December | 2010 | J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

Archive for December, 2010

CASE 0012: ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176389, 14 DECEMBER 2010); HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET AL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176864, 14 DECEMBER 2010)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176389, 14 DECEMBER 2010); HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET AL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176864, 14 DECEMBER 2010)

DOCTRINES:

ALIBI VS. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION: THAT ALIBI MUST FAIL IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION IS NOT AN ABOLUTE RULE:

“The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, “I saw him do it.”? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, “He did it!” without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.”

ALIBI CAN BE PROVEN BY DOCUMENTS. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN ESTABLISHING ALIBI.

“To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence^{^[1]}^[57] that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.^{^[2]}^[58]

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,^{^[3]}^[59] the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.^{^[4]}^[60]

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.^{^[5]}^[61]

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding “no evidence of lawful admission of Webb,” this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was “not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information.” Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that “the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..^{^[6]}^[62]

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower court’s minds.”

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.^{^[7]}^[1]

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.^{^[8]}^[2] The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro’s bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.^{^[9]}^[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.^{^[10]}^[4] The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals’ Special Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,^{^[11]}^[5] hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence^{^[12]}^[6] to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,^{^[13]}^[7] that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.^{^[14]}^[8] If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland^{^[15]}^[9] that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,^{^[16]}^[10] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.^{^[17]}^[11] They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio “Dong” Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening (“bad trip”).

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, “Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna.” Lejano said, “Ako ang susunod” and the others responded “Okay, okay.” They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout (“Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito”). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, “Malakas lang ang tama mo.” When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, “O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami.”

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it (“para daw walang ilaw”). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, “Sino yan?” Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, “Okay ba?”

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: “Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi.” She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: “Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse.” When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, “Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo.” Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the “blaming session” took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, “Bakit naman pati yung bata?” Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, “Pera lang ang katapat nyan.” Biong answered, “Okay lang.” Webb spoke to his companions and told them, “We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan.” Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.^{^[18]}^[12]

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an “asset,” a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an “asset.” She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the “Martilyo gang” that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her “very special treatment” and she became its “darling,” allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?

x x x x

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

x x x x

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

x x x x

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, “easy lang kayo, Sir,” if I may quote, “easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…”

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. “Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan.”

x x x x

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that “papapelan ko na lang yan?”

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, “hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.”

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some “akyat-bahay” group in Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso “akyat bahay” gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso “akyat-bahay” gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso “akyat-bahay” gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their “darling” of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: “How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me.” As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.^{^[19]}^[13]

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an “asset” then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, “Sino yan?” On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained^{^[20]}^[14] and the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,^{^[21]}^[15] indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.^{^[22]}^[16]

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly “cleaned up” Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the movements of the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,^{^[23]}^[17] White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.^{^[24]}^[18]

But Cabanacan’s testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.^{^[25]}^[19]

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’’s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb’s t-shirt.^{^[26]}^[20] She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs’ housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs’ security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola’s duty to collect the clothes from the 2^nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.^{^[27]}^[21]

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong’s acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called “Bagyo,” because he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.^{^[28]}^[22] Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.^{^[29]}^[23] On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb’s despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.^{^[30]}^[24]

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.^{^[31]}^[25] Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.^{^[32]}^[26] He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.^{^[33]}^[27]

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb’s entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,^{^[34]}^[28] the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb’s entry on March 9, 1991,^{^[35]}^[29] and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.^{^[36]}^[30]

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.^{^[37]}^[31] In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the Philippines.^{^[38]}^[32]

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California.^{^[39]}^[33] During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler^{^[40]}^[34] and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.^{^[41]}^[35] Webb presented the company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,^{^[42]}^[36] his paycheck,^{^[43]}^[37] his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver’s license^{^[44]}^[38] and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.^{^[45]}^[39]

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.^{^[46]}^[40] On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.^{^[47]}^[41] Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.^{^[48]}^[42] To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle^{^[49]}^[43] and a car plate “LEW WEBB.”^{^[50]}^[44] In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.^{^[51]}^[45]

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,^{^[52]}^[46] bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.^{^[53]}^[47] The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.^{^[54]}^[48] On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.^{^[55]}^[49]

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.^{^[56]}^[50] There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.^{^[57]}^[51] In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.^{^[58]}^[52] He left the Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.^{^[59]}^[53] Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,^{^[60]}^[54] certified by Agnes Tabuena^{^[61]}^[55] confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry.^{^[62]}^[56] Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF’s Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence^{^[63]}^[57] that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.^{^[64]}^[58]

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,^{^[65]}^[59] the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][57] People v. Hillado, 367 Phil. 29 (1999).

[2][58] People v. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36, 46.

[3][59] Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 216-217.

[4][60] Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

[5][61] Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).

[6][62] Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 218-219.

[7][1] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.

[8][2] Rollo (G.R. 176389), pp. 393-399 and rollo (G.R. 176864), pp. 80-104.

[9][3] Records, Vol. 25, pp. 170-71.

[10][4] CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.

[11][5] Resolution dated January 26, 2007, rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 197-214.

[12][6] A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007.

[13][7] 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

[14][8] People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 425 SCRA 504, 514.

[15][9] Supra note 7.

[16][10] 488 U.S. 41 (1988).

[17][11] Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652; Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 243.

[18][12] The ponencia, pp. 4-9.

[19][13] TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 13-41; TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 72, 81-131, 142-157; Exhibits “274” and “275”.

[20][14] Exhibits “G” to “G-2”, “Q” to “R”, “V”, “W” and “X”, Records, Vol. 8, pp. 308-310, 323-324, 328-330.

[21][15] Exhibits “H” to “K”, Records, Vol. 8, pp. 311-315; TSN, January 30, 1996, pp. xx.

[22][16] TSN, March 25, 1996, pp. 8-14, 17-34.

[23][17] TSN October 10, 1995, pp. 97-98 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 271-272).

[24][18] TSN, March 14, 1996, pp. 79-89, 103-104.

[25][19] TSN, December 5, 1995, pp. 21-65.

[26][20] Id.

[27][21] TSN, April 16, 1996, pp. 18-38, 79.

[28][22] TSN, August 14, 1997 and September 1, 1997.

[29][23] TSN, July 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.

[30][24] TSN, July 8, 1997, pp. 15-19; and TSN, June 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.

[31][25] Exhibit “227”.

[32][26] TSN, May 28, 1997, pp. 112-118, 121-122.

[33][27] Exhibit “223”.

[34][28] Exhibits “207” to “219”.

[35][29] Exhibit “207-B”.

[36][30] Exhibit “212-D”.

[37][31] TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 14-33; photograph before the concert Exhibit “295,” Records (Vol.2), p. 208.

[38][32] TSN, April 23, 1997, pp. 128-129, 134-148.

[39][33] TSN, April 30, 1997, pp. 69-71.

[40][34] TSN, June 2, 1997, pp. 51-64, 75-78.

[41][35] TSN, June 16, 1997, pp. 12, 16-38, 43-59 and 69-93.

[42][36] Exhibits “305”.

[43][37] Exhibits “306” and “307”.

[44][38] Exhibits “344” and “346”.

[45][39] Exhibits “244”, “245” and “246”.

[46][40] TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 35, 41-42, 48-49, 58, 61-62.

[47][41] TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.

[48][42] TSN, June 26, 1997, pp. 13-28.

[49][43] Exhibit “338”.

[50][44] Exhibit “348”.

[51][45] Exhibits “341” and “342”.

[52][46] TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.

[53][47] Exhibit “349”.

[54][48] Exhibit “337-B”.

[55][49] TSN, May 9, 1996, pp. 26-32, 37, 44-57.

[56][50] Id.

[57][51] TSN, July 7, 1997, pp. 19-35.

[58][52] TSN, July 2, 1997, pp. 33-37.

[59][53] Exhibit “212-D”.

[60][54] Exhibit “261”.

[61][55] Exhibit “260”.

[62][56] TSN, June 23, 1997.

[63][57] People v. Hillado, 367 Phil. 29 (1999).

[64][58] People v. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36, 46.

[65][59] Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 216-217.

[66][60] Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

[67][61] Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).

[68][62] Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 218-219.

Comment

CASE 0011: CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN AND CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA B. PLAZA, THE LATTER IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF HER CO-DEFENDANT, PETITIONERS VS. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “DXBR” BOMBO RADYO BUTUAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, NORBERTO P. PAGASPAS, AND HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 157315, 01 DECEMBER 2010) (SUBJECTS: VOLUNTARY INHIBITION/ ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

December 13, 2010

DOCTRINES:

IT IS NOT IMPROPER FOR A JUDGE TO INHIBIT HERSELF AND LATER TO CHANGE HER MIND AND RECALL HER ORDER OF INHIBITION.

“We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case,^{^[1]}^[19]he or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.^{^[2]}^[20] Thus, Judge Dabalos’ re-assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his seizing the opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon being faced with the urgent need to hear and resolve CBS’s application for preliminary injunction. Such action was commendable on his part, given that the series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the station to hear and resolve the application. It can even be rightly said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense justice.”

IN APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION THE COURT MAY NOT REQUIRE APPLICANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. SHE MAY EVEN REQUIRE RESPONDENT TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.

“It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,^{^[3]}^[31] thus:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

xxx

In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect, the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.”

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza (petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated October 28, 2002 (dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier self-inhibition),^{^[4]}^[1] and the resolution dated January 29, 2003 (denying their motion for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity and as representative of her co-defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business under the name and style “DXBR” Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F. Dabalos, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

Antecedents^{^[5]}^[2]

In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBS’s radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBS’s operating its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the City’s zoning ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:

In 1994, Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System manifested their intention to operate on their current site at Arujiville Subdivision which is a residential area. They were informed that they cannot situate their business in the area as it violates our zoning ordinance. However, they have pleaded and was agreeable to operate in the area by virtue of a Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx.

The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a very limited period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one year, which can be renewed every year for a maximum of five (5) years or until 1999. Thus, right from the beginning they have been informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in the area forever and that they have to relocate to a proper area.

Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew their TUP up to today.

This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation of private rights, inciting people to go rise against the government, malicious imputations, insinuations against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc. The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of the petitions, manifestos from various groups is hereto attached for your perusal.

Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their TUP, which was never renewed since 1997, failure to secure ECC and the numerous complaints against the station of the residents within the immediate vicinity of their premises and the threat they are causing to the peace and order of the City, I have decided to deny their application for a mayor’s permit and thereafter to close the radio station.

In view of the foregoing premises, I am forwarding this matter to the Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your resolution of support on the matter.

This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom of speech or expression. This is just a simply matter of whether or not Radyo Bombo has complied with existing laws and ordinances.

Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 “to strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayor’s Permit and thereafter close the radio station.”^{^[6][3]}

On February 18, 2002, the City’s licensing officer served on CBS’s station manager a final/last notice of violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.

On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC),^{^[7]}^[4] with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its business operations. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos.

On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle.^{^[8]}^[5] He cited the circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the controversy as his justification, to wit:

xxx

a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff’s) attacks and criticism which are judgmental and not inquisitorial in the comments over the air;

b) That the undersigned was shouted at disrespectfully by one of plaintiff’s reporters/news gatherers in the vicinity of the Hall of Justice;

c) That plaintiff’s commentaries are making pronouncements on legal matters, substantive and procedural, based on its perception and not on laws;

d) That in its commentaries in attacking public officials as well as private individuals, words which are disrespectful and indecent are used.

and the net effect and result of its commentaries over the air causes confusion on the minds of the public, including the young that the court and government offices and public officials will lose their credibility and respect which are due them.

The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution but such freedom should not be abused because in every right there is a concomitant obligation.

Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of Court VI for re-raffling.

SO ORDERED.

On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33, issued an order also inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5 without raffle,^{^[9]}^[6] viz:

xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but who is now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it would be impractical to include his courts in the re-raffling of cases for the reason that the case is for prohibition, mandamus, injunction, etc., that needs immediate action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge who is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act on this case on the ground of ‘delicadeza’ considering that defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his ‘kumadre’ plus the fact that before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP party here in Butuan City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political party of the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court cannot also be included in any raffle.

In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore, it being the only practical available court in this jurisdiction as of this moment.

Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L. Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently appointed by Mayor Plaza to the City’s Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng.

Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge Dabalos’ reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the inhibition.^{^[10]}^[7]

On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO,^{^[11]}^[8] to wit:

The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo until all the other issues in the complaint shall have been duly heard and determined without necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for injunction. The Court hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a temporary restraining order.

WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov’t of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayor’s order and instruction under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease, desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing, or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures and broadcasting facilities, and the ingress or egress of its employees therein.

As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining Order because of the incoming delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining order is hereby issued effective for twenty (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).

Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, 2002 at 8:30 in the morning to resolve the pending application for injunction and for the defendants to show cause why the same shall not be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge Dabalos).

On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition in Civil Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for consideration, with a request for the designation of another Judge not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to handle the case.^{^[12]}^[9]

Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the hearing of which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.^{^[13]}^[10]

In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses and praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBS’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did not appear, CBS’s counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request with the Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served on the petitioners.^{^[14]}^[11]

Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.^{^[15]}^[12]

Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The parties and their respective counsel appeared. At the close of the proceedings on that date, Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,^{^[16]}^[13] to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not introduce any evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for the defendants to present evidence which the defendants firmly refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint under oath alleges that plaintiff is a grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the Philippines and the act threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the constitutional right of freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the Court finds that it should be looked into, the defendants’ refusal to controvert such allegations by evidence deprived the Court [of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that it left the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayor’s order or instructions or under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff’s putting up a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this court which injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the defendants to answer for whatever damages which the defendants may sustain in connection with or arising from the issuance of this writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge that plaintiff is not entitled thereto.

This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a formal hearing or a full blown trial.

Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.^{^[17]}^[14]

Following CBS’s posting of P200,000.00 as the required injunction bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction on March 15, 2002,^{^[18]}^[15] commanding and directing the provincial sheriff to:

xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the mayor’s order or instruction or under her authority to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from preventing disturbing or molesting its business operations, including the use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress and egress of its employees therein. Copies of the writ of preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent documents thereto be served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your service of this writ within the period required by law and the Rules of Court.

Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction).

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a finding that Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon CBS’s application for preliminary injunction, given the peculiar circumstances surrounding the raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due to the expiration of Judge Tomaneng’s TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had threatened to defeat CBS’s existing franchise to operate its radio station in Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.

Issues

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners contending that:^{^[19]}^[16]

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME IN TWO EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 AND FEBRUARY 26, 2002 RESPECTIVELY.

II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS COULD VALIDLY RE-ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC.

Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed

jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193

In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse his discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed decision, to wit:^{^[20]}^[17]

Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the respondent judge issued his order of inhibition and directed the return of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, noting that there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the return thereof to the public respondent in view of the extreme urgency of the preliminary relief therein prayed for. Under the circumstances then obtaining, the respondent judge could do no less but to act thereon. So it is that he proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the application for preliminary injunction on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it for continuation the following day to afford the petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application and show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency of the action demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact that the TRO issued by Judge Tomaneng was then about to expire on March 13, 2002, not to mention the circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened to be around, advised the respondent judge to resolve the issues to the best of his discretion. xxx

The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the authority to act upon CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by virtue of his prior self-inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.

We cannot sustain the petitioners’ insistence.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges, states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges.– No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph.

The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who must discern with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and valid reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds from the reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:^{^[21]}^[18]

xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preference or predilections are many and varied.

In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability to dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms against him and other public officials by CBS’s commentators and reporters would not ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-assessment of the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other improper motive on his part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound exercise of his discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners conceded, their objection being based only on whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 5193.

We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case,^{^[22]}^[19]he or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.^{^[23]}^[20] Thus, Judge Dabalos’ re-assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his seizing the opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon being faced with the urgent need to hear and resolve CBS’s application for preliminary injunction. Such action was commendable on his part, given that the series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the station to hear and resolve the application. It can even be rightly said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense justice.

In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the application for preliminary injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS had communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5, 2002,^{^[24]}^[21] to wit:

If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 by the Honorable Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of said court xxx violent confrontations would have continued between supporters of plaintiff RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the loyalists of City Mayor LEONIDES THERESA PLAZA (including some city employees) led by the Mayor herself and her husband, former Mayor DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the other hand.

xxx

As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction is set on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the twenty-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order would expire on March 13, 2002. A repeat of the violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the application is heard as scheduled by a Regional Trial Court Judge who had not inhibited himself. xxx

Verily, Judge Dabalos’ decision to hear the application for preliminary injunction pending the Court’s resolution of the query on whether or not another Judge sitting outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193 did not constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable grounds to do so in the context of the tight circumstances that had developed in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to reconsider did not proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful adherence to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby neither violated any law or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his juridical authority.

II.

Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO

The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.

We do not agree with the petitioners.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts.^{^[25]}^[22] It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.^{^[26]}^[23] Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.^{^[27]}^[24]

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected.^{^[28]}^[25] It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,^{^[29]}^[26] which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right,^{^[30]}^[27] or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.^{^[31]}^[28] Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.^{^[32]}^[29] Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.^{^[33]}^[30]

While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayor’s permit and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBS’s rights under the franchise. In this regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave

injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.

It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,^{^[34]}^[31] thus:

xxx

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. ARANAL-SERENO

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][19] Alcantara v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1305, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 549, 550.

[2][20] In the cited case of Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 85, the Court observed:

In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.

[3][31] See also Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147191, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 668, 699.

[4][1] Rollo, pp. 37-47; penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later Presiding Justice and a Member of the Court, but already retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño (retired and deceased).

[5][2] This rendition is largely based on the narration made in appealed decision of the CA.

[6][3] Rollo, pp. 103-104.

[7][4] Id., pp. 72-83.

[8][5] Id., pp.106-108.

[9][6] Id., p. 42.

[10][7] Id., p. 111.

[11][8] Id., pp. 109-110.

[12][9] Id., pp. 116-117.

[13][10] Id., pp. 119-124.

[14][11] Id., p. 45

[15][12] Id., p. 46.

[16][13] Id., pp. 127-133.

[17][14] Id., p. 133.

[18][15] Id., p. 47.

[19][16] Id., pp. 23-24.

[20][17] Id., p. 53.

[21][18] G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 76.

[22][19] Alcantara v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1305, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 549, 550.

[23][20] In the cited case of Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 85, the Court observed:

[24][21] Rollo, pp. 120-121.

[25][22] Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Aparelle Inc., G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 236.

[26][23] Lee Hiong Wee v. Dee Ping Wee, G.R. No. 163511, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 258.

[27][24] Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Aparelle Inc, supra.

[28][25] Saulog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51.

[29][26] Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102881, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 236.

[30][27] Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110929, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 686.

[31][28] Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. v. Quintillan, L-26970, March 19, 1984, 128 SCRA 276.

[32][29] 43 CJS Injunctions § 18.

[33][30] Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R. NO. 179892-93, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 531.

[34][31] See also Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147191, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 668, 699.

Comment

CASE DIGEST 0008: MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRS DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: MARRIAGE; INTERVENTION IN INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS)

Filed under: LEGAL DIGESTS, Uncategorized — Leave a comment

December 12, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRS DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010)

THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE. BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATING THAT ONE’S PARENTS WERE MARRIED ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED.

READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com under the category RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

DIGEST:

FACTS:

RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA WAS DAUGHTER OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME OF RODOLFO’S DEATH, THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE OF RODOLFO BASED ON A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. RODOLFO’S BROTHER OPPOSED THEIR INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS NULL AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE USED AS PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE INDEED MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.

ISSUE:

CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?

RULING:

NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA WHICH SHOWS THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME ISABEL WAS STILL MARRIED TO JOHN. BEING NOT MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER DESCENDANTS HAVE NO SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.

WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT IS NOT REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE.^[1]^[47] JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.^[2]^[48] HENCE, EVEN A PERSON’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE REASON “FACE SAVING/ CUSTOMARY” IS WITHOUT MERIT. THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FOLKWAY.

The ruling of the Court:

PEREZ, J.:

X X X X X X

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.^[3]^[47] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.^[4]^[48] Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.^[5]^[49]

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were “married” and (b) that Sylvia is their “legitimate” child.^[6]^[50] In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,^[7]^[51] the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.^[8]^[52] In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to “save face.”^[9]^[53] They urge this Court to take note of a “typical” practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][47] Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 30-31 (1988).

[2][48] Pugeda v. Trias, 114 Phil. 781, 787 (1962).

[3][47] Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 30-31 (1988).

[4][48] Pugeda v. Trias, 114 Phil. 781, 787 (1962).

[5][49] In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47 at 30, this Court held:

To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. (Pugeda v. Trias, id.) (Emphasis supplied)

[6][50] CA rollo, p. 64

[7][51] See Article 410 in relation to Article 408 of the Civil Code and Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

[8][52] Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010.

[9][53] Rollo, p. 27.

Comment

J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

Archive for December, 2010

CASE 0012: ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176389, 14 DECEMBER 2010); HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET AL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 176864, 14 DECEMBER 2010)

Archives

Categories

Email Subscription

Friends & links

Pages

Monthly archives