Archive for December, 2010


LEGAL NOTE 0005: ON DAMAGES IN RAPE CASES

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December 23, 2010

SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICKY ALFREDO Y NORMAN (G.R. NO. 188560, 15 DECEMBER 2010). SUBJECTS: DAMAGES IN RAPE CASE; DECISION OF JUDGE WHO DID NOT HEAR THE CASE; ALIBI.

 

FOR RAPE UNDER ART. 266-A, PAR. 1(D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,  WHAT IS THE PROPER CIVIL INDEMNITY AND MORAL DAMAGES?

 

PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages. 

 

FOR RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT UNDER ART. 266-A, PAR. 2 OF THE CODE WHAT IS THE PROPER CIVIL INDEMNITY AND MORAL DAMAGES?

 

The  award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.[1][62]

 

CAN EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BE ALSO AWARED IN RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT?

 

Yes. It must be noted that prior to the revised Rules of Court, exemplary damages to be awarded must be  proven although not alleged in the Information. But under the revised Rules, it appears that exemplary damages must be alleged in the Information and proven.

In this case, the Court now rules that exemplary damages may be awarded if proven though not alleged in the Information. The basis is Art. 2229. While the focus of the revised Rules is Art. 2230.

According to the Court:

“We explained in People v. Cristobal that “for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted.”[2][63] Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x

x x x x

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

x x x x

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

 

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

 

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.  

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, “[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public good.”[3][64] (Emphasis supplied.)

 

[1][62] People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010.

[2][63] G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507, 517-518.

[3][64] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 817-821.

Comment

CASE 0020: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICKY ALFREDO Y NORMAN (G.R. NO. 188560, 15 DECEMBER 2010). SUBJECTS: DAMAGES IN RAPE CASE; DECISION OF JUDGE WHO DID NOT HEAR THE CASE; ALIBI.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICKY ALFREDO Y NORMAN (G.R. NO. 188560, 15 DECEMBER 2010). SUBJECTS: DAMAGES IN RAPE CASE; DECISION OF JUDGE WHO DID NOT HEAR THE CASE; ALIBI.

 

DOCTRINES:

 

REQUIREMENTS TO PROVE ALIBI:

It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[1][40]

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.[2][41]  It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[3][42]  Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.

In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms,[4][43] and not by credible persons.[5][44]

TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT HAS GREATER WEIGHT IN AFFIDAVIT.

Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[6][50]

 

THE VALIDITY OF CONVICTION IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE WHO RENDERED JUDGMENT WAS NOT THE ONE WHO HEARD THE WITNESSES

 

 

Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.

We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.[7][51] As this Court held in People v. Competente:

 

The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.[8][52] (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.

 

AWARD  CIVIL INDEMNITY,  MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES  IN RAPE CASES

The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified.  For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages.  However, for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.[9][62]

We explained in People v. Cristobal that “for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted.”[10][63] Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x

x x x x

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

x x x x

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

 

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

 

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.  

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, “[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public good.”[11][64] (Emphasis supplied.)

Concomitantly, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 should be awarded for each count of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[12][65]”

x———————————————————————————x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision[13][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricky Alfredo y Norman, which affirmed an earlier decision[14][2] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-CR-4213 and 01-CR-4214of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62 in La Trinidad, Benguet.  The RTC found accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which read:

 

 

Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213

That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA],[15][3] a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[16][4]

Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 

That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[17][5]

On June 21, 2001, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3 James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang.  On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses accused-appellant himself; his mother, Remina; his sister, Margaret; Hover Cotdi; Jona Canuto; and Pina Mendoza.[18][6]

 

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

 

In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden. On April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote. The following day, or on April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed.[19][7]

In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the walls of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off. After a few minutes, the light was switched on again.[20][8]  Thereafter, a male voice shouted, “Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!”[21][9] AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, “Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa…”[22][10] AAA immediately woke BBB up.  Just then, the male voice said, “Pabitaken kayo iti bala.”[23][11] AAA cried out of fear.[24][12]

Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp placed on top of the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it.  As the door opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight.  AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was covering his face.  She invited him to come inside the shack, but the latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill.[25][13]  Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.[26][14]

Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop.  Thereafter, accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove her clothes.  When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes.  When she also attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face.  Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to walk uphill.[27][15]

Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant boxed her thighs.  Accused-appellant then bent down and spread open AAA’s legs. After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAA’s naked body, accused-appellant removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves.[28][16]

Accused-appellant also held AAA’s breast, as well as the other parts of her body.  He shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks up and down.  AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen.  Accused-appellant stood up and directed the beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied.[29][17]

Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis into her vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood up and lit a cigarette.[30][18]

Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis in the latter’s vagina. His penis, however, has already softened.  Frustrated, accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina.  After removing his fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in diameter which he used to pierce her vagina.  Dissatisfied, accused-appellant removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina.[31][19]

After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAA’s vagina, he went on top of her again, pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs.  Subsequently, accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the authorities.  Immediately after, he left her at the scene.[32][20]

Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up and went back to the shack where she immediately woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet.  She also went to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet the following day to report the incident to the police authorities.[33][21]

Upon medical examination, Dr. Ged-ang found that AAA had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple head injuries, which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object hitting the eye.  There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the waist, and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also multiple linear abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms and legs caused by sharp objects with rough surface.[34][22]

Apart from the external examination, Dr. Ged-ang also conducted an internal examination of the genitalia of AAA.  Dr. Ged-ang found that there was confluent abrasion on the left and medial aspects of her labia minora about five centimeters long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt, rough object that has been forcibly introduced into the genitalia.[35][23]

 

Version of the Defense

 

In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant was allegedly working in the sayote plantation near his house.  At noontime, he went home to eat his lunch.  After having lunch, his mother told him to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the edge of the road.  Accused-appellant went to the place where the pile of harvested sayote was placed. However, when he reached that place, he claimed that he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his mother and placing them in a sack.[36][24]

Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant shouted at her, prompting AAA to run away with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they left, accused-appellant started placing the harvested sayote in the sack.  He was able to fill eight sacks. Remembering that his mother told him that he would be able to fill 10 sacks all in all, accused-appellant went to the shack of AAA after bringing the eight sacks near the road.  He suspected that she and her son were the ones who took the two missing sacks of sayote.[37][25]

When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son were staying, accused-appellant allegedly saw them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of sayote with the name of his father printed on it. For this reason, accused-appellant got mad and told AAA to go away and leave the place because what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would wait for Hover Cotdi, the owner of the sayote plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to leave. All this time, accused-appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening voice.  Nonetheless, while he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there.[38][26]

Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote belonged to his family, although he decided not to take them back anymore.  He supposedly left after five o’clock in the afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven o’clock in the evening.  During this time, all his family members were watching television on Channel 3. Accused-appellant joined them in watching a Tagalog movie.  He then allegedly went to bed at 10 o’clock in the evening, while his parents continued to watch television until 11 o’clock in the evening.[39][27]

The following morning, on April 29, 2001, accused-appellant woke up between six to seven o’clock in the morning. After having breakfast, he helped his mother clean the sayote farm. At around eight o’clock in the morning, he saw AAA by the road waiting for a ride with a baggage placed in a carton box.  His mother then went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving accused-appellant behind.  He claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything.[40][28]

 

Ruling of the Trial Court

 

Between the two conflicting versions of the incident, the trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its Decision dated February 17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape.  The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua including all the accessory penalties imposed by law.

The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Ricky Alfredo y Norman to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by the court.

Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his information, guidance and compliance.

SO ORDERED.[41][29]

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[42][30] modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA.

On August 17, 2006, accused-appellant filed his Brief for Accused-Appellant,[43][31] while the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee[44][32] on January 18, 2007.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

 

As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated September 30, 2008, affirmed the judgment of conviction by the trial court.[45][33]

Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 19, 2009.[46][34]

On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal[47][35] from the CA Decision dated September 30, 2008.

In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009,[48][36] we notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired.  On November 9, 2009, the People of the Philippines manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it believed that all the issues involved in the present controversy have been succinctly discussed in the Brief for the Appellee.[49][37] On the other hand, on January 26, 2010, accused-appellant filed his supplemental brief.

 

The Issues

Accused-appellant contends in his supplemental brief that:

I.

BY THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE LATTER HAS NO OTHER PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE EXCEPT ALIBI THAT SHOULD NOT JUST BE BRUSHED ASIDE IF THERE ARE MATERIAL INCONSISTENSIES IN THE CLAIMS OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION;

II.

THE DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT HEAVILY RELIED ON THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL WHEN THE PONENTE OF THE DECISION DID NOT HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE WITNESSES;

III.

THE THEN AND THERE CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS UNLIKELY TO YIELD A GUILTY VERDICT.[50][38]

The Court’s Ruling

 

We sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.

Alibi is an inherently weak defense

In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that he could not offer any other defense except denial and alibi, as he could not distort the truth that he was in his house at the time of the alleged rape in the evening of April 28, 2001 up to the wee hours of April 29, 2001.  He contends that although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal cases, consideration should also be given to the fact that denial becomes the most plausible line of defense considering the nature of the crime of rape where normally only two persons are involved.[51][39]

It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[52][40]

A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only about 150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001. Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was said to have been committed.

Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.[53][41]  It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[54][42]  Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.

In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms,[55][43] and not by credible persons.[56][44]

 

As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the latter is superior

 

 

Accused-appellant contends also that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in the latter’s respective affidavits, to wit: (1) whether accused-appellant’s penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.[57][45]

AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened.[58][46] On the other hand, AAA stated in her affidavit that “the suspect ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started to light and view my whole naked body while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis [sic] on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not errect [sic].”[59][47]  There is no inconsistency between AAA’s testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that she failed to state in her affidavit that before accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into AAA’s vagina, he had already succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ.

There is likewise no incompatibility between AAA’s affidavit stating that she came to know of accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the shack, AAA was “not then sure” but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant “because of his hair.”[60][48] In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit while they were still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight illuminated his face while they were on the mountain.[61][49]

Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[62][50]

 

The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses

 

 

Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.

We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.[63][51] As this Court held in People v. Competente:

 

The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.[64][52] (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt

 

 

After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[65][53]  Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus.[66][54]

In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rape¾one under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under par. 2 of Art. 266-A.

Pertinently, the elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.[67][55]

On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code are as follows: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others.[68][56]

Notably, the prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of the foregoing elements. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the incident that transpired in the evening of April 28, 2001 and early morning of April 29, 2001. AAA categorically asserted that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her and even sexually assaulted her against her will with the use of force, threat, or intimidation.

Particularly, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son with bullets if they do not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant thereafter forcibly pulled her hair and dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for her life.  Nonetheless, accused-appellant boxed her every time she did not yield to his demands.  He boxed her thighs forcing AAA to sit, and he threatened to box her if she moves while he carried out his bestial desires.[69][57]

AAA testified further that after accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually assaulted her.  He inserted his fingers into her vagina and then he tried to pierce the same with a twig.  Subsequently, he inserted his flashlight into her vagina.[70][58]  AAA was too weak to stop him. She had struggled to free herself from accused-appellant from the moment she was dragged from the shack until they reached the mountains.  However, accused-appellant still prevailed over her.  Notably, AAA was six months pregnant at that time.  She was frightened and hopeless.[71][59]

Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Ged-ang corroborated the testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAA’s testimony.[72][60]

Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAA’s son, BBB, testified as to how accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home in the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty white jacket she was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all over her body. All these are consistent with the testimony of AAA.[73][61]

All told, we accordingly sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.

 

Award of Damages

The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified.  For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages.  However, for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.[74][62]

We explained in People v. Cristobal that “for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted.”[75][63] Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x

x x x x

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

x x x x

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

 

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

 

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.  

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, “[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public good.”[76][64] (Emphasis supplied.)

Concomitantly, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 should be awarded for each count of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[77][65]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.  As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO        MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO 

  Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                                       Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

 

[1][40] People v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 170360, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 666, 683; People v. Garte, G.R. No. 176152, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 570, 583.

[2][41] People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 91; Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 664-665.

[3][42] People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 297, 309; Velasco v. People, supra note 41.

[4][43] People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 108293, September 15, 1995, 248 SCRA 239, 248.

[5][44] People v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 97969, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 91, 100-101.

[6][50] People v. Sara, G.R. No. 140618, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 431, 443.

[7][51] People v. Hatani, G.R. Nos. 78813-14, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 497, 508.

[8][52] G.R. No. 96697, March 26, 1992, 207 SCRA 591, 598.

[9][62] People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010.

[10][63] G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507, 517-518.

[11][64] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 817-821.

[12][65] People v. Lindo, supra note 62; citing Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 1, 2010.

[13][1] Rollo, pp. 2-13.  Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring.

[14][2] CA rollo, pp. 16-56.  Penned by Judge Agapito K. Laoagan, Jr.

[15][3] The real names of the victim and her immediate family members are withheld to protect their identity and privacy pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.  See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

[16][4] CA rollo, p. 16.

[17][5] Id.

[18][6] Rollo, p. 3.

[19][7] Id. at 3-4.

[20][8] Id. at 4.

[21][9] “You better come out if you will not come out I will riddle you with bullets.”

[22][10] “You better get out or else I will count, one, two…”

[23][11] “I will explode the bullet.”

[24][12] Rollo, p. 4.

[25][13] Id.

[26][14] CA rollo, p. 20.

[27][15] Rollo, p. 4.

[28][16] Id. at 4-5.

[29][17] Id. at 5.

[30][18] Id.

[31][19] Id.

[32][20] Id.

[33][21] Id. at 5-6.

[34][22] CA rollo, p. 31.

[35][23] Id.

[36][24] Rollo, p. 6.

[37][25] Id.

[38][26] Id. at 6-7.

[39][27] Id. at 7.

[40][28] Id.

[41][29] CA rollo, p. 56.

[42][30] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 657-658.

[43][31] CA rollo, pp. 62-83.

[44][32] Id. at 139-160.

[45][33] Rollo, p. 13.

[46][34] Id. at 50-51.

[47][35] Id. at 205-208.

[48][36] Id. at 19-20.

[49][37] Id. at 21-22.

[50][38] CA rollo, pp. 68-69.

[51][39] Rollo, p. 32.

[52][40] People v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 170360, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 666, 683; People v. Garte, G.R. No. 176152, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 570, 583.

[53][41] People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 91; Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 664-665.

[54][42] People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 297, 309; Velasco v. People, supra note 41.

[55][43] People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 108293, September 15, 1995, 248 SCRA 239, 248.

[56][44] People v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 97969, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 91, 100-101.

[57][45] Rollo, pp. 36-38.

[58][46] TSN, March 11, 2003, p. 6.

[59][47] Rollo, p. 48.

[60][48] TSN, June 16, 2003, p. 8.

[61][49] Rollo, p. 10.

[62][50] People v. Sara, G.R. No. 140618, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 431, 443.

[63][51] People v. Hatani, G.R. Nos. 78813-14, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 497, 508.

[64][52] G.R. No. 96697, March 26, 1992, 207 SCRA 591, 598.

[65][53] People v. San Diego, G.R. No. 129297, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 477, 486-487; citing People v. Gozano, G.R. No. 125965, January 21, 2000, 323 SCRA 1, 6.

[66][54] People v. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 185389, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 269, 276; citing People v. Baylen, G.R. No. 135242, April 19, 2002, 381 SCRA 395, 404.

[67][55] Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code 525 (16th ed., 2006).

[68][56] Id. at 525-526.

[69][57] CA rollo, pp. 44-45.

[70][58] Id. at 43.

[71][59] Id. at 45.

[72][60] See People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 142662, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 778, 788.

[73][61] CA rollo, p. 46.

[74][62] People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010.

[75][63] G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507, 517-518.

[76][64] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 817-821.

[77][65] People v. Lindo, supra note 62; citing Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 1, 2010.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0004: ON DAMAGES IN CRIMINAL CASES WITH IMPOSABLE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA

Filed under: LEGAL NOTES — 1 Comment

NOTES ON DAMAGES IN CRIMINAL CASES

 

SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. “PEPING” (G.R. NO. 189301, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECTS:  FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT RESPECTED; INCONSISTENCIES IN TESTIMONY;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

WHAT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED IN IN CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR THE CRIME IS RECLUSION PERPETUA OR DEATH?

 

As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages.

 

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL INDEMNITY?

 

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[1][21] This award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”

Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and indemnification.[2][22] Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for probation.[3][23] Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.[4][24] Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.[5][25]

 

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF MORAL DAMAGES?

 

“The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219[6][27] and Article 2220[7][28] of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as “compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.”[8][29] They may also be considered and allowed “for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant’s conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress.”[9][30]

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: “[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.”[10][31]

 

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES?

 

And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or qualifying. However, there have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the lack of an aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion in People v. Dalisay, where it categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, to wit:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x

x x x x

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

x x x x

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.  

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, “[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public good.”[11][32]

 

BEFORE AWARDING ANY OF THE THREE DAMAGES WHAT MUST BE CONSIDERED?

 

Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under Republic Act No. (RA) 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the penalty of death under certain circumstances.

For a full appreciation of the award on damages, it is imperative that a thorough discussion of RA 7659 be undertaken. Each crime will be discussed as well as the proper amount of damages for each crime.

Under RA 7659, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,[12][33] mutiny on the high seas,[13][34] and simple rape.[14][35]

For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;[15][36] qualified bribery under certain circumstances;[16][37] parricide;[17][38] murder;[18][39] infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose;[19][40] kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances;[20][41] robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;[21][42] destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;[22][43] attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;[23][44] and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[24][45]

RA 7659 imposes the penalty of death on the following crimes:

(a)              In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b)             In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c)              In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death results.

(d)             In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

Nevertheless, all these must be taken in relation to Art. 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. – In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1.                  When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2.                  When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3.                  When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4.                  When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

But with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited.  It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[25][46]

As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome[26][47] and People v. Quiachon,[27][48] is “the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.”[28][49]

 

IN SUMMARY, HOW MUCH DAMAGES SHALL BE AWARDED?

 

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,[29][50] that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be PhP 75,000.  We reasoned that “[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”[30][51] Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659.

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,[31][52] PhP 50,000 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim’s injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[32][53] Subsequently, the amount was increased to PhP 75,000 in People v. Soriano.[33][54]

As to exemplary damages, existing jurisprudence has pegged its award at PhP 30,000,[34][55] despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The reason, as previously discussed, is to deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good.

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.

On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.[35][56]”

[1][21] People v. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186, 200-201.

[2][22] Revised Penal Code, Arts. 104-107.

[3][23] Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).

[4][24] Id.

[5][25] Civil Code, Arts. 2194-2215.

[6][27] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1)     A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2)     Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3)     Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;

(4)     Adultery or concubinage;

(5)     Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6)     Illegal search;

(7)     Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8)     Malicious prosecution;

(9)     Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

[7][28] Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

[8][29] Bagumbayan Corp v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30, 1984, 132 SCRA 441, 446.

[9][30] 6A C.J.S. Assault § 68.

[10][31] G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.

[11][32] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 817-821.

[12][33] Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers.

The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.

[13][34] Id.

[14][35] Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x

[15][36] Art. 123. Qualified piracy. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;

2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.

[16][37] Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. – If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted. x x x

[17][38] Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

[18][39] Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

[19][40] Art. 255. Infanticide. – The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.

[20][41] Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

[21][42] Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. x x x

[22][43] Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials. x x x

[23][44] Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

[24][45] Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. – Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by x x x the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

[25][46] RA 9346, Sec. 2.

[26][47] G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 659, 676.

[27][48] G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 720.

[28][49] See People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20, 44.

[29][50] G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186.

[30][51] Id. at 200-201.

[31][52] G.R. No. 131814, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 214.

[32][53] Id.

[33][54] People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142779-95, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 140.

[34][55] People v. Abellera, G.R. No. 166617, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 329.

[35][56] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999, 313 SCRA 254.

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