMBER 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: RAPE; LACK OF RESISTANCE IS IMMATERIAL. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. NACHOR)

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DOCTRINES

 

 

 

THREE PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN DETERMINING THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF ACCUSED IN RAPE CASES

“[In determining] the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent,  to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.”[1][11]

ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, THE TRIAL COURT’S ASSESSMENT  DESERVES GREAT WEIGHT

“[On the issue of credibility of witnesses,] the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x x.  Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.”[2][14]

 

 

 

IN RAPE CASE LACK OF RESISTANCE  IS NOT ESSENTIAL AS LONG AS FORCE OR INTIMIDATION IS PRESENT.

Even if it were true that “AAA” did not seriously resist the appellant’s sexual offense, her failure is inconsequential and cannot affect the credibility of her testimony.  “It must be stressed that the resistance of the victim is not an element of the crime [of rape],” and the law does not impose on the prosecution the burden of establishing the same.[3][18]  “As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.”[4][19]

 

 

DENIAL AND ALIBI ARE INHERENTLY WEAK DEFENSES

The appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi were properly rejected.  Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.  “Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant,] the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”[5][25]

x –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

 

 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“[W]hen the offended parties are young and immature girls [aged 12 to16], courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by the trial if the matter about which they testified is not true.”[6][1]

The Charge

For review is the Decision[7][2] dated June 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02040 which affirmed with modifications the Decision[8][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case Nos. IR-6033 and IR-6034, convicting appellant Felipe Nachor y Omayan of the crime of rape against “AAA.”[9][4]  The Information[10][5] in Criminal Case No. IR-6033 contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about May 9, 2001, at x x x, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [lay with] and [succeeded] in having carnal knowledge [of] ‘AAA’, 14-year old minor, daughter of the culprit, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as shall be proven in Court.  The act is with qualifying aggravating circumstance of the fact that the victim is below 18 years old and the offender is a parent. (Art. 266-B, Par. 6, subpar. 1, R.A. 8353)

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

            The Information[11][6] in Criminal Case No. IR-6034 is identically worded except for the date of the commission of the crime.  In this case, the appellant was accused of raping “AAA” on or about 11:30 in the morning of the first week of June 2001.        

The appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.  After the termination of the pre-trial conference, joint trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

            “AAA” was born on September 11, 1986, and lived with her parents and four siblings.  She was 14 years old when in the morning of May 9, 2001, she was left alone with her father, the appellant.  While she was cooking at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, the appellant suddenly poked a bolo at her neck, pulled her wrist and dragged her towards the room which she shared with her brother and sisters. Gripped with fear, she struggled and attempted to escape but the appellant’s strength was too much for her.  Her shouts for help were futile since the house of their nearest neighbor was about a hundred meters away and separated by trees and hilly terrain from their house.

            While inside the room, the appellant, with a bolo still in his hand, forced “AAA” to lie down on the bed.  When she obeyed, the appellant removed her shorts and panty.  Thereafter, he took off his shorts and underwear and started kissing her neck and breasts.  He proceeded to mount “AAA,” inserted his penis inside her vagina and executed a pumping motion.  During this ordeal, “AAA” continued to struggle, but her attempt to resist the appellant’s lewd desires was unsuccessful.  She instead experienced intense pain and cried.

            After the appellant satisfied his lust, he again poked his bolo at “AAA” and threatened to kill her, her mother and siblings if she would report the incident to anyone.  The appellant then stood up, put on his clothes and departed.  “AAA” kept the incident to herself out of fear.

            “AAA” was again raped by the appellant in the first week of June, 2001 when her mother and siblings were not around.  At around 11:30 in the morning, “AAA” was studying in their house when the appellant came out of his room armed with his bolo.  “AAA” rushed outside for fear of another sexual abuse, but was overtaken by the appellant who poked his bolo at her neck and dragged her towards her room.  Once inside, the appellant removed the pants and panty of “AAA,” and threatened to kill her, her mother and siblings if she would relate the incident to another person.  As in the previous incident of rape, the appellant forced “AAA” to lie down, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made coital movements.  Despite her struggle and resistance, she was unable to resist his bestial acts.  After satiating himself, the appellant reiterated his warning to “AAA” not to tell anyone of her ordeal or else he would kill them all.

            A few months later, the abdomen of “AAA” started to bulge.  Having been threatened by the appellant, she refused to divulge any information.  The mother of “AAA” therefore sought the assistance of one of her wedding sponsors to whom “AAA” finally revealed the sexual abuse she experienced in the hands of her father.  After this revelation was relayed to her mother, “AAA” was immediately taken to the Regional Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development where she declared in an interview that her father sired the child she was carrying.  She was then taken to the National Bureau of Investigation for a medico-legal examination.  The results confirmed that “AAA” was pregnant.  On December 27, 2001, “AAA” gave birth to a baby boy she named “BBB.”

The Version of the Appellant

            The appellant denied raping “AAA.”  He averred that on May 9, 2001, he left his house at 7:00 o’clock in the morning to go to his sister in Antipolo, Buhi, Camarines Sur.  Moreover, “AAA” no longer stayed in their house from April 2001 to October 2001.  During this period, she worked as a housemaid without his permission.  It was only in October 2001 that he saw “AAA” and noticed that she was already pregnant.  He asked his wife if she knew anything of the delicate condition of “AAA” but he did not receive a reply.  He instructed his wife to go to her brothers and sisters to have a conference with “AAA.”  His wife complied but excluded him from the meetings without any explanation.  His wife could not also explain why they kept the pregnancy of “AAA” a secret from him.

The appellant asserted that it was his son, Randy, who impregnated “AAA.”  He confronted Randy on the pregnancy of “AAA” but the latter refused to reply and cried instead.  The appellant also claimed that his wife assisted “AAA” in filing the cases to get rid of him so that she could continue having an affair with the man often seen in her company.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

            On January 27, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding accused, Felipe Nachor y Omayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and further amended by RA 8353 in relation to RA 7610, in [C]riminal [C]ases No[s]. IR-6033 and IR-6034, respectively, he is sentenced to death, [to] pay an indemnity of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[12][7]

The Verdict of the Court of Appeals

            With the imposition of capital punishment on the appellant, the case was elevated to us for mandatory review and docketed as G.R. Nos. 157931-32.  Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[13][8] however, we referred the case to the CA, which affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision.  Thus:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appealed Decision dated January 27, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Cases Nos. IR-6033 and IR-6034 finding the accused-appellant FELIPE NACHOR Y OMAYAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentencing him in each case to suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that for each count of rape, the accused-appellant is also CONDEMNED to pay private complainant “AAA,” the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Should no motion for reconsideration be filed in this case by the accused-appellant within the allowable reglementary period, or after the lapse thereof, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for appropriate action thereon.

SO ORDERED.[14][9]

Assignment of Errors

            Hence, this appeal where the appellant raises the following assignment of errors contained in his Brief before the CA:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.[15][10] 

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

“[In determining] the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent,  to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.”[16][11]

Guided by these legal precepts, we find the testimony of “AAA,” who was 14 years old when the two incidents of rape occurred, credible and untainted by any hint of falsehood or prevarication.  She testified on her ordeal committed on May 9, 2001 as follows:

PROS. (BERNARD) BELTRAN:

Q:            Do you know the accused in these cases?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            If he is in this courtroom, will you [point] to him?

INTERPRETER:

The witness points to a person who when asked x x x his name answered [‘Felipe Nachor’]the accused in these cases.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Why do you know him?

A:            He is my father.

Q:            Sometime on May 9, 2001, where were you?

A:            I was at home.

Q:            Where is that house of yours situated?

A:            At  x x x, Camarines Sur.

Q:            With whom were you in your house during that day?

A:            My father.

Q:            While you were in your house at x x x, Camarines Sur on May 9, 2001 with your father, what unusual incident happened if any?

A:            My father poked a bolo [at] my neck.

Q:            How long was that bolo?

A:            The length of the bolo (witness demonstrating with her hand, 1 ½ feet).

Q:            Now, what happened next?

A:            He undressed me.

Q:            What was undressed from you?

A:            My shorts and panties.

Q:            What about your upper clothing?

A:            It was not.

Q:            After the accused undressed you, what did the accused do next?

A:            He also undressed, sir.

Q:            What was undressed from him?

A:            His shorts and briefs.

Q:            After the accused undressed himself, what did he do next?

A:            He lay on top of me.

Q:            What did he do next?

COURT:

Before that, what was your position?

A:            I was lying on my back.

Q:            Who made you lie on your back?

A:            My father.

Q:           Now, when you were lying on your back and your father was on top, what did your father do next?

A:           His penis was inserted in my vagina.

Q:            Prior to the insertion of his penis [into] your vagina, what did he do to you if any?

A:            He kissed me.

Q:            x x x what part of your body was kissed by him?

A:            On my neck.

Q:            Where else?

A:            On my breast.

x x x x

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Now while the penis of the accused was inside your vagina, what was he doing?

A:            He again poked the bolo [at] my neck.

Q:            What did he do next?

A:            He said that [if] I [report] the matter he will kill us all.

Q:            What happened next?

A:            He put on his shorts.

Q:            What else happened?

A:            And then he left.    

Q:            What about you?

A:            I put on my shorts also.

Q:            What about your panties?

A:            I put it [on] also.

Q:            Did you tell anybody what happened to you?

A:            No[,] sir.

Q:            Why?

A:            We might be killed.

Q:            By whom?

A:            My father.

x x x x

COURT:

Q:            You said the accused Felipe Nachor poked a bolo [at] you.  What part of your body did he poke his bolo?

A:            [At] my neck.

Q:            While poking the bolo [at] your neck, what did he say if any?

A:            That if I reported the matter, he will kill us all.

Q:            When you said the word ‘us’, who [were] you referring to?

A:            Myself, my mother, my sisters and brothers.

Q:           While he had sexual intercourse with you, what did you feel?

A:           I felt anger.

 

Q:           What about your vagina?

A:           I felt pain in my vagina.

 

Q:           What did you do while he was having sexual intercourse with you?

A:           I was crying.

 

Q:            Aside from that, what did you do if any?

A:            I was trying to escape, to run away.

Q:            Were you able to run away?

A:            No, your Honor.

Q:            Why?

A:            Because he held my hands.[17][12]

x x x x

On the rape committed in the first week of June, 2001, she testified as follows:

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            Sometime in the first week of June, 2001 in the morning was there any unusual incident that happened between you and your father if any?

COURT:

Where? In what place?

PROS. BELTRAN:

At  x x x, Camarines Sur.

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What was that?

A:            I was again poked with a bolo [by] my father on my neck.

Q:            When you said your father, you are referring to the accused in these cases Felipe Nachor y Omayan the one that you [pointed to] a while ago in court?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:           Now, what was [that] unusual incident that happened [in] the first week of June 2001, at x x x, Camarines Sur sometime at around 11:30 in the morning?

A:           I was again poked with a bolo on my neck and he undressed me.

 

Q:           What was undressed from you?

A:           My panties and shorts.

 

Q:           After he undressed you, what did the accused do next?

A:           He also undressed himself.

 

Q:           What was undressed by him?

A:           Brief and shorts.

 

Q:           After he undressed himself, what did he do next?

A:           He laid on top of me.

Q:            What was your position when your father laid on top of you?

A:            I was lying on my back.

Q:            Who made you lie on our back?

A:            My father.

 

Q:           Now when your father was on top of you, what did your father do next?

A:           His penis was inserted inside my vagina.

Q:            Immediately?

A:            Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q:           When your father inserted his penis inside your vagina, what did he do next?

A:           He made a push and pull motion.

Q:            So you want to impress us that while the penis of the accused was inside your vagina he was doing a push and pull motion on you, is that what you mean?

x x x x

WITNESS:

A:            Yes, sir.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What happened next?

A:            And then he put on his shorts.

Q:            What about his briefs?

A:            He put on his briefs also.

Q:            What about you?

A:            I also put on my panties and shorts.

x x x x

Q:            When your father was already dressing himself, what did he tell you if any?

A:            That if I reported the matter he will kill us.

Q:            Prior to the insertion of the penis of your father [in] your vagina, did he tell you anything?

A:            That if I tell the incident to somebody he will kill us.

Q:            When you said that he will kill us, [whom] do you think x x x your father [was] referring [to]?

A:            My mother, my sisters and brothers.

Q:            Now, how did these incidents come into the open?

A:            Because my mother brought me to the ‘hilot’.

COURT:

Q:            Why, why did your mother bring you to the ‘hilot’?

A:            Because according to one of the wedding sponsors of my mother, why is my [abdomen] becoming bigger.

PROS. BELTRAN:

Q:            What happened to the ‘hilot’?

A:            According to the ‘hilot’ my [abdomen] was already six (6) months big.

Q:            Do you know the reason why your [abdomen] was then about six (6) months big?

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            Why?

A:            Because of what my father did to me that he raped me.

Q:            Why was it that your [abdomen] was big?

A:            Because his penis was inserted in my vagina.

Q:            Do you know a certain child by the name of “BBB?”

A:            Yes, sir.

Q:            Why do you know the child?

A:            That’s my child.

Q:            Do you know the father of your child?

A:            Yes, sir[.]

Q:           Who is the father of your child?

A:           Felipe Nachor.

 

Q:           So you want to impress [on]us that your father Felipe Nachor is also the father of your child “BBB?”

A:           Yes, sir.”[18][13]  (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the observations of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, that the testimony of “AAA” on both occasions of her rape is worthy of credence.  Her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for having carnal knowledge of her by means of force and intimidation on May 9, 2001 and the first week of June, 2001.  “AAA” positively identified the appellant as her abuser.  She never wavered in her testimony and maintained even on cross-examination that the appellant was her rapist.

“[On the issue of credibility of witnesses,] the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x x.  Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.”[19][14]

In this case, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA.  The evaluation of the testimony of “AAA” has been appreciated properly and the evidence is overwhelming to convict the appellant of the crime charged. 

The appellant attempts to discredit “AAA” by assailing instances in her testimony that were improbable and inconsistent with human behavior.   Particularly, he argues that there was no resolute resistance by “AAA” on the assault on her honor.  He maintains that the testimony of “AAA” is incredible since he “cannot remove her shorts and panties or easily insert his penis into her vagina without first putting aside the bolo which he was allegedly holding with his left hand.”[20][15]  He further claims that there was failure on the part of “AAA” to immediately file a complaint or report the rape incidents to her mother or to the police authorities despite the absence of threats.  Lastly, he contends that “AAA” acted normally, as if nothing happened, and did not even leave their home after she was supposedly raped on different dates.

The appellant’s contentions fail to impress.  There is no factual basis for the appellant’s assertion that “AAA” did not exert a tenacious effort to defy his sexual aggression.  On the contrary, “AAA” was unwavering in her testimony that she struggled with the appellant in both occasions of rape.  “AAA” even punched and kicked him in the thigh during the first occasion of her rape.[21][16]  During the first rape incident, she tried to flee from her horrible fate, but the appellant was too strong and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.  She even shouted for help, but nobody heard her as the house of the nearest neighbor was more or less 100 meters away and separated from their house by trees and hilly terrain.

The appellant’s assault on the credibility of “AAA” by asserting that he could not remove her shorts and panties or easily insert his penis into her vagina without first putting aside the bolo held in his left hand while his right hand was holding both her hands[22][17] has also no  basis in fact.  As borne by the record, the appellant had already been undressed of her shorts and panties before she was forced to lie down.  It is thus not impossible for him to consummate the rape using his right hand to bind the hands of “AAA” while holding a bolo to her neck with his left hand.

Even if it were true that “AAA” did not seriously resist the appellant’s sexual offense, her failure is inconsequential and cannot affect the credibility of her testimony.  “It must be stressed that the resistance of the victim is not an element of the crime [of rape],” and the law does not impose on the prosecution the burden of establishing the same.[23][18]  “As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.”[24][19]

Here, “AAA” testified that on both occasions of rape, the appellant poked a bolo at her neck, dragged her to a room in the house and succeeded in making her submit to his will.  The use of a bladed weapon to ensure the commission of the rape “speaks loudly of appellant’s use of violence, or force and intimidation.”[25][20]  

Worth noting, too, is the filial relationship between the appellant and “AAA.”  He is the father of the 14 year-old victim.  In incestuous rape, the father’s “moral ascendancy and influence over [his daughter] sufficiently substitutes for force and intimidation.”[26][21]  He “takes advantage of his blood relationship, [proximity,] ascendancy, and [moral] influence over his victim both to commit the [rape] and to intimidate the victim into silence.”[27][22]

The appellant further claims that the conduct of “AAA” after being raped, i.e., not reporting the incident to anyone despite the absence of threats from him and acting like nothing happened, was incredible and contrary to human experience.  This contention is misleading as a review of the record reveals that he cowed “AAA” into not telling anyone of her harrowing ordeal by threatening to kill her, as well as her mother and siblings if she would do so.  Considering that “AAA” was a young girl at the time she was raped, the appellant’s threat was sufficient to produce fear in her mind.  Moreover, the fact that the appellant was her biological father and exercised moral ascendancy over her explains why she “behaved as though no wrong had been done to her.”[28][23]  “[D]elay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and [her] testimony nor destroy their probative value.”[29][24]

The appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi were properly rejected.  Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.  “Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant,] the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”[30][25]

We are not convinced by the appellant’s postulations that it was his son, Randy, who raped “AAA” and that he was accused of raping her due to the instigation of his wife who wanted to get rid of him so she could continue her illicit affair with another man.  A young girl, ‘innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.  Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.” [31][26]

The Proper Penalty

The appellant committed incestuous rape and must consequently suffer the penalty provided by law.  The trial court correctly imposed upon him the penalty of death since a rape committed while the victim was still under 18 years of age by an offender who is her parent merits no less than the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.[32][27]  It is clear from the birth certificate of “AAA” that she was only 14 years old when she was ravished by the appellant, her biological father. 

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,[33][28] which prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should be imposed.[34][29]  Thus, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count of rape.

The Damages

 

 

In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[35][30] the amounts of civil  indemnity  and

damages awarded to “AAA” also require a modification.  For each of the two counts of rape, she is entitled to an award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another  P75,000.00 as moral damages and  P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02040, which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, finding appellant Felipe Nachor y Omayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED with modifications that appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape; and the awards of moral damages and exemplary damages are increased to P75,000,00, and P30,000.00 respectively, for each count of rape.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice


 


[1][11] People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 381.

[2][14] People v. Basmayor, supra note 11 at 382-383.

[3][18] People v. Sulima, G.R. No. 183702, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 415, 426        ; People v. Fraga, 386 Phil. 884, 907 (2000).

[4][19] People v. Baldo, G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 225, 233.

[5][25] People v. Bang-ayan, G.R. No. 172870, September 22, 2006, 502 SCRA 658, 670.

[6][1]   People v. Torrellos, 448 Phil. 287, 299-300 (2003).

[7][2]   CA rollo, pp. 149-166; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa.

[8][3]   Records, Vol. I, pp. 117-126; penned by Presiding Judge Alfredo D. Agawa.

[9][4]   The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004.

[10][5] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

[11][6] Records, Vol. II, p. 1.

[12][7] Records, Vol. I, p. 126.

[13][8] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

[14][9] CA rollo, pp. 165-166.

[15][10]         Id. at 51.

[16][11]         People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 381.

[17][12]         TSN, July 6, 2002, pp. 4-8.

[18][13]         TSN, July 8, 2002, pp. 10-14.

[19][14]         People v. Basmayor, supra note 11 at 382-383.

[20][15]         CA rollo, p. 65.

[21][16]         TSN, July 8, 2002, p. 24.

[22][17]         CA rollo, p. 65.

[23][18]         People v. Sulima, G.R. No. 183702, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 415, 426                ; People v. Fraga, 386 Phil. 884, 907 (2000).

[24][19]         People v. Baldo, G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 225, 233.

[25][20]         Id.

[26][21]         People v. Madera, 460 Phil. 795, 816 (2003).

[27][22]         People v. Melivo, 323 Phil. 412, 423-424 (1996).

[28][23]         People v. Fraga, supra note 19 at 908.

[29][24]         People v. Villanueva, 312 Phil. 55, 67-68 (1995).

[30][25]         People v. Bang-ayan, G.R. No. 172870, September 22, 2006, 502 SCRA 658, 670.

[31][26]         People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20, 39.

[32][27]         ART. 266-B Penalties. – x x x.

                The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

When the victim is under  eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

x x x x.

[33][28]         Approved on June 24, 2006.

[34][29]         People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 173787, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 597, 610.

[35][30]         People v. Araojo, G.R. No. 185203, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 295, 309.

 

 A.M. NO. 09-5-2-SC; A.C. NO. 8292                                                                    

x– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, C.J.:                                                         

This resolves the above matter involving the leadership controversy at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the administrative case that was filed against some of the high-ranking officers of the IBP on account thereof.

I. Antecedents

 

The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated June 2, 2009 created a Special (Investigating) Committee[1][1] to look into the “brewing controversies in the IBP elections, specifically in the elections of Vice-President for the Greater Manila Region and Executive Vice-President of the IBP itself xxx and any other election controversy involving other chapters of the IBP, if any”, that includes as well the election of the Governors for Western Mindanao and Western Visayas.

Consequently, the Special Committee called the IBP officers involved to a preliminary conference on June 10, 2009. With respect thereto, Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan then submitted a Preliminary Conference Brief on the same day. During the conference it was determined that the investigation would focus on the following issues or controversies:

1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article V of the IBP By-Laws which provides:

“SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership (of Delegates) shall consist of all the Chapter Presidents and, in the case of Chapters entitled to more than one Delegate each, the Vice-Presidents of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the Chapters are entitled to. Unless the Vice-President is already a Delegate, he shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter. Members of the Board of Governors who are not Delegates shall be members ex officio of the House, without the right to vote.”

          2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila Region?

          3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas Region?

          4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao Region?

          5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the next term?

          6. What is the liability, if any, of respondent Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan under the administrative complaint for “grave professional misconduct, violation of attorney’s oath, and acts inimical to the IBP” filed against him by Attys. Marcial Magsino, Manuel Maramba and Nasser Marohomsalic?

         Meanwhile, a Supplemental Complaint dated June 11, 2009 was received from Attys. Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic regarding the earlier complaint that they filed last May 21, 2009 against Atty. Vinluan.       

As such, then IBP President Feliciano M. Bautista and then Executive Vice President (EVP) Vinluan agreed to submit their respective position papers on the above issues and controversies. Also, Atty. Vinluan was required to file his answer to the administrative complaint against him.

          A Position Paper dated June 15, 2009 was then received from Atty. Vinluan. Attys. Elpidio G. Soriano, III and Erwin M. Fortunato also filed their Position Papers both dated June 15, 2009. It appears that an earlier Position Paper also dated June 15, 2009 was submitted by Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto.

For their part, Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Magsino filed their Position Paper dated June 16, 2009. Incidentally, in a Manifestation likewise dated June 16, 2009 Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Marcial M. Magsino submitted the same paper but already bearing the signature of Atty. Bautista.

          Atty. Nasser A. Marohomsalic submitted his Position Paper dated June 17, 2009.    The Special Committee, in the course of its investigation, further received a letter dated June 22, 2009 from Atty. Alex L. Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter.

          As to the administrative case filed against him, Atty. Vinluan, as respondent, filed his Comment dated June 15, 2009. In turn, Attys. Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic, as complainants, submitted their Reply dated June 23, 2009.

          The Special Committee then submitted a Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009 the dispositive portion of which read as follows:

A. That to avoid further controversy regarding its proper interpretation and implementation, Sec. 31, Article V, of the By-Laws should be amended as follows (suggested amendments are in bold print):

“SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership of the House of Delegates shall consist of all the Chapter Presidents and in the case of Chapters entitled to mo(r)e than on(e) Delegate each, the Vice President of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the Chapters are entitled to. Unless the Vice President is already (a) delegate, he shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates and their respective alternates shall be elected from, and by, the Board of Officers of the Chapter. If the Delegate chosen is incapacitated, or disqualified, or resigns, or refuses to serve, and there are enough members of the Board to be elected as Delegates, then the Board of Officers shall elect the additional delegates and alternates from the general membership of the Chapter, and his corresponding alternate shall take his place.”

 

B. That to avoid any ambiguity as to how the President shall preside and vote in meetings of the House of Delegates, paragraph (g), Sec. 33, Article V of the By-Laws should be amended as follows:

“(g) In all meetings and deliberations of the House, whether in annual or special convention, the President shall preside, or the Executive Vice President, if the President is absent or incapacitated, but neither of them shall vote except to break a tie.”

 

C. Similarly, Sec. 42, Article VI of the By-Laws, on meetings of the Board of Governors, should be amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 42. Meetings. The Board shall meet regularly once a month, on such date and such time and place as it shall designate. Special meetings may be called by the President, and shall be called by him upon the written request of five (5) members of the Board. The President shall not vote except to break a tie in the voting. When for any reason, the President cannot preside on account of his absence, incapacity, or refusal to call a meeting, the Executive Vice President shall preside, there being a quorum to transact business, but he may not vote except to break a tie.

 

D. That Sec. 43, Article VI of the By-Laws, on the procedure for approving a resolution by the Board of Governors without a meeting, should be amended by adding the following exception thereto so that the procedure may not be abused in connection with any election in the IBP:

This provision shall not apply when the Board shall hold an election or hear and decide an election protest.”

 

            E. That the provision for the strict implementation of the rotation rule among the Chapters in the Regions for the election of the Governor for the regions, (as ordered by this Honorable Court in Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) should be incorporated in Sec. 39, Article VI of the By-Laws, as follows:

            “Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in the rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that it had in the round completed.

 

            F. That in view of the fact that the IBP no longer elects its President, because the Executive Vice President automatically succeeds the President at the end of his term, Sec. 47, Article VII of the By-Laws should be amended by deleting the provision for the election of the President. Moreover, for the strict implementation of the rotation rule, the Committee recommends that there should be a sanction for its violation, thus:

            “Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.

            “The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.”

 

            G. That Atty. Manuel M. Maramba should be declared the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term.

            H. That Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter should be declared the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term.

             I. That a special election should be held in the Western Mindanao Region, within fifteen (15) days from notice, to elect the Governor of that region for the 2009-2011 term. In accordance with the rotation rule, only the six (6) Chapters in the region that have not yet been elected to the Board of Governors, namely: Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Za(m)boanga del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City, shall participate in the election.

            J. That, thereafter, a special election should also be held by the Board of Governors to elect the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term with strict observance of the rotation rule. Inasmuch as for the past nine (9) terms, i.e., since the 1991-1993 term, the nominees of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao Regions have not yet been elected Executive Vice President of the IBP, the special election shall choose only between the nominees of these two (2) regions who shall become the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term, in accordance with the strict rotation rule.

            K. That the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future.

II. Findings of the Special Committee

          In its Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, the Special Committee disclosed when it was discussing the Board of Officers of each chapter that:

          The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers composed of nine (9) officers, namely: the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall be elected by the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Saturday of February, and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from the first day of April following their election and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. For the 2009-2011 term, the election of Chapter officers was held on February 28, 2009.

            In 1983 up to 1995, the Quezon City Chapter elected the usual nine (9) officers to its Board of Officers and they were all delegates to the House of Delegates. Beginning with the 1997-1999 term, when it added a Public Relations Officer (P.R.O.) and Auditor to its Board of Officers, the number of delegates allotted to the Chapter was also increased to eleven (11) like the membership in its Board of Officers, pursuant to a reapportionment of delegates by the Board of Governors under Sec. 30, Art. V of the By-Laws.

            Up to the 2007-2009 term, all the officers of the QC Chapter were also the Chapter’s delegates to the House of Delegates. Atty. Victoria Loanzon who has been an officer of the Chapter in various capacities since 2003, like her fellow officers in the Board, automatically became a delegate since 2003 up to this time.

            For the 2009-2011 term, the Board of Officers of the IBP-QC Chapter that assumed office on April 1, 2009, is composed of six (6) officers and (5) directors, namely:

                        President – – – – – – – – – – Tranquil Salvador III

                        Vice President – – – – – – Jonas Cabochan

                        Secretary – – – – – – – – – – Christian Fernandez

                        Treasurer – – – – – – – – – – Victoria Loanzon

                        Auditor – – – – – – – – – – – Ginger Anne Castillo

                        P.R.O. – – – – – – – – – – – – Ernesto Tabujara III

                        Director – – – – – – – – – – – Annalou Nachura

                        Director – – – – – – – – – – – Melody Sampaga

                        Director – – – – – – – – – – – Francois Rivera

                        Director – – – – – – – – – – – Joseph Cerezo

                        Director – – – – – – – – – – – Marita Iris Laqui

            It is important to be an officer of one’s Chapter and a delegate to the House of Delegates, because a delegate gets to elect the Governor for the Region (which must rotate among the Chapters in the region). The Governor of the Region becomes a member of the Board of Governors, and gets to elect, or be elected, as the next IBP Executive Vice President who automatically becomes President for the next succeeding term (which must also rotate among the Regions).[2][2]

          The Special Committee then pointed out that with respect to the IBP Board of Governors this consists of “nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) Regions. One (1) Governor for each Region shall be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The Governors, the President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 immediately following their election, up to June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.” It was further added by the Committee that:

          At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates from each Region shall elect the Governor for their region. The IBP By-Laws provide that “starting in 1993-1995, the principle on rotation shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for Governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be Governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. Hence, the governorship of the region shall rotate among the chapters in the region.

            The Governors-elect shall, by a vote of at least five (5), choose an Executive Vice-President, x x x  either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar. The Executive Vice-President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine (9) Regions.[3][3]

 

 

            According to the Committee, the “rotation of the position of Governor of a region among the Chapters was ordered by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 14, 1991 in Bar Matter No. 586 (Clarification Re: Bar Matter No. 491, Atty. Romulo T. Capulong petitioner)”. With respect thereto, it was revealed that:

            Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many terms as the number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a chance to represent the region in the Board of Governors. Thus, in a region composed of 5 chapters, each chapter is entitled to the governorship once in every 5 terms, or once every ten (10) years, since a term is two (2) years.

            The record of the National IBP Secretariat shows that during the past five (5) terms, from 1999 up to 2009, the GMR (Greater Manila Region) governorship was occupied by the five (5) chapters of the region as follows:

               1999-2001 —– Jose P. Icaonapo ———— Manila III

               2001-2003 —– Santos V. Catubay, Jr. —- QuezonCity

               2003-2005 —– Rosario Setias-Reyes —— Manila II

               2005-2007 —– Alicia A. Risos-Vidal —— Manila I

               2007-2009 —– Marcial M. Magsino ——- Manila IV

            In the next round, which starts with the 2009-2011 term, the same order of rotation should be followed by the five (5) chapters, i.e., Manila III shall begin the round, to be followed by Quezon City for 2011-2013 term, Manila for the 2013-2015 term, Manila I for the 2015-2017 term, and Manila IV for the 2017-2019 term.

            In the Western Visayas Region which is composed of ten (10) chapters, each chapter is entitled to represent the governorship of the region once every ten (10) terms. The first chapter to occupy the governorship, must wait for the nine (9) other chapters to serve their respective terms, before it may have its turn again as Governor of the region.

            The same rule applies to the Western Mindanao Region which is composed of twelve (12) chapters.

            On April 25, 2009, the election of Governors for the nine (9) IBP regions proceeded as scheduled, presided over by their respective outgoing Governor.[4][4]

          It was then cited by the Special Committee that “Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that the Executive Vice President shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine (9) regional governors. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions.” Further, the Committee averred that:

          The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National Secretariat, shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine (9) terms (1991-2009):

            Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) — Central Luzon — 1991-1993

            Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) —— Manila ———— 1993-1995

            Raul R. Angangco (Makati) ————– Southern Luzon – 1995-1997

            Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ———– Eastern Visayas – 1997-1999

            Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ————- Western Mindanao-1999-2001

            Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon – 2001-2003

            Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia ——– 2003-2005

            Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia —-2005-Aug 2006

            Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ———- Bicolandia — Aug. 2006-2007

            Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) —— Central Luzon —- 2007-2009

            Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two (2) terms already.

            Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term. Afterwards, another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round.[5][5]

          The Committee then disclosed that the controversies involved herein and should be resolved are the following: (I) the dispute concerning additional delegates of the QC Chapter to the House of Delegates; (II) the election of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region (GMR); (III) the election of Governor for the Western Visayas Region; (IV) the election of Governor for the Western Mindanao Region; (V) the resolution of the election protests; (VI) the election of the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term; and, (VII) the administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio Vinluan.

          In addressing the above controversies, the Committee arrived at the following findings and conclusions:

          I. The silence of Sec. 31, Art. V of the IBP By-Laws on who may be elected as additional delegates and alternates by the remaining members of the Board of Officers of the Chapter when the Chapter is entitled to more than two (2) delegates to the House of Delegates, is the root cause of the conflicting resolutions of the Bautista and Vinluan factions on the proper interpretation of the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws.

 

            According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 dated April 17, 2009 of the Bautista Group, “the additional delegate/s shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter only from among the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board, in consideration of their mandate from the general membership.

           According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) of the Vinluan Group, “the election of the additional delegate/s for the Chapters entitled to more than two (2) delegates shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general membership who are in good standing to include the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board.

            The Committee finds the qualification introduced by Resolution No. XVIII-2009 – “that the additional delegate/s and alternates must be elected from among the remaining officers of the Chapter” – to be consistent with the precedent set by Section 31 itself in appointing members of the Board of Officers, namely, (a) the president of the Chapter as the delegate, and the vice president as the alternate, or second, delegate to the House of Delegates, when the Chapter is entitled to two (2) delegates. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws to reserve membership in the House of Delegates (which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected officers of the Chapter since they have already received the mandate of the general membership of the Chapter.

            For the past four (4) terms (2003-2011), Atty. Loanzon has been an officer and delegate of the QC Chapter to the House of Delegates, until the Vinluan Group introduced its own interpretation of the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws and elected non-officers of the Chapter as delegates to the House of Delegates in lieu of herself and Atty. Laqui.

            We find the Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special – 23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases.

            II. Attys. Victoria Loanzon and Marite Laqui were properly recognized as delegates of the QC Chapter by the Presiding Officer, GMR Governor Marcial Magsino, during the election on April 25, 2009 of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region, in accordance with the guideline in Resolution No. XVIII-2009.

            The argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken.

            Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws provides that:

            “Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter.”

            The QC Chapter is not a “proper case” for the election of additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates (11) to the House, as the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapter’s delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election.

            A “proper case” for the election of additional delegates and alternates by the Board of Officers occurs when the number of additional delegates and alternates for the Chapter is less than the members of the Board of Officers, for, then, the Board of Officers must select, and elect, who among themselves should be the additional delegate/s and alternates of the Chapter to the House of Delegates. That has never been the case of the QC Chapter.

III. Atty. Manuel Maramba (Manila III Chapter) was validly elected as GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term, not only because he outvoted his rival, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Quezon City Chapter), but also because under the principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) since the five (5) chapters of the Greater Manila Region have all represented the region in the Board of Governors during the past five (5) terms, in the following order:

 

            1999-2001 ——– Manila III ——– Jose P. Icaonapo

            2001-2003 ——– Quezon City —– Santos V. Catubay, Jr.

            2003-2005 ——– Manila II ———- Rosario Setias-Reyes

            2005-2007 ——– Manila I ———– Alicia A. Risos-Vidal

            2007-2009 ——– Manila IV ——— Marcial M. Magsino

it is now the turn of the representative of the Manila III Chapter to sit again in the Board of Governors for the next round which begins in the 2009-2011 term. The Manila III representative, Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, has every right to the position not only because he won the election with 13 votes in his favor against 12 for Atty. Soriano, but also because his election follows the rotation rule decreed by the Supreme Court.

            On the other hand, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(00)8 was illegal because it was not called nor presided over by the regional Governor. Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his “election” as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be “strictly implemented”. Under the rotation rule, the GMR governorship for the 2009-2011 term belongs to the Manila III Chapter, not to the QC Chapter, whose turn will come two (2) years later, in 2011-2013 yet.

IV. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected as Governor for the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term, not only because he obtained the highest number of votes among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors.

 

            The contention of the protestants, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental Chapter) that the rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not mandatory but only directory, betrays their ignorance of the resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, ruling that “the principle on rotation shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors.”

V. Neither Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic nor Atty. Benjamin Lanto is qualified to be elected Governor of Western Mindanao Region. Sec. 39, Art. VI of the IBP By-Laws provides that: “Starting in 1993-1995, the principle of rotation in the position of governor among the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors shall be strictly implemented.

 

            Under Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, the Governor of a region shall be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. Since the delegate of a Chapter to the House of Delegates is the President of the Chapter, not the Board of Officers, the nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region.

            However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12-chapter Western Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board of Governors by only six (6) Chapters, as follows:

            1993-1995 —– Lanao del Sur —— Dimnatang T. Saro

            1995-1997 —– Cotabato ———— George C. Jabido

            1997-1999 —– ZAMBASULTA — Arthur D. Lim

            1999-2001 —– ZAMBASULTA — Paulino R. Ersando

            2001-2003 —– North Cotabato — Little Sarah A. Agdeppa

            2003-2005 —– Sultan Kudarat —- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

            2005-2007 —– SOCSARGEN —– Rogelio C. Garcia

            2007-2009 —– Sultan Kudarat —- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

            Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six (6) other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have their turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors.

            Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and B(e)njamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region for the 2009-2011 term. With respect to Atty. Benjamin Lanto, his nomination by the Board of Officers was not only invalid, but also lost credibility after three (3), out of the thirteen (13) signatories to his nomination, resigned from the Board of Officers, and six (6) others signed “authorizations” in favor of Atty. Macalawi authorizing him to nominate and elect the Governor for the Western Mindanao Region. That left only four (4) votes in favor of his nomination for Governor of the Western Mindanao Region.

VI. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately held on May 9, 2009 by the Bautista and Vinluan Groups were null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5) Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9-member Board of Governors-elect who shall elect the Executive Vice President.

            As previously stated, there were two (2) simultaneous elections for the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term – one was called and presided over by EVP Vinluan in the Board Room of the IBP National Office, while the other election for the same position was presided over by outgoing IBP Pres. Bautista in another room of the same building, at the same time, 9:00 A.M., on the same date, May 9, 2009.

            Those present at the meeting of the Vinluan Group were:

            1. Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano

            2. Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto

3. Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr., Governor-elect for Southern Luzon

4. Atty. Jose V. Cabrera, Governor-elect for Bicolandia

5. Atty. Erwin Fortunato, Governor-elect for Western Visayas

6. Atty. Roland B. Inting, Governor-elect for Eastern Visayas

            Since both Attys. Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected as Governors respectively of the Greater Manila Region and the Western Mindanao Region, they were disqualified to sit in the incoming Board of Governors and participate in the election of the succeeding Executive Vice President. The remaining four (4) Governors-elect – Governors Tolentino, Cabrera, Fortunato, and Inting, did not constitute a quorum of the Board of Governors to conduct a valid election of the IBP Executive Vice President. The election of Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano as Executive Vice President by the Vinluan Group was invalid. Aside from lack of a quorum to conduct the elections, EVP Vinluan wrongly presided over the election. Thus, Atty. Soriano was not duly elected as Governor of the Greater Manila Region, hence, he is disqualified to sit in the Board of Governors.

            Neither did the meeting of the Bautista Group fare any better, for those present were:

1.    Atty. Milagros Fernan-Cayosa, Governor-elect for Northern 

     Luzon

            2.  Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat, Governor-elect for Central Luzon

            3.  Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, Governor-elect for Greater Manila

            4.  Atty. Roan Libarios, Governor-elect for Eastern Mindanao

            5.  Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic

            Atty. Marohomsalic’s election as Governor for Western Mindanao was invalid for violating the rotation rule. The four (4) remaining governors-elect (Attys. Cayosa, Miclat, Maramba and Libarios) like those in the Vinluan Group, did not constitute a quorum to conduct the election of the IBP Executive Vice President for the current term. The election of Governor Roan Libarios as Executive Vice President by this group was therefore null and void.

            Besides that flaw in his election, since the Eastern Visayas Region, represented by Governor Jose Aguila Grapilon of Biliran, had succeeded to the presidency in 1997-1999, its next turn will come after the eight (8) other regions shall have also served in the presidency. That will be after sixteen years, or, in 2015-2017 yet.

VII. The administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio A. Vinluan and his Group of Governors (Abelardo Estrada of Northern Luzon, Bonifacio Barandon of Bicolandia, Evergisto Escalon of Eastern Visayas, and Raymund Mercado of Western Visayas) is meritorious, for their conduct was fractious and high-handed, causing disunity and acrimonious disagreements in the IBP.

            1. The request of the EVP Vinluan’s Group for a special meeting of the Board of Governors on April 23, 2009 – two (2) days before the scheduled election of the regional Governors on April 25, 2009 – when IBP Pres. Bautista was in Zamboanga on IBP business, and the other Governors had just returned to their respective regions to prepare for the April 25 election of the regional governors, was unreasonable.

            The special meeting on April 23, 2009 which he himself presided over, violated Sec. 42, Art. VI of the By-Laws which provides that it is the President who shall call a special meeting, and it is also the President who shall preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan (Sec. 50, Art. VII, By-Laws).

            The proper recourse for the Vinluan Group, in view of President Bautista’s refusal to call a special meeting as requested by them, is found in Section 43, Art. VI of the By-Laws which provides that-

            “The Board may take action, without a meeting, by resolution signed by at least five Governors provided that every member of the Board shall have been previously apprised of the contents of the resolution.”

But the Vinluan Group ignored that procedure. They held a special meeting on April 23, 2009, where they adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) striking out as ultra vires the earlier Resolution No. XVIII-2009 passed in the regular monthly meeting of the Board of Governors on April 17, 2009. That meeting was illegal, hence, the resolution adopted therein was null and void.

            2. The second special meeting held by the Vinluan Group on April 30, 2009 wherein they approved Resolution XVIII-2009 (Special-A-30 April 2009) resolving the election protests in the GMR, Western Visayas and Western Mindanao governors’ elections, with complete disregard for the protestees’ right to due process, was likewise illegal, hence, the Group’s resolution of the election protests was likewise null and void, and the new election of the GMR Governor which they set on May 4, 2009 was invalid.

            3. The “Board Resolution” which was adopted and faxed to the Governors-elect on May 8, 2009, by the Vinluan Group, setting the election of the IBP Executive Vice President on May 9, 2009, at 9:00 A.M.; declaring Pres. Bautista “unfit to preside” over the election and “designating EVP Vinluan to preside over the election” in lieu of Pres. Bautista, was uncalled and unwarranted, and caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. It was in effect a coup to unseat Pres. Bautista before the end of his term, and prematurely install EVP Vinluan as president.

            The actuations of Atty. Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan’s overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule.[6][6]

          Again, it must be noted that while the pending administrative case against Atty. Vinluan and his co-respondents has not yet been resolved, Atty. Vinluan was not allowed to assume his position as President of the IBP for 2009-2011. Instead, the Supreme Court designated retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP.

III. Rulings of the Court

          The Court completely agrees with the recommendations of the Special Committee with respect to, among others, the following:

          1. Declaring Atty. Manuel M. Maramba (Manila III Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term[7][7]; and,

          2. Declaring Atty. Erwin M. Fortunato (Romblon Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term[8][8].

          As far as the Court is concerned, there is no dispute that the election of Atty. Maramba was in order. During the election held last April 25, 2009 which was duly presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila Region Governor Marcial Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates compared to Atty. Soriano, 13 votes to 12 votes. However, instead of accepting the said defeat graciously, Atty. Soriano then filed an election protest on April 27, 2009 claiming that the said election was void because there were non-delegates, particularly Attys. Loanzon and Laqui of the Quezon City Chapter, who were allowed to vote. Consequently, Atty. Soriano got a favorable ruling from the group of Atty. Vinluan, as EVP, and former Governors Estrada (Northern Luzon), Barandon, Jr. (Bicolandia), Escalon (Eastern Visayas) and Mercado (Western Visayas) per Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-30 April 2009). This then resulted in the anomalous election of Atty. Soriano as Governor of the Greater Manila Region last May 4, 2009.

          In addressing the said controversy, and as already discussed, the Committee concluded that “the Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases.” It was then pointed out that “(t)he argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, (as well as by Atty. Soriano), that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken.” Likewise, the Committee considered the situation then involving the Quezon City Chapter as “not a ‘proper case’ for the election of additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates (11) to the House (of Delegates), as the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapter’s delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election.”

          Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court subscribes to, “the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(009) was illegal because it was not called nor presided by the regional Governor (Atty. Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his “election” as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be “strictly implemented”.” This being so, since he was not a duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region, then Atty. Soriano cannot be voted as well as IBP Executive Vice President for 2009-2011.

          With respect to the case of Atty. Fortunato, his election as Governor for the Western Visayas Region was upheld since “he obtained the highest number of votes among the three (3) candidates for the position” and “also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors.” On account thereof, the Court is convinced that the contentions of protestees Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental Chapter) cannot prosper. After all, the Court already upheld per its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991 that the “rotation rule” under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws “shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors.” More so, when the concerned chapter invoked its right thereto as in the case of Atty. Fortunato who came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in the rotation.

          To the Court, the election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor last April 25, 2009 is well-settled. He did not only come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the said position, but also got the highest number of votes among the candidates that included protestees Attys. Aldon and Ortega. As the election was presided over by then outgoing Governor Raymund Mercado, the Court finds no cogent reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee insofar as upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned. Suffice it to say, the Committee was correct in not finding any anomaly with respect thereto.

On the nullification of the election of Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic as Governor for the Western Mindanao Region, the Court does not agree with the recommendation of the Committee to hold a special election in the said region[9][9]. Instead, the Court rules to uphold the election of Atty. Marohomsalic last April 25, 2009 which was presided over by then outgoing Governor Carlos Valdez, Jr.

          It must be pointed out that Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex Macalawi, President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said chapter to the House of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections held last April 25, 2009. On the other hand, Atty. Benjamin Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, except Atty. Macalawi, in Resolution No. 002-2009 dated February 28, 2009. However, it appears that, as discovered by the Committee, “three (3) signatories of the resolution” apparently “resigned as members of the Board of Officers” since they are prosecutors who are “ineligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof”, while “(s)ix (6) other signatories of the resolution” allegedly “recalled their signatures” and they, instead, “signed an ‘authorization’ authorizing the Chapter President, Atty. Macalawi, “to select and vote” “for the Regional Governor for Western Mindanao”.” Thus, “(t)he withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in support of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority of the 14-member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter.” [10][10]

 

The attempt of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors to nullify the election of Atty. Marohomsalic through Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-30 April 2009) was clearly irregular and unjustified. Based on the April 25, 2009 election results, Atty. Marohomsalic won over his rival Atty. Lanto, 6 votes to 5 votes. Consequently, he was duly proclaimed as the elected Governor of the Western Mindanao Region. On April 27, 2009, Atty.  Lanto filed an election protest, “questioning the validity of Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination by Atty. Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter, and claiming that his    (Lanto’s) nomination  by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter was the valid nomination.”

Immediately, on April 30, 2009, the group of Atty. Vinluan issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009 proclaiming Atty. Lanto as the duly elected Governor without affording Atty. Marohomsalic his right to due process.  More importantly, instead of calling for another election like what it did for the Greater Manila Region, the group of Atty. Vinluan proceeded to instantly declare Atty. Lanto as having been duly elected “on the ground that the nomination of the protestee, Nasser Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur Chapter expressed through Board Resolution No. 00(2)-2009 of the Board of Officers (of the Lanao del Sur Chapter).”[11][11]

As borne out by the records, Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex Macalawi, President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said chapter to the House of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections. On the other hand, Atty. Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of Officers of the same Chapter in a resolution dated February 28, 2009, which was not signed and approved by Atty. Macalawi.  However,  and as already pointed out by the Committee, the “withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in support of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority of the 14-member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter.”[12][12]      

Thus, the Committee, citing Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, clearly   repudiated  and overturned Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-  30 April 2009)  of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors. In its Report, it declared that  the “nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region,”[13][13] thereby sustaining the position of Atty. Marohomsalic and, in effect,  the validity of his nomination by Atty. Macalawi.

Despite the said findings, Atty. Marohomsalic was stripped of his electoral mandate and victory when the Committee, invoking the strict application of the “rotation rule,” proceeded to altogether nullify the result of the elections duly conducted on April 25, 2009.  According to the Committee, neither Lanto nor Marohomsalic is qualified to be elected governor because it was not the turn of Lanao del Sur chapter to represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. As declared in the Report —

          However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12 –chapter Western Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board of Governors only six (6) Chapters, as follows:

            1993-1995—Lanao del Sur—–Dimnatang T. Saro

            1995-1997—Cotatabato———George C. Jabido

            1997-1999—ZAMBASULTA—Arthur D. Lim

            1999-2001—ZAMBASULTA—Paulino R. Ersando

            2001-2003—North Cotabato—- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa

            2003-2005—Sultan Kudarat—–Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

            2005-2007—SOCSARGEN—–Rogelio C. Garcia

            2007-2009—Sultan Kudarat—–Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

            Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation rule, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six (6) other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have their turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors.

            Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and Benjamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region for the 2009-2011 term.

The ruling of the Committee insofar as it nullified the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region cannot be sustained for not being in full accord with facts and the rules. While the Committee may have correctly pointed out that under the rotation rule it was not yet the turn of IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter to represent the region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term, it does not necessarily follow that the result of the elections should be altogether nullified on that ground. Evidently, and as determined by the Committee itself, there are instances when the “rotation rule” was not followed insofar as the elections in 1999 and 2007 were concerned with respect to the Western Mindanao Region.

In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty. Benjamin Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur Chapter. A third candidate, Atty. Escobar from the Sarangani Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.

While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region, including Sarangani, are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during the April 25, 2009 election.  Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of rotation.

By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the contrary, they fully expressed their concurrence to the cited nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of their right to take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term.

It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there were instances when the Governor of the Western Mindanao Region came from the same chapter such as ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 & 1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic could  not  be faulted if the other chapters opted not to field or nominate their own candidates. Having been validly nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to assume his position during the remainder of the term.

It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of rotation fielded its own candidate or invoked the rotation rule to challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination. But the record is bereft of any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was challenged on that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely referred to his nomination by Atty. Macalawi which the Committee itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason exists to disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting delegates as expressed through the ballot.

The “rotation rule” is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence. Such is not the case here.

 Suffice it to say, the “rotation rule” should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot.  Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.        

If only to stress, compared to the case of Atty. Fortunato whose Romblon Chapter invoked the “rotation rule,” no chapter in the Western Mindanao Region which was next in the rotation invoked the said rule.

Now, in its Report, the Committee nullified the elections for the IBP EVP separately and simultaneously conducted by President Bautista and EVP Vinluan on May 9, 2009 and called for a special election[14][14] for the same. In the case of the election conducted by EVP Vinluan, the results were nullified for lack of authority to preside over the election and for lack quorum, citing the disqualification of Attys. Soriano and Lanto to sit in the incoming Board of Governors.  The finding deserves to be sustained.

In the same Report, the Committee also nullified the result of the election for the incoming EVP conducted by President Bautista.  While recognizing  President Bautista’s authority to conduct the election, the Committee nonetheless  nullified the election results for lack of quorum, citing the ineligibility of Atty. Marohomsalic to sit in the incoming Board of Governors, thereby leaving only four (out of nine) Governors-elect in attendance which did not constitute a quorum.

With the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as Governor of Western Mindanao being deemed valid, then the defect of lack of quorum that supposedly tainted the election proceedings for EVP separately conducted by IBP President Bautista may have been cured, five (5) Governors being sufficient to constitute a quorum.

Be that as it may, the recommendation of the Committee to hold a special election for the EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term deserves to be upheld  to heal the divisions in the IBP and promote unity by enabling all the nine (9) Governors-elect  to elect the EVP in a unified meeting called for that purpose. This will enable matters to start on a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and the under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long.

In the conduct of the unified election of the incoming EVP, the following findings and recommendations of the Committee shall be adopted:

THE ROTATION OF THE

PRESIDENCY AMONG THE REGIONS-

 

Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that the Executive Vice President shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine (9) regional governors. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate  among the nine Regions.”

The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National Secretariat, shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine  (9) terms (1991-2009):

Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…1991-1993

Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City)… Greater Manila 1993-1995

Raul R. Anchangco (Makati)…Southern Luzon…1995-1997

Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran)… Eastewrn Visayas … 1997-1999

Arthur D. Lim ( Zambasulta)…Western Mindanao…1999-2001

Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga Apayao)…Northern Luzon…2001-2003

Jose Anselmo L. Cadiz (Camarines Sur)…Bicolandia…2005-Aug. 2006

Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay)…Bicolandia… Aug. 2006-2007

Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…2007-2009

Only the Governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two (2) terms already.

Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term.

Accordingly, a special election shall be held by the present nine-man IBP Board of Governors to elect the EVP for the remainder of the term of 2009-2011, which shall be presided over and conducted by IBP Officer-in-Charge Justice Santiago Kapunan (Ret.) within seven (7) days from notice. 

Further, in its report, the Committee declared that “the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of  Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future.” [15][15]

 

The Committee, however, fell short of determining and recommending the appropriate penalty for the grave professional misconduct found to have been committed by Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors. Still, with the above firm and unequivocal findings and declarations of the Committee against Atty. Vinluan and his group that included Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado as “unprofessional” members of the IBP Board of Governors (2007-2009 term) they certainly do not deserve to hold such esteemed positions.

It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[16][16] that “(a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that “(a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” In the case at bar, such canons find application.

In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that “(t)he actuations of Atty. Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan’s overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule.” Indeed, said actuations of Atty. Vinluan and his group of former IBP Governors Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado were grossly inimical to the interest of the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as lawyers. After all, what they did served only to benefit the apparently selfish goals of defeated candidate Atty. Elpidio Soriano to be elected as IBP EVP and be the next IBP President for the 2011-2013 term by hook or by crook.

Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado conspired to do was truly “high-handed and divisive” that must not pass unsanctioned. Otherwise, future leaders of the IBP, Governors at that, might be similarly inclined to do what they did, much to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership. Surely, this should be addressed without much delay so as to nip-in-the-bud such gross misconduct and unprofessionalism. They all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust bestowed on them for the high positions that they previously held.

The Resolution of the Court in the case of Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines[17][17] already declared that unethical practices of lawyers during IBP elections cannot but result in the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession being diminished. As held therein, “(r)espect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.” [18][18] Indeed, the said strong and vigorous declaration of this Court on the 1989 IBP Election scandal is relevant here.

 

While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their positions in the IBP, this can no longer be done as their terms as Governors already expired, specially on the part of Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan, as former EVP of the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the presidency for the term 2009-2011 but now should not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President. To the Court, if Atty. Vinluan cannot be fit to become a Governor and EVP of the IBP then he is not entitled to succeed as its President for the 2009-2011 term.

Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run as national officers to prevent such similar irregularity from happening again.  Thus, in subsequent elections of the IBP, they are disqualified to run as candidates. 

On the recommendation of the Committee to amend Sections 31[19][19], 33, par. (g) [20][20], 39[21][21], 42[22][22], and 43[23][23], Article VI and Section 47[24][24], Article VII of the IBP By-Laws, the Court finds the same in order. As such, and in order to immediately effect reforms in the IBP, particularly in the holding of its elections for national officers, the subject amendments are hereby adopted and approved.

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

          1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;

          2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term is hereby ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to represent and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective regions;

          3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and therefore barred from succeeding as IBP President for the 2009-2011 term;

          4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and adopted; and

          5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.

          SO ORDERED.

  RENATO C. CORONA

  Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

I join the dissenting opinion of J. Velasco            

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

                           (No part)

    CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                     Associate Justice

On official leave but left dissenting opinion.

See dissenting opinion.    

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                 

  Associate Justice

 

 

 

(No part)

    ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                    Associate Justice

 

 

 

     TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

I certify that J. Brion filed his concurring vote:

 

 

 

ARTURO D. BRION

                       Associate Justice

 

 

                                 (No part)

                 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                              

                          Associate Justice

(No part)

            MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

                         Associate Justice

 

 

 

                  LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                         Associate Justice

                   ROBERTO A. ABAD

                         Associate Justice

      

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.                             JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                              

          Associate Justice                                                        Associate Justice

 (No part)

          JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA                                  MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

         Associate Justice                                                       Associate Justice

 


 


[1][1]         Composed of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino (Ret.), as Chairman, and Justices Bernardo P. Pardo (Ret.) and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (Ret.), as Members.

[2][2]         Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, pp. 4-5.

[3][3]          Ibid, p. 6.

[4][4]          Ibid, pp. 7-8.

[5][5]         Ibid, pp. 8-9.

[6][6]          Ibid, pp. 21-28.

[7][7]          Letter G, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[8][8]          Letter H, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[9][9]         Letter (I), Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[10][10]       Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, pp. 14-15.

[11][11]       Ibid, p. 17.

[12][12]        Ibid, pp. 14-15.

[13][13]          Ibid, p. 24.

[14][14]       Letter J, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[15][15]        Letter K, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[16][16]        Promulgated on June 21, 1988.

[17][17]       178 SCRA 398.

[18][18]        Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 178 SCRA 398, 418.

[19][19]       Letter A, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[20][20]       Letter B, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[21][21]       Letter C, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[22][22]       Letter C, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[23][23]       Letter E, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

[24][24]       Letter F, Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. TERESITA DIATO-BERNAL (G.R. NO. 180979, 15 DECEMBER 2010, NACHURA, J.)        (EXPROPRIATION; JUST COMPENSATION) (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. BERNAL)

 

X————————————————————-x

DOCTRINES

 

 

 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUESTION OF LAW AND QUESTION OF FACT

In Santos v. Committee on Claims Settlement,[1][20] the Court had occasion to delineate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact, thus: A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts.

The Court elucidated as follows:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[2][21]

 

 

EXAMPLE OF HOW EVALUATION OF PRICE OF PROPERTY MADE BY COMMISSIONERS ARE DEEMED BASELESS

          In arriving at the P10,000.00 per sq m market value of the expropriated property, the commissioners utilized the following factors:

                        I. PROPERTY LOCATION

                                    The property subject of the appraisal is situated along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, Brgy. Anabu, Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, consisting of 946 sq. m. more or less, identified as Lot 6075-B with Flat Terrain approximately 5 kms. Distance Southwest of Imus Town proper, about 500 to 600 m. from the entrance gate of Orchard Club and San Miguel Yamamura Corp. from Southeast around 1 km. [t]o 1.5 kms. From EMI (Yasaki), Makro, and Robinsons Department Store.

                        II. NEGHBORHOOD DESCRIPTION

 

                                    The neighborhood particularly in the immediate vicinity, is within a mixed residential and commercial area situated in the Southern Section of the Municipality of Imus which is transversed by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Highway w[h]ere several residential subdivisions and commercial establishments are located.

                                    Residential houses in the area are one to two storey in height constructed of concrete and wood materials belonging to families in the middle income bracket, while commercial buildings mostly located along Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Highway.

                                    Some of the important landmarks and commercial establishments in the immediate vicinity are:

Newly constructed Robinsons Department Store

Makro

Caltex Gasoline station and Shell Gasoline station

Goldbomb Const. Corp.

EMI (Yasaki)

Pallas Athena Subd.

and various Commercial and Savings Banks

                                    Community [c]enters such as school, churches, public markets, shopping malls, banks and gasoline stations are easily accessible from the subject property.

                                    Convenience facility such as electricity, telephone service as well as pipe potable water supply system are all available along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway

                                    x x x x 

 

IV. VALUATION OF LAND MARKET DATA

This method of valuation involves the research and investigation of market and sales data of the properties comparable with the property under appraisal.

These other properties are compare[d] with the subject property as to location and physical characteristics. Adjustment of their selling prices [is] then made with respect to the said comparative elements as well as time compensate for the increase or decrease in value.

Based on our investigations and verifications of market sales data and price listings of the neighborhood where the property under appraisal is located indicates land value within the range of P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per square meter for residential lots while commercial lots along Gen. E. Aguinaldo Highway are range[d] from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 per square meters (sic).

With this data and making the proper adjustment with respect to the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject property, we estimate the market value of the subject land at P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date September 10, 1999.[3][22]

          It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondent’s property.[4][23] Finally, the market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

          As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.[5][24]

 

 

 

TRIAL COURT MUST NOT ADOPT FINDINGS OF COMMISSIONERS HOOK, LINE AND SINKER IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

          The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of the alleged “market sales data” and “price listings.” Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.[6][25] Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the commissioners’ report is unacceptable.

 

 

WHAT IS JUST COMPENSATION?

          Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.  The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.  The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[7][26] Indeed, the “just”-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property.

 The trial court should have been more circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.

 

 

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. NAPOCOR’S DETERMINATION IS NOT VALID.

As to the resolution of the PAC-Cavite advanced by NAPOCOR, which pegged the fair market value of the property at P3,500.00 per sq m, it can only serve as one of the factors in the judicial evaluation of just compensation, along with several other considerations.[8][27] NAPOCOR cannot demand that the PAC-Cavite resolution be substituted for the report of court-appointed commissioners in consonance with the firm doctrine that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.[9][28]

X————————————————————-X

RESOLUTION

 

NACHURA, J.: 

                              

 

          At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the September 28, 2007 Decision[10][1] and the December 17, 2007 Resolution[11][2] of the Court of Appeals (CA).

The assailed issuances affirmed the January 14, 2000 Order[12][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, which fixed the just compensation at P10,000.00 per square meter (sq m), in relation to the expropriation suit, entitled “National Power Corporation v. Teresita Diato-Bernal.”

         

The factual antecedents are undisputed.

 

          Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation created by Republic Act No. 6395,[13][4] as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. To carry out the said purpose, NAPOCOR is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain.[14][5]

          Respondent Teresita Diato-Bernal (respondent) is the registered owner of a 946 sq m parcel of land situated along General Aguinaldo Highway, Imus, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-384494.[15][6]

          In order to complete the construction of structures and steel posts for NAPOCOR’s “Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line Project,” it had to acquire an easement of right of way over respondent’s property.[16][7]

Thus, on January 8, 1997, NAPOCOR filed an expropriation suit against respondent, alleging, inter alia, that: the project is for public purpose; NAPOCOR negotiated with respondent for the price of the property, as prescribed by law, but the parties failed to reach an agreement; and NAPOCOR is willing to deposit the amount of Eight Hundred Fifty- Three Pesos and 72/100 (P853.72), representing the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes.[17][8]

          Respondent moved for the action’s dismissal, arguing the impropriety of the intended expropriation, and claiming that the value of her property is Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) per sq m for the front portion, and Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) per sq m for the rear portion, and that she will lose One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) per month by way of expected income if the property is expropriated.[18][9]

          On September 25, 1998, the parties filed with the RTC a partial compromise agreement,[19][10] which reads:

1.         That the parties, after earnest and diligent efforts, have reached an amicable settlement regarding the location and size of Pole Site No. DZ-70 to be constructed on the property of (respondent);

2.         That the parties have agreed that the said Pole Site No. DZ-70 shall be constructed or located on (respondent’s) Lot No. 6075-B covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-384494 of the Registry of Deeds for Cavite, covering a total affected area of 29.25 square meters more or less as indicated in the Sketch hereto attached as Annex “A”;

3.         That the case shall[,] however, proceed to trial on its merits only with respect to the question of just compensation.

          The agreement was approved by the RTC in its Order dated September 25, 1998.[20][11]

          With the first phase of the expropriation proceedings having been laid to rest by the partial compromise agreement, the RTC proceeded to determine the amount of just compensation. To assist in the evaluation of the fair market value of the subject property, the RTC appointed three (3) commissioners, viz.: (1) the Provincial Assessor of Cavite; (2) the Municipal Assessor of Imus, Cavite, upon recommendation of NAPOCOR; and (3) Soledad Zamora, respondent’s representative.[21][12] The commissioners submitted their report to the RTC on September 14, 1999. In the main, they recommended that the just compensation due from NAPOCOR be pegged at P10,000.00 per sq m, based on the property’s fair market value.[22][13]

NAPOCOR filed an Opposition[23][14] to the Commissioner’s Valuation Report, asserting that it was not substantiated by any official documents or registered deeds of sale of the subject property’s neighboring lots. NAPOCOR invoked our ruling in Rep. of the Phil. v. Santos,[24][15]  wherein we held that a commissioner’s report that is not based on any documentary evidence is hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. Lastly, NAPOCOR claimed that the just compensation for the expropriated property should be P3,500.00 per sq m, based on Resolution No. 08-95 dated October 23, 1995, enacted by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Cavite (PAC-Cavite).

          On January 14, 2000, the RTC issued an Order adopting the recommendation of the commissioners, viz.:

          To the mind of the Court, the appraisal made by the Commissioners is just and reasonable. It is of judicial notice that land values in Cavite ha[ve] considerably increased. Such being the case, the just compensation is fixed at P10,000.00 per sq. meter.[25][16]

Dissatisfied, NAPOCOR sought recourse with the CA, reiterating the arguments raised in its Opposition.

          On September 28, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC’s judgment.[26][17] Its motion for reconsideration[27][18] having been denied,[28][19] NAPOCOR interposed the present petition.

          NAPOCOR, through the Office of the Solicitor General, repleads its contentions before the courts a quo and adds that the CA failed to explain why the value of the subject property went up by almost 200% in a span of two (2) years – P3,500.00 per sq m in 1995 to P10,000.00 per sq m at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint in 1997.

          For her part, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it raises purely factual questions which are beyond the province of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

          The petition is meritorious.

          We shall first address the procedural infirmity raised by respondent. 

In Santos v. Committee on Claims Settlement,[29][20] the Court had occasion to delineate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact, thus: A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts.

The Court elucidated as follows:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[30][21]

          In this case, it is clear that NAPOCOR raises a question of law, that is, whether or not the resolution of the PAC-Cavite should prevail over the valuation report of the court-appointed commissioners. The issue does not call for a recalibration or reevaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties, but rather the determination of whether the pertinent jurisprudence and laws cited by NAPOCOR in support of its argument are applicable to the instant case.

 

On the substantive issue, the Court finds that the CA and the RTC erred in relying on the unsubstantiated and insufficient findings contained in the commissioners’ report.

          In arriving at the P10,000.00 per sq m market value of the expropriated property, the commissioners utilized the following factors:

                        I. PROPERTY LOCATION

                                    The property subject of the appraisal is situated along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, Brgy. Anabu, Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, consisting of 946 sq. m. more or less, identified as Lot 6075-B with Flat Terrain approximately 5 kms. Distance Southwest of Imus Town proper, about 500 to 600 m. from the entrance gate of Orchard Club and San Miguel Yamamura Corp. from Southeast around 1 km. [t]o 1.5 kms. From EMI (Yasaki), Makro, and Robinsons Department Store.

                        II. NEGHBORHOOD DESCRIPTION

 

                                    The neighborhood particularly in the immediate vicinity, is within a mixed residential and commercial area situated in the Southern Section of the Municipality of Imus which is transversed by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Highway w[h]ere several residential subdivisions and commercial establishments are located.

                                    Residential houses in the area are one to two storey in height constructed of concrete and wood materials belonging to families in the middle income bracket, while commercial buildings mostly located along Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Highway.

                                    Some of the important landmarks and commercial establishments in the immediate vicinity are:

Newly constructed Robinsons Department Store

Makro

Caltex Gasoline station and Shell Gasoline station

Goldbomb Const. Corp.

EMI (Yasaki)

Pallas Athena Subd.

and various Commercial and Savings Banks

                                    Community [c]enters such as school, churches, public markets, shopping malls, banks and gasoline stations are easily accessible from the subject property.

                                    Convenience facility such as electricity, telephone service as well as pipe potable water supply system are all available along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway

                                    x x x x 

 

IV. VALUATION OF LAND MARKET DATA

This method of valuation involves the research and investigation of market and sales data of the properties comparable with the property under appraisal.

These other properties are compare[d] with the subject property as to location and physical characteristics. Adjustment of their selling prices [is] then made with respect to the said comparative elements as well as time compensate for the increase or decrease in value.

Based on our investigations and verifications of market sales data and price listings of the neighborhood where the property under appraisal is located indicates land value within the range of P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per square meter for residential lots while commercial lots along Gen. E. Aguinaldo Highway are range[d] from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 per square meters (sic).

With this data and making the proper adjustment with respect to the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject property, we estimate the market value of the subject land at P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date September 10, 1999.[31][22]

          It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondent’s property.[32][23] Finally, the market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

          As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.[33][24]

          The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of the alleged “market sales data” and “price listings.” Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.[34][25] Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the commissioners’ report is unacceptable.

          Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.  The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.  The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[35][26] Indeed, the “just”-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property.

 The trial court should have been more circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.

As to the resolution of the PAC-Cavite advanced by NAPOCOR, which pegged the fair market value of the property at P3,500.00 per sq m, it can only serve as one of the factors in the judicial evaluation of just compensation, along with several other considerations.[36][27] NAPOCOR cannot demand that the PAC-Cavite resolution be substituted for the report of court-appointed commissioners in consonance with the firm doctrine that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.[37][28]

Hence, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation being insufficient, the ruling of the RTC and the affirming Decision and Resolution of the CA ought to be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 14, 2000 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Imus, Cavite, and the September 28, 2007 Decision and the December 17, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby Set ASIDE. This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Resolution. No costs. 

 

SO ORDERED.

 

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                      Chief Justice


 


[1][20]          G.R. No. 158071, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 152.

[2][21]          Id. at 159-160.

[3][22]          Rollo, pp. 54-56.

[4][23]          See National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 56.

[5][24]          Rep. of the Phil. v. Santos, supra note 15, at 34.

[6][25]        B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA 584, 586-587.

[7][26]          Republic v. Libunao, G.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 363, 376.

[8][27]          Id.

[9][28]          Id. at 378.

[10][1]          Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 8-15.

[11][2]          Id. at 17.

[12][3]          CA rollo, pp. 37-38.

[13][4]          Entitled “An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation,” effective September 10, 2001.

[14][5]          R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3(h).

[15][6]          Records, pp. 9-10.

[16][7]          See RTC Order dated November 24, 1998, in relation to paragraph 5 of NAPOCOR’s complaint; id. at 2, 63.

[17][8]          Id. at 1-7.

[18][9]          Id. at 18-20.

[19][10]         Id. at 56-59.

[20][11]         Id. at 60-61.

[21][12]         Id. at 67, 78.

[22][13]         Rollo, pp. 53-56.

[23][14]         Records, pp. 93-95.

[24][15]         225 Phil. 29, 34 (1986).

[25][16]         Supra note 3, at 38.

[26][17]         Supra note 1.

[27][18]         CA rollo, pp. 86-90.

[28][19]         Supra note 2.

[29][20]         G.R. No. 158071, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 152.

[30][21]         Id. at 159-160.

[31][22]         Rollo, pp. 54-56.

[32][23]         See National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 56.

[33][24]         Rep. of the Phil. v. Santos, supra note 15, at 34.

[34][25]       B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA 584, 586-587.

[35][26]         Republic v. Libunao, G.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 363, 376.

[36][27]         Id.

[37][28]         Id. at 378.