Archive for December, 2010


CASE 0010: MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRST DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: MARRIAGE; INTERVENTION IN INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS)

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December 12, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRST DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010

 

PEREZ, J.:

 

          On appeal[1][1] is the Decision[2][2] dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576.  In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders[3][3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings[4][4] to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.[5][5]  The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders.  No costs.[6][6]

          The antecedents are:

          Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.[7][7]  He died without issue.[8][8]

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration[9][9] with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate.  The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.[10][10]

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation[11][11] before the intestate court.  In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.[12][12]  

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the latter.[13][13]  For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.

Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.[14][14]  As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.[15][15]

          To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:

a.)  Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;[16][16]  

b.)  The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;[17][17] and

c.)   Their respective proof of births.[18][18]

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.

          The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ.  It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo.  The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo. 

          In its Comment to the Manifestation,[19][19] the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.[20][20]  As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a “legitimate” child of Isabel and John Desantis.[21][21]  The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as “married.”[22][22]  The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.[23][23]

According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.[24][24]

          On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings.[25][25]  The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.[26][26]

          The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.[27][27]  It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.[28][28]

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006.[29][29]  Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.[30][30]

          In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate.[31][31]  The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her parents.[32][32]  Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

          The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being bigamous.[33][33] From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.  The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.

          Hence, the instant appeal.[34][34]

          The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

          The petitioners answer in the affirmative.  They proffer the following arguments:

          One.  The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.[35][35]  In nullifying the intestate court’s order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.[36][36]  Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo.[37][37] 

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.[38][38]   Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.[39][39]

          Second.  Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.[40][40]  A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.[41][41]

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel and John Desantis.[42][42]  The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.

Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.[43][43]  In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a “typical” practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to “save face” and “not to embarrass their families,” concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.[44][44]

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.

          We are not impressed.

First Argument

          The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.[45][45]  Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.[46][46]

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction.   In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused.  That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.

Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo.  The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention.  Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.

Second Argument 

          The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit.  We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo.  The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established.  This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.[47][47]  Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.[48][48]  Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.[49][49]

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.  As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were “married” and (b) that Sylvia is their “legitimate” child.[50][50]  In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,[51][51] the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight.  They are presumed to be true.  Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.[52][52]  In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to “save face.”[53][53]  They urge this Court to take note of a “typical” practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.  That, the Court cannot countenance.

           The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries.  This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed.  It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.  Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo.  Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified.  We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

          Costs against the petitioners.

          SO ORDERED.

  JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO    DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

 Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

       RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                      Chief Justice

 

*              Per Special Order No. 916 dated 24 November 2010, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro as Acting Working Chairperson.

**           Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 913 dated 2 November 2010.

***         Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 917 dated 24 November 2010.

[1][1]           Via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2][2]           Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 38-48.

[3][3]           Orders dated 2 July 2004 and 26 January 2005, issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon.  Id. at 49-55 and 65-66.

[4][4]           The other siblings of the petitioners are Isabel Blee Desantis, Pierre Jojo Desantis Joven, Cynthia Desantis Handy, William Chester Handy, Carroll Leon Handy and Nora Margaret Handy.

[5][5]           Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338.

[6][6]           Rollo, p. 47.

[7][7]           Certificate of Death of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.  CA rollo, p. 187

[8][8]           Petition (for the Issuance of Letters of Administration).  Id. at 183.

[9][9]           Id. at 183-186.

[10][10]         Id.

[11][11]         The Manifestation was coupled by a Motion to Admit Manifestation.  See id. at 52-56;  id. at 57-74. 

[12][12]         Id. at 57-58.

[13][13]         Id. at 57.

[14][14]         Id. at 58.

[15][15]         Isabel Blee died on 21 November 1999 whereas Sylvia Blee Desantis died on 21 November 1994, see their respective Certificates of Death, id. at 65 and 84.

[16][16]         Annex “1” and “2” of the Manifestation.  The certificates attest to two nuptials—the first one being in 1951 and the other in 1953—as both having been celebrated between Isabel and Rodolfo.  Id. at 61-62.

[17][17]         Annex “4” of the Manifestation, id. at 64.

[18][18]         Annex “6” to “14” of the Manifestation.  The petitioners and their siblings all attached their birth certificates, with the exception of Nora Margaret Handy who presented her American passport.  Id. at 66-74.

[19][19]         Id. at 75-80.

[20][20]         Id. at 76.

[21][21]         Id.

[22][22]         Id.

[23][23]         Rollo, pp. 120-121.

[24][24]         Id. at 121.

[25][25]         Id. at 49-55.

[26][26]         Id. at 54.

[27][27]         Id.

[28][28]         Id.

[29][29]         Id. at 65-66.

[30][30]         Id. at 47.

[31][31]         Id. at 45.

[32][32]         Id.

[33][33]         Id. at 43.

[34][34]         Petition for Review on Certiorari, id. at 10-81.

[35][35]         Id. at 17.

[36][36]         Id. at 21-22.

[37][37]         Id. at 17-22.

[38][38]         Id.

[39][39]         Id.

[40][40]         Id. at 23.

[41][41]         Id. at 27-28.

[42][42]         Id. at 26.

[43][43]         Id. at 27.

[44][44]         Id.

[45][45]         See Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246-247 (1916).

[46][46]         In the Matter of the Will of Cabigting, 14 Phil 463, 467-468 (1909).

[47][47]         Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 30-31 (1988). 

[48][48]         Pugeda v. Trias, 114 Phil. 781, 787 (1962).

[49][49]         In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47 at 30, this Court held:

To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. (Pugeda v. Trias, id.) (Emphasis supplied)

[50][50]         CA rollo, p. 64

[51][51]         See Article 410 in relation to Article 408 of the Civil Code and Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

[52][52]         Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010.

[53][53]         Rollo, p. 27.

Comment

UP Law’s Leonen offers to resign over alleged plagiarism.

Filed under: LEGAL NEWS — 1 Comment
December 11, 2010

abs-cbnNEWS.com

Posted at 12/08/2010 6:30 PM | Updated as of 12/08/2010 8:20 PM

 

MANILA, Philippines – Atty. Marvic Leonen has offered to resign as dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law over accusations of plagiarism in an article he wrote in 2004.

The alleged plagiarism stems from an incident where he failed to cite his source, Dr. Owen Lynch, also a professor at UP Law, in an article he wrote for the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Journal back in 2004.

In a text message to ABS-CBN News on Wednesday, Leonen said that he “missed two footnotes” in the said article, an “honest mistake” which Lynch himself “does not consider an act of intellectual dishonesty.”

“Although I have not committed any act of intellectual dishonesty, any accusation of impropriety should be enough cause to offer to resign as dean of UP Law,” Leonen said.

“Some group of lawyers pointed this out to me two days ago,” he said. “We walk our talk.”

This comes at the heels of the battle between the UP law community and the Supreme Court over accusations that Supreme Court Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo plagiarized law journals in his ponencia in the Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary case.

Thirty-seven professors of the college, including Leonen, came out with a statement calling for Del Castillo’s resignation, even if the case was still pending, last August 9.

On October 20, the Supreme Court ordered the group, now dubbed the “UP Law 37,” to explain why they should not be disciplined for violating certain canons of the law profession.

In particular, it cited a portion of the Professional Code of Conduct of Lawyers, which says: “Lawyers are prohibited to issue statements to the media relating to pending cases which may influence the public in favor or against a party.”

The professors, in response, said they are required by the ethics of the profession to support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students.

Del Castillo was later cleared by the high court.

Leonen is also the chief negotiator of the Aquino government in the peace talks with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). — With reports from ANC

Comment

CASE DIGEST 0007: LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 (G.R. NO. 192935, 07 DECEMBER 2010). REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, AND REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. AND DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. NO. 193036, 07) SUBJECTS: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1)

Filed under: LEGAL DIGESTS — Leave a comment
December 9, 2010

 

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 (G.R. NO. 192935, 07 DECEMBER 2010)

 

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, AND REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. VS.   EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. AND DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. NO. 193036, 07                                             

THIS CASE IS ABOUT THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.

 

READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com under the category RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

 

DOCTRINE:  WHEN A TRUTH COMMISSION IS CREATED TO INVESTIGATE ANOMALIES OF A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATION IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

 

DIGEST:

 

FACTS:

 

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 WAS ISSUED BY PRESIDENT NOYNOY AQUINO TO INVESTIGATE REPORTED CASES OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.

 

ISSUE:

 

IS THIS LEGAL?

 

RULING:

 

NO. IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION IS BUT JUST A MEMBER OF A CLASS, THAT IS, A CLASS OF PAST ADMINISTRATIONS. IT IS NOT A CLASS OF ITS OWN. NOT TO INCLUDE PAST ADMINISTRATIONS SIMILARLY SITUATED CONSTITUTES ARBITRARINESS WHICH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CANNOT SANCTION.

The ruling of the Court:

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.  The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration”[1][87] only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.  Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.  Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the “previous administration” only.  The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, “Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”[2][88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only.  The OSG ventures to opine that “to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.”[3][89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or “end corruption and the evil it breeds.”[4][90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources.  “The law does not require the impossible” (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[5][91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century’s worth of graft cases.  However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.  The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations.  The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.  While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[6][92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.  [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited.  The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.[7][93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[8][94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution.  To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of “substantial distinctions” would only confirm the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an “adventure in partisan hostility.”  In the case of US v. Cyprian,[9][95] it was written: “A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.”

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[10][96] “Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.  Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.”[11][97]

The Court is not unaware that “mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.”[12][98] “Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach.”[13][99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.[14][100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations.  These cases refer to the “step by step” process.[15][101] “With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”[16][102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence.  That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order.  It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.”[17][103]

To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.[18][104]  The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

 The Court is not convinced.  Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future.  Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President.  If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was “crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.”[19][105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[20][106] that the “PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause.” The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is – whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference.  Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other.  Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: “And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.”[21][107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: “The end does not justify the means.” No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[22][108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

“The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.”[23][109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.  Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment.  It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”[24][110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.  Executive Order     No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

            SO ORDERED.

                                                           JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

                                                                 Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 ANTONIO T. CARPIO                     CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       ARTURO D. BRION

                   Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                              LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

  Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                        ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.                JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

                                                                                                                                                Associate Justice                                   Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

                                                                                                                                                                             Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

[1][87] 7th Whereas clause, Executive Order No. 1.

[2][88] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., p. 128.

[3][89] OSG, Memorandum, p. 89, rollo, p. 408.

[4][90] 6th Whereas clause, Executive Order No. 1

[5][91] Lee, Handbook of Legal Maxims, 2002 Ed., p.

[7][93] Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614, pp. 631-632; Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101 (1997).

[8][94] Id. at 632.

[9][95] 756 F. Supp. 388, N.. D. Ind., 1991, Jan 30, 1991, Crim No. HCR 90-42; also http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19910130_0000002.NIN.htm/qx <accessed December 5, 2010>

[10][96]  McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 367.

[11][97]  Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash. 2d 211 cited in  Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 367-368 .

[12][98]  Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 371.

[13][99]  Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So 2d 435 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 370.

[14][100] Clements v. Fashing, 457 US 957.

[15][101] See Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 370-371, as footnote (A state legislature may, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, address a problem one step at a time, or even select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. [Jeffeson v. Hackney, 406 US 535].

[16][102] McDonald v. Board of Election Com’rs of Chicago, 394 US 802 cited in  Am Jur 2d, Footnote No. 9. 

[17][103] Ricketts v. City of Hardford, 74 F. 3d 1397 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b),  p. 303.

[18][104] OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 66, rollo, p.186.

[19][105] Lagman Memorandum, p. 30; rollo, p. 118.

[20][106] G.R. No. 86926, October 15, 1991; 202 SCRA 680.

[21][107] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

[22][108] Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., pp. 12-13.

[23][109] Id.

[24][110] Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 156951, September 22, 2006.

Comment